• Dfpolis
    1.3k
    I recently read the SEP article "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification" and was quite disappointed by the protracted discussion, not of Foundationalism, but of claims of infallibility. We read:
    Aristotle argued that “not all knowledge is demonstrative” (i.e., not all knowledge is based on an argument from other things known), and that some knowledge must be “independent of demonstration” (Posterior Analytics, I.3).Ali Hasan and Richard Fumerton
    After that the article goes off on multiple tangents that seem not to touch on the central issue.

    Aristotle's claim is simple and straight forward: we can't prove everything, so we have to accept some judgements without proof. One can show this with an infinite regress argument, or simply reflect that life is too short to prove an unlimited number of claims. As far as I know, Aristotle never claimed to be infallible, or even that one could not question and discuss the grounds for accepting fundamental premises. Indeed, he does so, but considering how we form judgements and discussing the consequences of rejecting the principles of logic.

    Aristotle founded a number of sciences, including marine biology and mathematical physics, and he insisted that his students get their hands dirty doing dissections. It seems to me that he did philosophy in the same way, by reflecting on the reality he encountered, not the world he imagined -- as did 19th century German metaphysicians. He saw that we learn about reality via sense data and, in De Anima, provided an unparalleled analysis of what must happen for physical sensation to yield intellectual understanding.

    Clearly, human beings are fallible. So it is an enormous error to begin philosophizing by seeking an infallible basis for human knowledge, as Descartes did. He, and others, made divine omniscience the paradigm case of human knowing. We are not God, and will never know as God does. Thinking that we do, or ought to, is what I call the Omniscience Fallacy. Not only are we subject to errors of judgement, but our brains can only maintain 5-9 “chunks” of information in working memory. (D. A. Broadbent, “The Magical Number Seven After Fifteen Years” in Alan Kennedy and Alan Wilkes, eds., Studies in Long-Term Memory. (New York: Wiley, 1975): 3-18.) So, we do not know anything exhaustively.

    It is consequence of this second observation, of our limited representational capacity, that we must employ the stupid human trick of abstraction. When we encounter a complex situation, and all situations are complex, we must focus on certain aspects, on selected notes of intelligibility, to the neglect of others. The result is an abstraction. Abstractions, then, scale the complexity of reality down to our limited human representational capacity. We invariably wind up with a projection of reality -- a dimensionally diminished map.

    Alfred North Whitehead recognized this in Science and the Modern World and pointed out an all too common and unrecognized error, which he called "The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" (p. 11). The fallacy is mistaking our abstractions with the reality from which they are abstracted. As I pointed out in discussing the Hard Problem of Consciousness on this forum, this is the basis of both reductionism and physicalism.

    Further, all knowing is a subject-object relation. There is no knowing without a knowing subject and a known object. Consequently, it is foolish (an instance of Misplaced Concreteness) to speak of "purely objective" knowledge as though it were possible for humans. Our encounter with reality is relational -- shaped not only by the nature of what we encounter, but also by our human capacity for encounter, with all of its limitations. So, we can never know reality as "it is," as God does, but only as it relates to us.

    Still, this is enough. While all we can know is how reality relates to us, that is all we need to know -- for we only deal with reality in relation to us. How else could we deal with it?

    So, we come to the question of truth. Corherrentist theories deal with something of no concern to humans, as we are concerned with how to live in the world, and that requires us to be in relation to what we call "reality." So, the only kind of truth that matters is one that reflects the human relation to reality. How should we characterize that relation?

    Truth is not correspondence to reality. Why? First, because our knowledge is not exhaustive, but leaves an untold amount behind. It is only a diminished projection of what we encounter. Second, because we do not and cannot know reality as it is, but only as it relates to us. (While relations reflect the nature of the relata, they are not the natures of the relata.) Of course, we want truth to reflect our relation to reality, but reflecting our relation to reality is not reflecting reality in se.

    The medieval Scholastic defined truth asadaequatio intellectus et rei (the approach to equality of intellect and reality). The important point here, is that, despite numerous mistranslations, adaequatio does not mean "equality" (aequatio), but "approach to equality." Thus, the definition does not demand correspondence as a requirement of truth.

