Certainly this is the idealist and pansychist's view of things. — schopenhauer1

Absolutely. They are definitely hard perspectives to argue against.

They are definitely hard perspectives to argue against. — Merkwurdichliebe

Cant you just puncture it by denying God?

Cant you just puncture it by denying God? — frank

God is not necessary for idealism. But the notion of God is quite coherent and rational from an idealist perspective.

It's not called the Hard Problem for nothing. — frank

Whether qualia are appropriate to describe internal states, and indeed what the phenomenal structure of those internal states is, is a distinct problem from the hard problem, no? We're not talking about how phenomenal states arise or emerge out of non-sentient matter, we're talking about the appropriate description of internal/phenomenal states of sentient beings and what role qualia should play in that, if any. If we end up saying qualia do not exist as they are theorised/intuited, that still is consistent with keeping the explanatory gap open as we've not committed ourselves to any thesis regarding the emergence of phenomenal states from non-sentient matter! Solving the hard problem is a bridge between phenomenal states and physical states, dissolving it is showing there's no need of a bridge, the explanatory gap is asserting that there's a river in need of a bridge to cross . What we're doing in discussing this essay so far is staying on the phenomenal side to see if qualia help make a map of it.

If it turned out that keeping the explanatory gap open required relying on theories/intuitions which can be shown to be confused, inaccurate or false, only then would the hard problem dissolve.

If it turned out that keeping the explanatory gap open required relying on theories/intuitions which can be shown to be confused, inaccurate or false, only then would the hard problem dissolve. — fdrake

Isn't this possibly a case of a straw man then? Knockdown qualia but not the real problem (the hard problem). Call it sense-data, mental states, subjective states, qualia. Its choosing a very specific kind of idea (qualia) to (possibly?) try to eliminate all mental states from the equation. If he's not doing this, then can you explain how he is not doing this? What is Dennett's stand if not on qualia then on mental states in general? If it is something like, "It's an illusion" (not just qualia but mental states altogether), then what the heck does that mean? The illusion is still "something".

I dunno read and analyse the paper and see what you think.

I dunno read and analyse the paper and see what you think. — fdrake

I read the pumps, and ask this still to you.

Whether qualia are appropriate to describe internal states, and indeed what the phenomenal structure of those internal states is, is a distinct problem from the hard problem, no? We're not talking about how phenomenal states arise or emerge out of non-sentient matter, we're talking about the appropriate description of internal/phenomenal states of sentient beings and what role qualia should play in that, if any. — fdrake

I think you've misunderstood the idea of the Hard Problem.

To solve the Hard Problem would be to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness as opposed to functions. IOW, to solve the Hard Problem would be to explain qualia. No such comprehensive theory of consciousness presently exists. Some deny that it will ever be possible to achieve this kind of understanding because it requires turning the lens of science on itself, so to speak. A minority, people like Dennett, deny that there is anything to explain.

I think, so far, Dennett's inspiration has led you to see complexity in something as simple as the taste of a pumpkin (or whatever). Taste is influenced by your sense of smell, which is the only sense processed by your frontal lobes, the seat of emotion. That's why aromas and flavors are frequently accompanied by direct and primitive emotions. Some of that is the result of cranial reflexes. Notice sometime that certain smells can give you a sudden flash of being somewhere else, in your past. Maybe it's the smell of a certain kind of food. I had it once with the smell of a lilac flower.

The field of aesthetics is endlessly fascinating, whether it's about sound, visuals, tactile stuff, the way all of it mixes together with ideas and emotions, cultural influence, and philosophy. Yes, it's very complex. Nobody ever said it wasn't.

The field of aesthetics is endlessly fascinating, whether it's about sound, visuals, tactile stuff, the way all of it mixes together with ideas and emotions, cultural influence, and philosophy. Yes, it's very complex. Nobody ever said it wasn't. — frank

All attempts to explain the aesthetic sphere of life amount to mere vanity. It's complex but insubstantial. Science comes closest to giving us anything objective to rely on. Still, all scientific knowledge is based on appearance - as it seeks to tell us how things appear, and scientific fact is only an approximation of the truth (of how things are in themselves).

whether or not "mental phenomenon" qualifies as an object of perception? Even if we arrive at an adequate answer for how we percieve mental phenomenon, and can explain those perceptions, we would simply be pushing the problem farther down the line. We'd only be able to explain the true nature of our perception of mental states as we percieve it, as an object of perception (as it is for us, and not what it is in itself)...in the end, we get nowhere that hasn't already been gotten. — Merkwurdichliebe

What you say is not specific to perception of of mental phenomena, it applies to elephants and atoms too. And yet scientists go somewhere that has not been 'gotten' by studying their perceptions of elephants and atoms. So there's a gap in your logic.

