As I said above, there are two parts to this view as I construct it, a "critical" part whereby we can somehow or another find limits to possibilities and separate things that are possible from things that are not, and a "liberal" part which says that you're free to hold beliefs without yet justifying them from the ground up. — Pfhorrest

The "liberal" part seems to summon a fideism you would never escape from. In light of any critical philosophy you would not be entitled to hold any unjustified beliefs whatsoever. Perhaps it's the wording; perhaps you mean something like 'free to entertain possibilities, without justifying them from the ground up'. This is precisely the sort of thing Popper says about the value of metaphysical speculation; we can never predict what critical knowledge will emerge when we have tested our groundless speculations.

Perhaps it's the wording; perhaps you mean something like 'free to entertain possibilities, without justifying them from the ground up'. This — Janus

Yes, I think perhaps you're attaching too much significance to the word "believe". To me, to believe something just means to think it's true, not any kind of special faithful commitment to it. You're free to think whatever seems true to you is true, for no more reason than it just seems true to you, even if different things equally seem true to others in account of the same information -- that's underdetermination there -- until such time as some limits on what could possibly be true are found.

Yes, I think perhaps you're attaching too much significance to the word "believe". To me, to believe something just means to think it's true, not any kind of special faithful commitment to it. — Pfhorrest

To think something is true is to have a faithful commitment to it, as I see it. To entertain something as a possibility is not to believe or disbelieve it. Popper, as I remember it, cites the example of the belief that the Earth is the center of the Cosmos. It was testing that belief that led to the heliocentric model, and later to the realization that the Sun is one among countless stars.

The belief was generally held, to be sure, but those who were minded to test it would have counted it as one possibility that needs to be tested, in light of the observations that had been made that did not fit the model.

IOW, under a critical rationalist conception of knowledge, there is no Gettier problem at all, because justification in such a paradigm doesn't mean what Gettier assumes it does. — Pfhorrest

I think the problem is not with 'justification' but with 'true' in jtb. First off it ends up implying knowledge is immaculate which it need not be, however scary this is. We can (and do) categorize things as knowledge even if they may turn out to be false. Certainly scientists, at least officially, do this and are proud to counterpose this to religious people who they consider not open to revision. But secondly I think JTB is misleading because it is as if there are two criteria, when really there is just one 'justification.' Now if one wants to argue that something can be justified but false, well, if we know that about belief X it is no longer well justified. (and of course that falsification might, in the long run, be revised, but that's another story). And notice I slipped in the word 'well'. Justification includes a matter of degree. Some kind of adverb is involved and people differ on both the degree and the criteria hidden in those adverbs. Different degrees of rigor. Different criteria that lead to something being considered justified. And then in the context of other research/knowledge that might undermine the best little deductions or study results. (at least for now). I say, take out the 'true'. Best justified gets to stand. But then I add in that it does not make sense to only have beliefs that are rationally justified, certainly not consciously, but that's another kettle of propositions.

I'd just like to add that fideism is oddly binary and extreme. IOW it prioritizes faith, at least when it is centered on religion (and perhaps philosophy) and denigrates reason.

I think that's problematic when taken as one of the two main choices and when applied to beliefs in general.

There is no reason I can see not to have a mixed epistemology. I think we HAVE to have one to manage to live. With beliefs being arrived at in a variety of ways. Adn one need not denigrate the various methods and choose just one.

it is as if there are two criteria, when really there is just one 'justification.' — Coben

I pretty much agree with this.

I'd just like to add that fideism is oddly binary and extreme. IOW it prioritizes faith, at least when it is centered on religion (and perhaps philosophy) and denigrates reason.

I think that's problematic when taken as one of the two main choices and when applied to beliefs in general.

There is no reason I can see not to have a mixed epistemology. I think we HAVE to have one to manage to live. With beliefs being arrived at in a variety of ways. Adn one need not denigrate the various methods and choose just one. — Coben

I don’t see fideism as one of the two main choices, but as one of the two main types of error, and the view I advocate is explicitly meant to be a mixed epistemology, taking things that each of those erroneous approaches get right (the criticism of cynicism and the liberalism of fideism), while rejecting both of their problematic extremes.

So how would you label the two main epistemological choices. I am sure you have done this somewhere above, but it you can spare a moment to repeat just the labels. I am interested in the topic in both threads on these issues, but honestly finding it rather hard to understand the 'conversation'. (for example in the other thread I cannot figure out what the disagreement is between you and Isaac. And here I am having trouble getting what some of the disagreements are about - I am not asking you to explain this however. Generally I find I can come into a longer thread, read the OP and figure out how to join the discussion just by reading the last few posts. Well, I've done more than that in both threads and I don't get them. I get many individual statements, but the dynamics I find odd.)

So how would you label the two main epistemological choices. — Coben

I’m not sure I know what you’re asking, but maybe a picture will clarify my answer anyway:



I’m advocating for the middle area, and against either of the two extremes ends.

the dynamics I find odd — Coben

Me too.

the dynamics I find odd
— Coben

Me too. — Pfhorrest

OK, though you do seem to understand their objections. But then you clearly understand your position better than I do, so perhaps that makes the difference.

I’m not sure I know what you’re asking, but maybe a picture will clarify my answer anyway: — Pfhorrest

The picture made it more clear, and I generally understood.

Where would you see beliefs based on intuition?

Fideism demands faith, rather than merely accepting it. Or better put denigrates other methodologies. But there are various non-rational processes that lead to choices, actions and beliefs. Liberalism would seem to allow for these. Critical liberalism would, it seems, be critical of them, but allow them until, if I have interpreted you correctly, such time as they fail repeatedly or are disproved. Is that a fair take?

Is that a fair take? — Coben

Sounds right to me! :smile:

Great. I would go so far as to say that whatever people's official epsitemology is, I have never met anyone who did not, in practice, follow my paraphrase of your position. I find people often confuse their official positions with what they actually do irl.

I find that people generally tend to follow that as well, but only until it becomes inconvenient for them, and they often switch to the alternatives when it comes to what standards they hold other people to. E.g. it's not uncommon to insist that someone else prove their beliefs or else reject them (cynicism), or to hold one's own beliefs as beyond question when someone else challenges them (fideism), which is different from posing challenges to someone else's beliefs (which is merely criticism, not cynicism), or holding one's own beliefs without first proving them (which is merely liberalism, not fideism).

I find that people generally tend to follow that as well, but only until it becomes inconvenient for them, and they often switch to the alternatives when it comes to what standards they hold other people to. — Pfhorrest

*Exactly. Often I find that it can seem like a person arrives at their beliefs only via science and deduction (from scientific models), when in fact they have a wide range of beliefs arrived at via intuition, authority, unconscious processes. They then expect others to live up to to standards they do not. Now sometimes the belief they are criticizing is some larger concept like God, but in fact they themselves act in the world based on intuition, unconscious process and authority in ways that do directly affect other people.

It's the 'as if' people live up to mono-epistemologies that I think creates a great deal more strife. And ironically, it create a kind of holier than thou immaculateness in people who are presenting themselves as disliking such metaphors.