Hypothesis: pragmatic solutions do not work, because no matter how much time people like Rorty spend asserting that we should just ignore the idea of ultimate goals or transcendence or what have you, there is simply no way to stop humans from constantly asking "Why?". A lot of people are apathetic on this front, but should they be? More importantly, there are always people who aren't apathetic. Wittgensteinians go on and on about how philosophy ought to be therapeutic and there are no philosophical problems, but here we are nearly a century later and philosophers are still doing what they've always done, so that hasn't worked. — Pneumenon

:-O I notice you said some blasphemy towards the Great One there...

They can ask why till they're blue in the face, the only thing is that I cannot even imagine an answer to that question. Why? What kind of answer would you even expect? What kind of answer would even satisfy you? One's ultimate goal is to live in Hawaii, another wants to become Emperor of China, and so forth. An ultimate goal is about how YOU relate with reality - what YOU identify as your purpose given your material and spiritual conditions. So the question why is personal, there is no universal answer that can be given.

Yeah, but we have to cooperate in groups, and any group that cooperates needs a collective "why" if it's gonna function over the long term. More importantly, even if it's personal, it's still about my relation to reality - that big fluctuating-but-always-there thing that doesn't go away no matter how I define my terms. And that requires that my purposes reference something outside of me.

As to imagining an answer to the question - well, what of it? "I can't imagine it" isn't gonna satisfy any of those transcendental nutbags, now will it?

Also, I said "Wittgensteinians," not Wittgenstein, although there is no philosopher with whom I fully agree, besides myself, and even that one is sometimes doubtful. Wittgenstein was my favorite for a long time, and I don't deny that he was head and shoulders above most philosophers of the past few centuries, but he's not perfect.

Wittgenstein's problem comes from his references to "mysticism" (wink) and stuff beyond language (wink wink) and general sentiment along the lines of "This is all you can say about this and as far as you can go, and there's no more to it, except there is," (wink wink wink.) Nobody has destroyed him, it is true, but did he succeed in ending philosophy? No. And nowhere is this more aptly illustrated than in his modern-day followers, who have taken his supercilious attitude toward philosophy as a career and made a career out of it. Poor bastard must be spinning in his grave.

And that requires that my purposes reference something outside of me. — Pneumenon

Of course so? My reality and your reality are not the same, for the simple reason that we live in different communities, we have different backgrounds, desires, and so forth. We cannot have the same purpose for these reasons.

If you are born as Prince Charles, your purpose in life will be different than if you are born in a fishing village in Japan.

As to imagining an answer to the question - well, what of it? "I can't imagine it" isn't gonna satisfy any of those transcendental nutbags, now will it? — Pneumenon

No, but nothing will. That's exactly my point. There simply is no cure except that they give up the imagined itch.

Yeah, but we have to cooperate in groups, and any group that cooperates needs a collective "why" if it's gonna function over the long term — Pneumenon

Groups are formed by people who share similar purposes. In addition they are formed by those who can "sell" their large purpose unto others.

Augustino, I sense a tension in your thinking here, inasmuch as there seems to be some fracture (which every philosopher has). I want to try and diagnose it, in order to open up this discussion a little.

You seem to take the attitude that the transcendental nutbags will not be satisfied because there is nothing that can satisfy them, and the only winning move with such questions in not to play. You also appeal to personality and context, saying that such things are personal and different between different people.

Here's the issue, though. You are engaged in a discussion. You say things like this on the internet, where they're meant to be read by many other people. If I make it a point of saying that people who seek some kind of transcendence ought to stop, then, if I am arguing in good faith, I really am trying to get at least some of them to stop. But, as we've seen in philosophy since Wittgenstein, this never actually happens, because the transcendental types keep doing their thing. So shouldn't the Wittgensteinian be the one to halt das maul?

(Not that you should, of course. I'm talking to you for a reason, after all.)

