How does empiricism tell you that non-conscious stuff exists? Is there a hidden anti-panpsychist proof in empiricism? — RogueAI

Well, first you need a definition of consciousness that is distinct from unconscious, otherwise you're not making a meaningful claim. Then you study the object of doubted consciousness for whether its behaviours, which correlate to its properties, are consistent with it being conscious or unconscious. If you cannot distinguish then, again, it's a meaningless claim.

Well, first you need a definition of consciousness that is distinct from unconscious, otherwise you're not making a meaningful claim. Then you study the object of doubted consciousness for whether its behaviours, which correlate to its properties, are consistent with it being conscious or unconscious. If you cannot distinguish then, again, it's a meaningless claim.

I have no idea what you said here.

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, but does not assert it is its own composed entity. We don't say, "matter, energy, and water" exist right? Water is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy. — Philosophim

I'll elaborate a bit on the stance I favor for the sake of clarity:

But first off, stop it with the "conscious is entity" strawman. I won't reply if you don't. For some, such as myself, the belief upheld is that - while consciousness is likely primary to matter (the latter being physical energy, and vice versa ... this per the e = mc2 dictum on which our modern physics by in large rests) - a) consciousness is NOT an entity and b) matter/physical energy nevertheless holds blatant reality on account of its causal interactions with all first-person sources of awareness. The objective idealism of C. S. Peirce should suffice as an example of this ontological outlook. It's not something that can be cogently presented within the sound-bite format of a debate forum, so I'm not inclined to here make a cogent case for it upon request. All the same, neither I - nor those who uphold Buddhist (or Buddhist-like) views, such as I interpret @Wayfarer to - in any way, shape, or form maintain consciousness to be an entity. Quite the contrary.

Approrops, as to the evolution of life from non-life within such an ontological system, one leading inference is that of panpsychism.

Nevertheless, within such a framework, there is no denial nor doubt that for the individual consciousnesses of individual organisms there is a bottom-up causal process between the substratum of living organic matter and what we experience as our personal awareness. So this "separateness from matter or energy" doesn't hold in the day to day reality we experience. It only holds when addressing the utterly existential issue of what is metaphysically primary to existence as a whole.

One possible question might be: "but where does this (non-entity) consciousness come from existentially?" This, however, is just as mysterious - as of yet unknown and possibly unknowable in principle - as is the parallel question that can be placed to physicalists: "but where does physical energy come from existentially?".

So we're implicitly coming from two different schemas that attempt to cogently explain the same commonly shared reality: Yours affirms physical energy/matter to be primary but cannot explain either why physical energy/matter is in the first place nor why consciousness occurs. The one I currently hold affirms that physical reality - replete with is many intricate causalities and the like - is a complex byproduct of awareness dispersed among innumerable coexistent first-person loci of awareness. Which - as our impartial, shared, physical reality - then causally limits, binds, and goads (including via births and deaths) these sources of awareness in manners that are not fully predetermined but, instead, are causally compatibiliistic. Thereby allowing for progressive top-down causation upon the physical reality which is our brains. Here, there is no hard problem of consciousness, this being a physicalist problem. The only quintessential issue is that of what awareness in general actually is and where it comes from - but this is just as unresolved as the same questions applied to a physicalist's energy. Explaining that energy is energy is just as in/valid as stating that awareness is awareness.

In short, when addressing myself at the very least, consciousness is not an entity and it is not causally untethered from the physical reality which, nevertheless, is a product of awareness's global occurrence - as is the case in a system of panphychism, for one example. As to the magicality of its being, it is no more and no less an instance of pure and unadulturated magic as is the occurence of energy within any system of physicalism. One takes one pick of magical component of reality. I tend to pick the former over the latter - for, if nothing else, it at least accounts for the reality of that by which everything else is cognized.

So, I've presented a rough outline of where I, personally, am presently coming from ontologically. I'm not here interested, however, in debating metaphysical systems - with physicalism most certainly being one such.

