Descartes Hyperjumping To Conclusions

TheMadFool

Descartes says: Cogito, ergo, sum. I think. Therefore, I am.

The basic idea behind Descartes' argument, in a linguistic sense, is that the verb (act of thinking) entails a subject (that which is doing the thinking)

Hyperdrive (noun): An engine that allows spaceships to travel faster than light

Hyperjump (verb): To travel faster than light using a hyperdrive.

Anti-Descartes says: The spaceship D-105A is now hyperjumping to sector T23 in the Andromeda galaxy.

There's a verb, hyperjump but, because we know faster than light travel is impossible, it follows that the subject, the hyperjumper (D-105A) doesn't exist.

In other words, that there's a valid verb denoting an action doesn't imply the existence of a subject capable of that action.

A major point of difference between Descartes and Anti-Descartes is that thinking is real - we all think and that's proof - but hyperjumps and hyperdrives, unfortunately, aren't real and that's a Sunday punch for where, you might've already guessed by now, I want to take this thread. After all, there's a difference between real and not real and my argument makes the case of an action (verb) not necessarily implying an actor (subject) only in the latter. In the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb.

However, take a moment to consider the last sentence in the paragraph above viz. "in the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb". How do we know this? Well, if I'm anywhere near the truth, this principle (action implying an actor; verb implying a subject for that verb) is derived from the "real" world. I put real in quotes because, according to Descartes, the "real" world could, well, be not real and that throws a giant spanner in the works for nothing true could be/can be gleaned from the not real and that includes the foundational premise in Descartes' argument viz. actions (verb) imply an actor (subject). It's a premise derived from what is quite possibly an illusory world, a world that's not real and being so it loses its potency to such an extent I must add that Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument is blown clean out of the water.

In summary, the first step in my argument was to show that there's no necessary connection between actions and actors, between verb and subject. This was demonstrated in terms of a world that is not real [hyperjump (verb/action) and hyperjumper (subject/actor)]. The expected response is that in the "real" world there's a necessary connection between action and actor, between verb and subject. This, however, was shown to be a case of inferring from a world which according to Descartes' himself could be an illusion or not real and therefore unreliable or simply useless to make an inference about the real.

The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place.

javra

The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place. — TheMadFool

Yup. As the cogito is most commonly understood - to regard thought but not awareness per se - it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs. As wiser folk than I have mentioned along with you:

One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking".[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"?

TheMadFool

it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs — javra

What bothers me is that, to reiterate in fewer words than the OP, the inference from action to actor - doing, doer [reading, reader; loving, lover; talking, talker, being, beer ( :joke: ) ] - is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges, could be not real. That, as far as I can see, invalidates the action, actor/doing, doer reasoning.

How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? — javra

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking.

Pantagruel

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"? — javra

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought.

javra

- is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges could be not real. — TheMadFool

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such.

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking. — TheMadFool

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place?

I'll offer a suggestion: we are aware of our own thought, ergo we conclude that thought takes place. Now, one could play linguistic games with being an "aware-er" or else keep things in tune with commonsense expressions and just stipulate that we are aware beings. Here, epistemologically, our awareness of our thoughts takes precedence as a known over the thoughts in question of which we are aware.

javra

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought. — Pantagruel

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens?

TheMadFool

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such. — javra

While I ~~gave~~ attempted to give a linguistic twist to Descartes reasoning it seems only incidental to the tale I'm weaving. The crux of the issue is, in my humble opinion, the hidden premise - doing ergo, doer - which, as I've learned, is derived from the world we're in, a world whose reality is in question. In short, whatever premise we construct out of our experiences in this world (reality questionable) is of dubious value for reasoning about the real.

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place? — javra

aware — javra

Well, I'm "...aware..." that "...thought is taking place..." but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but this premise is, like it or not, derived from a pattern in the world we're in which Descartes admitted could be an illusion or not real and that casts a long shadow of doubt on the crucial doing implies a doer premise.

javra

but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but [,,,] — TheMadFool

Are you intending to infer a homonculus to first-person awareness? I'd strongly disagree with that. We don't infer that we are aware so as to conclude that we are aware; instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. And this regardless of us being entities, processes, both, or neither .... an ontological issue that can only be resolved (if at all possible to resolve) by inference and, hence, thoughts of which we are aware. No? (I'll check back in tomorrow.)