I anticipate (perhaps wrongly) that your response on this point will be "Well, they can do whatever they want! Meaning is personal, so it's not my problem." I don't think this response works, though, because if you really thought that, then why bother engaging in the discussion at all?

You seem to take the attitude that the transcendental nutbags will not be satisfied because there is nothing that can satisfy them, and the only winning move with such questions in not to play. You also appeal to personality and context, saying that such things are personal and different between different people.

Here's the issue, though. You are engaged in a discussion. You say things like this on the internet, where they're meant to be read by many other people. If I make it a point of saying that people who seek some kind of transcendence ought to stop, then, if I am arguing in good faith, I really am trying to get at least some of them to stop. But, as we've seen in philosophy since Wittgenstein, this never actually happens, because the transcendental types keep doing their thing. So shouldn't the Wittgensteinian be the one to halt das maul? — Pneumenon

I'm not saying they should stop - I am not concerned about what they're doing. I'm merely indicating that I think their activity is pointless - "it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing"

I don't think this response works, though, because if you really thought that, then why bother engaging in the discussion at all? — Pneumenon

Because I hope that maybe one of those lunatics will one day reveal some reason for their lunacy to me, which will make sense. I don't expect it, but maybe one day one will. And maybe that will be of use to me in achieving and following my own goals. So I have to challenge them. I would be surprised if they succeed - I don't see how they could go about it. You know @Pneumenon - a hunter never knows where the rabbit will jump from, so he must test and verify in all places.

Good! I think we've gotten deeper into the part of your thinking that interests me. You appear to believe that such activity is pointless, but you freely admit that you are not certain of that. You do entertain the possibility that they might give you a good reason. And this suspicion of yours that there is a possibility (albeit a remote one) that they may have a good reason for what they do, is enough to drive you into discussion with them. I see.

I will venture a conjecture here, that you may tear apart or affirm as you see fit. You are willing to engage in discussion with the lunatics because you are not 100% certain that they are lunatics. That is to say, you are willing to entertain the idea that there could be a transcendental answer, or at least, a good reason to seek one. And the lunatics do their loony stuff because they believe the idea that you are only willing to entertain as a remote possibility. Have I understood you?

You are willing to engage in discussion with the lunatics because you are not 100% certain that they are lunatics. — Pneumenon

Sure

That is to say, you are willing to entertain the idea that there could be a transcendental answer, or at least, a good reason to seek one — Pneumenon

Either that, or there could be something useful in their lunatic practices of relating with the transcendent that could be useful to me.

Have I understood you? — Pneumenon

Mostly.

The problem of goals. Why are you doing this? What, exactly, do you want, and what are your motives? — Pneumenon

Exactly, this is why I'm critical of physicalism, etc., because there's still some sort of motive behind it; it's essentially a religious belief. The call to lay all bias at the foot of Lord Science is essentially a religious call. It has some sort of undefined telos behind it.

To me, this illustrates how pervasive a teleological way of thinking is in society. And more importantly, how can anyone truly know all of the motives behind their own thinking in the first place? To fully be aware of ones own motives requires deep honesty with oneself. The discipline to "draw out the deep waters" itself requires a motive for why to even bother in the first place. Someone's "ultimate goal" is to live in Hawaii or be the Emperor of China, as Augustino says, but what's the motive behind the goal? Motives are deeply layered in us. I like how Tillich defines God as "ultimate concern".

Someone's "ultimate goal" is to live in Hawaii or be the Emperor of China, as Augustino says, but what's the motive behind the goal? — Noble Dust

The motive is strictly personal - one could want to live in Hawaii because they were born in very poor conditions, where life was very difficult and ardous - living in Hawaii would be a release for them and their family. Someone else could be motivated to become Emperor of China because he feels the destiny of his nation sits on his shoulders - feels he is asked to do something for it. And so on - these are very particular reasons, that are almost nonsense to people who aren't the person in question. I'll take the guy wanting to live in Hawaii, and the guy wanting to be Emperor of China as nutters from strictly my perspective. These things only make sense to them and for them.

