Hi! I’d like to make a few comments on your post:
The classic fatalism argument, when applying to God, is that:
1,If God knew, before creating the universe, that God would create the universe, then it was not in God’s power to NOT create the universe.
2, If God doesn’t have the power to change the occurrence of creating the universe, then God does not have free will.
3, God is omniscient (all-knowing), and therefore knew before creating the universe that God was going to create the universe.
4, Therefore, it was not in God’s power to change the occurrence of creating the universe. (1,3 MP)
5, Therefore, God does not have free will. (2,4 MP).
The first thing I want to talk about is that, premise 3 of the classic fatalism argument does not apply to God. We may think that, because God is all-knowing, God knew since a long time ago that we would do X at T. To us, things that will happen in the future are pre-existed, long before their actual occurrences. However, it is not true to say that God also knew what He would do before doing that. The reason is that, time is created by God, therefore doesn’t apply to God. Which means, in other words, God is not limited by time – what we think to be “the future”, might be just like the present to God. Therefore, the “foresight” part of God’s omniscience, because of its relevance to time, applies only to humans but not to God.
Also, same as you, I don’t agree with what premise 2 describes. It seems to me that, “to have power to change the occurrence of something (at T)” is a baffling thing to say. What we do, or what happens at T, is what’s final and that doesn’t change. For example, right now, I either sit here to finish writing this, or go out for a walk, no matter which one occurred, it is what happened. Does it then mean that right now, I do not have free will because I can’t change what happened? No, because our free will doesn’t hinge on “ the power to change something’s occurrence”, but on when we’re doing something, whether or not we are restrained by someone/something else. That is, whether I choose to continue to write or not is up to me, myself, not others, so I do have free will on this. The situation of God is similar. God does not change, and God never changes, however, He is completely free, because He decides His actions, not something else decides His actions for Him. If God wants to create the universe, he creates the universe, and that is God’s free will.

And free will is?

I think I agree with you that premise 2 is objectionable. I was curious on what your objection to premise 2 was since you mentioned refuting it, but you never elaborated. I think that even though we can’t change the future, it’s not because of a lack of free will. Knowing our future actions is just knowing what we’ll use our free will to do.

It seems to me that reading this post was my own choice and anyone knowing that I was going to read this, even an omniscient being knowing that I was going to read this, doesn’t change that it was a choice I made myself. It’s like in those tv shows or movies where someone has psychic abilities and knows what’s going to happen. A show I grew up with was That’s So Raven on Disney Channel, and the main character, Raven, had the ability to know what was going to happen at certain moments, just not how they’d happen. She’d then try to avoid the unfavorable outcomes that she’d seen in her visions. The things in her visions always happened so the characters didn’t have the power to change the occurrences, but it wasn’t because her having the vision caused them to become reality. It was the other way around. She was just getting glimpses of what people were certainly going to use their free will to do.

It may make it seem like they didn’t have free will then since they couldn’t change the future, but the visions were just showing what their choices would end up producing. I think knowing the future means knowing what surely will happen at least at a certain point so if one knew the future, the future he’d see would account for him having seen the future and the rest of the free will choices he’d make. He’d still be making his own choices, and his free will wouldn’t have been affected. He’d merely be getting a preview of what his choices will lead to.

While God supposedly knows everything about the future compared to Raven only seeing glimpses of the future, I think us not being able to change the future He sees works the same way. I think we have the free will to make all of our choices, but God just knows which of those choices we’re going to choose.

Furthermore, to touch on you mentioning how this argument could mean that God doesn’t have free will, I think that God sees the future of all of His own choices as well. He would choose to do the best actions so He wouldn’t want to change that. If He wasn’t omnibenevolent but still omniscient and omnipotent, then I think He could choose to do worse actions, but He’d still know what He was going to do. His choices aren’t affected by anything or anyone else, but He knows what He’ll end up choosing to do.

Imagine a world, Zor, with beings that do possess free will.

Is it possible for God to predict the actions and hence the future of Zor and Zorians?

If yes, then it isn't necessary that God's ability to predict the future of Zor and Zorians implies that Zorians lack free will.

If no, then God isn't omnipotent (he can't predict the future of Zor and Zorians who have free will).

But, God is omnipotent.

Ergo, yes its possible for God to predict the actions and hence the future of Zor and Zorians even if they have free will.

Hence, it's not true that God's ability to predict the future of Zor and Zorians implies that Zor and Zorians lack free will.

The same logic applies to scenario in which God knows faer own future. You tried to slip in the condition/caveat that God isn't omnipotent but if that's accepted we're no longer talking about God and your argument fails.

When it comes to God telling Moses that his people would rebel, couldn't Moses go tell them what God said and change their minds?

There are two schools of thought in Christianity about how God knows everything. There are the Molinists (I think they are called Armenians in Protestantism) and compatabilists (Augustine, Aquinas)

Molinism says that God knows what you would do in every possible situation you could be put in and God puts our lives and choices together to form "history". Now I think the Molinist position is illogical. I don't think there is some foggy region where all our potential choices for every situation reside. Acts are existential realities. They exist only when the choices are made. Would not we be morally responsible for every situational choices that resides in this region of potentiality? If not, why not. It seems clear that Molinism blurs the reality of choice making itself. If you were not put into a certain situation, God couldn't know what you existentially would do. Unless the other theory its true:

Compatibilism, to me, seems like a possible philosophical option. I can't prove that some force (energy, grace, or whatever) can infallibly guarantee, with not violating the freedom of will, that a choice will be made in a specific way. I can't prove that it's possible and I can't prove it's not possible. Daniel Dennett has a brief video on youtube explaining why so many philosophers are compatabilists. It clears up confusion in a lot of areas. HOWEVER, if you are a theist and believe in compatialism, doesn't this mean that God could have saved everyone through his grace and that he must desire people to go to hell? This is a big problem for Christians, but I am not a Christian so I'll leave this to them to explain