I have a small concern, how do you define interpretation? I use it here to say: explaining the meaning of something. If you agree with that and we are not talking about epistemology or using interpretations to strip a truth of its status as a truth, then I will be more comfortable about responding properly. I said I might agree with Skepticism but after doing homework on what that is, I don't agree with it, I would use the same criticism as you about it. — Judaka

"Explaining the meaning of a fact" looks like a decent working definition to me. With the caveat that facts usually engender multiple interpretations. I guess for me an interpretation is also an ascription of meaning to a fact. Ascription of meaning to a fact, derivation of explanation from a fact, the direction of fit is somewhat fungible.

In some respects a fact engenders explanations consistent with its nature (fact->agent's explanation), but it is also used with the significance afforded to it by an agent (agent's explanation -> fact). The discursive distinction between a fact and the role a fact plays in an account. I understand the role a fact plays as an expression of the nature of a fact in a context by an agent - that context can be an account, an ideology etc. The fungibility comes, I think, from agents enacting the fact's logical/causal/epistemic relationships to other ideas by leveraging them in an account. The nature of a fact guides an agent in that fact's explication. In truth, I believe facts have relationships to each other that agents may explicate or otherwise use when making an account of something. Prosaically, some facts find others palatable, some distinguish themselves from others, some organize others by their schematic nature. So when you write:

That is not something I'll discuss here but what is nonsense is to defend the arrangement by the truth of what you've arranged. It doesn't address any of the aforementioned choices you've made that have created the arrangement - none of which ever challenge what is and what is not true. — Judaka

I am suspicious that it is a skeptical thesis; the arrangement of facts in an account can be a truth too. A truth in the sense of a valid argument with true premises, or as providing evidence for a statement conjointly. Among countless other inferential relationships. Drawing a strict distinction between a collection of facts and arrangements using them (if indeed you are doing that) looks to sever all facts from any issue they may bear on. Though you may have a technical sense of "arrangement" in mind that avoids the criticism.

"Explaining the meaning of a fact" looks like a decent working definition to me. With the caveat that facts usually engender multiple interpretations. I guess for me an interpretation is also an ascription of meaning to a fact. — fdrake

Sure.

In some respects a fact engenders explanations consistent with its nature — fdrake

What is the nature of a fact? And is it the fact's nature according to only to your interpretation?

but it is also used with the significance afforded to it by an agent — fdrake

Sure.

Are you saying it is only the logical and causal and epistemic relationships to other ideas that create fungibility? This seems to be agreeing with the notion that I can include or exclude true pieces of information from a position, i.e the "relevant truths" part of my OP while neglecting the rest. Are you saying that the fact's role in a position is more or less defined by the fact's nature? The fungibility is not inherent in the fact itself which has a nature?

I am suspicious that it is a skeptical thesis; the arrangement of facts in an account can be a truth too. — fdrake

How can the arrangement of facts in an account have a truth value? What I can agree with is that it can be logical, rational, reasonable, probable and many other things. Are you sure that you are not conflating truth with things of this nature?

I believe the scope of your inquiry is too narrow, truth has become for you, responsible for too much. Skepticism is guilty of being illogical, it makes unreasonable assumptions, it defies the rules for justification, it defies the laws of probability. There is really no compelling argument to be made in favour of Skepticism, but why is it not compelling? Can you answer that question by simply saying it's untrue?

Drawing a strict distinction between a collection of facts and arrangements using them (if indeed you are doing that) looks to sever all facts from any issue they may bear on. Though you may have a technical sense of "arrangement" in mind that avoids the criticism. — fdrake

Arrangements do not sever facts from any issue they may bear on, they just don't have a truth value. It is the precipice of where the objectively true becomes the subjectively asserted. I have read many on the forum who have the worst view of what it means to for something to be "subjective", which is that it is some kind of personal preference, it's neutral, a good representation of it is "what's your favourite colour?" etc.

That is absolutely not how the "subjective" works because whether you like it or not, you are a biological entity and being that as it is, your brain - the tool you think with, is not even remotely close to neutral or unbiased. This bias is largely responsible for the differences and more importantly, the similarities in our interpretation of facts. No matter what one tries to do philosophically, nobody will ever succeed at removing these biases. The biases, do not even accurately distinguish between fact and fiction, let alone the truth value of facts versus arrangements.

A truth in the sense of a valid argument with true premises, or as providing evidence for a statement conjointly. — fdrake

The problem here is that just one set of facts can give rise to multiple valid arguments with true premises. How can the truth be self-contradicting? How do you choose what "truth" to subscribe to and does that question dismantle the concept of the truth by itself? Which is pretty much the crux of my OP, you can't say that all of these arrangements are truths while there are so many to choose from, arguing that you should do totally different things or have totally different opinions or perspectives on the same set of facts.

fdrake and Judaka, without a doubt you have two people here that are really trying to think, not implying that I am superior to either of you, I just like to see it. Would not be my approach or emphasis per se, but I think it is commendable in this anti-thinking world. When I see people really putting effort into thought it gives me hope. :)

That is absolutely not how the "subjective" works because whether you like it or not, you are a biological entity and being that as it is, your brain - the tool you think with, is not even remotely close to neutral or unbiased. This bias is largely responsible for the differences and more importantly, the similarities in our interpretation of facts. No matter what one tries to do philosophically, nobody will ever succeed at removing these biases. — Judaka

This is a tough one. Judaka, I think you might be a bit too dogmatic here? You are absolutely correct about implicit bias. This has been studied in depth and repeatedly verified, but I have a hard time with your last statement. I think you might actually be arguing that we cannot remove every last ounce of our bias? This is likely correct, but there are indeed things we can do to overcome bias, here critical thought and standards play a large role. If you take the position all the way to solipsism then it becomes pure dogma without distinction, and would indeed lead to Nihilism. I can understand how a critical thinker would become a Nihilist, it would almost seem to be a necessary stage, but one must grow beyond it. Not trying to be condescending, but it seems to me you have the foundation to be a powerful thinker if you have the discipline and courage to stick with negation, coupled with the resistance to fight back against it with the power of thought. This is really the essence of every great thinker.

