"top-down causation" — schopenhauer1

Sorry to interject but I think this is a concept that may require some attention, as well as the reverse concept of "bottom-up causation".

When I hit on a nail with a hammer, and the nail is driven down a plank of wood, can I say that the hammer head is accumulating kinetic energy, and that it transmits this energy to the nail? Or should I rather think that the atoms of the hammer head are accumulating kinetic energy and transmitting this energy to the nail atoms? Or should I instead say that the wave function of the hammer head elementary particles is interacting with that of the nail elementary particles? And at a smaller level, what about the quarks of my hammer? Are they the ones doing all the work or what?

I think that scale is in the eye of the beholder. We should avoid the assumption that there is a privileged scale at which causation happens. Causation happens at all levels at once because all levels coexist in one reality. Up and down in this context are best understood as metaphors for scale of observation, not for causation channels.

@schopenhauer1
... and why would levels necessitate a viewer?

There's a difference in reports or accounts of what's happening at different levels. If there were no accounting happening, would the difference still be there?

Are numbers there if nobody's thinking about them? :grin:

Are numbers there if nobody's thinking about them? :grin: — frank

Only Pi remains in the sky... :grin:

We just had a full moon, so yes. :razz:

At what epistemic level do tornados exist? — schopenhauer1

Everything we know about emergence happens within the epistemic framework of a "viewer". Without the viewer, what is it from something to move from one level to another? — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what is meant by something moving from one level to another. but I think I agree that emergence implies a viewer, because it seems like it's a consequence of limits of our cognition.

If we were omniscient, with unlimited cognitive powers, there doesn't seem to be a reason why we would use higher level emergent descriptions. Everything in a fluid could in theory be described in terms of particles moving (and probably more complete), we just prefer using fluid dynamics because it is to complex 'for us' to describe it in terms of moving particles.

People may not like where this is going, but I think words like "real", "reality", "to exist" all necessarily have some link to what kind of beings we are, to how we view the world and try to understand it. You get into trouble quickly if you think we are capturing something like a thing-in-itself with our descriptions.

So, let's just say tornados exist [period].... because they are relevant to us.

I'm not sure what is meant by something moving from one level to another. but I think I agree that emergence implies a viewer, because it seems like it's a consequence of limits of our cognition. — ChatteringMonkey

No. Our limits of cognition are irrelevant to the world of emergence.
Levels are there whether we exist or not. There were no atoms before we discovered them? Before Kant there was no universe outside the Milky Way?

No. Our limits of cognition are irrelevant to the world of emergence.
Levels are there whether we exist or not. There were no atoms before we discovered them? Before Kant there was no universe outside the Milky Way? — magritte

Alright, what is a level disconnected from our cognition and use? What do you exactly mean with the word 'to exist' entirely separated from any kind of viewer?

I'm also not saying nothing exists before we discovered it, i'm saying our descriptions and the languages we use (which includes words like exist) are (partly) influenced by us and our needs.

What do you mean by epistemic levels? — frank

This was in the context of the debate on experiential states vs. physical states. When new phenomenon come about, it is usually already cognized from an experiencer. When you see the results of physical forces arising, you are already viewing it. However, mental states are the very thing viewing the emergence, and is itself supposed to be emergent. What exactly is "emerging" if we are talking about mental states? And from "what" is it emerging? What perspective is going on here? Is everything from a localized perspective? Water has properties of fluidity. What is fluidity at a level of atomic structure? You need the top-down perspective for fluidity to even make sense. Otherwise it is turtles all the way down. There is no separation of this or that phenomena. It just is in itself. It's actually really hard for me to explain. Some days I can explain these thoughts better than others. Struggling right now.

Sorry to interject but I think this is a concept that may require some attention, as well as the reverse concept of "bottom-up causation".

When I hit on a nail with a hammer, and the nail is driven down a plank of wood, can I say that the hammer head is accumulating kinetic energy, and that it transmits this energy to the nail? Or should I rather think that the atoms of the hammer head are accumulating kinetic energy and transmitting this energy to the nail atoms? Or should I instead say that the wave function of the hammer head elementary particles is interacting with that of the nail elementary particles? And at a smaller level, what about the quarks of my hammer? Are they the ones doing all the work or what?

I think that scale is in the eye of the beholder. We should avoid the assumption that there is a privileged scale at which causation happens. Causation happens at all levels at once because all levels coexist in one reality. Up and down in this context are best understood as metaphors for scale of observation, not for causation channels. — Olivier5

Yes, but all of this (and I am going to include your folding and feedback loops from other thread here, are things observed at some level (our conscious one). What atoms and elementary particles are the most basic "simples" (as the term is used in philosophy circles).. and how they bootstraps themselves to other epistemic levels is at question. You can say feedback loops, but that seems like a shoehorn phrase, similar to the Cartesian Theater, as we are observing the feedback loops at this level already. What are feedback loops without this already-observed top-down level?