That said, staying on track with the thread's topic of the hard problem:

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, — Philosophim

We do not, cannot, observe our own identity as a conscious being. Consciousness is that which observes; and is never that which can be directly observed. If you disagree with this, what then does your consciousness look like, sound like, or smell like, etc., to you? (And if you jokingly tell me something along the lines of "like ice-cream", who could seriously take this to define what consciousness in general is?)

Again, the hard problem can be phrased as a problem in explaining how the observable can account for that which is unobservable but observes - and is thereby known to be real.

Processes are actions, and interactions with other entities. When an electron travels across a wire, we get the process of electricity. When that electron travels to your computer, and allows a signal to alter a logic gate, that is the process of computing. Processes are not separate from the matter and energy, they are the result of their interactions. These interchanges are matter and energy. — Philosophim

OK, but a photon is more basic than an electron, and a photon has no mass last I've heard, thereby not being matter, thereby not being an entity.

Then you get into Zero-Point Energy:

Zero-point energy (ZPE) is the lowest possible energy that a quantum mechanical system may have. Unlike in classical mechanics, quantum systems constantly fluctuate in their lowest energy state as described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.[1] As well as atoms and molecules, the empty space of the vacuum has these properties. According to quantum field theory, the universe can be thought of not as isolated particles but continuous fluctuating fields: matter fields, whose quanta are fermions (i.e., leptons and quarks), and force fields, whose quanta are bosons (e.g., photons and gluons). All these fields have zero-point energy.[2] These fluctuating zero-point fields lead to a kind of reintroduction of an aether in physics,[1][3] since some systems can detect the existence of this energy; however, this aether cannot be thought of as a physical medium if it is to be Lorentz invariant such that there is no contradiction with Einstein's theory of special relativity.[1]

Physics currently lacks a full theoretical model for understanding zero-point energy; in particular, the discrepancy between theorized and observed vacuum energy is a source of major contention.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-point_energy

This so as to back up what I've previously said: Though the issue is open-ended, it very much seems to be the case that entities emerge from non-entity processes, of which we still know very little about. Thereby, to make this explicit, resulting in a process theory view of reality.

But will science ever be able to produce the state of being a bat, and then have us feel exactly what it is like to be a bat? Maybe not. That is not relevant to stating that consciousness is separate from the brain. — Philosophim

While I know that I didn't provide an in-depth account, given what I first mentioned in this post, maybe you might understand how claiming that I affirm "consciousness is separate from the brain" isa misinterpretation of my views. No, a human consciousness is causally tethered to the workings of its respective living brain; its just that, in the worldview I endorse, this relation is not epiphenomenal, and so can result in top-down causality upon the physical brain.

Now, when addressing "awareness" just as abstractly as when we address "physical energy/matter", then, and only then, the primacy of awareness comes into play - this, again, as far as the stance I currently uphold goes. But this existential generality of primacy should by not means be mistaken for a consciousness that is causally untethered from its respective central nervous system's workings.

Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy. — Philosophim

Maybe so, but matter and energy are physical concepts created to explain a wide range of phenomena. It's possible that these concepts are lacking when it comes to consciousness, because they are abstracted categories based on careful investigation of what our senses tell us about the world.

I have no idea what you said here. — RogueAI

Things have properties. These properties a) dictate their behaviours and therefore b) distinguish them. For instance, we can distinguish a hot potato from a cold potato by their different behaviours, which correspond to their respective properties of hot and cold.

If your definition of consciousness is distinct from non-consciousness, as it ought to be to be meaningful, then conscious things will have different properties from non-conscious things, thus are distinct. Therefore they should also behave differently in certain circumstances. (If they behave the same under all circumstances, then they have the same properties, are indistinct, and therefore your definition of consciousness is meaningless.)

Empiricism is a way of examining how distinguishable things behave differently. Put a thermometer on a hot potato, it will read one temperature. Put it on a cold potato, it will measure a different temperature.

If it is meaningful to say that a rock is conscious, as opposed to unconscious, one should be able to discern that difference empirically due to their different behaviours corresponding to their different properties.

