Hello @Philosophim,

You have brought up some very thought-provoking points and, thusly, it has taken me some time to really give it its due. I realized, with aid of your contentions, that the synthetic/analytical distinction is also not actually directly exposing what I want (just as, I would argue, the applicable/distinctive distinction isn't) and, therefore, I can no longer invoke it legitimately to convey my position. Consequently, I was forced to really dive into what I am actually trying to convey and, therein, really clearly define each fundamental building block. So, I now going to share with you what I believe to be a much more clear, distinct representation of what I am trying to convey (but of course it could not be as well (: ).

As a general overview, I still do not think (as I alluding to above) either a/s or a/d properly convey the distinction I am addressing and, quite frankly, I don't think it quite explicates properly what you are trying to convey either. I think both distinctions are missing the mark: in hindsight, the a/s more than a/d. It is like at prima facea a/d makes sense, but at a deeper evaluation it diverges from the rightful distinction. Let's dive in.

First I need to start my derivation not at the distinction I want to convey but at the groundings, fundamentals, of everything. That is, a deeper analysis of reason to determine, recursively, what is occurring across all instantiations (because reason is the focal point of all derivation, I think we would agree on that at least generically). If this endeavor is accomplished, then I submit to you that it will be relevant, at the very least, to your epistemology as it would be the protocol by which all else conforms.

I think that, although I am open for suggestions, there are two groups of fundamentals worth mentioning right now: the most fundamental and some sub-distinctions therein. It is important to note, before I begin deriving and defining them, that I only giving ordering in terms of those groups and not in terms of the items therein: in the case of the most fundamental I am not particularly convinced one can make a meaningful order and in the case of the sub-distinctions therein I don't find it relevant at this point to parse it.

Most Fundamental:
In the case of the most fundamental, they are as follows:

- The principle of non-contradiction (PoN): subject concept which is not in contradiction by its predicate.
- Negatability: the ability to conceive of the direct opposite (contradiction) of a given concept.
- Will: a motive.
- Connectivity: the ability to construct connections via connectives.
- Connective: a concept which relates two other concepts in some manner (relations).
- Spatiotemporality: the spatiotemporal inevitable references of concepts.

These are the fundamentals which are such because they are the utmost (or undermost) conceptions that one can derive. Any other concept is thereafter.

It is important to note that by "spatiotemporal" I am not referring to "space and time" (as in two separate distinctions) but more as "space and time juxtaposed as one". Time and space cannot be separated in a literal sense.

Sub-distinctions Therein
There are two sub-groups worth mentioning at this time. First is the sub-group of connectivity:

- Possibility: a predicate which does not contradict its subject concept.
- Necessity: a predicate which is true of all possibilities of its subject concept.
- Impossibility: a predicate which contradicts its subject concept.
- Conditional (Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in some sort of dependency. This includes, but is not limited to, biconditionals (IFF) and uniconditionals (IF).
- Unconditional (Not Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in a manner that has no dependency (e.g. the connection that A and B are not related is a relation determined by a connective which dictates their unconditioned nature).
- Communal: two concepts share a concept.

The second relevant sub-group is of spatiotemporality:

- Quantity: A concept which is numerable. Such as "particular", "singular", "three", etc.
- Quality: A concept which is innumerable. Such as degrees on a spectrum from 0 to 1.

Immediate Productions of The Fundamentals and Sub-distinctions
Now, from those fundamentals, along with the understanding of the relevant sub-distinctions therein, arises immediate processes of reason which are identifiable, which are:

- Concepts
- Properties
- References
- Contexts
- Conflations
- Conceptual Conflations
- Contextual Conflations
- NOTE: probably many more, but the aforementioned are the relevant ones.

These immediate processes, derived ultimately from the fundamentals, are, in fact, arranged in order (unlike the two groups I mentioned previously) as their definitions rely on the previous to understand each other. They are what I would consider the "fundamentals" which can be constructed given the actual fundamentals (previously explicated).

Concepts:
A "concept" is spatiotemporal connection(s) composed of spatiotemporal connection(s).

E.g. Concept A is comprised of other concepts:

NOTE: apparently philosophy forum strips white space characters and won't let me upload any images, so I am going to have to represent by diagrams a bit odder.

'=' will be assigning operator
'[ ]' will be a set
'&' will be a reference operator
'<=>' biconditional operator
'( )' order of operations

A = [P1, P2]

Properties:
A "property" is a concept, P, which is connected (related) to another concept, C, in a manner of necessity as one of C's comprised parts. In the above example, P1 and P2 are properties of A.

References:
A "reference" is a connective, R, which connects its concept to another separate concept, wherein "separate concept" entails that the given concept is not a property of the other concept.

Concept A, which has two properties, is referencing concept B, which has a property that is not equal to either of A's:

B = [P3]
A = [P1, P2, &B]

Contexts:
A reference which dictates its concept as conditional on another concept in the manner of IFF (biconditional).

There are two concepts defined as A, but each is biconditionally referenced to concept B and C respectively (B and C would thereby be considered contexts):

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

It is important to note that the properties of both A's must be different, otherwise it is not a biconditional and, therefore, not a context.

Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties or/and references (see subsequent examples).

Conceptual Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties.

A = [P1, P2]
B = [P3, P4]

Conflation: B has property P1 because A has property P1.

Contextual Conflation:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their references.

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

Contextual Conflation: A from C has property P1 because A from B has property P1.

Brief Explanation:
The entire point of the previous derivation is so that I can more accurately and precisely convey my point of view and is not in any way meant to derail the conversation into a discussion about a different epistemology (although it inevitably sort of requires such insofar as it is my position). To keep this brief, let me elaborate on my previous definitions in contrast to your epistemology:

Advantages Over Your Epistemology

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. In relation to concepts, dissolving of the distinction of "distinctive" vs "applicable" resolves a lot of issues, such as the fact that contextual conflations can occur in distinctive knowledge which seems, in your epistemology, to be an exemption wherein no conflations can occur. Take the elephant example, here's your response:

Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case).

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible".

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. Thereafter, we can easily explain and justify the validity of what you are meaning to distinguish with "possibility". We simply need to provide the concepts of "reality" and "self" (for example) and demonstrate that the two concepts have at least one different properties and, therefore, they are two different subject concepts. Therefore, it would be a conceptual conflation to relate a predicate to both by mere virtue of them being considered synonymous (because they aren't). It is important to note here, as I have defined it, that this would not be a contextual conflation but a conceptual conflation. This is because the approach previously mentioned is differentiating the two concepts by means of their properties and not their references to other concepts. If it were the case that "reality" referenced a context and "reality" referenced a different context, then the use of a predicate for both in virtue of being synonymous would be a contextual conflation. But in the case of comparing properties, the conflation is not occurring contextually. To be clear, a "conceptual conflation" occurs by means of properties and "contextual conflations" by means of references.

Further, notice that properties, as I defined them, are only essential (because they are utilizing a connection of the nature of necessity) and never accidental (unessential). I think this nicely portrays what the mind really does: if something is an accidentally property, what is actually happening is the mind is determining the accidental property to be "possible" (as I defined it) and therefore noting that the given concept could reference another concept but it is not necessitous. For example, if concept A has one property of "being circular" (to keep it simple) and concept B has one property of "being green", then it is "possible" for A "to be green" (reference concept B: A = [..., &B]) because "being green" does not contradict A. Now, what you are noting, and rightfully so, is that A referenced in the concept of "reality", so to speak, cannot be conflated with a reference to "imagination", which really looks like:

Reality <=> (A = [Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

A contextual conflation arises if one were to claim X of Imagination's A in virtue of Reality's A (and vice-versa) because of the referential difference (even though they are the same conceptually in this case, so there's no conceptual conflation). Likewise:

Reality <=> (A = [Green, Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

This would be a referential and conceptual conflation if one were to claim X of one in virtue of the other. In this case the conceptual conflation would determine that the concepts of A are not synonymous when compared with each other (in their contexts). Which I think is important as well.

I think, overall, this really gets at the fundamental situation of reason and how it operates, which is the pinnacle in relation to a given subject.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. Which I think is important to note that the epistemology is never complete, only consistent. The most fundamental is that which is apodictic.

The last thing I will say is that I can see how this all, at prima facea, seems like I really used what your epistemology states to even derive these terms (e.g. I "created" definitions and applied them without contradiction). However, I actually think that the previously mentioned process is what occurs as the fundamental building block of reason (at least human reason) and your epistemology happens to align with it pretty nicely, but the subtle but vital differences required me to really derive and explicate my position to figure out what wasn't quite adding up for me: I think mine explicates the situation more clearly and precisely. Hopefully that makes sense.

In terms of your post, I am now going to try to respond to what I think is still relevant to our conversation, but feel free to prompt me to respond to anything you think I left out.

I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties.

I would define synonyms as two concepts which have the same properties, where property is connected as necessary. Apart from the obvious difference in semantics, the important part is that non-essential properties no longer exist: they are references to other concepts determined by "possibility".

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions:

Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty.

I see this as a direct contradiction. Which I think is resolved in my position because we no longer need a/d.

No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

I think that I was wrong to think the distinction needed to be contextual conflations, it is actually simply conflations in general (both).

No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. There's a difference between stating "I believe it will rain" and "I don't know if it will rain". The former is an induction, the latter could be either: both are expressing uncertainty. The latter is not a hypothesis, it is a certainty of uncertainty (assuming it was deduced). if I state "IF it rains, THEN ...", I may not be claiming that I "believe" it will rain, I could be claiming "I do not know either way" which is not an induction. That's my only point.

Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

I still think hume's problem of induction isn't really answered here. But I completely understand and agree that the most rational thing to do is the hierarchy of inductions. But more on that later as this is very long.

Bob

Well done Bob, a great analysis! No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be. The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN. Arguably, the PoN works because we cannot discretely experience a real contradiction ourselves. I have never experienced a situation in which I have existed in two different spots at the same time for example.

That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience. But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

Having discussed this with you for some time now, I believe this has been a re-occurring difference between us. You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong. I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

The d/a distinction applies as a fundamental formation of knowledge from discrete experience. As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system. Your creation of a system does not negate the d/a distinction, but only confirms it can be used to create a system.

