The linguistic turn ought not result in forgetting that all sorts of stuff existed prior to the accounting practices specifically designed as a means to explain them. Meaning existed prior to our knowledge and/or awareness of our own thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves(conscious experience), and did so as a direct result of creatures capable of drawing correlations between different things doing so. Many many correlations were drawn between different directly perceptible things long before we learned how to talk about it via language use.

Some correlations were and continue being drawn between directly perceptible aspects of language use, and had to have been, in order for language creation and subsequent use.

If our accounting practices regarding how things become meaningful to us cannot be used to bridge the gap between language less conscious experience and conscious experience informed by language, then we cannot possibly hope to offer an adequate account of belief, whereas what counts as being "adequate" would require building an explanatory bridge between non linguistic language less belief, beliefs formed from simple naming and descriptive practices, and the uber complex metacognitive varieties of belief products like logical notation, predicate calculus, general historical accounts, and metaphilosophy.

When applied to cats, belief as propositional attitude bears a striking resemblance to the little man that wasn't there.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming/having the belief.

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon


Well, no, I think that very badly expressed. — Banno


Oh, I'm sorry, it was an honest attempt to summarise what you said. Where did I go wrong? — Daemon

I would like to know what you meant Banno.

Stove's Gem. We can't see the world as it really is because we have eyes. — Andrew M

Well, we don't see the empty space between or inside atoms, do we? Nor do we see the electromagnetic field holding the molecules together. Nor do we see any the vast majority of the EM spectrum interacting or passing through objects.

So no, we don't see the world as it is. We see the world as we evolved to see it. Even Dennett in some of his later talks agrees with this. He came to favor the computer desktop analogy for how we experience the world. Computer GUIs are metaphors for ease of use in interacting with computers, but files and folders aren't actually icons you click or touch.

Start here.

Both Wittgenstein and Dennett acknowledge that there is a private aspect of conscious experience. — Luke

Glad to see you have that. I don't deny it, either.

...I don't think it's very clear from the paper (and, perhaps more so, from his defenders here) what Dennett intends to deny: — Luke

That's somewhat true, a result of the variability of the definitions used by the advocates of qualia. Hence:

Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? ...Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.

and:

I want to shift the burden of proof, so that anyone who wants to appeal to private, subjective properties has to prove first that in so doing they are not making a mistake.

The job of setting out what qualia are is were it should be: with the advocates of qualia. The purpose of the article is to set out the considerable difficulties involved.

What's up, Frank? Did your idea petter out?

Meaning existed prior to our knowledge and/or awareness of our own thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves(conscious experience), and did so as a direct result of creatures capable of drawing correlations between different things doing so. — creativesoul

So meaning has become a thing; How sad.

What I meant by what? The topic is too long not to need links.

What's upper, Frank? Did your idea petter out? — Banno

If you accept Word and Object doesn't your realism get weaker? You still have plenty of true statements being uttered, but without the folk realism most people operate by.

We see the world as we evolved to see it. — Marchesk

Do you want us to conclude that, hence, we cannot not talk about the world as it is? Because plainly, that does not follow.

Where's the explicit account of how meaning first emerges onto the world stage in it's most basic identifiable form such that it continues to grow and/or evolve over a sufficient enough time period so as to provide enough groundwork, a semantically rich enough basis, for us to be able to begin naming and describing all of the different aspects of own personal experiences as well as getting the simple language less ones right? — creativesoul

Creative is replacing vitalism with meaning...?

If you accept Word and Object doesn't your realism get weaker? — frank

Why?

(Why do I have to ask this? Why don't folk present arguments here, instead of innuendo?)

Why? — Banno

True statements are being uttered, but this is stripped of folk psychology surrounding realism.

It's Quine.

There's a bush outside the window. It's a Correa alba, about two metres wide by one and a half high.

Its leaves are more rounded than most Correa leaves, a grey-green that compliments the almost sepia stems. It has white open four petalled flowers, unlike other Coreas these do not resemble the cylindrical form of Fuchsia flowers, but are open. Its procumbent habit works perfectly as a screen, and I think it a rather large specimen from my own observations. It is one of the few things I prune, keeping it clear of the path on two sides and shaping it around a statue on the third. It is often home to the nests of small birds.

But some idiot philosopher will say that we cannot know about the bush, only about how it seems to us; as if that meant something.

And...?

Philosophy as dentistry.

Philosophy as dentistry. — Banno

Point counterpoint.

I don't think I've ever been accused of being too verbose...

We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation. — Banno

Would you also hold that your own belief is not a thing in your own mind, but only a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon

You responded that it would have to be both. So I sought clarification:

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon

But you said that was very badly expressed. I'd just like to know what I got wrong.

True. :smile:

SO we have @bongo fury complaining about essays while @Daemon requests them.

Beliefs are not mental furniture. The expression "a thing in your own mind" is fraught.

Indeed, it's the idea that a quale is a "thing in the mind" that is perhaps the target for Dennett.

Do you want us to conclude that, hence, we cannot not talk about the world as it is? — Banno

Sure, if we ignore the last several centuries of scientific discovery, and restrict ourselves to talk of cats, apples and the five elements ...

Because plainly, that does not follow.

If it were so plain, we wouldn't be having this debate ...

Why don't folk present arguments here, instead of innuendo? — Banno

Covid is up next. Think we can make it there ...?

Indeed, it's the idea that a quale is a "thing in the mind" that is perhaps the target for Dennett. — Banno

Where would you put the quale? I doubt you think brains work any better here.

Don't want essays, just enough to go on. It seemed to me that you were saying that a belief was a thing in your own mind, which puzzled me.

Just to help folk out, Here is an article by Chalmers which makes use of qualia. Here's the conclusion:

To summarize: we have established that if absent qualia are possible, then Fading Qualia are possible; if inverted qualia are possible, then Dancing Qualia are possible; and if absent qualia are possible, then Dancing Qualia are possible. But it is implausible that Fading Qualia are possible, and it is extremely implausible that Dancing Qualia are possible. It is therefore extremely implausible that absent qualia and inverted qualia are possible. It follows that we have good reason to believe that the principle of organizational invariance is true, and that functional organization fully determines conscious experience.

Working that out might take a bit.

But of course the paradox is rather easily resolved if we recognize that having words in mind or thinking silently in words no more implies that we have anything called a mind with words in it than having peace as a hope implies that we have anything called peace or a hope. — Goodman, On Thoughts Without Words

:rofl:

A pattern of behaviour is a thing in your mind?

You probably believe that the grunge under your left big toe's nail contains microorganisms. But I'd bet you never thought of it up until then. SO in what sense could it have been a thing in your mind?

(edit: ...which seems or be what is saying. )

A pattern of behaviour is a thing in your mind? — Banno

If it wasn't in your mind/brain, you wouldn't be behaving.

Philosophy as dentistry. — Banno

For Quine, our theories populate the world with objects. Isn't that correct? I'm asking.

"...mind/brain..." begs the question.