Hi I'm from Japan ,so I'm*not native speaker*
From the view point of Japanese, the action often be beautified.
Maybe Japanese attach their importance to 'how to success' than 'what success you will get'.
sorry for lacking of my English( ´Д`)y━･~~　plz ask me if you don't get what I say~

I hold that that is a strictly speaking false dilemma, between the two types of normative ethical model, although the strict answer I would give to whether the ends justify the means is "no". But that is because I view the separation of ends and means as itself a false dilemma, in that every means is itself an end, and every end is a means to something more. This is similar to how my views on ontology and epistemology entail a kind of direct realism in which there is no real distinction between representations of reality and reality itself, there is only the incomplete but direct comprehension of small parts of reality that we have, distinguished from the completeness of reality itself that is always at least partially beyond our comprehension. We aren't trying to figure out what is really real from possibly-fallible representations of reality, we're undertaking a fallible process of trying to piece together our direct sensation of small bits of reality and extrapolate the rest of it from them. Likewise, to behave morally, we aren't just aiming to use possibly-fallible means to indirectly achieve some ends, we're undertaking a process of directly causing ends with each and every behavior, and fallibly attempting to piece all of those together into a greater good.

Perhaps more clearly than that analogy, the dissolution of the dichotomy between ends and means that I mean to articulate here is like how a sound argument cannot merely be a valid argument, and cannot merely have true conclusions, but it must be valid — every step of the argument must be a justified inference from previous ones — and it must have a true conclusion, which requires also that it begin from true premises. If a valid argument leads to a false conclusion, that tells you that the premises of the argument must have been false, because by definition valid inferences from true premises must lead to true conclusions; that's what makes them valid. If the premises were true and the inferences in the argument still lead to a false conclusion, that tells you that the inferences were not valid. But likewise, if an invalid argument happens to have a true conclusion, that's no credit to the argument; the conclusion is true, sure, but the argument is still a bad one, invalid.

I hold that a similar relationship holds between means and ends: means are like inferences, the steps you take to reach an end, which is like a conclusion. Just means must be "good-preserving" in the same way that valid inferences are truth-preserving: just means exercised out of good prior circumstances definitionally must lead to good consequences; just means must introduce no badness, or as Hippocrates wrote in his famous physicians' oath, they must "first, do no harm". If something bad happens as a consequence of some means, then that tells you either that something about those means were unjust, or that there was something already bad in the prior circumstances that those means simply have not alleviated (which failure to alleviate does not make them therefore unjust). But likewise, if something good happens as a consequence of unjust means, that's no credit to those means; the consequences are good, sure, but the means are still bad ones, unjust. Moral action requires using just means to achieve good ends, and if either of those is neglected, morality has been failed; bad consequences of genuinely just actions means some preexisting badness has still yet to be addressed (or else is a sign that the actions were not genuinely just), and good consequences of unjust actions do not thereby justify those actions.

Consequentialist models of normative ethics concern themselves primarily with defining what is a good state of affairs, and then say that bringing about those states of affairs is what defines a good action. Deontological models of normative ethics concern themselves primarily with defining what makes an action itself intrinsically good, or just, regardless of further consequences of the action. I think that these are both important questions, and they are the moral analogues to questions about ontology and epistemology: fields that I call teleology (from the the Greek "telos" meaning "end" or "purpose"), which is about the objects (in the sense of "goals" or "aims") of morality, like ontology is about the objects of reality; and deontology (from the Greek "deon" meaning "duty"), which is about how to pursue morality, like epistemology is about how to pursue reality.

I want to start a discussion here on these two competing views of moral philosophy, does the action matter more or do the consequences matter more. This varies from scenario to scenario but I think it is still a fun discussion to have. — Grievous

I think we should clarify first that not all deontological systems ignore consequences, nor do all consequentialist systems give free reign over the means.

The specific question "do the means justify the ends" is not strictly about deontology Vs consequentialism. It's also, as @Pfhorrest has pointed out, somewhat of a false dichotomy, or perhaps more generally a purely thought out question.

Means really don't have any individual existence. A "mean" is always relative to an end. Means are tools, with specific purposes. An isolated "mean" would at best be a reflex, some kind of uncontrolled force. Morality does not usually concern itself with reflexes.