For myself, you have to demonstrate that you can form a system without using the d/a distinction, and that system must invalidate or demonstrate why the d/a distinction is invalid. To do so, I believe you have to show there is something more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience. Or if not more fundamental, something along the lines of that fundamental ability that can lead to knowledge without needing discrete experience.

But, let me address of a few of your derived concepts that cross into my derived concepts so I can clarify this position.

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto. — Bob Ross

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. Whether a person defines free will, or does not, is irrelevant. What I have attempted to note are situations that separate distinctive knowledge from applicable knowledge. One could use a concept of free will to describe a difference, but its not necessary.

What is necessary is the concept of a will. A will is an intention of the self, and an outcome is the result of that will. At its most basic, a will is the intention to eat to live. I believe this is very similar, if not identical to our previously agreed upon definition of "reason". It is very clear to any willing/reasoning being that one's intention does not always result in the outcome they wished. Situations in which one's will is provably certain is essentially distinctive knowledge. This is the act of discretely experiencing expressed as memory, identity, and sensations. Some in philosophy might call this, "being".

But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. — Bob Ross

As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN. If I did not applicably know the PoN, you would have to prove it existed correct? Which means you would have to show some application of it that would demonstrate to me it wasn't something you just distinctively identified, but something that can also be utilized apart from our direct distinctions.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case). — Bob Ross

Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context. If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that. The conflation occurs if you think that you have applicable knowledge that a pink elephant exists apart from your imagination. If conflation is allowed to occur in this epistemology without explanation, I would consider that a contradiction and flaw that should be pointed out. I just don't see where this is happening at this time.

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible". — Bob Ross

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively. But our definition of square and circles are not applicably necessitous by nature. I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction. In your case, you are using a societally agreed upon contextual definition of square and circle that is both distinctively, and applicably known and proven. Using those current societal definitions and applicable knowledge of square and circle, there are certain things you cannot distinctively conclude. That is a distinctive impossibility. But will the rules and applicable knowledge of a square and circle remain the same tomorrow? That is an applicable unknown. That is where induction comes in.

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a system in which you define possibility as when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept, that's fine. I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively. But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong. The fact that I use the word possibility to describe the concept of making a belief that because X is applicably known 1 time, it could be applicably known again, is irrelevant. You and I may be using the same sign/word, but the essential properties are widely different. We can discuss why you may be more interested in a different word than possibility to describe the essential properties of this particular kind of induction, but you have not shown that these particular properties of the induction are flawed in and of themselves.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. — Bob Ross

This would be a flaw in your proposal then. The d/a distinction has a finite regress of reason. That is to what is discretely experienced. An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions. In other words, an infinite regress cannot be applicably known. You may have created a distinctive set of logic that fit in your mind, but it has no capability of application. The a/d distinction is complete. It start with finite experiences, and ends with them. You can use the a/d distinction in the formulation of the a/d distinction itself. That is a major strength of the theory compared to all others which I know of that are not able to use the very theory they propose to prove the theory itself.

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive. — Bob Ross

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty. You aren't trying to discover anything. Synonyms are identical distinctive knowledge. When we are trying to match an unknown identity with a distinctive identity, that deduced result is applicable knowledge.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions: — Bob Ross

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property. You can define A as having X property for 1 second, then define A to have Y property the next second. You can even alternate every second for eternity. But there is no uncertainty that at any point in time, what you have defined or not defined as an essential property of A is the distinctive knowledge of A then.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. — Bob Ross

That may be the case. I do agree there is a difference between "I believe" versus, "I don't know". But the IFF is an affirmative of a possible outcome, which is an assertion that there are other possible outcomes. But we may be splitting hairs at this point.

I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely. I look forward to hearing from you again Bob.

Hello @Philosophim,

No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

I likewise find it exciting and intriguing. If one isn't out of their comfort zone, then they aren't learning.

The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be.

I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper.

The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN.

"discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality".

That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience.

You derived this via PoN. A common theme that I view as a misunderstanding is to think that the derivation of a "fundamental" should be what one can determine as what they are contingent upon: they were required in the first place. It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). A "fundamental" is that which is an unescapable potential infinite of the subject's manifestations ("thoughts", "reasoning" if you will). I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. I verified "because PoN is true" via PoN: it is a recursive potential infinite. That is the nature of "reason": a succession of finite operations which are constrained to necessary principles.

But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is:

I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

Other times it is:

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed.

The former implies some form of "free will" regardless of whether the term is constructed or not. The latter denies any such implicit necessity.

The way I understand it is:

- If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject.

- If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both.

Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): I think you are frequently mapping "distinctive knowledge" to a distinction of free construction, whereas "applicable" is outside of that construction. I don't think you have offered an adequate reconciliation to this issue (but I could be simply misunderstanding).

Furthermore, being able to always classify something under one of two categories does not entail that that those two categories are fundamentals. Your a/d distinction is like a line drawn in a potential infinite beach of sand, whereas I am trying to examine it by granule. Sure, the granule is either on the left or the right of the line, but that doesn't have anything to do with fundamentals.

What is necessary is the concept of a will.

Is this will "creating" the distinctive knowledge? I get heavy vibes that that is not what you are saying, but I could be wrong. If not, then there's a heavy "free will" implication. Even in terms of this will, if it is directing the constructed "distinctive knowledge" and it isn't an act of free will of some sort, then it isn't the subject "creating" anything: therefore they cannot do whatever they want distinctively, but maybe the rudimentary will can?

But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

This leads me to believe, instead of "creation"/"abstract" vs "matched"/"non-abstract", you are really trying to convey "certainty" vs "uncertainty", which, again, is not the same thing.

Let me invoke your definitions from a while back:

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.


Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set

This is a "creation" vs "matching" distinction. "creation" does not equate to "abstract consideration". "matching" does not equate to "non-abstract consideration".

You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong.

I think it is essentially the converse. However, what makes it tricky is that your definitions think higher and equal to mine, which clouds the waters.

I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. It works fine prima facea, but as I have been examining your epistemology it slowly breaks down when one gets to a/d. Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. PoN is the focal point and thereafter the other fundamentals follow logically. "discrete experience" is an ambiguous sort of equivalent to the lumping of these concepts: it is the realization that one is experiencing differentiation via the PoN, connections, negatiability, equatability, and spatiotemporal references: we cannot go beyond those, they are apodictic.

As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system.

I wasn't trying to note that I used a/d: I was meaning that it seems as though (in anticipation) that I am given the murky waters in the definitions of a/d. You are drawing a line in the sand, I am noting the granules and the granules that make up those, etc to derive what is necessarily always occurring in the finite procession of the manifestations of reason. I am not convinced that a/d somehow is being used to derive PoN, when PoN was required to derive a/d.

As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN.

Being able to categorize one granule of sand either as on the left or the right does not have any bearing on what is fundamental. Even if the a/d distinction works for all granules, it wouldn't thereby be a fundamental. The derivation of a/d, I would argue, utilizes my fundamentals to get there. Try to derive a/d without using PoN. Try to derive anything without it.

Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. There's a definition of "PoN" in my head, which I abstractly had to perform application to know that, and I abstractly apply it to my previous abstract thoughts to determine whether it holds as apodictic: and it does. I would suppose I had to "applicably" know that I "distinctively" knew, not the other way around, because I don't know I had a definition of "PoN" until after I perform the necessary abstract applications to determine I do. "Application" and "definitions" is a murky distinction (just like creation and matching), no different than a/s.

One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made.

Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context

That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. No matter what distinction is made, the subject is necessarily following the same underlying process. All the issues your distinction are supposed to be demonstrating can be resolved simply by noting conflations.

If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two.

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by.

But my point was that concepts can be conflated abstractly and, potentially depending on how you are defining "distinctive", distinctively.

I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract".

But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong.

There is no underlying system. My proposed system is meant as the underlying system. Your definition of "possibility" implicitly uses mine. The mind necessarily considers in terms of how I defined it. Now, semantically, that is a whole different question. Your possibility's function was to note a contextual conflation, which is accounted for in my system without redefining possibility in a way that creates confusing different "could" terminology (i.e. "I speculate I could" vs "I possibly could").

This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational).

Although I am interested to hear your reasoning, I didn't get the impression that your epistemology proves itself in that sense: it is consistent, but not complete. There's nothing wrong with that.

Thirdly, I think this is a strength of my system is that it explicates the true nature of reason: potential infinite regressions and one circular reference. This is why PoN is the focal point, as it is the one valid circular reference:

It is a potential infinite circular cycle of "X is true because of PoN", where X can also be PoN. There's nothing wrong with that: that is why it is an axiom. The reason that isn't special pleading is because all other circular logic depends on PoN and we can demonstrate therefrom their invalidity. Apodictic doesn't mean complete, it means demonstrably true (not to be confused with absolutely true). When a subject tries to prove PoN, they have to eventually give up under the conclusion that it is true as they follow the potential infinite path of derivation, which is cyclical. I don't think, in action, you can demonstrate that to be false (as that very proposition is presupposing PoN). That's why it is an axiom.

The potential infinite regressions (recursions to be specific) is simply noting what concepts are and how they exist in a infinite recursive pattern. Similar to how PoN is cyclical but yet valid, noting that when one derives any concept they can perform the finite operation to all of its properties, sub-properties, sub-sub-properties, etc for a potential infinite. All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. This is provable by means of simply trying to invalidate it: try to come up with a concept that isn't derive from other concepts. The nature of reason is a continuity: there's no stopping point. This does not rest on its own assumptions.

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. They had to dissect the concept of A, and the act of dissecting implies uncertainty. This is not the same as claiming they are formulating inductions.

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions.

I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely.

I appreciate your response, I hope I wasn't too reiterative from previous posts here.