But first off, stop it with the "conscious is entity" strawman. — javra

You may misunderstand. I don't believe consciousness is an independent entity with its own substance separate from matter and energy. Wayfarer does. He believes consciousness is independent from the brain. For yourself, you seem to think a bit differently, and I am much more inclined to agree with your approach.

I have nothing against panpsychism as a theory, as long as it reduces down to reality. I don't think we have enough information to confirm or deny panpsychism. First, there's quantum entanglement. Second, there is the reality that we are physical beings composed of the matter around us. It may very well be our concept of "intelligence" is simply one degree higher of a low expression of matter all around us.

We do not, cannot, observe our own identity as a conscious being. Consciousness is that which observes; and is never that which can be directly observed. If you disagree with this, what then does your consciousness look like, sound like, or smell like, etc., to you? — javra

I do disagree with this. I know what my own consciousness is from my self-subjective view point. The problem is you seem to be describing consciousness in terms of senses. Consciousness is not light hitting my eyes or soundwaves hitting my ears. That's why its a hard problem. It likely requires its own language to communicate exactly what it is. Which is perfectly fine. As long as the models are in line with reality, postulating and inventing new models to describe consciousness is perfectly fine.

OK, but a photon is more basic than an electron, and a photon has no mass last I've heard, thereby not being matter, thereby not being an entity. — javra

You might misunderstand this. Energy and mass are interchangeable mathmatically. The reason why we say light has no mass is due to the mathmatical conclusion that light travels at the maximum speed allowed. https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/04/01/light-has-no-mass-so-it-also-has-no-energy-according-to-einstein-but-how-can-sunlight-warm-the-earth-without-energy/#:~:text=Since%20photons%20(particles%20of%20light,their%20energy%20from%20their%20momentum.&text=If%20a%20particle%20has%20no,mass%20is%20nothing%20at%20all.

Energy, mass, and waves are all identifiers that allow certain mathamatical states to exist. These mathamatical states have been proven to be sound, so we continue to use them. The models of energy, mass, and waves are simply ways of expressing this math in a way relatable to our common understanding of reality around us. At extremes, these models break down in relatability. The key is that the math underlying it is solid. Now could we come up with a better model that relates the math to us? Quite possibly. The requirement however is that it must be mathamatically sound when applied to reality as well. This is the attempt by unified field theories.

Now, when addressing "awareness" just as abstractly as when we address "physical energy/matter", then, and only then, the primacy of awareness comes into play - this, again, as far as the stance I currently uphold goes. But this existential generality of primacy should by not means be mistaken for a consciousness that is causally untethered from its respective central nervous system's workings. — javra

Yes, I understand what you mean now, and have no disagreement with this.

Maybe so, but matter and energy are physical concepts created to explain a wide range of phenomena. It's possible that these concepts are lacking when it comes to consciousness, because they are abstracted categories based on careful investigation of what our senses tell us about the world. — Marchesk

Certainly. This can be said about anything, not just consciousness. Alone, that is not an argument to deny what is known today. To deny what one knows today, they must propose evidence that incontrovertibly contradicts a knowledge claim. Again, I have nothing about saying, "Maybe its something else" about anything. But when a person says, "It IS something else" without evidence, its not a rational discussion.

You may misunderstand. I don't believe consciousness is an independent entity with its own substance separate from matter and energy. Wayfarer does. — Philosophim

A comedy of misunderstandings. I assumed you thought this to be my stance. As to Wayfarer, I greatly doubt this, seeing how he is greatly inclined toward Buddhist thought.

I have nothing against panpsychism as a theory, as long as it reduces down to reality. — Philosophim

Hear, hear! As I previously mentioned somewhere in the thread, I'm still trying to grapple with the notion of panpsychism philosophically. @Kenosha Kid's last post speaks to some of the problematic issues with it. But it is so far a position I infer as being readily likely.