Ends, on the other hand, do have a separate existence. But what is an end without the associated means? It's a fantasy, a wish. An idea without a connection to a possible action. And again, pure wishes are rarely relevant for morality (unless you are doing pure virtue ethics).

Means and end are two elements of the will to action. It really doesn't make sense to treat them as opposites.

Deontology (internalist): If an action is right, then it is intrinsically right; if it is wrong, then it is intrinsically wrong.
Consequentialism (externalist): An action is right or wrong by virtue of its consequences.

Two points to make. Firstly, every action has an internal consequence (a consequence which makes the action the action that it is) by which it can be judged deontologically to be right or wrong. Consequentialism often overlooks this (it entails an inadequate conception of action). Secondly, any consequentialist theory is committed to specifying what consequences are intrinsically valuable. It displaces intrinsic value from action to outcomes (states of affairs).

Deontology does not judge rightness or wrongness, insofar as duty is not a judgement, but rather, is the necessity of the will to determine its volitions in accordance with respect for the principles of law.

The judgement concerns what one's duty is. The idea of moral judgement is central to Kantian ethics, which is deontological.

I don’t think so; one cannot judge a principle of necessity.

Moral judgement is central to Kantian moral philosophy, but it isn’t duty being judged. It is lawfully willed volitions being judged, and then only with respect to the maxims from which they are derived. Duty is merely the primary condition which grounds one’s moral obligations, whatever they may be.

To say judgement concerns what one’s duty is, it the classic error Kant specifically illuminates....

“.....That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place,...”
(F. P. M. M., 1785)

Something done because of a particular duty is an interest (the purpose attained); something done from the sense of duty is an obligation (the principle of volition sufficient for the purpose attained)..

Dewey remarks on the schism between the practical and moral interpretations of action. He says that the whole enterprise of classifying something as "moral" often becomes a thinly veiled excuse for not focussing on practical consequences (i.e. as in the classic gloss of utilitarianism, that the ends justify the means). Or equally, by making it an ideal, an excuse to do nothing, since qua ideal it is somehow above enaction.

What Dewey suggests is that we allow ourselves to be guided by our principles, but that wisdom consists in discovering the most optimum actions in situ. These are themselves the precursors to optimum ends. Make of it what you will.

One cannot judge a principle of necessity.

There's a lot of misunderstanding going on here. To judge a principle of necessity would simply be to judge whether it is in fact a principle of necessity. I'm certainly not saying that a Kantian moral judgement judges the categorical imperative. Of course it doesn't. It judges an action according to its compatibility with the moral law (categorical imperative). Lying, for example, is (according to Kant) rationally incompatible with the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is the criterion for judging the moral value of actions; so judging what one's duty is, is just a question of that - judging what action it is my duty to perform or avoid, in the light of the categorical imperative.

Your quote from Kant concerns how an action that is done from duty derives its moral worth. It derives it from the maxim which motivates the action, not from "the realization of the object of the action" (the outcome of the action). This distinguishes Kant's deontology from consequentialism, in terms of its internalism. To say that moral judgement concerns what one's duty is, does not imply that the value of an action is derived from "the realization of the object of the action".

To judge a principle of necessity would simply be to judge whether it is in fact a principle of necessity. — Bunji

A principle of necessity has already been posited as such, its necessity directly related to that for which the principle is the ground. To then judge whether or not it is a ground, defeats the fact it is a principle. One can say, e.g., this is not a necessary principle for this condition, iff he can show the condition is impossible without it. In such case, he has not judged the principle of necessity, but the necessity of the principle.

Kantian deontology is predicated on fundamental principles, as is any decent moral philosophy, which immediately makes them principles of necessity, so to say they are susceptible to judgement otherwise, is to refute the ground of the theory they support.

And, as I said, paraphrased in my own way, “...Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law....”. This is the principle, and its necessity is given in it.

A principle of necessity has already been posited as such..To then judge whether or not it is a ground, defeats the fact it is a principle.

I disagree. A principle can be posited as a necessary ground (for moral action), and it remains a principle even if that principle is judged not to be a necessary ground (for moral action). The judgement in this case concerns whether the posited principle is any good. It does not defeat the fact that it's a principle.

this is not a necessary principle for this condition, iff he can show the condition is impossible without it.

I take you to mean: "iff he can show the condition is possible without it".

Kantian deontology is predicated on fundamental principles

Actually it's predicated on one fundamental principle - the categorical imperative.

