This also raises issues of why countries like the US or the EU get to intervene. Does that mean China and Russia do as well? — Marchesk
A strong man ought to help a frail old lady who is being beaten by someone younger and stronger than she is, even if she is not asking for help. The situation with humanitarian intervention is significantly different from that analogy, but exactly how is it different, and what are the consequences of that difference for the moral rightness or wrongness of intervening? — jamalrob
I was critical of the motives of the people involved is making those decisions
Because it involves countries.
Who has the moral high ground? — jamalrob
One where it goes beyond preventing an individual in the street from being raped, because you might have to bomb a neighborhood, among other things.
What moral/philosophical code introduces the concept of a "country" where a previous strategy becomes invalidated? — Paul Edwards
The countries, and thereby their governments, and thereby the people these governments represent, insofar as they were democratic at the time, have signed the UN Charta, which enshrines non-intervention. That's at least a contractual obligation with some moral weight.
But the rule is also reasonable because outside of the UN, states operate in an anarchic environment with only few overarching principles. Interventionism would amount to a state, or states, imposing their will on other states without any process of redress and without any possible oversight. It'd be akin to mob justice, done without the consent of all parties.
Simply put, I cannot trust the USA to do the right thing, or to attempt to do the right thing carefully. — jamalrob
I didn't sign any such thing, so my moral code is not dependent on the UN Charter. Is yours? — Paul Edwards
Not all parties consented to being raped by Saddam's goons either, or having their tongues cut out. It's already mob justice in my eyes. But not yours? — Paul Edwards
Contractual obligations have moral weight according to my moral code.
Two wrongs do not make a right
There is a difference between you personally fighting an injustice and you employing the machinery of a state against another state to help their subjects.
An goal is only morally good if it can also be accomplished by morally good means.
There is nothing immoral about calling up International SWAT to go and spread human rights. There is something immoral about trying to stand in the way of SWAT. — Paul Edwards
Of course there is. Because yours is not the only SWAT team around,
and all of them also shoot innocent bystanders.
So long as they don't deliberately target them, it's not immoral. — Paul Edwards
If it was you having your tongue cut out by Saddam's goons, would you want International SWAT to rescue you? Doesn't your moral code require you to look at the world from the perspective of others? — Paul Edwards
Yeah, I disagree. You're limiting responsibility for your action only to your intended results. But it's a fact that you don't control the exact result, so your idea of responsibility rests on a fiction.
I'd only want to be rescued if the rescue can be achieved without endangering even more innocent people.
Then you cannot call the police when you see a rape occurring outside your house. The police might hit a pedestrian when responding to the call. — Paul Edwards
Note that if I was having my tongue cut out, and I had a button to destroy Earth, I would do so to end the injustice. Certainly International SWAT can do a much better job than destroying Earth, ie they will accidentally kill a lot fewer people. — Paul Edwards
You have to consider likely outcomes. Some risks are justified.
That just means your moral compass is way out if whack.
It is the care of the common weal that is entrusted to those in authority and it is therefore their business to watch over the common weal of a community. And as it is lawful for them to use the sword, as Aquinas put it, in defending this common weal against internal disturbances so too is it their business to wage war in defending the common weal against external enemies.
Quoting Augustine he says: “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should lie in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.” It is important to stress the requirement of supreme authority. It would seem that any authority that can turn to a higher authority for arbitration is not allowed to declare war. However, the possibility that seeking redress might fail because the highest authority is ineffectual in enforcing its decisions begs the question whether a lower authority is then allowed to declare war. It appears to me that the ability to enforce decisions is inherent to Aquinas’ idea of authority, since he does not consider this problem. What, then, is an acceptable way of defining authority?
It is suggested for the purposes of my analysis that an authority is a body, which is entrusted with the care of the common weal and has been given the power to use force in accordance with the consensus of the relevant community that transferred its ability to use force to the authority.
“In accordance with” denotes the fact that nobody subjugates himself body and soul to a sovereign or State, for there exist statutes that confer definite powers to an authority to administer and provide an order of coexistence in which everyone can do as he wishes as long as he remains within the system that is created for everyone’s secure and safe interaction and interdependence. It is undeniable that the object when instituting such authority is to subject the exercise of power to a rule of law.