I do disagree with this. I know what my own consciousness is from my self-subjective view point. The problem is you seem to be describing consciousness in terms of senses. Consciousness is not light hitting my eyes or soundwaves hitting my ears. That's why its a hard problem. It likely requires its own language to communicate exactly what it is. Which is perfectly fine. As long as the models are in line with reality, postulating and inventing new models to describe consciousness is perfectly fine — Philosophim

Hmm. So, earlier today I finally uploaded my culminating chapter on consciousness's demarcation. And, as you state, it makes use of novel terms to express either what I take to be novel concepts or, else, to make cumbersome phrases (like, "a first-person point of view") more easily communicable in ordinary speech. One will likely also need to read, or skim, through the chapters leading up to it to get a better grasp of what is expressed. Extremely understandable if you're not inclined, but, if it tickles your fancy, I'd would welcome your feedback on the demarcations of consciousness I've offered. (I known. I'm now shamelessly self-promoting a work I've barely begun. But seeing how doing so is moderately acceptable on this forum, why not, right?)

So, if interested, here's the link: https://www.anenquiry.info/index.php/Chapter_7:_Demarcating_Consciousness

You might misunderstand this. Energy and mass are interchangeable mathmatically. The reason why we say light has no mass is due to the mathmatical conclusion that light travels at the maximum speed allowed. — Philosophim

Although physics isn't my strong point (much prefer the biological sciences) what I was alluding to is that we nevertheless conceptualize a photon as being a thing, an entity, when it scientifically doesn't quite fit the bill. As to its particle/wave duality, I've read papers expressing that enzymes can exhibit the same duality. Just now quickly found this reference online: https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/09/238365/a-natural-biomolecule-has-been-measured-acting-in-a-quantum-wave-for-the-first-time/

That said, I like process theory, so I'm biased toward this outlook. So maybe that explains the stance I've taken.

Now could we come up with a better model that relates the math to us? Quite possibly. The requirement however is that it must be mathamatically sound when applied to reality as well. This is the attempt by unified field theories. — Philosophim

Yes, of course.

As Javra has pointed out, I certainly don’t conceive of any kind of mental substance or thing.

I’m not a Greek scholar, nor do I know much about Aristotle. But one discipline I have had some experience in is ‘history of ideas’ and I think there’s a point that needs to be brought out here.

The use of the word ‘substance’ in philosophy is different to the normal usage. It was originally translated from Aristotle’s ‘ousia’ and could feasibly be translated as either ‘subject’ and ‘kind of being’. The original idea was the Socrates was of the substance, ‘Man’, where the ‘substance’ is ‘that of which attributes can be predicated. If you translated this as ‘the kind of being, Man’ then it would be in some ways nearer the mark of the original meaning of ‘ouisia’. But it’s invariably taken to mean ‘substance’ in the sense of being ‘protoplasm’ or ‘living substance’ or ‘ghostly stuff’, using the word ‘substance’ in the modern sense of a particular kind of stuff or thing. ‘Res’, in Descartes Res Cogitans, is straightforwardly ‘a thing’ (actually, the word is the root of ‘reality’. This is why I keep pointing out the ‘post-Cartesian’ attitude which underlies the debate.)

The last couple of days, I’ve watched an excellent three-part PBS documentary series called ‘Mystery of Matter’ which revolves around Mendelev’s discovery of the periodic table - which he basically did in one weekend! - and also the discovery of radioactivity, and plutonium. (Recommended, free on You Tube. All the people covered were giants of science, not least Harry Moseley, who lost his life at Gallipoli at 27).

The point is, scientific method will want to deal with ‘substance’ on that level. It wants to identify the attibutes of an object of analysis, be that plutonium or neural data. Both those advocating this approach are treating the problem in that way - which is no slight. It is natural in scientific culture to approach problems through that paradigm. But what David Chalmers is saying is there is something fundamental to the nature of consciousness (I prefer to say ‘the experiencing being’) which can’t be fit into this frame.

