Suppose that there is a set of facts that is evidence of a conclusion.

We speak of weak evidence, good evidence, conclusive evidence. We qualify so that the strength of the evidence is stated.

If A, B, C, and D are taken to be evidence of E, we say that A, B, C, and D are evidence for E. Good evidence, strong evidence, conclusive evidence.

There was a trend for a while in philosophy to flip things around, so that E was said to explain A, B, C, and D, instead of saying that A, B, C, and D are evidence of E. The language of explanation was used instead of the language of evidence.

What I noticed is that there was no corresponding qualification on how well the explanation explains the facts, or if there was, it was not as easy for people to evaluate. There was simply the statement that E explains A, B, C, and D, but there was no adverbial qualification on "explains".

There was the "best fit" model of explanation, but I believe that many people, even philosophers, do not reason well when thinking in terms of how well an explanation fits a set of facts. People reason much better when thinking in terms of evidence and conclusion, not explanans and explanandum. They have a better sense of proportion, so that they can appropriately qualify the strength of the evidence.