What is the nature of a fact? And is it the fact's nature according to only to your interpretation? — Judaka

I think a fact's nature depends on the fact. Aspects of a fact that do not depend on an agent's interpretation, an agent's interpretation simply brings it out. If (1) there's a cup full of coffee on my table and (2) I live alone (3) It's about 10am here then it is reasonable to infer (4) I enjoy drinking coffee.

It's reasonable to infer some statements from facts and not others, whether it is reasonable usually will not be determined by an agent's tastes. Contextual information about the agent (say you're talking to your friend about someone they know intimately) can determine whether it's reasonable to trust them about what they say (regarding their friend).

It's all fallible, being reasonable and fair doesn't ensure you'll speak or believe truth, it just raises the chances.

How can the arrangement of facts in an account have a truth value? What I can agree with is that it can be logical, rational, reasonable, probable and many other things. Are you sure that you are not conflating truth with things of this nature? — Judaka

I don't believe so. Look at the above example, from (1) (2) and (3) it is reasonable to conclude (4). And when it is reasonable to infer a thing on some basis, it is true that it is reasonable to do so. A particularly stark example is that the syllogism: A => B, A, therefore B, requires that A=>B is true. But perhaps you would not see the inference A=>B, A as an arrangement of facts.

Perhaps more precisely, if an arrangement of facts cannot be true by fiat, whether an arrangement of facts renders it reasonable to conclude a claim can be. A paradigmatic instance is a valid argument with true premises.

That is absolutely not how the "subjective" works because whether you like it or not, you are a biological entity and being that as it is, your brain - the tool you think with, is not even remotely close to neutral or unbiased. This bias is largely responsible for the differences and more importantly, the similarities in our interpretation of facts. No matter what one tries to do philosophically, nobody will ever succeed at removing these biases. The biases, do not even accurately distinguish between fact and fiction, let alone the truth value of facts versus arrangements. — Judaka

It seems to me you are conflating the fact that facts require agents for explication (through arrangement + narrativisation + emphasis) for the dependence of facts' relationships upon agents' explication of them. An error like saying whether things fall to the ground when dropped depends upon our scientific accounts of gravity. You need to adopt a story to explicate any aspects of reality; that makes such storytelling error prone. But not all accounts (= fact + arrangement + emphasis + narrative) are equally vindicated - they support their conclusions with different strengths.

Everyone is biased at all times. Biases are not enemies of the truth. As soon as you reason you are possibly in error; but not necessarily in error. Whether you are in errror depends on how you reason, that error is always possible is inherent to reason.

You did a good job in the OP describing a few mechanisms that bias can block the generation of relevant truths. I think you have invalidly inferred from the fact that we are necessarily biased when interpreting anything to the claim that interpretations of facts (with biases) are equally vindicated.

Sometimes a biased conclusion is the only reasonable one.

Which is pretty much the crux of my OP, you can't say that all of these arrangements are truths while there are so many to choose from — Judaka

That's clearly an invalid argument. The number of arrangements doesn't say anything about their quality, only whether there are reasonable accounts does (and how many there are).

Does the fact that we disagree that your conclusions follow from your premises mean that there's no truth of the matter?

Anyway, bringing in the other aspect of what I'm saying. Let's grant that everything you are saying is true. Then consider a bunch of facts X with two interpretations A, B. What you are saying is independent of the quality of justifications between X and A,B, since it applies equally well to all accounts based on facts. So it applies to arbitrary X too. It thereby is entirely useless in every case for deciding on whether A or B or both are reasonable given X. Your concerns are orthogonal to any practice of justification.

Given that some people take X=all the evidence about the shape of the Earth and conclude A=The Earth is flat, and some people conclude B=The Earth is approximately a sphere. The only distinction between concluding A based on X and B based on X is taste in your account. It makes it entirely useless at assessing arguments on their strengths and weaknesses.

Which, ultimately, makes the function of this idea be entirely its discursive role. What ideas you throw the idea at to criticize. It can only be applied based on personal taste - tearing down what you dislike, leaving in place all you like. It's a version of faith, but a shallow one. It works to support any commitments you already have by rendering your tastes the last account standing, the only one you have not applied it to.

Which, ultimately, makes the function of this idea be entirely its discursive role. What ideas you throw the idea at to criticize. — fdrake

I think you've hit the nail on the head here.

Given that some people take X=all the evidence about the shape of the Earth and conclude A=The Earth is flat, and some people conclude B=The Earth is approximately a sphere. The only distinction between concluding A based on X and B based on X is taste in your account. It makes it entirely useless at assessing arguments on their strengths and weaknesses. — fdrake

There is a way of salvaging some of the merit though, without losing this ground, I think. None of our epistemic peers think the earth is flat. It doesn't seem to be a conclusion it's possible to honestly derive from the evidence. Is it reasonable, do you think, to say that some arrangements of the facts are not reachable by use of reasonable thinking, but that those which are don't then become more or less true by virtue of that function? In essence, some arrangements are wrong, but those which are right are all equally right? Is there one single arrangement it is 'most reasonable' to reach (and we all simply strive for it), or is reasonableness simply a threshold which must be met?

We presuppose that reality exists and that truth is that which is in accordance with reality. Whether something is true or not is based on whether it is in accordance with reality or not. Therefore, the only thing for an intellect to do is to determine what is true or not true and they are either right or wrong about it.