...as is any decent moral philosophy

That's just a dogmatic assertion. I take the view that moral principles often lead to bad judgements and at best should be treated as rules of thumb. A morally sensitive agent doesn't need them.

Yes, to judge the categorical imperative is to allow the possibility of refuting the ground of the theory it supports. But the irony in all this is that in my previous posts on this thread I've been talking about judging actions by means of Kantian principles - I haven't been talking about judging Kantian principles. You introduced that, thinking that was what I was saying. I am saying it now, since you've mentioned it. I'm a huge fan of Kant, and I'm a deontologist rather than a consequentialist, but I think Kant's insistence that morality consists in principles is a mistake. But that wasn't what I was saying in previous posts on this thread!

Possible, yes. Good catch. Thank you.

Kantian deontology is predicated on fundamental principles....
Actually it's predicated on one fundamental principle - the categorical imperative. — Bunji

Which contains a maxim, which is itself a principle.
—————

I've been talking about judging actions by means of Kantian principles — Bunji

That’s not what you said. If you had, I wouldn’t have objected.
—————-

I think Kant's insistence that morality consists in principles is a mistake. — Bunji

I take the view that moral principles often lead to bad judgements and at best should be treated as rules of thumb. A morally sensitive agent doesn't need them. — Bunji

I get it. However, if morality is a qualitative human condition, that which serves to make us human, then it can be said without mistake, that which is examined with respect to that condition, consists of principles in order to inform us what form such condition may take.

In addition, we don’t think in terms of principles, that is, pure a priori legislations, when we consider our actions, which indicates it is not necessarily principles that lead us to bad judgements. Rather, we look to the benefit we may or may not receive from the action, which leads back to the fallacious proposition that Kantian deontology respects right/wrong, when in truth it respects only good/moral, not good/immoral.

Which contains a maxim, which is itself a principle.

A maxim is I suppose a limited sort of principle, in that it is a determination to always do a particular thing under particular circumstances; but it applies only to oneself. It becomes a proper principle when it's universalized as applying to all rational beings. For Kant there is only one fundamental principle which defines the moral condition and determines the moral value of action, and that is the categorical imperative.

That's not what you said. If you had, I wouldn't have objected.

It's always possible that I didn't express what I meant clearly enough, but I think you objected to something I didn't actually say. Any chance you could remind me of exactly what it was I said, verbatim, that you objected to?

In addition, we don't think in terms of principles, that is pure a priori legislations, when we consider our actions, which indicates it is not necessarily principles that lead us to bad judgements. Rather, we look to the benefit we may or may not receive from the action, which leads back to the fallacious proposition that Kantian deontology respects right/wrong, when in truth it respects only good/moral, not good/immoral.

Sorry but this seems terribly confused.
Kant actually considered the right to be superior to the good. The good merely concerns the benefit we may or may not receive from an action, and is expressed by a hypothetical imperative, as in "If your aim is to get a good job, then you should study hard". This does not express a moral imperative. A moral imperative is necessarily categorical and concerns what it is right to do. To act rightly is to act in accordance with the categorical imperative, and in order to do that we need to think in terms of whether or not we can will the maxim of our action to become a universal principle (a principle binding all rational beings). So (in order to act morally) we must consider our actions in such a way as to put aside any thoughts of the goodness of their outcomes. Our motivation to act must come from the moral value of the act itself (as determined by the categorical imperative). So thinking in terms of the a priori legislation of the categorical imperative is exactly what we have to do, according to Kant, in order to act morally - to act rightly.

As for principles leading to bad judgements, I agree that it's not necessarily principles that lead to bad judgements. Bad judgements come about when we fail to take all the morally relevant features of the case into account, or when our motives are purely selfish. But being bound too rigidly to a principle can cause the agent to fail to take all the morally relevant features of the case into account. The principle being adhered to may not capture the most morally salient feature of the particular case.

"If your aim is to get a good job, then you should study hard". This does not express a moral imperative. A moral imperative is necessarily categorical and concerns what it is right to do. — Bunji

In the words of my ol’ buddy Wolfgang, when we used to hang out back in The Day....this isn’t even wrong. What you’ve given is a hypothetical imperative, which proves all moral imperatives are not categorical.

I’ve had enough. I appreciate you’re a fan of Kant, I wish our number was greater. But one of us is way off base, and after half a century, not entirely of dedicated study of course, but constant referential familiarity, and a rather complete literary catalog, ehhhhh.......you catch my drift.