    If only an approach to equality is required, the question arises: "How close an approach?" Let me suggest that the answer is context-sensitive, and suggested by the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequate." To be true, our judgements must be adequate to the context under consideration. Remembering that what we know is not exhaustive and based on an abstractive process, that our judgement will be adequate if what we ignored in our abstractions is irrelevant to our present endeavor.

    For example, I do not think I was lying when I taught freshmen engineering students Newtonian physics without fully explaining how relativistic quantum physics falsified it. Why? Because what I taught them was adequate to their needs. Those who would need more precise physics would take other courses to learn it. We can never present all that we know, but we can speak the truth by presenting something adequate to the needs of our audience.

    In sum, philosophy can only deal with human knowledge, because, however limited, it is the only knowledge we have. It begins by accepting experience, not as infallible, but as the only raw material that we have to reflect upon.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k
    Truth is not correspondence to reality. Why? First, because our knowledge is not exhaustive, but leaves an untold amount behind. It is only a diminished projection of what we encounter.Dfpolis

    But why must it be exhaustive? If a state-of-affairs includes aspects A, B, C, D, E, and F, and we only describe it as having A, B, and D -- is that not true? It would be false if we claimed it only had aspects A, B, and D, but we needn't claim that. We know we're leaving things out. What we want is correspondence between what we claim is there and what is there. You can reasonably say "correspondence" should be a bijection, not an injection, but that's just semantics. What really matters is the difference between my A-B-D claim and someone else's A-B-M-N-O-P claim. That's not an injection, because the state-of-affairs does not include M, N, O and P. And then there's the A-B-C-D-E-F-M-N-O-P claim: that's exhaustive but also excessive, and also no good.

    To be true, our judgements must be adequate to the context under consideration. Remembering that what we know is not exhaustive and based on an abstractive process, that our judgement will be adequate if what we ignored in our abstractions is irrelevant to our present endeavor.Dfpolis

    And I think this is exactly what you recognize here. "To say of what is that it is" while avoiding saying "of what is not that it is", and so on.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    But why must it be exhaustive?Srap Tasmaner

    I don't think knowledge needs to be exhaustive. Still, if we demand that what we know correspond to reality, then, if we think a table is solid, and later find that it has an atomic substructure structure, we will conclude that our initial knowledge was as nothing in it corresponds to atoms.

    If a state-of-affairs includes aspects A, B, C, D, E, and F, and we only describe it as having A, B, and D -- is that not true?Srap Tasmaner

    It depends on the context. If F is the fact that we were at the murder scene when the murder was committed, and we leave that out of our witness statement, then our statement is inadequate and false. If F is the fact that we scratched our noise before going to bed, that will not make the statement inadequate and false. Formally, these cases are the same (F is left out), but materially, they are very different.

    It would be false if we claimed it only had aspects A, B, and D, but we needn't claim that.Srap Tasmaner

    We do not have to make an explicit claim for a statement to be false, because truth and falsity are context dependent.

    What we want is correspondence between what we claim is there and what is there.Srap Tasmaner

    I think we want more and less than that. We want more if there is more known relevant to our needs, and we do not care if more is known that is irrelevant to our need. If you know that a material will fracture at the temperature that I tell you I'm going to use it at, but meets my requirement at room temperature, and you leave the relevant information out, what you say corresponds to reality, but is substantially deceptive. If I tell you F=ma, leaving out the relativistic corrections you have no need of, what I said does not correspond to reality, but is substantially true.

    You can reasonably say "correspondence" should be a bijection, not an injection, but that's just semanticsSrap Tasmaner

    Yes, you can and I think must specify the kind of correspondence you mean if that is your theory of truth. Still, since human knowledge is limited, a one-to-one mapping is not possible.

    Truth is a species of goodness, that appropriate to judgements and the propositions expressing them. It seems to me that goodness is adequacy for purpose. Is my representation of reality sufficient/adequate for the action I contemplate, the theory I am constructing, or the information I am conveying? It is if it includes the relevant factors and not otherwise -- and that depends on context in a way not captured by formal correspondence.