We could begin by saying that the meaning of a fact can be true and it can also be untrue. That is to say that one can interpret a fact to mean another thing is true and be correct or incorrect about it but it is still separate from the fact that was interpreted. Nonetheless, there is coherency in asking "is the meaning of the fact in accordance with reality?" After all, there are many contexts where the meaning of a fact can be proven, such as within probability, physics, economics etc.

Thus the arrangement of facts can conclude in another fact, there can be a logical or causal relationship between the arrangement of facts, the conclusion and the truth value of the conclusion. The conclusion may not have been able to have been reached in another way than by demonstrating it through an arrangement. Nonetheless, the truth value of the conclusion was not determined by the truth value of what was arranged. The truth value of the conclusion is quite simply the result of the conclusion being in accordance with reality. That it took us the arrangement to understand the conclusion or reach the conclusion demonstrates the usefulness of the arrangement but not its truth value.

I don't believe so. Look at the above example, from (1) (2) and (3) it is reasonable to conclude (4). And when it is reasonable to infer a thing on some basis, it is true that it is reasonable to do so. A particularly stark example is that the syllogism: A => B, A, therefore B, requires that A=>B is true. But perhaps you would not see the inference A=>B, A as an arrangement of facts. — fdrake

Reasonableness is a characterisation and cannot be a truth, you create a ruleset for when something is or isn't reasonable and when the conditions are fulfilled then the characterisation becomes justified but this justification doesn't create a truth value. It is only true that you believe it is justified. The functionality of the ruleset was never dependant upon being in accordance with reality in the first place.

It seems to me you are conflating the fact that facts require agents for explication (through arrangement and narrativisation) for the dependence of facts upon agents' explication of them. An error like saying whether things fall to the ground when dropped depends upon our scientific accounts of gravity. You need to adopt a narrative and arrangement to explicate any aspects of reality; that makes it error prone. But not all accounts (= fact + arrangement + emphasis + narrative) are equally vindicated - they support their conclusions with different strengths. — fdrake

I am not sure how you reached that conclusion, so I can't rebut except to say "no, I'm innocent!".

You said you are not conflating truth with reasonableness, logic, strength of arguments and the like but you clearly are. Reasonableness, logic, validity, they're all characterisations defined by mutually agreed upon rulesets which function without accordance with reality being necessary. They're equally applicable in reality as they are in fiction. I don't know what purpose it serves to bring these things up to me, at the very least, there is no diagreement in the usefulness of these things, I am not trying to suggest that all arrangements are equal by every measurement or that they can't be characterised as being unreasonable, illogical, invalid or whatever else.

You did a good job in the OP describing a few mechanisms that bias can block the generation of relevant truths. I think you have invalidly inferred from the fact that we are necessarily biased when interpreting anything to the claim that interpretations of facts (with biases) are equally vindicated. — fdrake

I am not positing that arrangements are of equal quality, I am suggesting that any evaluation of the arrangement needs to go beyond whether the facts arranged are in fact true. Something which I think is self-evident but people ignore it because they enjoy having the authority that comes with your position being true.

Keep in mind also that arrangements don't just generate truths but also oughts, perspectives, characterisations and many things which we hopefully agree are very subjective. That is more so where our biases become important than merely trying to figure out the truth - where bias just appears to be a hindrance.

That's clearly an invalid argument. The number of arrangements doesn't say anything about their quality, only whether there are reasonable accounts does (and how many there are).

Does the fact that we disagree that your conclusions follow from your premises mean that there's no truth of the matter? — fdrake

It says something about their quality of all being true - considering they're contradicting. If I have true premises and a valid conclusion and you have true premises and a valid conclusion and the result is two contradicting conclusions from the same premises then calling them both true is just absurd. How can two contradicting conclusions both be in accordance with reality?

Given that some people take X=all the evidence about the shape of the Earth and conclude A=The Earth is flat, and some people conclude B=The Earth is approximately a sphere. The only distinction between concluding A based on X and B based on X is taste in your account. It makes it entirely useless at assessing arguments on their strengths and weaknesses. — fdrake

Impossible. You know full well that X proves B so why this example?

Which, ultimately, makes the function of this idea be entirely its discursive role. What ideas you throw the idea at to criticize. It can only be applied based on personal taste - tearing down what you dislike, leaving in place all you like. It's a version of faith, but a shallow one. It works to support any commitments you already have by rendering your tastes the last account standing, the only one you have not applied it to. — fdrake

Can you rephrase if you still feel this is valid?

I understand bias has negative connotations, I don't know of a word that helps me to avoid these. Biases, when you are trying to determine the truth, are a hindrance, biases in your subjectivity are what make life enjoyable and meaningful. We discriminate based on our biological proclivities but there's nothing there to replace it if it went. You wouldn't care if you lived or died, if your family was taken care of or not, you wouldn't be human anymore.

Nihilism is usually understood with the worst possible interpretation of nihilism which is the utter pointlessness of life. To me, nihilism is just reality, not an impediment to my enjoyment of life or the creation of meaning. I believe that only through the realisation of nihilism can true pragmatism be achieved. What lies beyond nihilism is an interpretation of nihilism that empowers your subjectivity without rejecting what makes you human.

Reasonableness, logic, validity, they're all characterisations defined by mutually agreed upon rulesets which function without accordance with reality being necessary. — Judaka

Mutual agreement will not save you. An agreement is simply a shared interpretation. The community of flat earthers shares an interpretation of facts that the Earth is flat.

Impossible. You know full well that X proves B so why this example? — Judaka

I chose that example because it would be obvious to you that X proves B. It's important to pay attention to how X proves B, however.

Is it possible that all evidence that the Earth is round is fabricated to suit an agenda? Yes. So that the Earth is round cannot be derived from the facts alone; it is not like A=A. If we agree that the evidence proves that the Earth is round, what style of proof is it? What is the mode of justification?

