That seeing things how they are has soteriological benefits — Wayfarer
What's next?
The discarding seems reasonable to me. The apparent lack of any "whats next" does not. — Hippyhead
My apologies. I wore myself out on the forum yesterday and by end of the day my brain had turned to toxic applesauce. Sorry, my bad! — Hippyhead
I think the Vienna Circle misinterpreted Wittgenstein - see Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism Philosophy Now. — Wayfarer
But again he warns that we should not imagine that such games can tell us anything about the nature of reality. — Janus
'The nature of empirical reality', perhaps. — Wayfarer
Right, that has been my whole argument; that religious experience can tell us nothing about empirical reality other than that people have such experiences and may be moved by them to believe various things. — Janus
you still haven't attempted to answer the question about different religions proposing different cosmologies — Janus
It is not surprising that within human awareness many different God-figures have formed. Phenomenologically - that is, as describable - the Holy Trinity is different from the Allah of Islam, which is different from the Adonai, the Lord, of rabbinic Judaism, which is different again from the Vishnu and the Shiva of theistic Hinduism, and even more different from the non-personal Tao, or Dharma, or Brahman. All these are, in Kantian language, divine phenenoma [appearances] in distinction from the divine noumenon [reality] of which they are its appearances to humanity. Thus we need – I am suggesting - a two level model, with the experienced realities in relation to which the religious life is lived as manifestations of an ultimate reality beyond them.
What if it is 'empirical reality' itself that is the delusion — Wayfarer
isn't there a degree of absurdity in the assumption that any of us know anything about issues of such enormous scale? — Hippyhead
What if it is 'empirical reality' itself that is the delusion? Then there would be no 'certain knowledge' obtainable of it. — Wayfarer
Unless you can offer an example of some other kind of propositional knowledge. — Janus
There is no absolutely certain knowledge if you take into account the human possibility of radical skepticism. — Janus
"Whoever wants to live well (eudaimonia) must consider these three questions: First, how are pragmata (ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's answer is that "As for pragmata they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), astathmēta (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and anepikrita (unjudged, unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be adoxastoi (without views), aklineis (uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantoi (unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not.
By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. — The Buddha
The Buddhist doctrine of the two truths differentiates between two levels of satya (a Sanskrit and Pali word meaning truth or reality) in the teaching of the Buddha: the "conventional" or "provisional" (saṁvṛti) truth, and the "ultimate" (paramārtha) truth.
The exact meaning varies between the various Buddhist schools and traditions. The best known interpretation is from the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, whose founder was Nagarjuna. For Nagarjuna, the two truths are epistemological truths. The phenomenal world is accorded a provisional existence. The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable [this is the origin of Pyrrho's 'indeterminability']. Ultimately, phenomena are empty (sunyata) of an inherent self or essence, but exist depending on other phenomena (Pratītyasamutpāda).
Joshu's Zen
Joshu began the study of Zen when he was sixty years old and continued until he was eighty, when he realized Zen.
He taught from the age of eighty until he was one hundred and twenty.
A student once asked him: “If I haven’t anything in my mind, what shall I do?”
Joshu replied: “Throw it out.”
“But if I haven’t anything, how can I throw it out?” continued the questioner.
“Well,” said Joshu, “then carry it out.”
//ps// I don't think that is an official Ko-an. It's one of the anecdotes in Zen Flesh, Zen Bones that I particularly liked.// — Wayfarer
This thread is about Ch'an or Zen Buddhism. It has generated a vast literature but it is not concerned with 'propositional knowledge' as such. — Wayfarer
Radical or absolute scepticism of the kind you encounter in Internet discussions is generally meaningless. — Wayfarer
'God exists", "there is an afterlife" "karma is real" etc. are propositions that are imagined by some to be justified by religious experience. — Janus
Those who have not known, seen, penetrated, realized, or attained it by means of discernment would have to take it on conviction in others that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation; whereas those who have known, seen, penetrated, realized, & attained it by means of discernment would have no doubt or uncertainty that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation. — The Buddha
Is Ch'an Buddhism more about observation and using logic to determine the nature of the world? — TiredThinker
That's how you will see it, but that in itself is also a statement of belief. — Wayfarer
But from within the Buddhist domain of discourse, although it acknowledges that faith is required at the outset, it claims that it culminates in certain knowledge (i.e. 'of the deathless'). — Wayfarer
What if it is 'empirical reality' itself that is the delusion? Then there would be no 'certain knowledge' obtainable of it. — Wayfarer
I don't know what that could even mean. — Janus
the very idea that humans can directly know the nature of reality is itself an article of groundless faith — Janus
Ask yourself why you resist acknowledging that, and why you won't address the questions that present difficulties for your position and you, and this discussion, might get somewhere. — Janus
As I asked before
What if it is 'empirical reality' itself that is the delusion? Then there would be no 'certain knowledge' obtainable of it. — Wayfarer
To which you replied:
I don't know what that could even mean. — Janus
Yet, somehow, I'm accused of 'ducking questions'. — Wayfarer
so now you seem to be contradicting yourself.Radical or absolute scepticism of the kind you encounter in Internet discussions is generally meaningless. — Wayfarer
You then repeat the positivist assertion: ' All human ideas of knowledge are derived from empirical knowledge' - only to then deny you're positivist! — Wayfarer
the very idea that humans can directly know the nature of reality is itself an article of groundless faith — Janus
A statement not made about yourself or about me - but humanity generally! All claims to 'revealed truth' or 'spiritual insight' are, we're being told, 'acts of groundless faith'. — Wayfarer
The idea of the empirical being a delusion is your example of radical skepticism, about which you earlier said... — Janus
Even Kant held that all knowledge derives from experience (the empirical), so this is not an exclusively positivist statement. — Janus
I have no reason to believe that all humans are not fallible, and yet you for some reason, that you cannot give apparently, think that some humans are infallible. — Janus
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
I'm not saying there's anything wrong with believing those things; but intellectual honesty demands that you should acknowledge that they are faith-based. — Janus
but if you do come on here then you should be prepared to discuss your ideas in good faith, and submit your ideas to critical scrutiny; — Janus
He did not. He said that there a facts that are known a priori, and the ‘categories of the understanding, and that without them, empiricism could not be sustained. ‘Percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty’. — Wayfarer
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