Bob

I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper. — Bob Ross

Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

"discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality". — Bob Ross

As a reminder, one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience. Its been a while since we last discussed this, but if you recall, the same with differentiation and spatiotemporality. Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

As a reminder of discrete experience, a camera lens that takes a picture is a non-discrete experience. Everything that comes into the camera lens is spit out on the picture without the lens being able to differentiate anything within the light it receives. All it does is receive light. A being that can discretely experience can parcel that experience into things that it might later identity and differentiate into colors, shapes, etc.

Therefore a fundamental which a being must have before it can identify, is it must be able to discretely experience.

It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). — Bob Ross

We used the PoN to deductively assert that we discretely experience. But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. — Bob Ross

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are. I believe truth and falsity are more fundamental than the PoN. While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

I believe you have mentioned prior the idea of temporal fundamentalism. In other words, the order of discovery determines what is "fundamental". If for example, molecular theory was used to discover atomic theory, you would say molecular theory was more temporally fundamental.

Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole. While we may have discovered molecular theory first (hypothetically) molecules are fundamentally made up of atoms and rules that we might not have been aware of. But the use of a tool which discovers another fundamental does not mean that the underlying make up of the tool is not fundamental, nor that we necessarily needed that particular tool to discover the underlying fundamental. As we could use molecular theory as a starting point to discover atomic theory, we can also use atomic theory to discover molecular theory once we discover atomic theory. A fundamental when discovered, either confirms the higher order we used to discover the lower order, or adds clarity to that higher order concept.

I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts. Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are. As such, I think its been clearly shown that the PoN has parts and logic prior to its logical construction, and is not a fundamental.

At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is: — Bob Ross

I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense. But you cannot use derived systems to explain the fundamental system that allows those derived systems to exist. I think this is ultimately the source of your misunderstanding and confusion. You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental. What I've tried to demonstrate is your system is derived, and rests on the assumptions you are trying to negate. Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

Other times it is:

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. — Bob Ross

"I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): — Bob Ross

But I'm not implying free will. I think you're mapping your own outlook on this when it has never been my intention.

The way I understand it is:

- If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject. — Bob Ross

No. Distinctive knowledge is the creation of the discrete experiencer. If I see the color red within the sea of existence, that is my creation. If I am color blind, then what I discretely experience might be different. A person might see a tree while another sees two plants, "green leaves" attached to "brown trunks". A camera lens cannot see the color red within the light that it absorbs. It is unaware of any difference. There is no "I" within the lens. There is no distinction.

- If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both. — Bob Ross

As I've noted, its about deduction vs induction within your chain of reasoning. It depends on your context of what you mean by "abstraction". In one context, everything is abstraction. Our sensations are abstractions, as well as thoughts. Arguably a person could state we never experience "the thing in itself".

Distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the experience itself, knowledge of the abstraction one creates. The key is that there is no deduced uncertainty of one's will. If I see red while you see blue, we both distinctively know our own experiences. But the moment I introduce deduced uncertainty, "You see the color blue, while I see the color red," that is a belief that my will alone cannot assert. Have I experienced how you see the world? No. That is an application I must experience before I can determine if my belief is true. Do I have the distinctive knowledge of this belief? Yes. Is that belief applicable knowledge? No. At best, such a belief is an inapplicable speculation.

I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. — Bob Ross

This is why it is a fundamental. A fundamental is part of everything that derives from it. Atoms are the fundamentals of molecules. We don't have to create the concept of molecules, and the fundamentals of atoms will still exist. Discrete experiences are the necessary atoms that make up your higher level concepts. That's not an ambiguous lumping. All I'm noting is your molecules are made up of atoms, and atoms can be used to make more than the molecules you are noting.

Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. — Bob Ross

I think I've shown the thinking that they do not arise out of discrete experience to be incorrect. Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false? Each of your terms rest on concepts that you have not proven yet, or shown where they come from. Mine does. Negation is the discrete experience of one thing, and then that thing not being experienced anymore. True is what is and can be discretely experienced, while false is what cannot. From this, I can derive the PoN. Can you derive the PoN differently, or demonstrate how my derivation is incorrect?

Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. — Bob Ross

As with everything, you must clarify whether your knowledge is distinctive or applicable. The problem with epistemology has been it has lacked this distinction, and has conflated very two different identities. I can distinctively know of a pink elephant, and I can applicably know if I've encountered one. What one distinctively knows does not necessitate it can be applied.

One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made. — Bob Ross

Notice how you used "know" without clarifying whether this knowledge was distinctive or applicable. If you don't clarify what type of knowledge, then you aren't using the epistemology. At that point you aren't disproving the epistemology through a contradiction of use, you are simply showing how not using the epistemology causes confusion.

Let me reconstruct your sentence. "One cannot applicable know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that." While that sentence still doesn't make much sense, it is not addressing distinctive knowledge. Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

Perhaps what you meant was that you cannot distinctively know something prior to experiencing it. Which is true. But you also cannot applicably know something before you experience it. If the a/d distinction cannot be used to divide a generic use of knowledge or runs into a contradiction, then I think we can safely say there is a flaw. But using a generic definition of knowledge alone is a straw man.

That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. — Bob Ross

Knowledge is a chain of deductions. The difference between distinctive and applicable knowledge has been clearly made. Do they both use deductions as an underlying fundamental? Yes. But it is clear that we run into situations in which we have beliefs that must be resolved, and cannot be resolved by our will alone. When a chain of inductions contains a resolved induction, it is an important enough difference to note a new identity. The separation of the knowledges notes this important event, and avoids the problems other epistemologies run into.

If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two. — Bob Ross

Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by. — Bob Ross

No disagreement, as this is a logical consequence of using a logic derived from the context of distinctive knowledge.

I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract". — Bob Ross

I will note, I did not introduce the term "abstract" into the conversation. It depends on your context of "abstract". Applicable knowledge comes about from the deduced realization of an uncertain belief. The "uncertainty" is a deduction that our will alone is not enough to ascertain it cannot be contradicted. I may believe this apple is healthy, but upon eating it I discover it was rotten on the inside. Can the terms "eating, rotten, apple, action, etc" be all termed as abstractions? Sure. Can everything in the mind be termed an abstraction? Yes. This is probably where the confusion comes from. You are using a general word that can have its essential properties switched with its accidental properties depending on the context you are using.

As such, if I have used the terms "abstract" it has been to meet what I evaluated your context to be at the time. In the largest abstract of the word, discrete experience can be called an abstraction, and everything is made up of discrete experiences, including applicable knowledge. If we are to use the term abstraction going forward, could you define it clearly in your own terms so I can understand your meaning?

This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational). — Bob Ross

What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN. I assumed several higher order logics to be true, and I can use the epistemology to demonstrate why logic works. I may ask the question, "Why do I discretely experience?" but that answer is not necessary to know that I discretely experience, and can use it to form knowledge. Just like I don't need to know molecular theory to use a ruler for measurement. There is (to my mind) nothing underlying or apart from the theory itself that needs to be given to explain the theory itself.

Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free. Goedel's is also not a free pass to set up an infinite regress. What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation. Such an argument is flawed, and as my system is more fundamental than yours, can conclude Setting up an explanation for knowledge as infinitely regressive is therefore a flaw. I can construct your system distinctively, but it is inapplicable. My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress. Because an infinite regress is inapplicable, it is an inapplicable speculation, or induction. Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. — Bob Ross

No. I avoid that flaw that most other epistemologies fall into. Everything starts with the foundation that I discretely experience. All distinctive knowledge boils down to that. I need no other outside reference. If I do, please show how I do.

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. — Bob Ross

Correct. My note was there is no uncertainty in distinctive knowledge. When there is uncertainty, or when it is deduced that one's will, will not necessarily result in the will's outcome, we have a situation in which we must experience the deduced outcome of that induction. That is acting upon a belief until that beliefs outcome is found.

There is no application within distinctive knowledge, because it is our experience itself. You don't match the experience itself to the experience itself. It is simply the experience itself. The act of being. What you are, is what you are. What you remember is what you remember. What you define something as, is what you define something as. There is no regress. There is no induction in this. This has been deductively shown by noting that you discretely experience, and all of these things logically flow from this fundamental.

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions. — Bob Ross

Poor wording with lots of implicitness on my part. Let me rephrase it.

Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

And no worry Bob if we retread old ground a bit! Many of those subjects were disparate, but now we have a nice consolidation.

Hello @Philosophim,

Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

I appreciate that, and same to you! Most of my conversations on this board, apart from ours, hasn't been very fruitful. It seems as though most people on here like swift abrupt responses and then get bored and move on to the next topic. I, and I think you as well, like longer, thought-out discussions that really go much deeper. That's why I really enjoy our conversations, as you are very respectful, genuine, and are providing thought-provoking responses.

The fundamental issue between us is becoming clearer and clearer for me, and I suspected as much but now I think it is pretty solidified. I think this is the pinnacle of our fundamental disagreement:

Philosophically, you seem to be taking a heavy realist methodological approach whereas I seem to taking a heavy anti-realist methodological approach.

Consequently, I am performing derivation starting with the mind and working my way outwards onto the "real" world, whereas you seem to be starting with the "real" world and working towards your mind. Now, firstly, I want to disclaim that I am not in any way trying to put words in your mouth or unfairly fit you in a category, I am merely explicating what I think is the root issue here, which is reflected quite clearly (I think) in our disagreement in terms of what a "fundamental" is. Secondly, when I stated you seem to be working "towards your mind" from the "real" world, obviously you are thinking and therefore are starting with your mind in that sense, but what I mean is that you are grounding fundamentals in the "real" world, whereas I don't. Subsequently, I think you would hold (correct me if I am wrong) that your mind is from a brain (which the latter would be more fundamental than the former) and, as you mentioned, the atom is would be more fundamental than the brain. That kind of derivation, if I am allowed to say so, is a realist approach which I would gather, if I may guess, you are probably somewhere along the lines of an ontological naturalist. Again, not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to get to the root of the issue between us, as I don't think that our disagreement is as easy as "fundamental" semantics.

I, on the other hand, although I used to be in that boat of thinking (ontological naturalist, materialist), approach it from a heavy anti-realist position. It took me a while to recognize the shift in my thinking over the years, but in hindsight it is quite obvious. I start with the mind and, therefore, only subscribe to methodological naturalism (as opposed to ontological).

