No. The problem of explaining the emergence of immaterial processes --- such as Life, Mind, & Consciousness --- was inherent in the theory of Materialism. That notion was based on the observation that physical Effects usually had prior physical Causes. So, it was just common sense to conclude that even meta-physical aspects of reality should be reducible to physical causes. Unfortunately, no one has ever found the missing link between Matter and Mind. This glaring gap in cause & effect may be why Plato concluded that ultimate Causes (Forms) were not physical, but meta-physical : i.e. Ideal.Have we invented the hard problem of consciousness? — Beautiful Mind
I view "the hard problem" as not really a "problem". All its really doing is stating, "Figuring out how your subjective consciousness maps to your brain in an exact and repeatable model is hard." — Philosophim
But do we have a model that states, "If I send 3 nanos of dopamine to cell number 1,234,562 in quadrent 2 you'll see a red dog?" Not yet. — Philosophim
the qualities of consciousness that are experienced by living things may arise from out of inanimate matter which possesses no inherent qualities in and of itself; outside of our subjective perceptions. — Beautiful Mind
There is an aspect of the needle-prick - what it feels like (qualia) - that is present in you but absent in the robot.
How can we be sure of this? — ChrisH
How can we be sure of this? — ChrisH
Did you, by any chance, happen to see anything that contradicts me? — TheMadFool
Of course, but we seem to be talking about something quite different now. — ChrisH
I'm simply suggesting that we are not in a position to say with absolute confidence that a robot, as described by TheMadFool, cannot/does not experience 'qualia'. — ChrisH
You're on a computer right? Phone at least. Run a systems diagnostic or "CPU health" test or something of the like. It doesn't "feel" anything it only reports, when asked. — Outlander
Welcome to the hard problem. — ChrisH
I wasn't casting doubt on your interpretation of the hard problem.
I'm simply saying that there is no way in practice or in principle to determine if any entity, other than oneself, animate or inanimate, actually experiences 'qualia'. Therefore the claim that a robot cannot/does not experience qualia is an unwarranted assumption — ChrisH
Since you don't deny that humans have qualia, — TheMadFool
can it be explained with physicalism? — TheMadFool
How can the quality of depth in a visual experience be explained within physicalism? What is physical about the experience of empty space? What does "physicalism" even mean? What are "experiences"?I assume conscious experiences can be explained within physicalism. — ChrisH
How can the quality of depth in a visual experience be explained within physicalism? — Harry Hindu
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