The human condition, OTOH as far as subjective interpretations (such as beauty, pleasure, pain etc) exists on personal/individual spectrums without objective constants, thus descriptors such as "negative", or "worse" only have meaning when compared to another event on that spectrum. — LuckyR

That would mean that if you put a dog in a cage at birth and beat it every day and gave it no pleasures, the least severe beating would be a positive experience. That is simply not correct.

By all means attack the connection I have made, but please don’t imply that I haven’t attempted to make one. — Herg

While I appreciate your elucidation, with respect this is not what I asked for. You made a connection between two conceptions of one assumed fact (which falls back on the previous objection).

What I want is something like:
Kicking puppies causes them harm =
It is wrong to kick puppies.

I cannot conceive of this, other than just claiming (as ethical naturalists often do) supervenience. That's fine if so, I just wanted that clarified. Please do not feel attacked. These are discussions about ethics and its best we stay away from taking things personally. I feel you havent clarified yourself or provided the baove. That's all.

torturing B is painful for B, that pain is intrinsically bad, that T is therefore instrumentally bad, and that if A is exercising free will when he performs T, then T is morally bad. I am not simply associating the facts in my mind, I have argued that they are connected in fact. — Herg

Fwiw, it wasn't sufficiently clear to me that this was your fundamental form of claim. Apologies I missed it.

I can see that you're trying to make that connection, but the second bold collapses into my prior objection. Why is pain intrinsically bad? I think, unfortunately, this is just wrong. There are plenty of counter-examples. Enough to make it a little silly, don't you think?

My claim is that pain is intrinsically bad. Where pain is beneficial, it is instrumentally good, which does not contradict my claim. — Herg

That's fine and i fully take the point. There's no logical incoherence in that. What i'm claiming is incoherent is making the claim that pain is intrinsically bad. But that's somewhat for another time, tbh.

The issue is that instrumental value is basically all we can actually assess. "intrinsically bad" begs a question. That means there is a basic, fundamental disconnect between what you'd call a natural fact "pain is bad" and the moral claim "it is wrong to cause pain". Far too much contingency in that for it to be a fact in any sense, imo.

evidence that (a) she was in a great deal of pain and (b) she had a strong negative response to the pain, which supports my contention that pain is intrinsically bad. — Herg

It absolutely does not. It supports the facts that a) she was in pain, and b) she had a strong negative response to the pain. This is personal discomfort, writ large. It does not follow, in any way, that pain is intrinsically bad. You've illustrated a single instance which cannot be extrapolated to every other instance. It says a lot more about your wife, than it does about the intrinsic nature of pain.

But why did she see it as bad? If you don’t think it is because it was intrinsically bad, then what was her reason? — Herg

Because she didn't enjoy it. People get the same feeling from eating food they don't like.

There is genuinely no connection in your posts between the claimed natural fact, and the moral claim such that
A. Pain is intrinsically bad; can be supported through to;
B. Therefore, do not pain.

Uummm... no. It doesn't mean that. As you've described it, the dog would be given no positive experiences from their handler. They would receive episodes of beatings of various severities. They'd have the majority of their life in the absence of beatings and dogs left on their own commonly lick themselves. So in summation the least severe beating would likely be a pretty severe negative, when looking at their lifespan. If you only count the beatings, it would be the least negative or the most positive, which are identical on a continuous spectrum in the absence of a zero.

This seems to be the central theme of this entire forum—to deduce "ought" from "is," thereby overcoming Hume's guillotine.

What if we try through the "other"? In other words, the other is the one who confirms the fact of our existence. Without the "other," this would turn into a fusion into unity. The single, monolithic "I" is the center and essence of everything. Does being itself exist, then, without a true other?

None of this proves that kicking a dog = bad. However, killing a dog = depriving yourself of otherness, provided that you yourself became through it and with it: in contact with it, you yourself acquired form? It follows that kicking a dog is not equal to evil. But destroying its otherness (including through kicking) is equal to evil, since it harms you (in the long term).

This approach is taking egoism to the extreme, which could explain "ought" through "is." Namely: the destruction of another is the erasure of one’s own limits; limits whose essence constitutes your own form.

I can't understand what you're getting at, sorry.

What if we try through the "other"? In other words, the other is the one who confirms the fact of our existence. — Astorre

This doesn't seem to be something one can respond to intelligibly. I do not mean at all to be rude, but I can't understand this.

Yes, I apologize. This really does seem like a random comment, taken out of context and out of the previous discussion. It was too harsh and too off-topic.

No need to apologise - it seemed interesting, I just am not grasping it. Could be me!

Yes, I've been working on this for about two years now. And, of course, such a sudden outburst might seem strange.

This is an attempt to justify what is due through ontology, to derive it from the self itself.

At the moment, it's a long, unnecessary 50 pages of text that even my friends struggle with. I'm disappointed in it. I think it's neither interesting nor necessary.

Does being itself exist, then, without a true other? — Astorre

I, for one, can see where you get that idea from. I too have been exploring it, although from a different perspective.

At one stage on my spiritual-philosophical path, I came up with the catchy term 'the illusion of otherness'. It was meant to convey a quality which is fundamental to our sense of felt existence - the idea that reality or Being is something that we're outside of, or 'other' to. This manifests as the sense of alienation or separateness which is the source of the pervading anxiety of life as the self is aware of its own eventual mortality whereby it is once again absorbed by what is other to it, in the form of death.

The over-arching theme was that, to overcome this 'illusion of otherness' was to experience that state of union with the All, which yogic and some mystical teachings point to. (It's not specifically Christian, in that such union in Christianity is always in terms of union with God, and I didn't necessarily understand it in theistic terms)

As life went on, and the effects of youthful optimism fell from my eyes, it turned out that transcending this 'illusion of otherness' and realising that unitive state was impossibly remote for an ordinary person such as myself. This is why, after all, most of the teachings about this state assume a kind of reclusive or ascetic way of life, practically the opposite of modern middle-class existence with all its many attachments and habits.

Later in life, I've come to look at the question from a more philosophical, and less mystical, perspective. I have been exploring an idea found in the pioneering book by Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophy of Biology. I won't try and summarise it, as it is a profound and weighty book. But one central idea in it, is that the appearance of even the most rudimentary life-forms is the appearance of intentionality as a mode of existence. Even a primitive organism has to navigate its environment, ward off threats, seek sustenance, and so on, even though they are not possessed of anything lilke sentient awareness. Likewise, here you see the most rudimentary sense of 'self-and-other', in that the organism has to maintain itself distinct from the environment. Its enclosing membrane comprises the boundary between it and the sorrounding nature. That is the ancient origin of the sense of 'otherness' that I had previously thought was a kind of illusion or false consciousness.

So to address your question, perhaps it could be said that existence always entails that sense of otherness or separateness, as it is fundamental to the phenomenon of life. I still feel like the 'illusion of otherness' or separateness is always a kind of existential state or spiritual lack, and that transcending that sense of separateness is what the 'unitive vision' seeks. But note that this also entails dying, in some fundamental sense. From which perspective, embodied existence is itself a plight or a malaise. So I suppose this must always end up being a kind of religious intuition, although again not necessarily Christian.