The answer is, do not harm or force burdens onto others unnecessarily, and without the ability to ask — schopenhauer1

No it isn't because the question of morality is 'how can we all live together?', and your answer has us cease to do the very thing the question seeks.

No, I'm just saying a prescriptive claim that would, if followed, lead to the presuppositions of moral claims being unfulfilled and unfulfillable cannot itself be a moral prescription.

The parody theory I posted is a rejection of morality that is indistinguishable from anti-natalism, despite having a different motivation.

No, I'm just saying a prescriptive claim that would, if followed, lead to the presuppositions of moral claims being unfulfilled and unfulfillable cannot itself be a moral prescription.

The parody theory I posted is a rejection of morality that is indistinguishable from anti-natalism, despite having a different motivation. — Srap Tasmaner

So why would moral claims be unfulfilled? If a person exists, do not cause harm or force a situation of burdens onto a future person. If a person does not exist, then yes, a moral claim doesn't matter. What is wrong with that?

So why would moral claims be unfulfilled? — schopenhauer1

The presuppositions of moral claims, viz. the existence of human beings interacting with each other.

If a person exists, do not cause harm or force a situation of burdens onto a future person. If a person does not exist, then yes, a moral claim doesn't matter. What is wrong with that? — schopenhauer1

Maybe that you state it as if the two are unrelated; one brings about the other.

But let's talk about you.

You submit that a person ought to be spared suffering. Why? We do usually have an answer for that: not suffering is better than suffering. The person who's pain we relieve, for instance, is that much, let's say, happier.

But that's not what you're talking about. You want a person who does not exist to be spared existence in order to be spared suffering. They do not benefit. Their non-life is no better than it was before by being kept at the non- stage. So why do it?

To repeat: there is a commonly accepted justification for the idea that we should avoid causing suffering to others and to relieve suffering when we can. We do it because it is better for that person. And we can be pretty specific about this: if I catch a brick that was about to land on your foot, I know a lot about what you were going to suffer and when, and I know in what way your life is better than it would have been if I had not caught the brick. If your shoulder aches and I get you an ice-pack and an ibuprofen, I know exactly what you were suffering and when your life became a little better than it was.

What justification is there for preventing a person's suffering by making sure they don't exist?

You do not see a difference between what? A moral being a matter of cause and effect, or a moral being what the Bible says God likes and doesn't like? You can ask for God's forgiveness and get away with doing wrong or the failure to do right, but you can not get away with violating the laws of nature. Three dementional reality is a matter of cause and effect, not the whims of a god.

The presuppositions of moral claims, viz. the existence of human beings interacting with each other. — Srap Tasmaner

That isn't being violated with how that is phrased. If there are humans, then this principle applies. You are putting another presupposition that there has to be humans in order to have this principle in the first place. That last part is not necessary for morality.

But that's not what you're talking about. You want a person who does not exist to be spared existence in order to be spared suffering. They do not benefit. Their non-life is no better than it was before by being kept at the non- stage. So why do it? — Srap Tasmaner

That no one is suffering is what matters.

To repeat: there is a commonly accepted justification for the idea that we should avoid causing suffering to others and to relieve suffering when we can. We do it because it is better for that person. And we can be pretty specific about this: if I catch a brick that was about to land on your foot, I know a lot about what you were going to suffer and when, and I know in what way your life is better than it would have been if I had not caught the brick. If your shoulder aches and I get you an ice-pack and an ibuprofen, I know exactly what you were suffering and when your life became a little better than it was.

What justification is there for preventing a person's suffering by making sure they don't exist? — Srap Tasmaner

Because life inevitably contains the whole set of Suffering. You do not need to know the specific instances of suffering to know that there are instances of suffering, known or unknown that will occur. Procreation = creating capacity to suffer.

There is another aspect here, and that is forcing onto someone burdens. Creating someone entails that person must play the game of life. Forcing a game on someone, is not justified.

Another way to look at is that your idea of morality does not allow for procreating new people as part of the equation. You are claiming that my focus on procreation doesn't allow for what happens after procreation. However, you can have morality consider both. Procreation happens to be one of THE most important decisions as it is affecting another person's whole state of being (they are now alive). However, morality of course then takes on the intra-wordly affairs morality that ensues once this has already occurred to someone. So it is more like inter-wordly ethics (the more important one to me) vs. intra-wordly ethics (what happens after the decision has been made and someone is born already).