I think, in light of the aforementioned, it is glaringly clear to me why I am thinking PoN is a fundamental whereas you think it is discrete experience. I don't think going back and forth about "you had to use PoN to claim that" (me) and " one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience" (you) is going to get us anywhere productive. I would simply respond with the same counter argument that you already know well, and thusly I don't think you find it productive either.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). Now, I don't think that is how you explained it, but I think that is a pretty fair (admittedly oversimplified) generalization.

I understand that, and in contemplation of my body as an object I agree. In contemplation of other bodies, objects, I agree. But in relation to myself, wherefrom derivation is occurring, I start with PoN and derive the relations of objects (and one conclusion is that the brain produces discrete experiences wherefrom it makes sense contemplation of PoN can arise). However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold.

Before I dive into direct responses, I want to explicate clearer what I mean by "fundamental". I am not talking about a contextual fundamental in relation to another object. Yes, atomic theory is more fundamental than molecular theory (I vaguely remember that conversation, and if I argued the converse then I was mistaken) contextually within that relation. I am talking about, do I dare say, the absolute fundamental. By absolute I need to be careful, because what I don't mean is that it is unquestionable: I mean that amongst all contexts (and the derivation of what a context is in the first place) it is necessarily true.Now, what I mean by "all contexts" is in relation to the subject at hand: I am not extending this out objectively or inter-subjectively at this point.

Let me try to explicate this clearer in my direct responses:

Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes).

You are explicating a correct derivation of a fundamental contextually in relation to when discrete experience arises out of objects (this is an analysis of the mereological structure of objects, which is fine in its own accord) . However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself.

But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. I am not talking about what is necessary to argue for PoN, I am talking about the actual utilization of PoN regardless.

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". That claim doesn't thereby grant you some kind of obtainment outside of PoN, or what exists beyond it because you just thereby used it.

In the most radical example, if I could hypothetically prove without a doubt PoN was false (even just in terms of some kind of distinction), that would be in relation to PoN. Again, I think this disagreement is really at a deeper level than this because I suspect you were anticipating this response.

While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

In terms of fundamentals contextually in object relations, you are correct. But in terms of the absolute pin point of derivation, I think you are incorrect: that is why PoN is called an axiom: you can't prove it in the sense that you can prove something via it.

I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

I appreciate you demonstrating this, but I think it is fundamentally still using PoN. First your entire derivation here is utilizing it: "truth = what can be discretely experienced" is an argument from PoN and so is "false = what cannot be discretely experienced". To claim that impossibility is to discretely experience and not discretely experience in the same time is utilizing the more fundamental aspect of your mind: spatiotemporality. Our minds will not allow for something to be in two places at the same time, nor one place at the same time. This is because the mind considers it a contradiction in its continuous understanding, which inevitably is based off of PoN. I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. Likewise, try to justify not that one thing being at two places at the same time is a contradiction but why it is a contradiction without using PoN: you can't. Try to point to something objective to prove it, I don't think you can: not seeing something right now in two places at the same time is not a proof that it cannot occur.

Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole

In mereological consideration of objects it does: not holistically. I am using it more in terms of (from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fundamental):

"serving as an original or generating source"
"of central importance"
"belonging to one's innate or ingrained characteristics"

I am not referring to what constitutes as the parts of an object or all objects (like fundamental particles).

I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts

Hopefully I demonstrated why it is not made of component parts. You aren't contending with PoN itself but, rather, utilizing it to define it differently (which is completely possible).

Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are.

It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. The contemplation of the understanding is fundamentally in terms of spatiotemporal references (e.g. I can redefine PoN in terms of something else as long as it does not violate these underlying principles, if I were to define it as "discrete experience of X and Y at the same place in the same time" then that obviously wouldn't fly, but why?--because I am inevitably playing by the rules of my own mind and so are you regardless of whether either of us realize it). This happens before consideration of what must exist for us to transfer our views to one another.

I am not sure how relevant defining "true" and "false" are with this respect, because "true" is simply a positive affirmation, and "false" is a negative affirmation (denial). I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. Likewise, if X had the capability to be in two different places (even merely in abstract consideration), then X can be "true" and "false" at the same time because it isn't in the same place.

I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

I can assure you I am not meaning to straw man your position: if it is the case that not even "certainty" and "uncertainty" relate to it, then I am not sure yet what to do with your distinction. I am not saying it is wrong in virtue of that, I am simply not understanding yet.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me.

You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental.

For you it is higher, for me it is lower. For you "higher" is the mind, "lower" is the objects which constitute the production of the mind. For me, "lower" is the mind, and "higher" is the derivation of the objects. For me, "lower" and "higher" aren't really sufficient terms because they more relate to mereological structure, which pertains to objects alone.

Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

I feel like my response so far should clear up the confusion here (not saying you are going to agree with me though of course (: ).

"I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. If I walk up to a hard determinist and say that they are definitely going to catch on to that implication very quickly.

Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. Explain to me how you can validate causality holistically: the best one can do is systematically validate one connective (relation) of two objects by virtue of assuming the validity of another connective (or multiple): this occurs for a potential infinite.

Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. Your distinction is not separable in that sense like I would imagine you think it is.

Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

Of course. Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. The concatenation of concepts is not the same as the union of them.

What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN.

I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S.

Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free.

I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof".

What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual.

My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible.

Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable.

Because I am not fully understanding (I would suspect) the a/d distinction I am going to end this with a step by step analysis of your definition here and you tell me where I am going wrong (thank you by the way for elaborating):

Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

1. Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept.

Makes sense.

2. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience.

The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. You know it because your mind related the objects in that manner in accordance to the rules you inevitably submit to. Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth.

3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness.

4. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

I agree that it is not PoN, but you are necessarily using it here. Just because you can discover it doesn't mean you weren't using it fundamentally to discover.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello again Bob, this was more delayed than I had liked due to Memorial week activities and summer starting here, thanks for waiting. This was also a doozy of a post as there are a couple of central themes. As a summary, I can state I feel I've lost you somewhere along the way on the d/a distinction, and that may be an insurmountable issue at this point. For my part, you have given me every single examination and critique of the d/a distinction I have ever wanted, and I am eternally grateful for that. At this point, I feel we are getting into your own outlook and view of knowledge, and I greatly respect that as well.

The goal of this exploration was to see if someone could poke holes in the d/a distinction within the argument itself. I feel that has been adequately explored. At this point, it seems to be the dissection of your theory, and I'm not sure I want to do that on this thread. It is unfair, as you have not had the time and space to adequately build it up from the ground floor. Further, my emphasis on this thread is my own theory, and I have a bias towards that. Perhaps it is a time for another thread where you write and construct your theory, and then I will be able to adequately address it properly, minus the d/a distinction I've written here. There are a few questions I could ask about the basis of your theory, but then the thread would get derailed, and the posts here would reach new record lengths. :smile: You'll see below a lot of my disagreements with your points are merely due to perhaps not understanding how you built the theory from the ground up. As such, I feel we might be talking past each other, and I would rather just give your theory its full focus and due. I do feel at this point though that we'll need to address either your theory, or mine, and the combination of both will just explode too much writing and exploration for one thread.

With that, I'll begin.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). — Bob Ross

Yes, this is correct.

However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold. — Bob Ross

Again, I would ask how a person could even realize they were a subject without discrete experience. What I believe I can agree with is the speculation that a self could exist that could not discretely experience. Such a thing would have no awareness of itself, much less the capability for knowledge.

Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes). — Bob Ross

I don't think we're disagreeing here. I've never claimed that "I am the brain", just "I am the discrete experiencer". Focus on your breathing for a second, and control it. There you are discretely experiencing your breathing. But a few minutes ago, you were not discretely experiencing breathing. It was part of the entirety of your existence, but you didn't parcel it out of everything. Now we know from other knowledge that the brain is still what causes you to breath, but as the discrete experiencer, you do not always discretely experience breathing. To form the initial theory, knowledge of the brain is not needed, much like the knowledge of the material a ruler is made out of is needed to use the ruler.

However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself. — Bob Ross

Stating that there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from this methodology is an induction, not a fact. Everything the mind can comprehend is a representation of the mind, including itself. That is exactly what discrete experience is. It is creating discrete experiences out of the entirety of existence. An atom is a creation of discrete experience. It is a concept. As I've noted, we never had to create that concept. Think of the Bohr model versus quantum model of atoms. https://pediaa.com/difference-between-bohr-and-quantum-model/#:~:text=Main%20Difference%20%E2%80%93%20Bohr%20vs%20Quantum%20Model&text=Quantum%20model%20is%20considered%20as,particle%20duality%20of%20an%20electron.

Are any of those models "the thing in itself"? Is even "the thing in itself" something that is existent in nature as a concept apart from the minds creation? No. They are all discrete experiences. Everything is a representation of the mind, the brain is no exception.

But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. — Bob Ross

I want to clarify again that I am not positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, at least in regards to knowledge. First, I never use the word "object" in the theory. Knowledge never claims "truth" or that there is a "thing in itself" that exists out there. Knowledge is a logical tool developed by a subject (the discrete experiencer) to create a model of one's discrete experience in such a way that it ensures our survival and success. PoN can be part of that model, but it is not a fundamental that is first needed to derive other things. The PoN is derived and proved. I showed you how I did it with the a/d distinction. The ability to discretely experience is required first for the PoN to be derived and proven.

As I have noted in an earlier post, one can use something without applicable knowledge of it. Many of our conclusions are filled with implicit inductions. We may use the PoN without first proving that it is applicably known. But for the PoN to be applicably known, we must then examine it. And the point that I was making is that when we finally get around to seeing if the PoN is applicably known, we must prove it. And to prove it, we need the d/a distinction. A thing's use does not make it fundamental. What makes it fundamental, is that there is nothing deeper that needs to be shown to logically explain it as a concept. We may have a fundamental disagreement here, which is fine. For my purposes, fundamental construction of logic is in both explication and utilization. And to explicate and utilize PoN as knowledge, one must distinctively and applicably know the d/a distinction. I'll keep exploring below why that is.