    "To say of what is that it is" while avoiding saying "of what is not that it is", and so on.Srap Tasmaner

    I am not arguing with Aristotle, but with a purely formal view of correspondence.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k


    Agreed pretty much all around, and congenial to my usually Gricean way of looking at things. We can, for purposes of theory, or in difficult cases, distinguish between the bare meaning of a sentence and what someone meant by saying it in the context that they did. Leaving out a relevant piece of information, for instance, doesn't make what you say false, so much as misleading (and violates Grice's maxims).

    Truth is a species of goodness, that appropriate to judgements and the propositions expressing them.Dfpolis

    Is this Aristotle?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    if we think a table is solid, and later find that it has an atomic substructure structure, we will conclude that our initial knowledge was as nothing in it corresponds to atoms.Dfpolis

    My coffee cup sits on the table. I just put it there. My coffee cup does not sink into the table, the way it would if made of something that is not solid - a liquid, perhaps.

    Knowing that the table is also made mostly of space, and has a certain atomic structure, does not mean that we are wrong about the table's being solid.

    I noticed a preponderance of physical examples. Perhaps the point of foundationalism might be better served by taking a wider view. I know, for example, that the bishop remains on its original colour, the one that starts on my left will remain on the red squares for the whole of the game. That's not a truth that is known by making observations of the way things are and then describing them, but a truth that is in a way constitutive of playing Chess; were it otherwise, we would be playing a different game.

    If you like, that the bishop stays on the red squares is foundational to chess.

    And perhaps, that the cup does not sink into the table is foundational to their being solid.
  • JerseyFlight
    782
    Knowing that the table is also made mostly of space, and has a certain atomic structure, does not mean that we are wrong about the table's being solid.Banno

    The other position is lost in abstraction. There is a concretion to reality, which not even the most fundamental idealist or radical skeptic can deny.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Truth is a species of goodness, that appropriate to judgements and the propositions expressing them. — Dfpolis

    Is this Aristotle?
    Srap Tasmaner

    Not that I recall. It just came to me as I was writing my response.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Knowing that the table is also made mostly of space, and has a certain atomic structure, does not mean that we are wrong about the table's being solid.Banno

    I agree. The example is from Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, who reflected on the table of common sense vs. the table of science. The lesson is we shouldn't extend the meaning of "solid" beyond its experiential basis. Saying it is solid is adequate to what we want to know, e.g. that your coffee cup is not going to fall through it and make a mess of the carpet.

    I noticed a preponderance of physical examples.Banno

    You caught me! My degree is in theoretical physics. I tend to go to science for examples because reflecting on it raised a lot of my questions.

    I know, for example, that the bishop remains on its original colour, the one that starts on my left will remain on the red squares for the whole of the game. That's not a truth that is known by making observations of the way things are and then describing them, but a truth that is in a way constitutive of playing Chess; were it otherwise, we would be playing a different game.Banno

    Yes. I agree that knowledge has a justified range of application. Of course, in doing philosophy we want a consistent framework for understanding the full range of human experience, from mysticism to cosmology.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k


    Good for you!

    Truth and knowledge are also normative concepts. You should believe what is true, and should believe it because it is true. To do so is to have knowledge. "Getting something right", "doing something right" and "doing the right thing" are not just homophonically related.
  • Judaka
    1.7k

    I have been talking about similar concepts on this forum lately, it is interesting to see a different way of explaining it, thanks for your post. I will note how you laid out these concepts and see if there isn't something I can use to improve my own position.
  • apokrisis
    6.8k
    Further, all knowing is a subject-object relation. There is no knowing without a knowing subject and a known object.Dfpolis

    But what if we use this "psychological" fact as the stepping stone to the larger metaphysical picture?

    So your argument is that the "truth of reality" seems problematic as we appear caught between a subjective and objective viewpoint. It is we who construct the abstract concepts by which we understand the physical world. So all becomes modelling and the thing-in-itself never truly grasped.