Dennett and the hard-core materialists all continue to insist that there is no other way to know anything worthwhile, and that it’s ‘just a matter of time’ until consciousness/being yields its secretes secrets. But I think they can fairly accused not of argument, but of denial - as if by refusing to recognise the challenge, it magically goes away - like Trump’s attitude to COVID-19. This is why Dennett’s first magnum opus was described by no lesser luminaries than John Searle and Thomas Nagel as ‘Consciousniess Ignored’ or ‘Consciousness Explained away’. At best, he’s a foil for his adversaries - maybe he’s an ‘intuition pump’! - but he needs to listen to the old saw, ‘Denial is not a river in Egypt’ :-)

Because there is no consensus in any related field for an explanation of consciousness. — Marchesk

There's no consensus on the vast majority of open questions in psychology. Why is the definition of consciousness special here. Notwithstanding, we're not here talking about a lack of consensus about a solution, we're talking about claims that whole fields of enquiry are not even addressing the question.

No it isn't. That's just an assertion that consciousness is somehow identical to certain functions. If we knew that to be true, then there would be no mystery as to what else is conscious. If it performed those functions, whether it was a bat nervous system, a simulation, a robot or a Chinese Brain, it would all be conscious, end of story. — Marchesk

Yes. You're using the fact that people hold consciousness to be something deeply mysterious as an argument that consciousness is deeply mysterious. It's circular. How can you demonstrate consciousness is not identical to certain functions (and so we can indeed tell what's conscious and what isn't) without calling on the fact that people don't believe it to be so?

Because it doesn't explain how it is that we're conscious. — Marchesk

Again, it does for me and it matches the criteria for a satisfactory explaination of 'how' in all other cases I can think of. You keep just saying it doesn't explain how without addressing my examples of cases where such types of explanation are considered to have exactly answered the question 'how'.

Why do functions result in an experience at all? — Marchesk

Now you're changing the question to 'why'. Again, ask why we have noses and developmental or evolutionary answers are considered completely satisfactory, so the answer to your question is...we benefit from a narrative form of combining sensory information which identifies our body as the subject of such sensation because we can plan and respond better to changing opportunities in our environment which gives us a competetive advantage in our niche.

I'm not asking if you agree with that answer (I'm not even sure I do) I'm asking why it isn't even addressing the question, as @schopenhauer1 claims.

I'm asking why it isn't even addressing the question, as schopenhauer1 claims. — Isaac

Because schopenhauer1 is not a zombie, in the sense that he has got something called subjective experience. He maintains a difference between subjects and objects.

I'm not asking if you agree with that answer (I'm not even sure I do) I'm asking why it isn't even addressing the question, as schopenhauer1 claims. — Isaac

Because I just don't see how one gets color, sound, taste out of number, shape, extension. It's that simple. Dennett is wanting to say the world is just explainable in terms of Locke's primary qualities. Which in modern language is function and structure. But the secondary qualities, or the sensations of consciousness, aren't derived from the primary ones.

So we're left with explanations that explain the underlying mechanisms, as best we've figured out so far, but not the resulting sensations. The best people on Dennett's side can do is dismiss the senasations as an illusion, leaving nothing but the cognitive trick to be explained.

The implication of Dennett's arguments is that we are p-zombies, fooled into thinking we have conscious experiences which can't be explained by the physical mechanisms, or at least, we haven't figured out how to do so. But it's all just a magic show. There's no real mystery, no cognitive closure, no dualism. Physicalism is adequate.

Physicalism is adequate. — Marchesk

Yes, adequate, with respect to empirical knowledge. Would you agree with me, that human reason is often not satisfied with the merely adequate?

Yes, adequate, with respect to empirical knowledge. Would you agree with me, that human reason is often not satisfied with the merely adequate? — Mww

Certainly in the case of consciousness. There may be a few other exceptions. I was just stating the implication of Dennett's arguments.

Agreed, on consciousness, and understood on Dennett.

Thanks.

Biology should be taken seriously by philosophers. — Olivier5

As Melkor stole Elves and corrupted them into Orcs, so biologists took the concept of life and removed all subjectivity from it. Can't bear the buggers. They don't take philosophy seriously. All of them, no exceptions. The worst of the scientists.

Biologists stole your concept of life? Did you report them to the police?