These things only make sense to them and for them. — Agustino

But surely by learning about their reasons, you can make sense of it for yourself? The reasons you just laid out sound perfectly reasonable, why do they not make sense to you? I can put myself in their shoes and imagine why they feel that way. I can imagine myself feeling similarly if I was them.

And so on — Agustino

Yes, and so on. These motives are a chain, a series. Where exactly is the genesis? How many of the motives are conscious, and how many unconscious? Motives and decisions are almost like the dark matter of society. Motives, conscious and unconscious are what cause society to propagate. It seems dismissive to me to simply say that others motives don't make sense to anyone but the person who holds them, simply because they are different from yours. Empathy is built on the ability to understand someone else's motives, to make sense of them.

But surely by learning about their reasons, you can make sense of it for yourself? — Noble Dust

I can imagine being in their situation but I cannot imagine arriving there.

Why not?

Why not? — Noble Dust

Because one's motives reveal themselves to them, and to no one else. I do not know how, for example, the guy wanting to become Chinese Emperor, how he started to perceive it as his duty to become the leader of the country, and start feeling it is his responsibility to do so.

The popular pragmatic answer to this is just to stick with a reference point until it is falsified, which is more or less how science works. — Pneumenon

The problem of goals .... This, I conjecture, is the big problem with trying to analyze the whole history of science, because the people involved may not have even had the same goals. — Pneumenon

Pragmatiism highlights the place goals have in rational inquiry. So that in fact defines "reference points in nature" in explicitly self-interested fashion. Reality is the "view from us". Our goals become an active part of the triangulation.

Vulgar pragmatism says the world-defining goal (the purpose that forms the umwelt of sign, to use the semiotic jargon) is personal utility. The questions about existence are guided by the ultimate anchoring question of "what's in it for me?".

But a scientific pragmatism - that tries to speak as nakedly and disinterestedly of nature as it can - instead might seek the goal of generalised invariance.

If one could imagine the distillation of all possible points of view, then what would emerge is the invariant characterisation of being? Lets look at a rock or a star from the point of view of the "universe". What would we see if we were that kind of "mind".

So in full blown Peircean pragmatism, you get that final ontic shift. The Universe is granted a mind in the sense that it stabilises its being by having a generalised point of view .... that is guided by some central purpose.

Cue the second law, equilibrium dynamics and entropy maximisation.

What you call "a fixed reference point" seems just another way of talking about the invariance of a symmetry. So relativity arises simply from a demand for the symmetry of universal co-variance. The world should look the same at any spatiotemporal scale of observation. So the "special interests of observers" - their particular states of acceleration - have to be factored out as localised, very personal, symmetry breakings.

This extends beyond science, by the way. The history of modern society is the history of us (ostensibly) trying our hardest to be good little children of the Enlightenment. — Pneumenon

Yep. Except the Enlightenment was based on atomism and Newtonian physics. And that reductionism - which presumes material being as brute existence, and spatiotemporal symmetry as transcendently fixed - has long since been revised by more holistic theory.

So society still understands existence in these classical terms. Science - pragmatically - has moved on.

Hypothesis: pragmatic solutions to this problem do not work, because no matter how much time people like Rorty spend asserting that we should just ignore the idea of ultimate goals or transcendence or what have you, there is simply no way to stop humans from constantly asking "Why?" — Pneumenon

Rorty is hardly a pragmatist. But I guess even in his own time Peirce was having to relabel himself a pragmaticist because folk like James could only understand a simplified "Enlightenment" version of his holism. :)

But anyway, again one can always ask "why?". Yet if one's answers achieve the invariance of universality, the questions become merely repetition of differences that don't make a difference. The questions become about chance particulars and not about deep universal laws (or symmetries and the reasons for their breaking).

And note that the goals are emergently immanent. That is the point of pragmatism proper, the ontic kind - to show how the regularity of universal habit could arise.