A minority, people like Dennett, deny that there is anything to explain.

I think, so far, Dennett's inspiration has led you to see complexity in something as simple as the taste of a pumpkin (or whatever). Taste is influenced by your sense of smell, which is the only sense processed by your frontal lobes, the seat of emotion. That's why aromas and flavors are frequently accompanied by direct and primitive emotions. Some of that is the result of cranial reflexes. Notice sometime that certain smells can give you a sudden flash of being somewhere else, in your past. — frank

What the fuck kind of argument is that? Dennet tries to deny qualia need explaining but lilacs remind you of your childhood so...what? What on earth has any of that got to do with the article or with the 'hard' problem?

So far what should have been an interesting exegesis has been nothing but an Herculean attempt by fdrake to get at the issues (nothing to add, some really good insights there though) which has been met by a lot of vague hand-waiving of a level more suited to the smoke-hazed dorm-room. "Yeah but...like...I can smell lilacs, man? Crazy init?"

But the heart of the matter is the hard problem. What are mental states, and what are they in relation to physical states? Anything else is just putting a "Do not disturb" sign up and pushing the Cartesian theater to another area of focus. — schopenhauer1

Note we don't know what matter is. We may never know, and yet we still study it.

If by "what ARE mental states" you mean "how can we categorize them usefully and think about their relations with other things", I agree with you that it's a good question. (My answer is mental events are informational in nature). But if you are asking about the true ontology of minds, I'm afraid you will have to wait forever for an answer.

What you say is not specific to perception of of mental phenomena, it applies to elephants and atoms too. And yet scientists go somewhere that has not been 'gotten' by studying their perceptions of elephants and atoms. So there's a gap in your logic. — Olivier5

Perhaps there is ellipsis in my reasoning, it doesn't change the fact that scientists would have to go beyond perception to study perception as such, and since that seems to be impossible so far, we are mired in perception - not a world of being, but a world of appearances - hence "gotten".

anything that doesn't apply to elephants and atoms?

anything that doesn't apply to elephants and atoms? — Olivier5

What do mental states, elephants and atoms have in common?
~They are objects of perception.

How do they differ?
~Nobody has ever perceived a mental state.

You cannot perceive your own mental events? That's odd.

You cannot perceive your own mental events? That's odd. — Olivier5

Mental events, like thought or emotion, nope. I can't even think of which perceptual faculty might be responsible for apprehending a mental event. Perhaps you could enlighten me.

Self consciouness, I suppose. I kinda know when I am angry, impatient or happy. I kinda see the colour red. Etc.

exactly, knowing is not a perceptual faculty, but seeing is. We can point to red and argue over a thing's redness. But to argue whether you yourself are angry, impatient or happy is absurd - all evidence is indirect. And to point to your knowledge of you being angry, impatient or happy, well that is a matter of your word, there is no way for me to perceive what you know, especially what you know about the mental events you may be experiencing.

My take on qualia is that it's, for certain, 100%, real.

Why?

A simple question follows:

Can you or anyone, even Daniel Dennett, describe, put into words, everything that's going on in your or their or his mind/head?

The answer is a resounding NO!

And that which you can't describe in words - the ineffable aspect - of consciousness is precisely what qualia is.

There seems to be connection with Wittgenstein's private language argument. Qualia can't be put in the public domain and thus, private language argument given due weightage, qualia is beyond the reach of language. What say you? :chin:

And to point to your knowledge of you being angry, impatient or happy, well that is a matter of your word, there is no way for me to perceive what you know, especially what you know about the mental events you may be experiencing. — Merkwurdichliebe

I suspect you also know something about your own mental phenomena, and this knowledge is based on a capacity for introspection. It doesn't come from nothing. The distinction between knowing and sensing is weaker than you seem to think: you know because you sense.