That justification is going to require we submit facts to an arrangement. EG: you weigh that the contours of equal force for Newton's law of Gravitation are spheres along with the data of the horizon, measurements of the Earth's curvature, space pictures and so on against the very weak arguments and fabrications of a flat Earther and conclude the only reasonable position is that the Earth is round.

I am sure you will agree with that. However, that you do so only evinces that you selectively apply your position. You invite me to doubt the connection between facts and interpretations; arrangements of facts cannot be true. However, I must precisely arrange the evidence that the Earth is round, emphasize it correctly, and skillfully judge what is relevant and plausible to in order to conclude that the Earth is round. I must partake in emphasising, narrativisation, and arrangement of facts in order to prove that the Earth is round.

Yet here you are quite happy to say other conclusions are impossible. That the Earth is round has been proved. It isn't that other conclusions are impossible; indeed, some people conclude that the Earth is flat; it is simply that their interpretations of facts are deficient. They are unjustified, they see the wrong things as relevant, they tell the wrong stories, they are too implausible. They are wrong.

Were we in a context that usual norms of discourse applied, I would quite happily agree with you that it is impossible that the Earth is flat. When the methods of speaking truth (storytelling!) have their connection to the truths spoken using them blocked? It's all game. And you instinctively resist this conclusion, as you should, because it makes reason die.

The problem here is that just one set of facts can give rise to multiple valid arguments with true premises. How can the truth be self-contradicting? How do you choose what "truth" to subscribe to and does that question dismantle the concept of the truth by itself? Which is pretty much the crux of my OP, you can't say that all of these arrangements are truths while there are so many to choose from, arguing that you should do totally different things or have totally different opinions or perspectives on the same set of facts — Judaka

You are more than willing to privilege shared epistemic standards when it suits your purposes. Whenever something is sufficiently obvious. And reading your position carefully, we know that what is obvious is simply a matter of taste for anything of note.

We need to be able to criticize how stories are told, the truth plays a part; the subjective element that all things are spoken from some perspective plays absolutely none in the abstract. Always a question of how and why.

Mutual agreement will not save you. An agreement is simply a shared interpretation. The community of flat earthers shares an interpretation of facts that the Earth is flat. — fdrake

That's the world we live in, earthly manners of acquiring agreement are all there is, do your beliefs give you supernatural powers to compel others to be reasonable or logical? I talk about what is, the consequences of reality can be considered after.

That's right, there are rules we follow because we desire the results that they bring about, the method of proving something I subscribe to doesn't have a true/false value, it's either effective in leading me towards the truth or it fails. I don't know the truth by default, I discover the truth through the methods I employ which have been figured out by others before me. The Earth being flat is impossible according to the methodology I employ for determining what should or shouldn't be considered impossible.

If my methodology could be whimsically changed to suit my preferences then it would no longer be effective in leading me towards truth and what would be the purpose of it? I rigidly apply high standards for determining the truth because that's how I succeed. If it were not in my benefit to know the truth then I wouldn't try to know it but it's almost never the case.

I don't know what to say to what you've written, there's scarce argument, few responses to anything I've written and bold assertions. I can't understand where you're coming from anymore.

It is not about people making mistakes, being unreasonable, fallible, biased or whatever else. You are either aware of your involvement in how you have organised the truths, characterised them and interpreted them or you are deludedly believing that the result is also a truth and not something you have created. — Judaka

I talk about what is, the consequences of reality can be considered after. — Judaka

Through which truths are made relevant or important or are known, to how they're characterised or interpreted, a unique story is created. Yet what truths are made relevant or known, how they're characterised and interpreted, all of it happens differently depending on who is telling the story. We can disagree on what is fair, what is reasonable, what is lopsided and because how the story is arranged can all be reasonably disagreed upon, how it should be evaluated can be reasonably disagreed upon as well. — Judaka

Consider that we're talking sufficiently abstractly that any reason, any fact, any justification, any supporting story, any sentimental attachment for anything are being quantified over. We're in precisely the space of reasons where these delusional attachments you speak about are in play. Yet here you speak confidently about "what is"! With no qualification.

You are asking interlocutors to believe that you have surveyed the totality of human reasons and sentiment and filtered "what is" out like a pan full of gold, despite a well written injunction not to when considering such wide ranging topics. Because you have faith that you adhere to:

If my methodology could be whimsically changed to suit my preferences then it would no longer be effective in leading me towards truth and what would be the purpose of it? I rigidly apply high standards for determining the truth because that's how I succeed. If it were not in my benefit to know the truth then I wouldn't try to know it but it's almost never the case. — Judaka

a methodology. A style of interpretation. But it's ultimately a vascillation between degrees of credibility. You are happy, as I have said, to accept that your forebears and inspirations have given you the acuity to speak unqualifiedly of "what is". Whereas those who do not share this methodology will be prone to delusion. Every filter bubble declares its interior reasonable and its exterior irrational and irrelevant, a mechanism you have so well described in the thread.

The point of disagreement regards the consequences of your commitment; skepticism regarding any story told using facts. It seems you want to have a general skepticism that any arrangement of facts; which I take to be an account, or a story told using them; can be true. But your arrangement of facts is "what is"! And you know the Earth is round because it was "proven". Not because you've seen it from space, because you have evaluated evidence and trusted people, and made reasonable inferences based on that information.

Inferences, emphasis, arrangement, knowing what is relevant to what; that's all skill in using facts, it's knowing how to make sense of a part of the world. In one breath you will say it is impossible that the Earth is flat, and that it was proven to be round, in another you will forget what establishes the truth of those things; well reasoned accounts!

It strikes me that your account is trying to disassemble what it is based on. It further strikes me that you do not reason using it when pressed. When it comes down to it, your viewpoint is as dependent upon story as any others' - it's simply a question of skill.