... and why would levels necessitate a viewer? — magritte

Because what is a property without something that knows the property? How do properties arise from simpler properties without just assuming that property already there?

There's a difference in reports or accounts of what's happening at different levels. If there were no accounting happening, would the difference still be there? — frank

Right.

If we were omniscient, with unlimited cognitive powers, there doesn't seem to be a reason why we would use higher level emergent descriptions. Everything in a fluid could in theory be described in terms of particles moving (and probably more complete), we just prefer using fluid dynamics because it is to complex 'for us' to describe it in terms of moving particles. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes good example.

Alright, what is a level disconnected from our cognition and use? What do you exactly mean with the word 'to exist' entirely separated from any kind of viewer?

I'm also not saying nothing exists before we discovered it, i'm saying our descriptions and the languages we use (which includes words like exist) are (partly) influenced by us and our needs. — ChatteringMonkey

I believe in some circles, the term "view from nowhere" and "view from everywhere" is discussed. Now discuss haha.

What atoms and elementary particles are the most basic "simples" (as the term is used in philosophy circles) — schopenhauer1

It's turtles all the way down, there's no elementary level of matter and energy that I can see. "Simpler" and "smaller" do not mean "more causal".

I believe in some circles, the term "view from nowhere" and "view from everywhere" is discussed. Now discuss haha. — schopenhauer1

Haha, I scrambled my brain trying to think about this.

What if we worked toward a basic definition and then conquered Chalmers strong and weak emergence?

The IEP puts it this way:
"If we were pressed to give a definition of emergence, we could say that a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges. However, as will become apparent, things are not so simple because “emergence” is a term used in different ways both in science and in philosophy, and how it is to be defined is a substantive question in itself."

Problem is i'm not so sure there is something like strong emergence. From what i've gathered, part of the problem here is i'm no scientist, at least a good part of them doesn't believe in strong emergence. It's seems part of the controversy, so I don't know if we should just assume it.

"If we were pressed to give a definition of emergence, we could say that a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges. However, as will become apparent, things are not so simple because “emergence” is a term used in different ways both in science and in philosophy, and how it is to be defined is a substantive question in itself." — frank

So I'd even go further as to break down what the term "arises" means here. What does that entail. Our brains probably process this term similarly, but the term on its own might have issues. It is a fiat epistemic change. Arises, like many terms creates a new epistemic leap but without explanation other than, this happens.

I have to start reading again, Terrence Deacon's Incomplete Nature. He does start discussing this. I am not far enough along to comment on his actual theory. I do like his discussion of Cartesian Theater and Homunculus fallacy. Reading group anyone? He does try to tackle the problem of emergence I believe, via the idea of "abstential states". I am not sure I will buy it, but it is an attempt. Even Dennett said this may have changed his view on things. That is indeed pretty good praise.

Problem is i'm not so sure there is something like strong emergence. From what i've gathered, part of the problem here is i'm no scientist, at least a good part of them doesn't believe in strong emergence. It's seems part of the controversy, so I don't know if we should just assume it. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, I didn't mean take Chalmers as gospel, but rather look at the pros and cons of it.

I'm up for it as long as the book isn't super expensive.

I'm up for it as long as the book isn't super expensive. — frank

I don't think it is. Not sure how to set these up though. People would have to let me know when they get the book I guess.

I just got the kindle version.

I'd be willing to join. And I can get an e-version of book too.

It's interesting:

"So, at the risk of initiating this discussion with a clumsy neologism, I will refer to this as an absential2 feature, to denote phenomena whose existence is determined with respect to an essential absence. This could be a state of things not yet realized, a specific separate object of a representation, a general type of property that may or may not exist, an abstract quality, an experience, and so forth—just not that which is actually present. This paradoxical intrinsic quality of existing with respect to something missing, separate, and possibly nonexistent is irrelevant when it comes to inanimate things, but it is a defining property of life and mind." -- page 3

Yeah I've started reading the intro of the book too. Like Schopenhauer1, I not entirely sure I'll buy into it, but it looks interesting. And I remember seeing the author on some discussion panel a while back, and he looked like he knew what he was talking about, at least... so i'm willing to give it a try.

First thing I wonder is: do physical sciences not deal with absence? Why is a vacuum not a case of an influential absence?

First thing I wonder is: do physical sciences not deal with absence? Why is a vacuum not a case of an influential absence? — frank

Vacuum is never really nothing right? There's always the vacuum-energy and fluctuations, and so there is something "physical" going on which is why I suspect (I'm only a few page far) it wouldn't qualify as absence like he wants to use it.

Arrangements emerge from there being lots of stuff.

Thus: solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, are group properties. One molecule of H2O on its tod is none of these, because it is the relations between molecules that is the emergent property in question.

You need three or more ducks to get them in a row, or fail to get them in a row. Rows emerge. From ducks. Or other stuff.

People write books about all this.

People even read them.