And yes, mental phenomena are subjective by definition. But MRI of brains can detect emotions, so self-reporting is not the only tool we have to study these things.

What the fuck kind of argument is that? Dennet tries to deny qualia need explaining but lilacs remind you of your childhood so...what? What on earth has any of that got to do with the article or with the 'hard' problem? — Isaac

That was part of my intuition regarding the taste if pumpkins. I had to cut it short else Warhol prints and Keifer lead splatters would show up.

What intuitions did you encounter re: taste of pumpkins?

What intuitions did you encounter re: taste of pumpkins? — frank

I'm not even sure that sentence makes sense, but if it does, I'm afraid I have no idea what you're asking me. The closest I could get to what might be an intuition about the taste of pumpkins is that they would taste like the last time I ate a pumpkin??

I figured that part of the exegesis would involve doing what he asks to see what happens. That's what drake did.

I figured that part of the exegesis would involve doing what he asks to see what happens. — frank

OK...might be getting somewhere, but still an awful lot of dots to join up...

Our mental (and physical) response to eating pumpkin is complex and varied - got that bit (smelling lilacs makes you think of childhood or whatever). So... that relates to Dennet's "surely it is quite OK to talk of the way the juice tastes to Dennett at time t, and ask whether it is just the same as or different from the way the juice tastes to Dennett at time t', or the way the juice tastes to Jones at time t." - there's some way pumpkin tastes to you at some point, right?

But then he goes on to say "right here we have already made the big mistake. The final step presumes that we can isolate the qualia from everything else that is going on--at least in principle or for the sake of argument. What counts as the way the juice tastes to x can be distinguished, one supposes, from what is a mere accompaniment, contributory cause, or byproduct of this "central" way." Which seems exactly the matter waived away. Just because tasting pumpkin initiates some pathway of responses, doesn't mean it's anything more to do with the pumpkin than the chair you're sat on.

Well said. We're in Merleau-Ponty territory. If I present a swash of prussian blue to you, I can dramatically alter your experience of it by what I put beside it. So the notion that there is a distinct prussian blue qualia is wrong. It would appear that speaking in that way would have to be a kind of shorthand.

But is it really a shorthand for something? Could it be that the mind is a sieve that electrical and hormonal events flow through, leaving behind words as markers?


Or better: is there a theory out there (involving qualia) that pictures the mind this way when all that really exists is words?

We're in Merleau-Ponty territory. — frank

Wasn't he one of the first to raise the logical contradiction of some theory trying to undermine the reality of human subjective experience, from which all knowledge and theories spring?

Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the world’s, are always both naïve and at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself around me and begins to exist for me. To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, whence knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.

Phenomenology of Perception - Introduction

But is it really a shorthand for something? Could it be that the mind is a sieve that electrical and hormonal events flow through, leaving behind words as markers?


Or better: is there a theory out there (involving qualia) that pictures the mind this way when all that really exists is words? — frank

I think Dennet's 6th intuition pump touches on this. It's my favourite pump, and often overlooked for it's implications. You could not tell the difference between inverted messages or inverted memory links. You'd have no way of knowing which had happened. Dennet uses this pump only to show that the supposedly private nature of qualia must, if they exist, be so private as to be unavailable even to ourselves.

I think, however it has wider connotations from a broadly neurological perspective. Associations, like the memory association Dennet imagines having been inverted, are all there is going on. The reason why intuition pump 6 delivers the punch it does is because it shows that there's nothing to the 'quale' other than the chain of mental events (and physical/physiological responses) of which it is a part. A seamless process of two-way interaction between our minds and our environment. At no point in the process of inference and error reduction have we ever finally 'received' the input from the hidden states of the external world, they're constantly in a state of two-way interaction.

Wasn't he one of the first to raise the logical contradiction of some theory trying to undermine the reality of human subjective experience, from which all knowledge and theories spring?

Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the world’s, are always both naïve and at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself around me and begins to exist for me. To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, whence knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.

Phenomenology of Perception - Introduction — Olivier5

:cheer: Have you read PoP in French? Is it the same in French as in English?

I think Dennet's 6th intuition pump touches on this. It's my favourite pump, and often overlooked for it's implications. — Isaac

Yep. Banno and I discussed this one.