Which speaks to the universal acid criticism; to whom are you addressing your idea? Who have you decided is deluded for believing fanatically in mere stories based on it? As reasoned in another mere story.

If you want syllogisms rather than polemic, though I doubt a syllogism will be particularly effective.

(1) The discovery of facts requires interpretation (of information, evidence...).
(2) Interpretation requires narrativisation, emphasising some things over others, selection of relevant detail.
(3) The discovery of facts requires narrativisation, emphasising some things over others and selection of relevant detail. (from 1,2, MP)

From what I understand of your notion of arrangement, an arrangement is a mapping from the collection of all facts to a subset. The mapping will be done in a manner that involves judgements of relevance, questions of emphasis, flow of story etc...

Using that notion of arrangement, you separate accounts from truths:

It is not a flaw, it is an unavoidable consequence of intelligence, that you are able to arrange truths, interpret them and argue the meaning of what you've brought forward is an amazing thing. And it cannot be contested by truth alone. — Judaka

I do not contest the claim that some conflicts cannot be contested by truth alone; some people disagree on right and wrong. What I contest is how you are using the notion of arrangement to separate truths from stories using them, based on the argument above. An arrangement is not a mapping from facts alone to interpretations, it's a productive relationship from facts and interpretations to facts and interpretations; you need to interpret+investigate skillfully to speak truthfully and keep falsehood + irrelevance at bay. The facts alone don't do that, you gotta put their interpretations (and their contexts + stories...) in the mix to do anything with them - to link them up and reason and investigate.

And since the facts alone don't do that, and even basic truths require that structure, the resultant picture assuming your framing of "arrangement" is an unduly skeptical one. It demolishes the connection between facts and accounts generating them at the same time as emphasising that all we ever make are accounts (the irremovable subjective element)... So there's no contact between us and the facts wherever it matters.

I am with you that facts under-determine interpretations; I am not with you that the under-determination of interpretations by facts allows you to conclude that (unspecified commonplace things) cannot be decided by facts - because there are judgements of relevance, emphasis and narrativisation that go into the facts themselves through their discovery mechanisms. If you think about facts in a manner that does not separate them from interpretation (hence all this talk about facts guiding interpretation previously...), then it addresses this global underdetermination = cannot be contested using facts thesis. The facts come with interpretations, that makes some facts weigh heavily on some interpretations (eg: refuting them, rendering them implausible...). Relationships between facts and their evidence should be brought out in an account using them; there is a structural symmetry in the domain of the map (facts) and the image of the map (selected subsets) that the notion of an arrangement as you were using it does not portray. The structural symmetry being evidentiary relationships among facts, what interpretations they engender and so on... showing up as lending support in an account through those relationships.

The purpose of all the polemic was to portray you as someone who purports to be using "just the facts", but is actually taking a lot of liberties with storytelling. It was intended to use the same idea as in the argument above. I took to posting in that style because it is extremely difficult to convince someone who believes in "just the facts" about anything, regardless of whether they are wrong. Because, you know, they allegedly just believe facts. In my experience, those who emphasize at length about facts in discourse are usually doing so to support their own worldview; it's a backhanded criticism against all that they do not believe. It purports to be an injunction to reason, but it actually functions as a means of rendering ideas invulnerable to critique. Reason as insulator. If you one day decide to waste an evening watching Flat Earthers on Youtube, look out for how much they emphasise the scientific method, skepticism, and conservative interpretation of evidence. I am not kidding you, they really say those things a lot. It's very easy to take on the posture of a rationalist without actually being one.

Consider that we're talking sufficiently abstractly that any reason, any fact, any justification, any supporting story, any sentimental attachment for anything are being quantified over. We're in precisely the space of reasons where these delusional attachments you speak about are in play. Yet here you speak confidently about "what is"! With no qualification. — fdrake

What I have said is that you are either aware of the personalisation of your arrangement or you are deluded, not that using narratives or characterisations makes you deluded. I have said that the truth of the facts used in the arrangement doesn't substantiate the truth of the claim which is really self-evident. I have said that the conclusion arrived at by the arrangement can be correct and validated by the arrangement. That the conclusions of interpretations of the fact could be factually correct or factually incorrect.

a methodology. A style of interpretation. But it's ultimately a vascillation between degrees of credibility. You are happy, as I have said, to accept that your forebears and inspirations have given you the acuity to speak unqualifiedly of "what is". Whereas those who do not share this methodology will be prone to delusion. Every filter bubble declares its interior reasonable and its exterior irrational and irrelevant, a mechanism you have so well described in the thread. — fdrake

The methodology you describe is one you likely subscribe to as well, why then this response?

The point of disagreement regards the consequences of your commitment; skepticism regarding any story told using facts. It seems you want to have a general skepticism that any arrangement of facts; which I take to be an account, or a story told using them; can be true. But your arrangement of facts is "what is"! And you know the Earth is round because it was "proven". Not because you've seen it from space, because you have evaluated evidence and trusted people, and made reasonable inferences based on that information. — fdrake

Could you for a second slow down and ask whether yourself if you have understood me properly? I am not arguing for scepticism regarding any story told using facts. I am not saying arrangements are useless for understanding things, I've argued the opposite. If the arrangement has been made with the purpose of discovering the truth then my OP has almost no relevance anymore. Perhaps only to point out that people are biased which was already obvious to everyone. I never argued that this bias makes the arrangement useless.

When it comes down to it, your viewpoint is as dependent upon story as any others' - it's simply a question of skill. — fdrake

I mean... I agree? I don't think I've said otherwise. Did I ever even use this word "story"?

In one breath you will say it is impossible that the Earth is flat, and that it was proven to be round, in another you will forget what establishes the truth of those things; well reasoned accounts! — fdrake

I didn't argue this and there's no disagreement.