My entry:

... because of the mise en abyme allowed by our two brains talking to one another.
— Olivier5

...and that's an answer. — Isaac

Why yes, one possible answer among many.

By the way, the fact that we have two interconnected brains (left, right) rather than one can be used to solve the "Cartesian theater" paradox. Instead of an infinite regress of theater viewers, you can conceive of just two viewers sharing notes and impressions.

the fact that we have two interconnected brains (left, right) rather than one can be used to solve the "Cartesian theater" paradox. Instead of an infinite regress of theater viewers, you can conceive of just two viewers sharing notes and impressions. — Olivier5

Yes, you could conceive that...

then you could test it (say with severe epilepsy patients who've had the connection between their right and left hemispheres severed)...

if only there were some discipline where literally hundreds of well-trained researchers were looking into this exact type of conjecture and then reporting the results on some kind of global information sharing system...

then we wouldn't have to just sit around making uninformed speculations...

if only...

All of this can be summed up as, "Some people feel we need a new model to talk about consciousness," which I have said several times I do not object to. But NO one is saying that consciousness does not come from the brain.

That's the only real issue we have. I think you've misinterpreted the idea that a different model alters reality, or that needing a new model overrides what we already know. It does not.

Yes, you could conceive that... then you could test it — Isaac

Indeed, which is far more than you can say for anything in 'Quining Qualia'... :-)

then we wouldn't have to just sit around making uninformed speculations... — Isaac

You asked for speculations in this post, remember? If you didn't want then, you shouldn't have asked for them....

NO one is saying that consciousness does not come from the brain. — Philosophim

Let me say it, then: we don't know for a fact that consciousness comes only from the brain. It could emerge from the entire nervous system, or even from the entire body.

Let me say it, then: we don't know for a fact that consciousness comes only from the brain. It could emerge from the entire nervous system, or even from the entire body. — Olivier5

Actually, that is within acceptable science. The nervous system can be seen as an extension of the brain. Losing an arm means the consciousness of having an arm is altered. I did not say consciousness only comes from the brain. But to deny consciousness comes from the brain at all? That's clearly wrong.

Yes, by and large agreed. If we could have the same kind of consciousness without a brain, we probably wouldn't have a brain... Vice versa, if we could function just with a brain and without consciousness, i.e. if a Dennett zombie was actually possible rather than just a mind experiment, then we would probably all be Dennett zombies. Nature does not build things for no good reason.

What I’m objecting to is plain vanilla ‘materialist philosophy of mind', of which Daniel Dennett is a leading exponent. Obviously you need a brain to think, and we say of those who think well that they 'have good brains'. But the impications of philosophical materialism go well beyond that.

One of the famous aphorisms of the French enlightenment was that 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile'. Of course that is a vulgar statement and one which msny sophisticated materialists would reject. But it does capture something fundamental about materialism, which is the claim that 'only matter exists' - so that, whatever thought or the mind must be, it must be continuous with matter, it must arise as the doings of matter. Matter is the fundamental explanatory sub-strate, and the 'laws of physics' the only ultimately real laws. That is materialism 101.

So - I broadly accept the outlines of modern scientific cosmology - the hot big bang, evolution by natural selectoin over aeons. I'm not arguing for special creation or a separate 'mind-stuff'. The argumet I'm putting is that no matter how much is known of the laws of physics - and for that matter, there are many enormous gaps at this point! - the laws of logic, mathematica, and the like, belong to a different explanatory level altogether. They're real in their own right, not because they evolved. They're not 'the product of evolutiion' - which is, after all, a biological theory, not an episemology. H. Sapiens evolved to the point where the massive forebrain - one of the most stupendous evolutionary bursts known to science - is able to grasp ideas. I mean, 'the law of the excluded middle' didn't come into existence on account of evolution. What evolved was the capacity to understand. Sapience, in fact.

You will note that Dennett, in addition to his full-time job as professor of scientism, has a side gig as one of the world's most vocal atheists. So it's natural he has to deny the reality of mind. Mind doesn't exist anywhere 'in nature' - we see other beings with minds, specifically other people and the higher animals. But the nature of mind eludes objectification, for the reasons I have been discussion. So, what to do, other than deny it. Which is basically all there is to it. What is that saying? ' For every problem there is a solution that is simple, neat—and wrong.' This is one such case.

Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what exists is real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists is real —namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.

In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them. A person doesn’t experience patterns, and her experiences are as irreducibly real as her brain waves are, and different from them.

Review of Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos. Nagel is an acedemic philosopher and secular critic of materialism.

You asked for speculations in this post, remember? If you didn't want then, you shouldn't have asked for them.... — Olivier5

No, I clearly didn't. I asked for examples of an answer to the question which were different from Dennett's in such a way as to offer an explanation of why people think Dennett isn't even addressing the question. all you've done is given me the first half (an example answer), you've left off the second half (why is this an example answer, but Dennett's not).

Say we have an unknown quantity - how many red coins there are in a jar. You say 30, others say 35, Dennett comes along and say 0 and everybody tries to claim he's not even addressing the question. 0 is a perfectly reasonable answer to the question. You may not agree with it, but it's a dishonest move to try and avoid counter arguments by claiming it's not even an answer to the question.

I'm not accusing you of doing the above, by the way, my original question was addressed to @schopenhauer1, I'm explaining what I was looking for in an answer (see how easy it is!).

It's actually orthodox Christian doctrine that believers undergo bodily resurrection. So dualism isn't required even there.
— Andrew M

'At death the soul is separated from the body and exists in a conscious or unconscious disembodied state. But on the future Day of Judgment souls will be re-embodied (whether in their former but now transfigured earthly bodies or in new resurrection bodies) and will live eternally in the heavenly kingdom.' ~ Encyc. Brittanica

Not saying I believe it, but it's clearly incompatible with Dennett's neo-darwinian materialism, which is not surprising, given that he's a militant atheist. — Wayfarer

A separate soul implies dualism. But there is no definite Christian position on a separate soul, as IEP notes:

c. The Resurrection of the Body

Whereas most Greek philosophers believed that immortality implies solely the survival of the soul, the three great monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) consider that immortality is achieved through the resurrection of the body at the time of the Final Judgment. The very same bodies that once constituted persons shall rise again, in order to be judged by God. None of these great faiths has a definite position on the existence of an immortal soul. Therefore, traditionally, Jews, Christians and Muslims have believed that, at the time of death, the soul detaches from the body and continues on to exist in an intermediate incorporeal state until the moment of resurrection. Some others, however, believe that there is no intermediate state: with death, the person ceases to exist, and in a sense, resumes existence at the time of resurrection. — Immortality - IEP

Orthodox Christians do believe God is spirit, so their worldview is still dualistic. — Marchesk

Yes though, as the above IEP quote suggests, human soul/body dualism may have more to do with the influence of Platonism than with monotheistic religion itself.

Here's Hacker's proposal again: that sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms.

Do you think that's a valid problem for science to investigate?
— Andrew M

Yes of course - evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and so on. Does not, however, vitiate the fundamental issue. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that the emergence of sentience is the fundamental issue. Now note how Nagel frames the issue:

"it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view."
— Thomas Nagel — Wayfarer

The inclusion of objective and subjective only appears in Nagel's proposal, not Hacker's. The description of the "objective spatio-temporal order" is Nagel's "view from nowhere". "Subjective experiences" translates as "radically private experiences" (that can't be described "objectively"). Thus a hard problem arises by definition, due to the subject/object dualism.

No such hard problem arises in Hacker's proposal since it doesn't assume subject/object dualism. In ordinary language, we experience the world, and therefore that is what we naturally investigate and describe (from our particular points of view).

Say we have an unknown quantity - how many red coins there are in a jar. You say 30, others say 35, Dennett comes along and say 0 and everybody tries to claim he's not even addressing the question. 0 is a perfectly reasonable answer to the question — Isaac

And how is "7894785327954" not an equally "reasonable" answer, in the absence of any empirical fact? You lost yourself in a sea of empty speculations now...