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". — Bob Ross

Lets list what the PoN is. In Western Philosophy it is often associated with Aristotle and comprises several principles. The law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction for example.
'if p, then not not-p,'
'if not not-p, then p.

In India you have the principle of four cornered negation. "S is neither P, nor not p, nor both p and not p, nor neither p nor not p. And that is not necessarily agreed with by all people.

The point is that these are distinctive knowledge constructs that then must be applicably known to be useful. My theory can explain how they can be known without assumption. We may have assumed they were true, but the PoN is not proven as a fundamental truth, or thing in itself. It is a construct of the mind like everything else. The reason why it works, is that it works both applicably and distinctively.

One further, I'm going to go back to something I said very early on. Humans aren't the only discrete experiencers. Animals, and even insects discretely experience. If they did not, they could not identify what was food, and what was not food. A thing that does not discretely experience is like a coma patient on a drug trip of indeterminate sensation and thoughts. Its not an "I" at that point, but what we might call a "thing" that exists without any determinate realization of anything in the world, including its own existence.

Does an insect need the PoN? No. Its beyond its capability to realize or think such a thing (in theory). Yet it can, and must, discretely experience. This is why the ability to discretely experience is more fundamental than the PoN. You see the PoN as fundamental to human thinking and logic. I'm noting that human thinking and logic relies on the fundamental of being able to discretely experience.

So back to "truth" and "false". Yes, without the PoN, we could create another identity called "indeterminancy".

I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. — Bob Ross

We can create a distinctive logic model which notes that it is possible for a thing to exist, and not exist at the same time. "Truth" is when a thing exists in its state. "False" is when it does not. "Indeterminancy" is when it exists in both a true and false state. We'll call this the "PoI".

What we cannot do is applicably know such a thing, which is why it is not used by anyone seriously within science. But a human being can live their entire life believing in the "PoI" if they so desired, and live a life. "Somewhere out there, I believe we'll find a thing that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time." Again, this is speculative at best. But why it isn't useful is it has not been applicably known, seems inapplicably and arguably illogical, and is not useful to daily life. But the reason why we distinctively and applicably know this, is not because of the PoN. Its because of the knowledge formula formed with the d/a distinction. While I can distinctively know indeterminancy, I cannot applicably know it.

I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. — Bob Ross

A deduction assumes that the conclusion follows the premises. I will instead use the PoI. All deductions instead would be hypothetical, as the deductions state could exist, but it could also not exist at the same time. A conclusion would not necessarily follow the premises, because the premises and the conclusion could potentially be, and not be at the same time. At that point we would have to tweak it to say, "But if it were the case that the involved premises and conclusions were not indeterminate", we could get something like a determinate theory. It is not required that we have the PoN, it just makes things cleaner, and is something we have applicably known.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time. I would say then that we could applicably know something, and we could applicably know something that exists, and does not exist at the same time. But after determining the d/a distinction, I can then go back and ask myself, "Is the PoI something I can applicably know?" No, using the theory from there, I determine I cannot applicably know the PoI. Therefore its a distinctive theory that cannot be applicably known, and is unneeded. At best, it would be included as an induction. But I did not need the PoN to create the d/a distinction as shown. What I could do is form the PoN to make the proof cleaner, but it is not required.

Without the d/a distinction, there is a problem that the PoN must answer. "Just because I have not experienced an existence and its contradiction at the same time, how do I know I won't experience such a thing in the future? Isn't claiming that the PoN will always exist just an induction without the d/a distinction? And if it is an induction, why is it any better than the induction that in the future, we may experience the PoI?" The d/a distinction can answer this clearly. With the d/a distinction, the PoN is something which is possible, the PoI is speculatory at best. As they are competing inductions, it is more cogent to use the PoN over the PoI. How do you answer such a question without the d/a distinction? Despite your disagreements with the d/a distinction, this is an essential question your theory must answer.

I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. — Bob Ross

The I is the discrete experiencer. It is what discretely experiences. I'm using "want" broadly here, and should probably have used "will". What the discrete experiencer experiences, is what the discrete experiencer experiences. Whether it has constructed a logical idea of will that is free or deterministic are non-essential properties.

It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. — Bob Ross

And yet someone could choose to use the PoI distinctively. The reason why its not useful is because it cannot be known applicably. Just because you couldn't choose to create a different distinctive knowledge, doesn't mean its not possible for others to do so. You have never observed these contradictions, but as noted earlier, how do you explain that this gives you knowledge that it is not possible somewhere in reality? Without the d/a distinction, your argument is only a subjective induction and cannot necessarily explain why it is superior to the PoI.

Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. — Bob Ross

I create the idea of PoN distinctively, then applicably show it to be true. Then, I note that any competing principle when used in the future, the PoI for example, is not as cogent of an induction as the PoN.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me. — Bob Ross

Then this is absolutely key. If there is any doubt or misunderstanding of the idea that we discretely experience, that has to be handled before anything else. Please express your doubt or misunderstanding here, as everything relies on this concept. You keep not quite grasping the a/d distinction, and I feel this is the underlying root cause.

The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. — Bob Ross

No, this is fundamentally false. Applicable knowledge absolutely requires distinctive knowledge first. If there is no distinctive knowledge, there is nothing to match to. When you first encounter a new sensation, you can try to match it to something you have already distinctively known. But if you have no distinctive knowledge, or do not try to match it to something distinctively known, your knowledge of the sensation will be distinctive, not applicable.

If I see a swamp thing for the first time, and name it a "swamper", that is how I distinctively know it. If I encounter it again and deductively match it to a "swamper", then I applicably know it as a swamper. But I can't applicably know it as a swamper, until I've first distinctively known it as a swamper.

Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. — Bob Ross

That's not a conceptual conflation, that's a lie. If I say I've imagined something, but I have not, then obviously I have not. Words without any essential properties to them are just words without any essential properties to them. I'm not seeing the problem.

I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S. — Bob Ross

I think completeness is more than clearly showing distinct identities. It also must be able to adequately answer questions and critiques of it. Anytime a theory must reference an infinite regress is when it is inapplicable, and incomplete in my eyes. As I've stated many times, you can form many distinctive logical arguments in your head that fail in application. My theory notes that ability to create a distinctive logical concept is only one half of the equation. I'm quite certain someone could construct a distinctive logical concept that is in exact contradiction to your own. The proof is whether the logical construct can be applicably known. Without applicable knowledge, how can your theory compete with someone who uses a completely different theory using different definitions for words and concepts?

I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof". — Bob Ross

Yes, absolute truth outruns proof. Which means any theory which relies on absolute truth can never be proven. But I am not arguing absolute truth. Anything which relies on absolute truth is inapplicable, and therefore not useful. My theory is applicable, and therefore useful and logically consistent.

What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual. — Bob Ross

No, its not applied, and by this, I mean applicably known. Any distinctive reference to the infinite can never be applicably known. Long ago when we first met on the "A First Cause is Logically necessary" thread, you were the only one to point this out, and I conceded you were correct. If there is potential infinite regress, then you don't have a deduction. That's an induction.

My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible. — Bob Ross

I think I've done that. Using the d/a distinction, I constructed the idea that I cannot distinctively experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. Then, I've applicably known this. As such, I hold the induction that it is not possible for me to experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. This is the principle of negation, and requires nothing else then the steps shown.

Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable. — Bob Ross

A potential infinite regress is an induction. You can deductively ascertain this induction, but it is an induction. Potential means, "It could, or could not be." If your theory has a potential infinite regress, you have an unresolved induction as the base of your argument. This leads anyone to ask, "What separates your theory which has an induction as its base, from any other theory that has an induction as its base?" Mine contains no potential infinite regress. It is all a finite logical system, and needs nothing more than what I've given.

The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. — Bob Ross

As I've demonstrated, PoN can be replaced with the PoI, and I can still conclude this. In other words, I'm not claiming that I cannot discretely experience indeterminancy. Discretely experiencing indeterminency would still be discretely experiencing. The PoN is a logically concluded limit to discrete experience, because if we explore our discrete experiences, we find it impossible to applicably know that we can discretely experience both an identity and its negation at the same time. Space and time are later identities we can both distinctively and applicably know within our discrete expereinces as well. But they are not required to know I discretely experience.

Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth. — Bob Ross

I've never spoken about causality or objective reality so this does not apply to my theory. We can discuss how causality would apply with the a/d distinction, but that shouldn't be in the conversation at this point. I would address it here, but this post has already been long enough!

3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness. — Bob Ross

I do not claim the mind or brain on first construction of this theory. Yes, these are all distinctively constructed identities that we can then applicably know. I don't disagree with your notion, but they don't disagree with the knowledge theory either.

I see and understand your theory, but it is separate and apart form the a/d distinction. Your criticisms seem to miss the mark on the a/d distinction, and at this point I'm not sure what else I can do except ask you to review either parts of the original paper again, or go back and see previous replies. Again, I do not want to imply that the PoN is wrong, or that spatiotemporal identities are wrong either. I'm also not denying that you couldn't conclude the a/d distinction with those identities. What I'm trying to point out is they are not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the idea of discrete experience. They are also not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the a/d distinction either.

The key between us at this point is to avoid repetition. I fully understand that two arguments can be made, and eventually it may be that each side is unpersuaded by the other. It may be time where if you feel you are repeating yourself, feel free to state, "I disagree because of this previous point." and that is acceptable.

I feel I understand your positions at this point, and they are well thought out. But there are a couple of fundamental questions I've noted about your claim that the PoN is fundamental that I think need answering. Neither are a slight against you, you are a very intelligent, philosophically brilliant individual; the best I have encountered on these boards. So, if you would like, either we can start a new thread addressing your knowledge theory specifically, or we can simply spend the next post only going over your theory from the ground up, without the d/a distinction. I leave it up to you!

Hello @Philosophim,

Hello again Bob, this was more delayed than I had liked due to Memorial week activities and summer starting here, thanks for waiting.