What I contest is how you are using the notion of arrangement to separate truths from stories using them, based on the argument above. An arrangement is not a mapping from facts alone to interpretations, it's a productive relationship between facts and interpretations to facts and interpretations; you need to interpret+investigate skillfully to speak truthfully and keep falsehood + irrelevance at bay. The facts alone don't do that. — fdrake

Sure.

I am with you that facts under-determine interpretations; I am not with you that the under-determination of interpretations by facts allows you to conclude that (unspecified commonplace things) cannot be decided by facts - because there are judgements of relevance, emphasis and narrativisation that go into the facts themselves through their discovery mechanisms — fdrake

I didn't say it necessarily means that you can't conclude that (commonplace thing) cannot be determined by facts. I said the arrangement itself has been personalised by your choices and you weren't "correct" to emphasise one bit of information or "incorrect" to leave out a key piece of information" because the arrangement has no truth value. You are only "incorrect" in accordance with agreed-upon rules of justification, logic, fairness, reasonableness or whatever else.

You can have an arrangement with a valid argument and factually correct conclusion which could/should be believed regardless of how there is the presence of emphasis of certain points or whatever.

The purpose of all the polemic was to portray you as someone who purports to be using "just the facts", but is actually taking a lot of liberties with storytelling. — fdrake

I mean this might just be the antithesis of my OP which says that nobody is using "just the facts" and everyone takes liberties with storytelling and can't help but do so. It's become very difficult to retrospectively go back and say which of your points are valid criticisms and which aren't or which of my responses no longer make sense because I believed myself to be understood (or misunderstood).

"I talk about what is" but that belief in "what is" is fallible and how I use it or argue with my beliefs is necessarily subjective. My interpretation of what the facts mean is not determined by the facts alone and I create my own narratives using the facts I choose to emphasise and without doing that, I would be stuck and unable to argue for anything.

I said the arrangement itself has been personalised by your choices and you weren't "correct" to emphasise one bit of information or "incorrect" to leave out a key piece of information" because the arrangement has no truth value. You are only "incorrect" in accordance with agreed-upon rules of justification, logic, fairness, reasonableness or whatever else. — Judaka

If we disagree so vehemently, there is usually something of substance to the disagreement. I have a few questions regarding this:

When you say an something is subjective, what do you suggest apart from the fact that it was articulated by someone? Or what does the fact that it was articulated by someone entail about it? To me this sense of subjective seems an uninformative truism, but I sense that it means something more to you.

And can you give examples of what your critique in the OP applies to? When do you believe it is especially relevant to bring up? When someone writes or speaks, what reminds you of it?

Whether something is objective or subjective tells me how I should approach trying to understand it. When it comes to objective truth, it is experienced involuntarily, it is what it is irrespective of how or what I think about it. Therefore, if you say "B" is true then my options are to either accept that it is true or argue that it is false. I'm restricted to a particular type of conversation - finding out the truth of the matter.

Whereas if something is subjective, then the conversation can go in many different directions, so many lines of inquiry become valid.

When something subjective is called an objective truth, the door to all these different directions is shut closed. Where all these different lines of inquiry were possible, we can now once again only debate the truth of the claim.

There are many examples of this happening and OP is just one way in which people do it. OP is saying that the truth value of the facts arranged does not necessarily make your conclusion a truth. If it isn't the truth then you should need to justify it in a different way than "its the truth". You have to justify the framing in a different way and really consider its pros and cons or effectiveness.

I think about OP in talking about cultural or religious norms, morality, political framings, causal arguments, justifying one's behaviour, defending characterisations, justifying interpretations, many things. Just any situation where someone characterises a choice they've made as a truth which you either accept or are ignorant of.

Whether something is objective or subjective tells me how I should approach trying to understand it. When it comes to objective truth, it is experienced involuntarily, it is what it is irrespective of how or what I think about it. Therefore, if you say "B" is true then my options are to either accept that it is true or argue that it is false. I'm restricted to a particular type of conversation - finding out the truth of the matter. — Judaka

I think about OP in talking about cultural or religious norms, morality, political framings, causal arguments, justifying one's behaviour, defending characterisations, justifying interpretations, many things. Just any situation where someone characterises a choice they've made as a truth which you either accept or are ignorant of. — Judaka

So much comes down to the distinction between subjective and objective! I don't support the distinction. It looks like two words (with a lot of baggage) masking a difference in degree that's hard to precisely define. When a claim's objective, I take it you agree that it is a statement about how the claim is justified/checked/evinced/verified and related to standards for those things. Same for subjective.

"The moon orbits the Earth" is objective (verifiable even!) and true.
"The Earth orbits the moon" is objective (verifiable even!) and false.

Right/wrong is separate from objective/subjective, right? It's also independent of topic:

"fdrake likes spicy food" is objective (verifiable even!) and true.
"fdrake does not like spicy food" is objective (verifiable even!) and false.

It doesn't matter that it's about me, what matters are things like: I've enjoyed a burger with blended reaper chilis on top of it. There is a prescient distinction between subjective and involving or being derived from an agent.

So what is subjective? Maybe a candidate is "Abortion is wrong", for reasons of people disagree about it. It's controversial. But I doubt being controversial suffices for being subjective. Objective statements bear on it too. A fertilised egg planting itself to the womb's wall cannot feel pain; it cannot suffer. Someone who believes "Abortion is wrong" because "murder is wrong" and believes "A fertilised egg planting itself to the womb's wall" is murder because it kills a human is wrong... It doesn't kill a human, it can't be murder, so it can't be wrong on that basis.