The relevance of a community relates to the extent it has the ability to use force against other communities and impose its will on those other communities and its ability to transfer the use of force. A supreme authority is therefore never part of any community. In a democracy the relevant community is the electorate, who are a part of a larger nation. In a medieval kingdom it were the king’s vassals, but the kingdom consisted of peasants and workmen as well. Although the described process seems democratic it is of course possible that the relevant community is a powerful minority within a greater whole. This is sociological legitimisation of authority and as such it is unconcerned with the objective good of the authority.
Illegitimate authority is then authority that has lost its legitimacy because of the development of one or more new relevant communities that vie for enforcement of their will with the established relevant community. This will mean that at that time there is no relevant community that can transfer power for no one community has at that time the ability to impose its will on others or prevent others from wilful exercise of force within their community. Once the fog of such civil war lifts sufficiently to enable some understanding of the new balance of power, it is entirely possible that several new authorities are created dependent on the progress and/or the outcome of a war. The authority can also be illegitimate because of a lack of consensus within the relevant community in the sense that not enough subjects of the relevant community recognise the authority. In either case, there is a fundamental absence of legitimacy for the authority does not represent the relevant community or a community’s majority. The authority might well continue to exist and exercise power, but it has lost its legitimacy.
I would suggest another term for an authority to which no powers or only partial powers have been transferred. I consider this to be imperfect authority. For example, such authority can have religious, scientific or traditional authority but it has no instruments or too little instruments to enforce its rules. Imperfect authority can also be the result of the development of new problems to which the authority has not been adequately equipped to deal with. It is then the business of the relevant community to create new instruments for the authority to handle such problems, as it is their business to decide to which rules of law the authority’s powers are subject.
Considering that it is easier to control that which is close at hand, there must be a convincing reason why the parts that make up the relevant community are willing to transfer their ability to use force. When we consider the use of force necessary to be able to impose one’s will on others, two processes become apparent. If one person imposes his will on others, these others will have lost their freedom insofar as this person chooses to exercise force to impose his will. These others are then faced with two options, either acquiesce to these circumstances, which do not necessarily have to be bad circumstances, or oppose them in a combined effort, assuming that each separately does not have enough strength.
Instead of having one’s freedom dependent on the way the person in “power” exercises force, a level of freedom is guaranteed by transferring (a part of) the ability to use force to a common authority able to protect the community against the wilful exercise of force by an outside third. On the other hand, acquiescence will create an authority, which is not necessarily illegitimate.
The other process is similar to that of conflict settlement. In conflict settlements disputes are sometimes brought before an objective third party. This third party, however, can also be created from the ranks of the disputing parties. In this process, it is the authority itself that enables the relevant community to reach consensus and diminish strife. Both (or more) parties protect themselves against each other’s wilful exercise of force, which is now transferred to the authority and bound by the rules these same parties instituted when forming this authority. The purpose, for which authority is instituted, is therefore the protection of the community against the wilful exercise of force.
The protection against wilful exercise of force must then inter alia be the authority’s primary duty. If the authority fails in its primary duty, it fails in its care of the common weal. The relevant community that instituted it automatically assumes this duty as there is no other community – not considering the development of one or more new relevant communities – that has the ability to provide this protection or any community necessarily willing to do so. Also, it can be argued that the relevant community that instituted the authority is primarily responsible for the authority’s functioning for it is this community that subjected the authority’s exercise of power to rules of law. If the authority lacks the powers to fulfil its primary duty and this is caused by its imperfection then the relevant community is responsible. Either way, if the authority fails in its primary duty then it loses its singular right to exercise force. As long as the authority has the powers to fulfil its primary duty and effectively does so it retains this right in principle. This is what I will say of authority, its legitimacy and its ability and right to exercise force. — Moi
By that token there are no customs and traditions. Not really, really. — Benkei
Germany attacked the Netherlands because England and France were going to attack the German Ruhr Area. Hitler has a legal defence for every invasion. Explain to me why the gorillas are bothering? — Benkei
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