    And once you accept that psychological fact, then perhaps the search for truth must collapse back on itself as being a merely the "pragmatic" exercise as truth as it is "for us". Objectivity must be forsaken and subjectivity accepted?

    However rather than inquiry collapsing back onto itself in solipsistic manner, it could also kick on to generalise the very fact of this subject~object modelling relation.

    It is still going to be an exercise in abstraction. But now the goal is to generalise the very idea of a modelling relation.

    That becomes pragmatism writ large.

    An example of this way of thinking can be found in Robert Rosen's relational biology, for instance. The "physics" of nature is enlarged so it includes formal and final cause.

    In direct contradiction of the French philosopher Descartes' supposition that all animals are only elaborate machines or mechanisms. Rosen stated: "I argue that the only resolution to such problems [of the subject-object boundary and what constitutes objectivity] is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are 'objective'; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism."
  • JerseyFlight
    782
    Truth is not correspondence to reality. Why? First, because our knowledge is not exhaustive, but leaves an untold amount behind. It is only a diminished projection of what we encounter. Second, because we do not and cannot know reality as it is, but only as it relates to us.Dfpolis

    This already claims to know beyond what it says cannot be known. Seems to me this criteria of exactitude that you seem to leverage is unproductive. I know mountains, grass, stones, words, successful surgeries are performed on the basis of empirical knowledge. I reject the kind of skepticism (and I have good suspicion of where you got it) that says knowledge must entail exhaustive comprehension. You do not live by this standard, it is just a formal objection, one that I suspect, allows you to posit the probability of another kind of premise. I don't see what you are putting forth here as the conclusion of your polemic, interesting that you mentioned God. I wonder...
  • Banno
    23.1k
    ...Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, who reflected on the table of common sense vs. the table of science.Dfpolis
    Indeed, here it is: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260342309_AS_Eddington_Opening

    Now isn't there something a bit mad about the assertion that there are two tables?

    Isn't it rather the case that we have two ways of talking about the very same table?

    But back to the OP; do we agree that, the bishop remaining on the same colour for the duration fo the game is a foundational truth, rather than a truth known by experience?
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Thank you.

    I do not think that knowledge is either a normative concept or a species of belief. If knowledge were a form of belief, we would necessarily believe (be committed to the truth of) everything we know. We do not. We may know that we cannot afford a purchase, or that smoking is bad for us, and choose not to believe it.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    I look forward to your further reflections.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k


    That's interesting. When someone says, for example, "You should have known how many were left," what they mean is probably, more or less, you should have counted, should have put yourself in a position to know.

    I want to hear more about belief and knowledge. You gloss "believing that such-and-such" as being committed to the truth of such-and-such. Does that come in degrees?

    Do you treat "knowledge" as a primitive, not to be glossed or explained?
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    But what if we use this "psychological" fact as the stepping stone to the larger metaphysical picture?apokrisis

    It is an epistemological fact that must be considered in our metaphysical reflections.

    So your argument is that the "truth of reality" seems problematic as we appear caught between a subjective and objective viewpoint. It is we who construct the abstract concepts by which we understand the physical world. So all becomes modelling and the thing-in-itself never truly grasped.apokrisis

    No, that is not my argument. I am following Aristotle in De Anima ii, 7. We are not "caught between a subjective and objective viewpoint." To view, someone (a subject) must see, and something (an object) must be seen. So, it is not that we are caught, but that in knowing, we enter into a relation with what we know. Since knowing is relational, it cannot exist independently of its relata, viz. its subject and object.

    In knowing we do not construct concepts. Rather, we encounter intelligible objects, i.e. things that can be known. (Remember that "knowing" names an activity that humans actually do, and that philosophic reflection seeks to understand the nature of that activity.) So, the content of our concept derives from the intelligibility of the object known, not from us. If we already had the content, we'd already know the object and no encounter would be needed.

    Since, we grasp the object's intelligibility, we know it, and not our own construct.