As always, take your time: no worries! I have no problem waiting for substantive, well-thought out replies (:

The goal of this exploration was to see if someone could poke holes in the d/a distinction within the argument itself. I feel that has been adequately explored. At this point, it seems to be the dissection of your theory, and I'm not sure I want to do that on this thread. It is unfair, as you have not had the time and space to adequately build it up from the ground floor.

That is absolutely fair. This is your thread and, thusly, I want this conversation to be directed exactly where you would prefer: if you think that the discussion has met its end (in this discussion board at the least), then by all means we can conclude whenever you deem so! I completely understand the desire to prevent irrelevant derailments on the thread, and I can see how diving into my epistemology could do just that. With that being said, someday soon I am planning on posting an in depth analysis of my epistemology and, as always, feel free to rip it apart (: It may be a little while though as I want to ensure its quality before posting.

With that being said, I will respond to your post with the intention of keeping it relevant to your epistemology but also very briefly responding to some of the points you made about mine (or alluded to them in your responses). After that, if you wish to cease the conversations on grounds of derailment, that is totally fine my friend.

To be honest, I don't think you are entirely understanding what I am trying to convey, but that is by no means your fault and it is entirely possible that you do and I am failing to perceive it. To keep it brief, let me address your points on PoN and how it relates to what you defined as PoI.

Lets list what the PoN is. In Western Philosophy it is often associated with Aristotle and comprises several principles. The law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction for example.
'if p, then not not-p,'
'if not not-p, then p.

My contention here would be that the LEM (law of excluded middle) is by no means apart of the law of noncontradiction even with respect to classical western logic: they are completely separate principles. Instead of positing it as "not-p" and "p", which are meant to presuppose the use of LEM and PoN together, there separability can be more easily demonstrated as follows:

"B cannot be A and not A" (or more precisely "B cannot be A and not A at the same time")
"B is either A or not A"

The former does not directly necessitate the latter in this terminology, but using "not-A" instead of "not A" implies LEM--as anything that is A = not not-A and thusly anything that isn't A is a not-A, which means that the if conditionals "if A, then not not-A" and "if not not-A, then A" directly necessitate the law of the excluded Third. But within the refurbished terminology it is quite clear that B necessarily not being "A and not A" does not necessitate that B is thereby one or the other. This is the wiggle room where paraconsistent, paracomplete, and, as you noted, eastern logic, such as catuskoti (tetralemma) notions, are able to be conceived. Also, as you noted, the kotis actually do allow for B to be A and not A . To keep it brief, my point is that my use of PoN is not meant as a logical construct like those, and its precise definition holds no immediate favoritism on the battle between paraconsistent vs consistent logical languages. I am defining PoN in the form of predicate-logic:

"a predicate cannot contradict its subject concept"

Or even more precisely:

"a predicate cannot be true and false of its subject concept"

This move is admittedly subtle, potentially sneaky, which turns out to be vital. This is not equivocal to "B cannot be A and not A" nor "B cannot be A and not A at the same time"! To keep it brief, here is an example where the distinction matters:

"circles are green and not green" (aka: "Bs are A and not A")

A more classical logic enticed individual will deny this sentence in virtue of the obvious (A and not A), while a more paraconsistent minded individual will allow it in at least some circumstances. However, using the predicate-logic definition of PoN, the aforementioned sentence, at face value, is not violating PoN, contrary to popular, classical logic belief. Firstly, let's allow ourselves to refurbish the subject concept "circles" how we please (with the exception of holding fast to the concept of plurality: i.e. circles), given that the sentence wasn't given any prerequisite definitions of the concepts. One particular scenario of the definition of "circle" pops out: what if "circle" is defined to contain "has essential property of being green and not green". Now the sentence "circles are green and not green" makes perfect sense: apart of the definition of being a "circle" is to have a "contradictory" state of greeness, which is perfectly definable and describable by human reason. Now, this definition of "circle" is perfectly coherent, yet does not entail any sort of "circles in 'reality' that are green and not green". Secondly, let's analyze it from the understanding of the colloquial use of the term "circle": nothing in the concept of a "circle" necessitates a certain color nor that it cannot be "green and not green". However, we have violated the predicate-logic PoN in the colloquial use of the term "circle" because stating is permits the non-necessity of color in the definition of a "circle" with its necessity in a coexistent state, which amazingly has nothing to do with the fact that we posited the color in contradictory states, this violation can also occur without it:

"circles are green"

Given a "circle" inheriting the colloquial definition, this violates PoN. With a bit more clarity, we can also violate PoN with the contradictory greeness:

"a circle, by definition, can be any color"
"circles are green and not green" (which could equally violate PoN with proposing any color even in a "non-contradictory" state in this case)

Now, I am skipping a couple steps here, but I think you get the point. This is why subjects can posit and bend "PoN", because they are not referring to what I am referring to. It is perfectly possible to hold sincerely that something is A and not A without contradiction as long as the subject concept is not contradicted by the predicate: this is the aspect of reason which is always abided by, not "B cannot be A and not A" or "B cannot be A and not A at the same time". If someone defines B as X and then posits B is not X, they will not hold it unless there is some other variables at play which resolve this predicate contradiction as no longer existent or they simply do not recognize the contradiction (regardless of how valid their derivation actually is or is not). The important aspect here is that I am trying to derive and convey how reason works as opposed to developing a logical language. Maybe PoN is the wrong term? People can most certainly construct PoN how they like as long as they abide by the PoN I am proposing (I would argue).

And, yes, I am using a constructed logical language's, predicate-logic's, form of PoN and still claiming that it precedes constructed logic, because this is analogous to simply deriving that one discretely experiences by constructing it from discrete experience. I can most definitely propose a constructed logical language which embodies a more fundamental principle than logical languages.

Now, with that in mind, let me address your PoI. Yes, one could, prima facea, construct a logical language wherein the classical logic PoN is accounted for but LEM is non-existent (which is exactly, I would say, what you did in creating PoI). In fact, there are many logical languages which deny LEM without any issues, such as fuzzy logic (https://www.globaltechcouncil.org/artificial-intelligence/fuzzy-logic-what-it-is-and-some-real-life-applications/), which doesn't utilize boolean logic (which by virtue of being boolean requires LEM) but, instead, uses values from 0 to 1. It is actually very useful in certain situations where boolean logic doesn't cut it. Logical systems, such as fuzzy logic, necessarily cannot hold LEM as that would necessitate it to be boolean logic, which would defeat the purpose.

Now, what you described in PoI is a much bolder constructed logic which is like but not equivocal to our fuzzy friends: you posited three outcomes (true, false, and indeterminate). Firstly I want to note that this is entirely possible to construct, prima facae, using the predicate-logic formulation of PoN. One can produce sentences with PoI in which the subject concept is not contradicted by its predicate, such as:

"B is in an indeterminate state"

That's fine. This makes no inherent position on what "state" must be in terms of possibility (it doesn't contradict its subject concept)--it doesn't specify that an indeterminate state must be either A or not A (LEM). Indeterminate could be ineffable, neither both, both, true and not false, or false and not true (the kotis for example). Let's take your sentence:

"Somewhere out there, I believe we'll find a thing that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time"

The reason this is possible for you to construct this sentence is because the subject concept, implicit here, isn't contradicted by its predicate: the concept of ignorance could potentially be enough wiggle room for one to posit such a sentence about the unknown. My main point with respect to your epistemology is that you are using, inadvertently, this more fundamental PoN (more like the form of predicate-logic) to formulate discrete experience. I was never trying to convey that you have been involuntarily using classical logic PoN and LEM.

What we cannot do is applicably know such a thing, which is why it is not used by anyone seriously within science.

Although I understand what you are trying to convey, logicians and mathematicians (and scientists) do not disregard logic simple based off of classical logic principles. There are perfectly applicable logics, like first-degree entailment logic, which allow for koti-like truth value systems: f (false and not true), t (true and not false), b (both true and false), and n (neither true nor false). Wherein the output of a given function is a set: {f}, {t}, {t, f}, and {} (empty set being n).

But more in terms of every day to day application, four possibility systems are also applicable, albeit not as applicable as classical logic is. Imagine I am eating cereal and claim:

"I am eating bread"

That's false and not true. Imagine I am eating cereal and claim:

"The bread I am eating is purple"

Well, I am not eating bread. So I am neither eating bread that is purple nor bread that is not purple, because I am not eating bread. Therefore it is neither true nor false. Imagine I am eating cereal and I claim:

"this sentence is false"

I could simply concede that the liar paradox outputs {t, f}, which is essentially the same thing as defining a liar paradox sentence as having a property of being contradictory (just like being green and not green). I could also simply deny its truth-aptness, which is the exact same thing as claiming the output is {} (i.e. n). As you can probably see, there are application, even in mundane life, for first-degree entailment logic.

This is incredibly relevant to how you are trying to resolve this within your epistemology:

But after determining the d/a distinction, I can then go back and ask myself, "Is the PoI something I can applicably know?" No, using the theory from there, I determine I cannot applicably know the PoI. Therefore its a distinctive theory that cannot be applicably known, and is unneeded. At best, it would be included as an induction.

You are subscribing your epistemology to LEM and PoN, most notably as described by classical logic. This rules out the actual applicable usages of paraconsistent, fuzzy, and first-degree entailment logic. My epistemology still accounts for these within their own respects.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time.

I don't think you can posit this unless you are redefining discrete experience: the subject concept necessitates, categorically, that it be distinct, which necessitates that one cannot experience both something and its negation at the same time in the same place. As you described it, technically speaking, that is possible. I could experience a blue car and a not-blue car at the same time as long as they are not in the same place. My main point here, in relation to predicate style logic PoN, is that the subject can only posit your claim here if they either don't recognize the contradiction in the predicate or they convinced themselves of some sort of wiggle room (which requires, I would argue in your case, some refurbishing of the term "discrete experience").

What I could do is form the PoN to make the proof cleaner, but it is not required.

You can most definitely posit it without classical aristotilian logic which uses PoN and LEM, but that's not what I am referring to. You cannot help but use predicate style PoN to determine discrete experience.