At the very least, there are intimate relationships between subjective and objective claims. Subjective and objective as epistemic properties do not seem to be preserved through inference - at what point in the above chain of reasons does "Abortion is wrong" (the purely subjective value statement) transform into "fertilised eggs cannot suffer" (an objective statement regarding the capacity to feel pain and have one's agency effected)? Anyone familiar with how those arguments goes can follow the points. It seems reason can act on what is subjective to produce objective statements through intermediary justifications.

And act on what is objective to produce subjective statements.

(1) Bagpipes exist.
(2) Fuck bagpipes. (1, restatement)

Anything can be wrong insofar as it involves interpretation. If someone believes that abortion is wrong, their reasons do not only concern their moral values, their reasons concern the properties of foetuses and tradeoffs with women's agency. I would like to say that believing abortion is wrong is a relationship to the facts of abortion - any interpretation can have a moral valence as a component. The reasons for believing it need not terminate in the individual, even though they concern a moral value. Having a disposition/attachment is never a good reason for having it.

Just any situation where someone characterises a choice they've made as a truth which you either accept or are ignorant of. — Judaka

It doesn't matter that they've made the claim, it matters what the claim is and how it relates to others. To my mind, subjective and objective are actually retrojected types based on intiutions regarding (agent derived)=(subjective) and (agent independent)=(objective). The distinction sits uneasy with the fact that all claims are agent derived (with some motives and history and blah blah); everything becomes subjective. Not because it speaks to its evidentiary status, but because the linking between a claim's subjectivity and the fact that an agent made it is being emphasized too much. The distinction between subjective and objective claims is hot air when you press on it.

People can like things for the wrong reasons.
People can like the wrong things (I just love crushing kitties).

To me, nihilism is just reality, not an impediment to my enjoyment of life or the creation of meaning. — Judaka

This only proves that you are not a Nihilist, but a thinker bent on facing the negative, whether you know it in those terms or not.

I believe that only through the realisation of nihilism can true pragmatism be achieved. — Judaka

Friend, holding pragmatism up as something to be achieved only manifest that one is lost in philosophical confusion. For example, the categories of pragmatism are themselves idealistic fictions without history, you will not make progress as a thinker or revolutionary through the domain of pragmatic idealism. It is essentially a philosophical position of giving up, which of course, makes it attractive to searching Nihilists.

I don't really disagree that the terms objective and subjective have issues. Thinking of alternative conceptualisations has been on my mind lately but I've yet to settle on anything. Mostly what I am interested in is looking at the effects of a viewpoint on an individual and challenging the individual to ask not what is true but what effect their ideas and beliefs are having on their lives. Analysing characterisations or narratives - looking at the consequences and evaluating what outcomes are good and why and how can we try for those outcomes.

In being interested in that, I look at why that's not happening by default. Why do people hold onto ideas or interpretations or have perspectives that are clearly having a net negative impact on their self-esteem, success or whatever else? The truth quality is something that I see come up a lot and there's something about the truth that makes it the least malleable thing, it's something you have to just accept.

The kinds of evaluations I want to ask people to make are invalid because the truth can't be changed just because it's inconvenient. That is why demonstrating how what was incorrectly called truth is actually often a set of decisions which have been made by you and that makes it less easy to shrug off responsibility for the conclusions. Then we can evaluate the conclusions by their effectiveness at bringing about desirable outcomes as opposed to their truth quality.

The reason I said that OP was a building block for nihilism was that I prefer to evaluate things in this way as opposed to their truth value. Even if God did exist and had created objective moral order and our existence had objective meaning (whatever those things even mean) then I could still choose my own way of evaluating outcomes and choose what gave me the outcomes I desired. Thereby retaining and defending what I have built irrespective of any truth value of alternatives.

My interest in OP is based on such thoughts, as far as the best method for determining what is or isn't true, honestly, I had given much less thought to how this might bear on that. I was really thinking more about challenging the unwarranted truth status given in a variety of contexts which I was unhappy about.

Then we can evaluate the conclusions by their effectiveness at bringing about desirable outcomes as opposed to their truth quality. — Judaka

Any self respecting thinker must reject this kind of subjectivity. Whose "effectiveness" the Right or the Left? Quite consistently, I deny the presumptions on which this kind of thinking is based. The idea that one cannot know truth is a game of radical abstraction. I easily deny it. Children deprived of water and food will die. Supposing our Nihilist friend has a child, he will not fail to give it food and water. I deny that the Right is equal to the Left; I deny that pragmatism is a philosophy of intelligence. Some never recover from the error of radical abstraction, it poisons life and thought. The way forward will not be found by letting Nihilism set the rules. A thinker is better than that, nay, thought is a greater power.

Giovanni Gentiles was a Fascist with similar thoughts ;)

We presuppose that reality exists and that truth is that which is in accordance with reality. Whether something is true or not is based on whether it is in accordance with reality or not. Therefore, the only thing for an intellect to do is to determine what is true or not true and they are either right or wrong about it.

We could begin by saying that the meaning of a fact can be true and it can also be untrue. That is to say that one can interpret a fact to mean another thing is true and be correct or incorrect about it but it is still separate from the fact that was interpreted. Nonetheless, there is coherency in asking "is the meaning of the fact in accordance with reality? — Judaka

Probably, we can agree on the existence of things external to human consciousness. Yet, we need a more comprehensive account of realism. A spherical object such as a bundle of newspapers held together by a string, or a piece of foam rubber, is a thing that exists. But it is a 'football' in the context of a particular rule-governed practice, such as playing football; in other words, its meaning and significance are relative to a specific set of meaningful practices. A thunderstorm could be a physical phenomenon in our culture and the expression of Zeus's anger for ancient Greeks. Things can acquire different meanings and functions in different historical contexts and situations. Likely, our conceptual and discursive forms can ever exhaust their objectivity and meaning. Yet, if we do not apply Lacanian conceptualization of 'the Real,' when we talk about 'things,' we inevitably imply a network of social and discursive practices and embedded meanings. Is that possible to separate facts and their interpretations? John Searle distinguishes between 'brute facts' and 'social facts': "Brute facts require no human institutions for
their existence: Mount Everest has snow and ice near the summit or that hydrogen atoms have one electron, these facts are independent of any human opinions. 'Institutional (social) facts' are so-called because they require human institutions for their existence. In order for this piece of paper to be a five-dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human institution of money. Of course, to state a brute fact, we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished from the statement of it." (John Searle, ‘The construction of social reality’) Doesn't Searle unreasonably determine his concept of a brute fact? "Mount Everest has snow and ice near the summit" could be considered as an example of a social fact, the product of various institutional practices, inscriptions of meanings and interpretations.