    . Objectivity must be forsaken and subjectivity accepted?apokrisis

    No. Subjectivity and objectivity are correlative poles of the relation called "knowing." While objects may exist independently of subjects, they cannot be known independently of knowing subjects.

    It is still going to be an exercise in abstraction. But now the goal is to generalise the very idea of a modelling relation.apokrisis

    Humans do model, but knowing is not modelling. Knowing actualized prior intelligibility. Modeling adds hypotheses to what we know to filling the gaps in our knowledge. Or, perhaps, it may simplify what we know on the hypothesis that part of what we know is not needed to attain our goal.

    That becomes pragmatism writ large.apokrisis

    There is nothing wrong with being pragmatic, as long as we limit our pragmatism to the practical order. Humans also want to know, not for the sake of doing, but purely for the sake of knowing. As there is no practical goal in theoretical knowledge, there pragmatism is irrelevant and useless.

    I am unsure how Rosen's remarks are relevant to what I am saying.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Truth is not correspondence to reality. Why? First, because our knowledge is not exhaustive, but leaves an untold amount behind. It is only a diminished projection of what we encounter. Second, because we do not and cannot know reality as it is, but only as it relates to us. — Dfpolis

    This already claims to know beyond what it says cannot be known.
    JerseyFlight

    No, it does not. It reflects on our surprise when something we thought we knew teaches us something unexpected. From this we learn to be humble and not complacent in our knowledge -- to realize that in knowing, we do not know all.

    Seems to me this criteria of exactitude that you seem to leverage is unproductive.JerseyFlight

    I'm unsure what you think I am proposing, I am merely saying that divine knowledge is not a proper paradigm for human knowing, and that infallibility and Cartesian certitude are foolish and inhuman goals. Our knowledge is human, not divine, knowledge, and it can suffice for a well-lived human life.

    I know mountains, grass, stones, words, successful surgeries are performed on the basis of empirical knowledge. I reject the kind of skepticism (and I have good suspicion of where you got it) that says knowledge must entail exhaustive comprehension.JerseyFlight

    We agree completely.

    Although I am a theist, my mention of God is merely to make the idea of perfect knowledge concrete.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Now isn't there something a bit mad about the assertion that there are two tables?Banno

    I read it as two table concepts.

    do we agree that, the bishop remaining on the same colour for the duration fo the game is a foundational truth, rather than a truth known by experience?Banno

    It is a conditional conclusion, and in no way foundational. The condition is, "If one follows the rules of chess, ...".
  • JerseyFlight
    782
    I am merely saying that divine knowledge is not a proper paradigm for human knowing,Dfpolis

    Our knowledge is human, not divineDfpolis

    I was not aware there was such a thing as divine knowledge?
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    I want to hear more about belief and knowledge. You gloss "believing that such-and-such" as being committed to the truth of such-and-such. Does that come in degrees?Srap Tasmaner

    Think of Descartes telling us about his methodological doubt. He begins by telling us that he was in his chamber. He knew, therefore, that he was in his chamber, which is an act of intellect, of awareness. Nor does he cease to be aware that he is in his room when he chooses (an act of will) to doubt it. (Just as dramas call for a willing suspension of disbelief, so Descartes willingly suspended his belief.) As he continued to know he was in his chamber, even as he suspended his belief that he was, knowing cannot be a species of (say, causally justified true) belief. So, nothing in the Descartes reflections ever calls knowledge into question, only his commitment to the truth of what he knew.

    I think there are degrees (or, more properly, regimes) of belief. We may be willing to act as though p is true in some operation regimes, but not in others -- or we may be absolutely committed to the truth of p.

    The whole idea of knowledge as justified true belief comes from a careless translation of Plato. The term doxa means "judgement" as well as "belief" and "opinion." It seems pretty clear from the Teatatetus 190A, that Plato meant "judgement," not "belief," by doxa in the context of knowledge.