Without the d/a distinction, there is a problem that the PoN must answer. "Just because I have not experienced an existence and its contradiction at the same time, how do I know I won't experience such a thing in the future?

You could, if it isn't in the same place at the same time. But let's refurbish the claim to append "at the same place" into your inquiry here to try and steel man it: the concept of space and time (in terms of their overlying references and not different theories out there such as string theory) would be contradicted by a predicate which states "Space/time contains A and not A in the place at the same time". This is why it is important to note the necessary inseparability of time and space, for the sentence "Space contains A and not A" does not violate predicate logic PoN, nor does "Time references A and not A at the same time": it's only when combined, the union of the two concepts, where the predicate contradicts the subject concept. I don't see how this is a problem for PoN as I've described it.

You have never observed these contradictions, but as noted earlier, how do you explain that this gives you knowledge that it is not possible somewhere in reality?

It doesn't. Firstly, I am deriving the possibility of reason, not constructing rationality. Secondly, there is application, rationally, for logical systems that do not use LEM and even some that do not use traditional PoN (from classical logic). What isn't possible is to sincerely posit a claim wherein the predicate contradicts its subject concept. It is only possible if one refurbishes the terminology or simply doesn't recognize the contradiction: that's the only way. At this point, I am not attempting to construct a logical system I deem most rational for a given context, I am noting the possibility of reason and therefrom asserting the fundamentals thereof.

Then this is absolutely key. If there is any doubt or misunderstanding of the idea that we discretely experience, that has to be handled before anything else. Please express your doubt or misunderstanding here, as everything relies on this concept. You keep not quite grasping the a/d distinction, and I feel this is the underlying root cause.

I think I understand that we discretely experience. However that doesn't necessitate it is a fundamental. We utilize predicate logic style PoN to derive we discretely experience. Someone could possibly deny this by introducing "wiggle room" into the concept of discrete experience to abstract applicable non-LEM scenarios or even non-PoN scenarios. Maybe my use of PoN is misleading, maybe I need to use a different term?

Without applicable knowledge, how can your theory compete with someone who uses a completely different theory using different definitions for words and concepts?

They would be using mine fundamentally. I cannot say the same for classical logic, fuzzy, etc. I can't say the same for every definition of PoN, LEM, law of identity, etc. I am speaking much broader than I think you may believe me to be.

Yes, absolute truth outruns proof.

That's not quite what I meant, but I agree. I'll refrain from further elaboration to keep this shorter and more relevant to your epistemology.

A potential infinite regress is an induction. You can deductively ascertain this induction, but it is an induction. Potential means, "It could, or could not be." If your theory has a potential infinite regress, you have an unresolved induction as the base of your argument.

Every valid epistemology must have an absolute as its point of derived contingency. Mine is no exception. A potential infinite regress is not an induction. Again, uncertainty is not equivocal to an induction. The absolute wherefrom contingency arises is utlimately reason in my epistemology. A potential infinite, of the type I am describing, is not claiming "it could, or could not be", it is claiming that a particular finite operation would be infinite if given the sufficient resources to continue. For example, counting the positive integers starting at 1 is a potential infinite. This claim is not an induction whatsoever. I deductively know that given sufficient resources counting the positive integers would be an finite operation occurring infinitely: there is no uncertainty in the claim here, only uncertainty in whether there is sufficient resources or not (which is not the actual claim here). This is clearly different, I would say, than an induction, such as, for example, if I were to claim that because I've seen white swans my whole life that all swans are white. Any sort of epistemology which grounds itself in an induction is faulty.

Mine contains no potential infinite regress.

I think it does. You can construct PoN and LEM based off of my definition of PoN, but cannot prove my definition of PoN without recursively using it. This is just like how you can't ever stop counting positive numbers granted enough resources and claim you've hit the last positive integer.

The key between us at this point is to avoid repetition. I fully understand that two arguments can be made, and eventually it may be that each side is unpersuaded by the other. It may be time where if you feel you are repeating yourself, feel free to state, "I disagree because of this previous point." and that is acceptable.

I feel I understand your positions at this point, and they are well thought out. But there are a couple of fundamental questions I've noted about your claim that the PoN is fundamental that I think need answering. Neither are a slight against you, you are a very intelligent, philosophically brilliant individual; the best I have encountered on these boards. So, if you would like, either we can start a new thread addressing your knowledge theory specifically, or we can simply spend the next post only going over your theory from the ground up, without the d/a distinction. I leave it up to you!

I understand and that it completely fair. If you would like to end the conversation in this discussion board here, that is totally fine! Sometime soon I will post a discussion board of my epistemology anyways. If you feel like this post has been utterly repetitive, then feel free to simply respond stating that, there's no need to repeat yourself countering my claims herein if you think you will indeed be reiterating.

I really appreciated our conversation, and I look forward to many more! You are also a brilliant, respectful, and genuine philosopher, and I respect that. It may be that we just agree to disagree, and continue this conversation (if you are interested) on another discussion board in the future.

Bob

I completely understand the desire to prevent irrelevant derailments on the thread, and I can see how diving into my epistemology could do just that. — Bob Ross

My concern was less with derailment, but not giving your theory its proper due when you're constantly trying to compare it to the d/a distinction. I've had time to build up the d/a distinction, then we've drilled into it. You have not been given the time to build your theory up, but are building it while comparing. That makes it very difficult for me to evaluate your theory fairly, while also trying to explain mine. In reading your reply, I see my suspicions were correct. Your definition of PoN was different from my understanding of it, and that's only because you haven't had time to let your own epistemology be explored and carefully constructed like I've had time to do here.

I do not mind at all exploring your epistemology here! Next post, feel free to get the last responses to the points I'll make here. I will not respond to them, but give you time to post your theory. You can use this spot as a draft if you would like before making your own post. Once I understand your theory, and get to ask my questions about it without the d/a comparison, we might come back to this later. You have had patience and curiosity with my proposal, the least I can do is return that favor. If this sounds like something you would like, I'll post my final points on the d/a distinction (for now!).

To keep it brief, my point is that my use of PoN is not meant as a logical construct like those, and its precise definition holds no immediate favoritism on the battle between paraconsistent vs consistent logical languages. I am defining PoN in the form of predicate-logic:

"a predicate cannot contradict its subject concept" — Bob Ross

Ah, I completely misunderstood this. I don't think this is called the principle of negation as often understood, but simply a consequence of language construction. First, lets break down what a predicate and subject are Feel free of course to amend my understanding of these definitions to fit your intention!

Subject - the "thing" being addressed in the sentence
Predicate - some type of assertion attributed to the subject in the sentence. An attribute, action, etc.

First, we can clearly see this is not more fundamental than discrete experience. This is a linguistic construct, whereas discrete experience requires no language, and is the foundation for language. One must be able to discretely experience to define a subject, and within my theory, you are able to define an essential or non-essential attribute of said subject. This is essentially a predicate; a further breakdown of the discrete experience of a subject into more discrete component parts. The "thing" is currently running. The "thing" is red. But I don't have to note that its running or red. The "thing" can exist as simply the discrete experience itself, unbroken and without any attributes but itself. Predicates are not required for subjects to exist.

Now if we are to note that properties are sub-discrete experiences of a subject, then by consequence we've constructed a system of distinctive logic that entails that a predicate is part of a subject. Thus we could propose that a predicate cannot contradict a subject, as that would mean we created attributes of a discrete experience that cannot exist on that discrete experience (the subject). But this does not predate the ability to discretely experience, it is built up from it. As such, "The predicate cannot contradict the subject" is not needed as a fundamental. It is a derived logic.

As for it being impossible that a predicate cannot contradict a subject, lets go further. What is the nature of a deduction? That the conclusion follows the premises. This also means that the conclusion does not contradict the premises. That the predicates do not contradict the subject. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises. This also means one possible type of induction is a conclusion which does negate the premises! I believe Dan is running right now. If so, it is distinctively implicit that Dan may in fact not be running right now. I look at Dan, and applicably determine he is not running. So here I have an induction who's resolved conclusion is that the predicate counters the subject. This was something I distinctively knew and held, despite reality showing otherwise. How does your epistemology handle the fact that inductions also implicate a predicate that contradicts the subject?

Let go even further. I applicably conclude Dan is running. But it turns out I made a mistake. It turns out this was Dan's twin that I was not aware existed. His name is Din, and he was the one running. Dan was also walking nearby with his back to us, and he turned around to let us know that was his brother when we yelled at "Dan" (who was Din) to turn around. Yet prior to Dan turning around, I distinctively and applicably knew that "Din" was "Dan" and that he was running. Barring the d/a distinction, was I not holding knowledge of a subject that had a contradictory predicate? Because the actual Dan was walking. In short, a Gettier type problem. How does your epistemology handle this?

The d/a distinction does not require the principle of subject non-negation (PSNN?) This is because I can distinctively know inductions, which implicitly allow me to distinctively hold knowledge of a sentence that could in application, have a predicate that contradicts a subject. Now, we can state that we distinctively know through deductions. This is true. But why should we hold to deductions over inductions? As I've noted, there is a hierarchy. But why is there a hierarchy? It is not because there is some necessary logical construct. It is because this logical construct gives us the best chance of survival, and actually understanding the world in a way where we can control or predict its outcomes accurately. Again, I do not see the PSNN as a fundamental. A nicely derived logic, but necessary for my epistemology.

Thinking further, someone could most certainly construct a distinctive knowledge that does not follow the PSNN. The construction of an all powerful God is one. All three omni's make this God. Despite a person being pointed out how that would be a contradiction, the person simply adds another property to God, "God can do all things, including holding predicates which are contradictory to its subject." Are we to say they do not distinctively know this? No, they distinctively know this, despite the predicate contradicting the subject. We can construct a separate distinctive logical system which would show this to be a poor distinctive bit of knowledge to hold, but we cannot deny that this is what they distinctively know.

I think this is similar to your green circles example.