Anyway, carry on, and good luck.

Consequences are real; judgements of right or wrong are not.

These two view are a bit more complicated. Think about this, would you kill a kitten for $1000 towards a charity of your choice whether it be animal welfare or humanitarian relief. You may at first take this deal but how many kittens would you kill before the action started mattering to you.

Do you have a point?

My point is the view of consequentialism does not stand in every situation like you said

Consequences are real; judgements of right or wrong are not. — A Seagull

Im saying that this one line cannot solve this debate.

My point is the view of consequentialism does not stand in every situation like you said — Grievous

Do you have any evidence for this?

Sorry for the delayed reply, I was out all day yesterday.

What you've given is a hypothetical imperative, which proves all moral imperatives are not categorical,

I said it was a hypothetical imperative! According to Kant, hypothetical imperatives are not moral imperatives: all moral imperatives are distinguished as categorical. That is absolutely basic Kantianism. If you feel this is way off base, then I'm afraid we are going have to go our separate ways in our interpretations of Kant, and I likewise wish you luck. I respect your long-time dedication to the subject, so no hard feelings.

Did you read my previous comment about the kitten. This is evidence enough that sometimes the action matters more than the consequences

So is it the thought that counts, basically?

Pretty much summed it up. Depends. lol

I'm sure we could all think of a thousand scenarios where one view holds water where the other doesn't.

Moral philosophy you say.

Well thanks to freedom of thought you're free to choose you're own way.

Let's think of two inversely relevant examples.

You try to stop your neighbor's house from burning down and though you have a hose outside that can reach it is small and the pressure is low and so you instead reach for the phone to call emergency services. Say for some reason there's a bee on it which you happen to be allergic to and perish.

It burns down. No one was home and the pad was insured for a cool few million. Your neighbor collects, moves, and goes on to start a business that turns into a large global chain and ends up benefiting your home town beyond anything anyone could have imagined. Whereas if you had extinguished the fire, the house would have remained, let's say continued to lower property values and the area would've became a financial and investing wasteland leaving both you, him, and everyone else in financial ruin.

Unlikely? Yeah. But possible. One consolation is if a large enough perception of a well-intended action can not only null but reverse a negative effect. Say people see it decide to start a funding raising campaign that does exactly that. Of course, it falls on perception. Meaning literally none of the aforementioned needs to have happened only people need to believe it did,.

Public opinion rules the world and therefore is reality. Only religion can say otherwise.

Your 'evidence' was a highly unreal hypothetical fantasy. It does not constitute evidence. Have you got anything better?

What is really at issue in this fundamental normative ethics question is deciding when and how an action takes on moral value. Is it with the act, or when there is a consequence? That suggests there is a space between the two that needs to be considered. So it seems to me the first thing to ask is whether such a space exists. We now tend to look at such dualisms as being based on false distinctions, with the observer/observed being a prominent one. Now we tend to think that the process of observation changes what is observed, which destroys any sharp distinction between the two. Similarly here we are being asked does the action stand alone, or is there an immediate or inescapable consequence that is an intrinsic part of the action, and vice versa.

In this kind of thing, I don't think there is a clear answer that necessarily applies across the board. For some actions, the consequence is immediate. So for those actions arguing that there is a sharp distinction would seem to be going down a false path. One could argue that the action and the consequence are part of a single unit. But for other actions the consequence will be delayed, and perhaps there could have been other consequences. And in those situations, it's hard to see how the action itself had independent moral standing, if it could have resulted in both good and bad outcomes. And if there can be an action that is morally neutral, but later ends up with a moral value, that would suggest that there is some merit to consequentialism, at least in some situations.

More significantly to me, I think this suggests that perhaps neither are the answer, which then gets into the whole false dichotomy issue. In other words, perhaps it is neither the action nor the outcome that is sufficient to produce moral value. Perhaps we see it as the action in some situations, but see it as the consequence in others. To me it suggests that the ethical nature of actions lies beneath the surface. I'm thinking here of Spinoza's answer to dualism. He viewed the mind and the body as different lenses through which a more basic underlying reality was being perceived. For him, it was all about God, but it need not lead to a religious interpretation. If ethics is a reflection of some more basic reality, then our language concepts of action and consequence are going end up being an insufficient way to access it, or fully understand it.