    Do you treat "knowledge" as a primitive, not to be glossed or explained?Srap Tasmaner

    I treat "knowing" as naming an actual human activity, the nature of which we can reflect upon. Denying that we know is, therefore, an abuse of language.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    I was not aware there was such a thing as divine knowledge?JerseyFlight

    I do not wish to go off on that tangent in this thread. Here, one can take it as an ideal standard for human cognition I am rejecting.
  • JerseyFlight
    782
    I do not wish to go off on that tangent in this thread. Here, one can take it as an ideal standard for human cognition I am rejecting.Dfpolis

    Wait a second. This is not fair, it is intellectually dishonest. You were the one who introduced "divine knowledge." We have got to get something straight on this Forum. It is not okay to point the finger at those who call out this kind of stuff as somehow derailing the thread, that is not philosophical, it is emotional. Philosophy precisely targets and calls out these kind of loaded terms. It is part of your central argument. It reminds me of Plantinga with Michael Tooley, Plantinga is allowed to just use a thousand general terms and fantastic concepts, and no one is allowed to call them out? How can this be philosophy? No friend, you don't get to bring this kind of stuff up and then evade your burden of proof. If that's what this Forum is about then it's not a philosophy forum.

    Of course, you don't want to explain these fantastic terms, the burden of proof here is too great and you know it, hence you feign to some kind of false nobility. My real problem with it is that it's hypocritical and unphilosophical.

    So far as we know based on evidence there is no such thing as "divine knowledge," how then do you introduce this term into philosophy? If it's a mere hypothetical it's a nonsense hypothetical because it doesn't even have a probability, it's a religious assertion.

    I'm open to all counter views here, but if the legitimacy of a counter position is only sustained by rejecting the very essence of philosophy's negativity, then we are no longer doing philosophy, we are playing a different game.

    Because thinkers identify with their beliefs, which is a huge mistake, this is why they get so emotional and defensive when it comes to refutation. As philosophers we must learn to grow past such immaturity. Real philosophy will always produce psychological pain in one form or another. If it's not producing this you are doing it wrong because philosophy is directly set against man's primitive psychology -- man's psychology is not philosophy, but is thwarted by it. This is painful.

    I MOVED THIS CONVERSATION TO ANOTHER THREAD: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9214/high-philosophy-and-the-burden-of-proof
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Wait a second. This is not fair, it is intellectually dishonest. You were the one who introduced "divine knowledge."JerseyFlight

    I introduced it as a concept, not as a reality. I could have said the same thing if I were an atheist. It is not part of my present argument that there actually is omniscience. I am only saying that it is a bad paradigm for human knowledge.

    There is nothing dishonest or emotional in managing the direction and scope of a thread. If you wish to discuss theism or omniscience, I would be happy to do so, either privately, or in thread dedicated to that topic. This one is about human knowledge.

    Which option do you prefer?
  • JerseyFlight
    782
    If you wish to discuss theism or omniscienceDfpolis

    No, I do not wish to discuss these, but the thread I linked to above deals with the more important topic, the ministry of philosophy itself.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    If you only wish to take shots at my thread management, and not actually discuss your objections, I can't help you.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k


    I think a layperson's reaction to Descartes is often something like, he is pretending not to know.

    But pretending can be given some force. Suppose you have hidden Easter eggs for your children and you want to provide advice on how to search without really providing hints on where they are. You can pretend not to know where they are and describe how you would look. (You don't need to look inside the salt shaker, because it's too small, that sort of thing.) Pretending here means, roughly, not relying on what you know, not using what you know in the search process.

    A belief then might be something you rely on, use in reasoning, and might be something you know or something you don't. If you reason from something you don't know, you're either talking hypothetically or making a mistake.

    Am I in the neighborhood of your approach?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    It is a conditional conclusion... The condition is, "If one follows the rules of chess...".Dfpolis

    Yes.
    ...and in no way foundational.Dfpolis
    No. It is foundational to chess.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.6k


    What's riding on the word "foundational" here?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    Indeed.

    Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible?
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    Am I in the neighborhood of your approach?Srap Tasmaner

    I don't have a problem with anything you said, but what I'm saying is that we know things in terms of how they relate to us, and while that is not exhaustive, it is what we need to know to be human in the world.
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