I do not know how, for example, the guy wanting to become Chinese Emperor, how he started to perceive it as his duty to become the leader of the country, and start feeling it is his responsibility to do so. — Agustino

Can't you just ask the guy? >:O

Really though, I partially agree, at least in that the motives of another are not always knowable or clear, but I think we can certainly apprehend some amount of another's motives. Actions also reveal motives, for instance. We can make decently accurate assessments, given enough time. We can make an assessment accurate enough, for instance, to make a judgement and then take an action. The results of our action could reveal that our judgement of the other's motives was accurate.

Can't you just ask the guy? >:O

Really though, I partially agree, at least in that the motives of another are not always knowable or clear, but I think we can certainly apprehend some amount of another's motives. Actions also reveal motives, for instance. We can make decently accurate assessments, given enough time. We can make an assessment accurate enough, for instance, to make a judgement and then take an action. The results of our action could reveal that our judgement of the other's motives was accurate. — Noble Dust

Knowing what his motives are is different than understanding why they are his motives. It's part of his freedom, having chosen those motives (or being chosen by them :P ). For example, why was Steve Jobs motivated by the idea of creating ground-breaking and revolutionary products for the world instead of, let's say, go and become a Buddhist monk? Both were viable alternatives, but he chose one of them. Why?

Knowing what his motives are is different than understanding why they are his motives. It's part of his freedom, having chosen those motives. — Agustino

I definitely disagree here; understanding why his motives are what they are would just be discovering the further motives underneath those motives. We don't choose our motives, as you say. Steve Jobs chose his career path, but he did so because of underlying motives; he didn't choose those motives. If I had been one of his closest friends or family members, I could probably elaborate further on what some of his motivations probably were.

Do you disagree with what else I've said here about motives? You don't really seem to be responding to my thoughts, just to what I say about your thoughts.

I definitely disagree here; understanding why his motives are what they are would just be discovering the further motives underneath those motives. We don't choose our motives, as you say. Steve Jobs chose his career path, but he did so because of underlying motives; he didn't choose those motives. If I had been one of his closest friends or family members, I could probably elaborate further on what some of his motivations probably were.

Do you disagree with what else I've said here about motives? You don't really seem to be responding to my thoughts, just to what I say about your thoughts. — Noble Dust

I disagree because some motives are primary. It's simply what it means to be Noble Dust that you have such a driving motive. Without it, you lose your very own essence. Otherwise we'd have an infinite regress of motives, which is nonsense. Some motive has to be primary and foundational to one's character.

Steve Jobs chose his career path for an underlying motive - he didn't become a Buddhist monk, even though he could have become one. But if he had, he would no longer have been Steve Jobs. Because to be Steve Jobs was simply having that underlying motive that was the core of who he was.

Some motive has to be primary and foundational to one's character. — Agustino

So you're saying the foundational motive is unknowable? If so, I mostly agree with that, but it doesn't mean we can't learn about the other motives layered on top, and get a sense for someone's general motivations, even if it's not a perfect, exhaustive knowledge.

So you're saying the foundational motive is unknowable? — Noble Dust

No I'm not saying it is unknowable. I'm saying that its source is unknowable - it's not known why Steve Jobs has that motive.

This motive is entirely knowable to the more self-conscious amongst us, at least our own is. It's our own individual purpose for being here, bestowed upon us by the Eternal. Its source is unknowable and unfathomable. How one relates to this motive depends - some have motives that cannot be fulfilled at this time and place. Chinese culture has a word for these people - they are known as "sleeping dragons". A sleeping dragon is someone whose purpose cannot show itself to the world at the moment, and remains known only to the individual. This particular individual relates to it by patiently waiting until the stars align - the moment when the dragon awakens and the motive becomes known to the world through the individual's actions, whatever they happen to be. Steve Jobs for example was asked what his motivation was, and said if you want to know that, look at our products. Steve Jobs as a young man, before he founded Apple, was a sleeping dragon - no one knew that this kid who liked to go to meditate and live an ascetic and simple lifestyle in India would go on to be the founder of a large business empire.

