Muddled, indeed.

I'll go with ill-founded. One important methodological issue here is this: under what conditions is the activity of philosophical analysis logically well founded? What are the necessary axioms of analysis, the basic premises that may generate a fruitful, useful analysis, and without which analysis does not 'work', and instead tends to crash or just produce white noise? What are the limits of productive analysis? And where is analysis unproductive, and why?

I (and I think Jersey) contend that the concept of truth is necessary for any analysis, that if you take it our of the axioms, analysis crashes (or the axiom reasserts itself automatically unconsciously). It's not that is is muddled, it just doesn't work. Nobody can do any better than Davidson on the topic because in that territory the function "analysis" is out of its domain of definition.

In short, a philosopher trying to analyse truth is sawing the branch on which he sits.

In short, a philosopher trying to analyse truth is sawing the branch on which he sits. — Olivier5

An Analytic philosopher, like Tarski, Davidson, or JerseyFlight, trying to analyse truth within analytic philosopy is sawing the branch on which he sits. However, most other peritrope arguments are fallacious.