TheMadFool

instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. — javra

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. If this premise is false the statement 2. Some doings are not things that have doers will be true and that means it's possible that just because we "...are aware" [doing] it doesn't follow that there are "...aware beings [doers]".

You'll need to prove each doing that you come across has a doer individually and your inference "...are aware..." to "...aware beings" is one such case. How are you going to build your case? You can't use premise 1. All doings are things that have doers because it's no longer reliable, drawn as it is from the world, a world that could be not real.

a The only option left for you is to construct the required premise from your own experience of yourself and the truth of that key premise of your argument viz. if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" has to turn on the only truth you know viz. "...are aware..." and that isn't sufficient to build the key premise because I've demonstrated the truth of statement 2. some doings are not thing that have doers and that means if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" doesn't have to be true. Basically, you can't prove your key premise.

You may ignore what I've written below and even above if it suits you. It's for my own clarity that I've fleshed out the argument. There's a certain part in my refutation that's troubling me.

Your argument:

1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings"
2. "...are aware..."
Ergo
3. "...aware beings"

First things first, from the fact that the world we exist in could be an illusion/not real, it follows that the inferences drawn from it may not be valid in the real world. Ergo, one such inference, the proposition all doings (actions) have doers (actors) could be false. If this is the case then premise 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false (not false but could be false).

So, we need to prove/support premise 1. The only reliable source that could help you in proving premise 1 is your own knowledge of "...are aware..." You experience it and so you can't deny it. However, since it's possible that 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false, that you know "...are aware..." is not adequate grounds to assert premise 1. That's the end of the road for your argument.

Pantagruel

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens? — javra

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought, then I'd dive right into things like "passive volition", which is an advanced yogic concept. Willing without willing. Thought can be amazingly complex, easily housing contradictions, aporias, paradoxes. But are the actual "mechanics" of thought relevant to the conditions of its possibility? Emergence is a funny thing.

javra

↪TheMadFool

:cool:

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. — TheMadFool

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing.

Secondly - and this is harder to address impersonally rather than from an experiential vantage, but I'll try - for "X to be aware" is for X to be in a state of being of awareness ... which entails that X is, i.e. holds the property of ~~isness~~ being, i.e. is a being (here, is a given that is).

I don't aware; I am aware.

Contrast this with the cogito. Here, the affirmation of "I think" is questioned due to lack of evidence that that which is done (the thought in question) pertains to a particular doer ("I"). Differently expressed, that that which is (the thought in question) is a product of some agency (the "I"); here, then, there can be the implicit issue of causality, as in X causes Y. It might have been Descartes demon that was doing (else causing) all the doubting that Descartes ascribed to his own agency, for one example.

However, (and correct me if I'm wrong about this) you've granted that "I am aware" is a sound experiential fact whenever the given "I" is aware. At this junction, X's awareness cannot logically occur in the absence of X; X must be in order for X to be aware. If Descartes was aware of all the given doubts he talked about - even if we get into weird doubts about telepathy on the part of the demon being the cause of this awareness, or some such - it remains the fact that a first-person awareness which addressed itself as Descartes was aware. Since this first-person awareness was aware, this first-person awareness was.

To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.

... Interesting to see where this goes.

javra

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought [...] — Pantagruel

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical.

Pantagruel

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical. — javra

Well, they are both just words whose extension is debatable. In my experience, those words mutually entail.

javra

↪Pantagruel

OK. Thanks. Due to the plasticity of language, I'll agree that the terms' extension is debatable. Just to further this: Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? I'm asking out of a curiosity to see if so conferring would be deemed commonsense, or else counterfactual.

Pantagruel

Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? — javra

I would. But then I'm a strong subscriber to a systems theoretic interpretation of reality. From a systems theoretic perspective, even inanimate things can be said to participate in thought "in a way". It lends itself to a brand of panpsychism.

TheMadFool

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing. — javra

Well, you threw me off with the statement:

being an "aware-er" — javra

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state.

I don't aware; I am aware. — javra

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb).

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)?

This leads us to the following puzzle...