It is perfectly possible to hold sincerely that something is A and not A without contradiction as long as the subject concept is not contradicted by the predicate — Bob Ross

Except for the fact that there are contradictory predicates. But if the predicates are contradictory in themselves, how does this relate to the subject? In the d/a distinction, I can claim I do not applicably know of any thing that is both existent and non-existent at the same time. But I can distinctively create such a thing in my mind. Which means I can say "There is a thing which is everything and nothing at the same time." and it be "possible" because I can create this in my mind. In your argument, these predicates do not contradict the subject. Whereas with the d/a distinction, I can demonstrate distinctively such a thing is possible, but applicably, it is something we cannot know. I do not have to concern myself to a linguistic game of predicates and subjects.

Finally, I want to ask if a subject can hold two contradictory predicates, why can it not hold a predicate which contradicts its subject? If a thing can have the predicate of both being there, and not being there, then isn't the subject a contradiction in itself? Which again, we can imagine such a thing distinctively. At best we can only speculate that such a thing could be known applicably. If I can distinctively create whatever subject with whatever properties (predicates) I want any time, then doesn't that hold to the notion I've been stating this entire time? That is, distinctively, I can hold whatever system of logic I want. And I am not seeing the argument that convinces me that I cannot create a system of logic in which the predicate can contradict the subject.

Again, the only way to counter such a hold, is with applicable knowledge. By asking them to show that such a being exists, we can escape the fact that we can distinctively know almost anything we want/are programmed to hold. In applicable knowledge we use deduction, but again, we use deduction not because we need to, but because it is more helpful to our survival and outcome in life.

"The bread I am eating is purple"

Well, I am not eating bread. So I am neither eating bread that is purple nor bread that is not purple, because I am not eating bread. Therefore it is neither true nor false. Imagine I am eating cereal and I claim: — Bob Ross

I had to note I don't believe this is the case. This is a combined sentence, and we can break it down.

I am eating bread.
The bread is purple.

Both are false, I cannot see this as being neither true or false in application.

"this sentence is false"

I could simply concede that the liar paradox outputs {t, f}, which is essentially the same thing as defining a liar paradox sentence as having a property of being contradictory (just like being green and not green). — Bob Ross

Again, we can break the implicit combination down.

This is a sentence "This sentence is false."
The previous sentence is false.

That results in t,f. No paradox or indeterminency. I would argue that when one cannot break a sentence down into t and f, that is a weakness of sentence construction, not a revelation of knowledge.

You are subscribing your epistemology to LEM and PoN, most notably as described by classical logic. This rules out the actual applicable usages of paraconsistent, fuzzy, and first-degree entailment logic. My epistemology still accounts for these within their own respects. — Bob Ross

I never claimed my epistemology ruled these logical constructs out. If anything, I've noted repeatedly you can construct whatever logical system you want distinctively. Can those logics be used in application? If so, then they are fine. I think this is a situation again in which I do not fully understand your theory.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time.

I don't think you can posit this unless you are redefining discrete experience: the subject concept necessitates, categorically, that it be distinct, which necessitates that one cannot experience both something and its negation at the same time in the same place. — Bob Ross

No, we just affirmed I could do this. Can't I say a thing is both green and non-green at the same time? That is indeterminency. I can distinctively know this. Can I applicably know such an indeterminency? So far, no.

A potential infinite, of the type I am describing, is not claiming "it could, or could not be", it is claiming that a particular finite operation would be infinite if given the sufficient resources to continue. For example, counting the positive integers starting at 1 is a potential infinite. This claim is not an induction whatsoever. — Bob Ross

I agree with your definition here. But we know this because the design of numbers allows this to be. Such a description is not necessarily meaningful for any designed system. What we can discretely experience is potentially infinite. What we can applicably experience is potentially infinite. Any formulaic system with an X variable will always be so. My question to you so I understand better, is whether your foundation is finite. The system of numbers is formed by symbols, addition, subtraction, and for our purposes, base 10 rules. Does your epistemology have a solid and unquestionable base that does not need potentially infinite regress?

This is why it is important to note the necessary inseparability of time and space, for the sentence "Space contains A and not A" does not violate predicate logic PoN, nor does "Time references A and not A at the same time": it's only when combined, the union of the two concepts, where the predicate contradicts the subject concept. — Bob Ross

I don't believe this is correct Bob.

Space contains A and not A
Time references A and not A at the same time
Therefore space and time contains A and not A, and references A and not A at the same time

So again, we have contradictory predicates to a subject. What might help is showing a genuine situation in which a predicate contradicts a subject, and why, without using the d/a distinction.

Mine contains no potential infinite regress.

I think it does. You can construct PoN and LEM based off of my definition of PoN, but cannot prove my definition of PoN without recursively using it. This is just like how you can't ever stop counting positive numbers granted enough resources and claim you've hit the last positive integer. — Bob Ross

I think I clearly did using discrete experience. If you discretely experience within another discrete experience, then that sub discrete experience is part of the bigger one. But we could also discretely experience that the sub discrete experience is not part of the bigger one. Perhaps it is a parasite, or foreign entity that we find not necessary to the greater experience. If the predicate cannot contradict the subject, can the subject contradict the predicate? What happens then if in my mind I reverse what the subject and predicate are? Claiming a predicate can never contradict a subject is a logical rule you have constructed after understanding what a subject is, and what a predicate is. It is not foundational.

If you would like to end the conversation in this discussion board here, that is totally fine! Sometime soon I will post a discussion board of my epistemology anyways. — Bob Ross

Coming back to this, I think it is simply needed that you construct your epistemology from its foundation at this point. I believe I don't fully understand your theory, as you've noted you define things different from what I think you are. Coming from me, I understand. :) So until you really have room to build your theory, I think we'll be talking past one another. Again, feel free to respond to my points that I have made, and I will let you have the last word on those. Then, if you would like to continue, feel free to construct your epistemology here, even as practice before posting it on its own thread. I will address it without using the d/a distinction. If we get to a point where you and I both feel we understand your theory, then we may go back to those final points that you'll make. Great discussion as always Bob!

I've been having a fantastic discussion with a member on this forum — Philosophim

You mean, simply, "I had a fantastic discussion ..." :smile:

how we "know" knowledge. — Philosophim

Besides being a pleonasm and a circular question, knowledge is acquired, not known.
Knowledge consists of facts, information and skills acquired through experience or education.
I had no idea about baseball. Then a friend of mine explained to me how it is played, its rules. points. etc. So, I got some information --which I had to process in my mind (vital)-- and I know now a little about this game. If I had watched a baseball match --which I haven't-- I would have more knowledge about the game. Still though, far less knowledge from a baseball player. There are levels of knowledge, They are built --and knowledge is built-- with acquiring more and more information and getting more experience about an object or subject.

This is basically the process of acquiring knowledge, but, here too, there are levels of elaboration, complexity and details in its description/explanation, which have to do, for example, with how the mind processes facts. But this belongs to some other topic ...

***
I know of course that this is far from being an actual reply to the whole topic, which BTW sounds quite interesting, but too mauch for me to get involved.. I just brought up some basics of knowledge.

↪Philosophim
I've been having a fantastic discussion with a member on this forum
— Philosophim
You mean, simply, "I had a fantastic discussion ..." :smile: — Alkis Piskas

As you'll see in the last reply prior to yours, I'm still having a nice conversation with Bob.

I know of course that this is far from being an actual reply to the whole topic, which BTW sounds quite interesting, but too mauch for me to get involved.. I just brought up some basics of knowledge. — Alkis Piskas

No offense, but if you aren't going to read the OP, you have no idea what you're talking about and are not offering anything useful. Feel free to read it and bring your full criticism and knowledge to bear on the subject. We'll chat then.

As you'll see in the last reply prior to yours, I'm still having a nice conversation with Bob. — Philosophim

I see. So you simply mean, "I have a nice conversation ..." :grin:

OK, I see that you don't care about semantics and/or grammar, which is of secondary importance of course, neither about how knowledge is acquired, which is of primary importance because it concerns your topic, and which nevertheless you ignored or avoided to discuss, most probably because you don't know what knowledge is and you don't want to know.

Anyway, posting a topic requires being also a good host and thank people who repsond to it, except if they are offending you. Which was not my case (as you stated).
Anyway #2, even semantics and grammar, let alone definitions and desciptions of concepts -- such as "knowledge"-- are useful. Only nonsense is useless. Which was not my case either, I think.

Anyway, sorry about my intervention in your topic. My bad. I've just chosen a wrong person to respond to.

As you'll see in the last reply prior to yours, I'm still having a nice conversation with Bob.
— Philosophim
I see. So you simply mean, "I have a nice conversation ..." :grin: — Alkis Piskas

No, I am having. As in ongoing, present tense. The conversation has not ended yet.

Alkis, you're being a troll, and its obvious. Anyone who doesn't read the OP, in which I go over how knowledge is acquired, then tries to critique something they haven't read is an ignorant person who is wasting my time. I thank people who are willing to engage in the OP and legitimately challenge the views here, not people like you.

@Philosophim,

First and foremost I want to thank you for a wonderful discussion (as always)! I appreciate you taking the time to respond the points I made that had no relevance to your epistemology and for being willing to discuss it in this forum. However, as you suspected, I don't think you quite understand my epistemology (and that's no fault of your own) nor do I 100% understand yours. I think it is best if we actually just pause the conversation here and reconvene after I post my epistemology. Then, you will have a fair grasp of what I am trying to convey and we can revisit our conversation of your epistemology. Then we can juxtapose them and explore them more adequately. With that being said, I think it is best that I actually leave it with your last post having the last word: although there is much I would like to say, it will all be addressed properly in my epistemology post (once I get the time to post the whole thing).

I look forward to our next conversation,
Bob

First and foremost I want to thank you for a wonderful discussion (as always)! — Bob Ross

I feel equally the same Bob! This is hands down the best overall discussion I've had with another person on the forums. My respect for you cannot be overstated. You've given me a conversation I tried to find for years. Even if this never goes anywhere beyond these forums, that has been enough for me to feel fulfilled. I look forward to your epistemology, and I will seek to give it the respect and thoughtfulness you have shown mine.

Thanks again,
Philosophim