Another way to engage with this motive is to despair for not being able to actualise it at the present moment. Such a person may jump from activity to activity and experience a sort of restlessness and inability to quiet themselves down.

Others may not know the motive at all - because they lack self-awareness. They will be rushing from here to there, and back, not knowing what they're looking for, troubled by an itch whose origin they do not know.

I think that two people can share a motive. That's why we can cooperate. And if you're certain that you don't share a motive with someone else, trying to find out what they want, by your lights, is pointless.

I think that two people can share a motive. That's why we can cooperate. And if you're certain that you don't share a motive with someone else, trying to find out what they want, by your lights, is pointless. — Pneumenon

We don't share fundamental motives with others. However, them reaching their goal may help me to reach mine and conversely, in which case we'll both work together.

So what exactly is the point you're driving at? You're slowly revising your position. You originally said:

Someone else could be motivated to become Emperor of China because he feels the destiny of his nation sits on his shoulders - feels he is asked to do something for it. And so on - these are very particular reasons, that are almost nonsense to people who aren't the person in question. — Agustino

Which isn't the same as saying

I'm saying that its source is unknowable — Agustino

This motive is entirely knowable to the more self-conscious amongst us, at least our own is. It's our own individual purpose for being here, bestowed upon us by the Eternal. Its source is unknowable and unfathomable. — Agustino

These two ideas, that 1) our own motive is knowable to us, while 2) it's source is not knowable, seem arbitrary to me.

It is the same:

Knowing what his motives are is different than understanding why they are his motives. — Agustino

I can imagine being in their situation but I cannot imagine arriving there. — Agustino

The motive is strictly personal - one could want to live in Hawaii because they were born in very poor conditions, where life was very difficult and ardous - living in Hawaii would be a release for them and their family. Someone else could be motivated to become Emperor of China because he feels the destiny of his nation sits on his shoulders - feels he is asked to do something for it. And so on - these are very particular reasons, that are almost nonsense to people who aren't the person in question. — Agustino

The path as to how these persons arrive at having such fundamental motivations is not known. Why? Because their motives emerge from their own particular relationship with reality, which is unknowable. You can know their motivation is X - you can imagine being in their situation and having that motivation - but you cannot imagine ARRIVING there - you cannot imagine their relationship with reality that grounds that motive.

1) our own motive is knowable to us — Noble Dust

Not only our own motive, the motive of others too are knowable.

it's source is not knowable — Noble Dust

The source of our own motive is not knowable because it cannot be put into concepts. The source of others' motives is not known because we have no direct access to their relationship with reality, since we are not them.

So, ontological holism, ontic pragmatism. I can accept this, or some flavor of it, provided it still allows the possibility of philosophy (not a big fan of quietism anymore).

Let me paraphrase you here - I want to make sure I got it right. You're saying that proper pragmatism is an ontic inquiry; you can always ask "why," but once you do this past the point of universal invariance, you hit a wall because there's no answer in terms of a more general kind of invariance. Since scientific pragmatism, on your definition, is about explanation in terms of more general kinds of invariance, it follows that the pump runs dry once we get to universal invariance. Basically, a qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason with a restriction on the kinds of explanations allowed, viz. they must be in terms of more general invariance.

Now I want to talk about something else here: why that particular restriction? I would assume that this is motivated by the success of natural science, but that's a guess because you have not yet said so. Does this methodology bootstrap itself out of scientific pragmatism, from "Let's do this because it works" to a more general method, a sort of conceptual ascent? Or is it some other reason?

It is the same: — Agustino

No, in the bit about the Emperor, you're saying that his motivations "are almost nonsense to people who aren't the person in question". But you just said that we can know the motivations of others. That's the inconsistency I was pointing out.