Nobody likes epiphenomenalism these days. Poor epi :(

I know little about this subject, so just some tentative discussion that may be not relevant, as I find dualism interesting:

If self consciousness is a factor that receives input from but does not output to the system, how does the system (cognition) can recognize the existence of the factor?

(Possibly related, and the same question I have about Chalmer's argument, with the difference he also postulates no input and admits a paradox. He does answer it in his book though.)

What do you mean by "reporting" in Q1? A conscious experience? Or causality chain in the system?

What do you mean by "reporting" in Q1? A conscious experience? Or causality chain in the system? — Ignoro

Every time I feel something, I can talk about it. For example, if a sudden pain struck me, I can say ''I am in pain''. Under epiphenomenalism, brain states that produce qualia can also cause one to say ''I feel X'', when X is being felt. At the same time, there are no brain states that don't produce qualia but make one to say ''I feel Y'', if Y does not exist. For example, there is no brain state that makes you suddenly say ''I feel plamburine'', when this quale doesn't even exist. So it is weird how we got to this perfect accuracy.

it's not weird that the primordial juice we come from is best formed in a body that likes to enjoy and sometimes says things about itself it truly doesn't feel

But under epiphenomenalism, ''liking'' plays no role. That is what we're arguing against. ))

Q1. If epiphenomenalism is true, how come 100% the brain states that produce qualia also produce reporting, while 0% of the brain states who don't produce qualia produce reporting? E.g. Why can I report when I have a quale, but I never say ''I feel X'' unless that X is a quale? — Eugen

Let me suggest this is the wrong question, because it assumes, on pure faith, that brain cells produce qualia, as opposed to qualia signifying the contents of neural states. Signs relate to what they signify, but they are not produced by what they signify. Dogs do not produce the sound or spelling "dog," nor do they produce the concept <dog>, for if they did, ideas would not require thinkers.

A more pointed question, and one that I can see no epiphenomenal response to, is "how we can discuss qualia if they can have no physical effect?" Physicalists assume that concepts are at physical states or, perhaps, operations. So the existence of the concept of qualia shows that qualia can produce either physical states or operations -- and surely expressing the existence of qualia is a physical effect.

Q2. Why do we go to the cinema to watch comedy movies if not driven by pleasure? It is not productive in the sense of reproduction or survival. Not to mention drugs. — Eugen

I think this could have an epiphenomenal answer if we forget the problem I just outlined. We could say that watching comedies produce endorphins and the behavior occurs to secure this effect -- with pleasure being epiphenomenal.

As you mention survival, if qualia could produce no physical effects, their emergence can't be explained by evolution. Natural selection can only select on the basis of the physical effects of an inheritable variation. Epiphenomenalism allows for no physical effects.

So why? — Eugen

Because Harris is not driven by rationality. If he were, he would provide the best case for both sides. As he does not, his works are polemic and so must have an irrational motivation.