“EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.
Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower.
But, whatever is received is 'in the recipient' according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses.
If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner.
This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. 'To understand' is to free form completely from matter.
Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.
Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known.
But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
Not an argument but an observation. To say that a thing is composed of matter seems to me unobjectionable. To say that it is composed of form, at close look, seems if not incoherent, then somehow a whole different meaning of "composed." The observation is that in the Greek, there is not so much form, as form-ing. That is, for example, to make something of wood, we get out some wood from the lumber room. but there is no corresponding form room where forms are stored. Plans to achieve a particular form, maybe, but not the form itself. Thus the Greek traces back to the verb. We turn it upside-down as a noun and then try to make sense of it. Plato's form, example again, of justice isn't anything more, when shorn, than being(-)just.EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form.
So until matter 'takes form' or 'receives form' then it is 'inchoate' or formless. (The emergence of order from chaos is of course one of the underlying problems of all philosophy and science.) — Wayfarer
ollowers of Duns Scotus thought that prime matter can exist on it's own. — Gregory
Please provide a real argument that a tree is composed of two principles instead of one. Why not just the treeness principle instantiated? — Gregory
If a tree was just form, then with every passing moment that the form of the tree changed, it would be a hew object. We could not refer to it as one continuous, existing "tree" because every new moment it becomes something different, with change. So Aristotle posited "matter" as the underlying thing which stays the same, as the form changes, — Metaphysician Undercover
The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word — JerseyFlight
I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. — JerseyFlight
You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference. — JerseyFlight
The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process. — JerseyFlight
Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference. — JerseyFlight
Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself. — JerseyFlight
Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? — JerseyFlight
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255 — JerseyFlight
It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? — JerseyFlight
This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle. — JerseyFlight
This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), — JerseyFlight
It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once... — JerseyFlight
What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity. — JerseyFlight
So it's a new form every time a color dims on an object? — Gregory
Most of us have no problem seeing something as the same even though parts change, without positing an underlying principle under another one that changes. — Gregory
There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?' — JerseyFlight
He is using the word "essence" to describe thoughts because he thinks the world is literally in his head thru the forms — Gregory
You speak as if the form in the mind is the same in essence as the outside forms. — Gregory
You've been ambiguous about identity and said that essence is the form in the mind. — Gregory
But you can continue to ignore the fact that I've refuted your position many times, that's up to you. — Gregory
I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack. — JerseyFlight
The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark? — JerseyFlight
Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind? — JerseyFlight
(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position). — JerseyFlight
Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to: — JerseyFlight
I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. — JerseyFlight
I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion? — JerseyFlight
Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection? — JerseyFlight
(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more — JerseyFlight
I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? — JerseyFlight
How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process? — JerseyFlight
Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair? — JerseyFlight
I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects. — JerseyFlight
It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind. — JerseyFlight
When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. — JerseyFlight
Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. — JerseyFlight
What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. — JerseyFlight
If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same. — JerseyFlight
This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind. — JerseyFlight
Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. — JerseyFlight
This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point. — JerseyFlight
Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. — JerseyFlight
It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? — JerseyFlight
What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense. — JerseyFlight
Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it? — JerseyFlight
I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories. — JerseyFlight
He is so convinced he has the correct psychology and that we really abstract without knowing it that he can't see that he created this feeling of abstraction is his mind through lust for a devourment of scholastic books. "Reason is a whore" said Luther (about Aristotle btw) — Gregory
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