I can see the importance of such distinctions, I agree though I wouldn't have described it nearly as well. There's a lot you've brought up which I ought to think more deeply about.

Is there a need to distinguish between the practical elements of social facts and the elements which make claims that could reasonably be disagreed with? I could be satisfied to call a soccer ball a soccer ball, if people call that the truth is not something I can see myself going out of my way to argue against that. I enjoy being able to refer to a soccer ball as such and be understood. However, I don't wish to accept social facts which make claims that are guiding people towards ways of thinking which lead to misfortune or negative social effects. Social facts seem to be an umbrella to a great many different kinds of claims.

Slow down there Jerseyflight, I believe one can know the truth, however, we need to scrutinise which claims of truth are valid and which are misleading.

And can you give examples of what your critique in the OP applies to? When do you believe it is especially relevant to bring up? When someone writes or speaks, what reminds you of it? — fdrake

I've been sitting back reading this thread with the hopes of better understanding what Judaka was getting at in the OP. You've found a way to tease it out quite a bit. Impressive actually... for me anyway.

So, if I have Judaka right, he's talking about situations where everyone agrees that a group of statements are all true, but he's also saying that the way those statements are used, and what they're used for(the arrangement?), can vary remarkably.

Is that about right?

Does the following count as one of those arrangements we agree on?

I think that one can reasonably prove that the US government has purposefully constructed the relevant laws in ways that they knew would disproportionately affect the races. You need to look at how the US governments handle politics, the major goal is getting the party re-elected and everything done takes this into account. The policies appeal to the racial undertones that have been present in the US and still are. Nonetheless, the result can't be argued to be racially neutral.

There's a lot of room for interpretation here but there's a level of inexcusable simplicity in thinking that because the government doesn't use language that targets race, they can't be racist. That laws that don't mention race can't be part of systemic racism. I encourage you to further your education on this vast topic, if you're going to be as involved as you have been in this discussion. — Judaka

So, I take it that you and I agree that systemic racism remains inherent, to some extent or another, within America.

However, when it comes to the notion of white privilege, it seems that we're nearly at complete odds.

So, to me... if I've got it right... that is a prima facie example of what the OP is getting at. Would you agree?

So, if I have Judaka right, he's talking about situations where everyone agrees that a group of statements are all true, but he's also saying that the way those statements are used, and what they're used for(the arrangement?), can vary remarkably. — creativesoul

Yes, this is most of what I was pointing out.

Does the following count as one of those arrangements we agree on? — creativesoul

Yes, that is a good example of an arrangement, you can see a lot of what I was talking about in OP here.

So, I take it that you and I agree that systemic racism remains inherent, to some extent or another, within America.

However, when it comes to the notion of white privilege, it seems that we're nearly at complete odds.

So, to me... if I've got it right... that is a prima facie example of what the OP is getting at. Would you agree? — creativesoul

Yes, much of my discussions about privilege get stuck at people failing to understand the concepts talked about in my OP.

I have told you, this is not an issue about what the truth is, it's an issue of framing and interpretation. Just like Banno, you want to validate the framing by the fact that what you're saying is true but that's not actually a justification that explains why you choose this framing over the others... because there are many options and none of them are disputing the facts.

Again, technically speaking, white privilege isn't saying anything untrue - the statistics back up most of the claims being made. How we look at attractiveness and intelligence is changed when we describe it or even refer to it as an "unearned advantage" and in this way your framing becomes a philosophical position.

All that is clear to me is that you don't realise that and you believe you are kind of just stating facts when you're not. You're simply showing that you cannot tell the difference between facts and characterisations, interpretations and framing. — Judaka

Yes, much of my discussions about privilege get stuck at people failing to understand the concepts talked about in my OP — Judaka

I can see how that could be problematic. There are some very important 'concepts' being discussed. However, I'm stuck on the fact that you do not seem aware of the actual relationship(s) between systemic racism and white privilege.

The distance between us here comes before the issues of racism and racial inequity and back to my OP. If white privilege is an arrangement of truth, filled with choices to emphasise, include/exclude information, characterise and narrativize then how should it be evaluated? Should we ask if it is true? Should we ask if it is reasonable? Should we ask if it is effective? Whether it makes things better or worse? How do we evaluate these choices?

Even without ever disagreeing on what is true, you can arrive at a near infinite number of different conclusions by arranging the facts differently. Thus the question becomes, how do I judge a good conclusion from a bad one. — Judaka

Firstly, you can't arrive at a near infinite number of different conclusions by arranging facts differently. That matters because it's means that there's some set of conclusions which cannot be reached without denying or ignoring one or more of the relevant facts.

Secondly, once you're within the set of arrangements which can be arrived at legitimately from the relevant facts, why would you further need to judge a 'good' conclusion from a 'bad' one? If the arrangement has been legitimately arrived at (neither denying nor ignoring a relevant fact), then what could a further judgement of 'goodness' within this set possibly be evaluating?

Firstly, let's call near-infinite a hyperbole.

Secondly, why evaluate anything? Because you discriminate between outcomes. How one discriminates is not really crucial to understanding my OP, just that one does.