What's really getting me worked up is that it was relatively easy to invalidate the reliability of the world (possibly not real) as a good source from which to build a set of premises to be used in, transferred to, the real world. When that happened a critical premise for cogito ergo sum viz. all doings have a doer which would've proved the Cartesian premise "if thinking then thinker" goes out the window.

The only reliable source to build premises from is one's own experience but that consists of only thinking or, if you prefer, awareness. To make the case that there's a thinker or a thing that is in a state of awareness, we need the following premises:

1. Thinking implies thinker
2. Awareness implies something that is aware

Since both propositions 1 and 2 require the support of the statement "doing implies doer" which we know could be false we're unable to prove these premises. There's only one last option for us - turn to our own experiences to build a proof for statements 1 and 2 is our own actual experiences but these involve only thinking and awareness and if I claim that these actions (verbs) implies the existence of a thinker and something that is aware I'm assuming precisely what needs to be proved. Circulus in probando.

javra

↪Pantagruel

I'm still trying to understand the notion of panpsychism. Currently, to me, it seems to be a logical conclusion, though I can't make sense of it, not to my own satisfaction at least.

If you don't mind indulging me further, what of the distinction I alluded to in my reply to TMF?:

Thought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens.

Don't mean to badger. Only want to flesh out whether or not they are the same thing in you view.

Pantagruel

hought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens. — javra

It sounds like you are drawing lines similar to those of Locke, between passive and active thought. Personally, I would describe all types of thought as being unified under something like a transcendental ego. So I would still view thought and awareness as united at some level.

javra

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being?

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb). — TheMadFool

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here.

What's really getting me worked up [...] — TheMadFool

If this conversation is getting you worked up, I'll stop partaking. Best not to get into even more worked up modes.

Pop

To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.

... Interesting to see where this goes. — javra

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further.

Olivier5

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further. — Pop

It can go to: therefore I exist, and therefore the world exists.

Heiko

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb).

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

But where did the ego get introduced? Where is the step from "There is something." to "I am aware of something."
The nature of being could be self-fulfilling, self-sufficient.

Pop

It can go to: therefore I exist, and therefore the world exists. — Olivier5

I think we exist as consciousness, and the world is a product of this, but I will start a new thread so as not to derail this one.

javra

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further. — Pop

Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. I've disagreed with this on logical grounds in this recent thread.

So I disagree with your conclusion, instead agreeing with @Olivier5.

Olivier5

I think we exist as consciousness, and the world is a product of this, — Pop

Consciousness by definition is always the consciousness of something (the world). So the world does not spring of consciousness, it is a logical requirement for any consciousness.

Pop

Consciousness by definition is always the consciousness of something (the world). So the world does not spring of consciousness, it is a logical requirement for any consciousness. — Olivier5

That is true, but the world is our interpretation of this information, rather than an accurate integration of the facts of the world as they might exist.

I agree however, both must exist. One cannot exist without the other - chicken and egg situation.

Pop

Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. — javra

Not quite. Idealism would prevail. As @Olivier5 states , integration requires something to be integrated.
I have started a thread on this and would be grateful for your contribution.

Olivier5

One cannot exist without the other - chicken and egg situation. — Pop

I've seen no evidence that the world cannot exist without consciousness in it. In fact, it must have started as a totally stupid universe.

TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra

Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am.

Descartes' argument in syllogistic form (there are 2 arguments actuallly) would look like below:

1. If there's thinking then there's a thinker that exists [Argument 1]
2. There's thinking (cogito)
Ergo
3. There's a thinker that exists [Argument 2]
4. I am that thinker that exists
Ergo
5. I exist (sum)

Cogito ergo sum!

My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. Descartes identifies with the thinker (supposing he manages to get past the hurdle that this thread is about viz. that actions don't necessarily imply an actor or that doing doesn't mean there has to be a doer). I don't see a line in Descartes' argument where he claims that "...is an agency for - its own being". The being/existence is inferred from an action/the doing of something - the thinker, according to Descartes, follows logically from thinking.

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though. — javra

Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. If you disagree, you'll need to describe awareness in terms on non-action i.e. you'll have to show that awareness doesn't involve an mental activity but that, as I mentioned in the post preceding this one, is the definition of non-awareness. This puts you in the position where, if you stick to your guns, you'll have to admit that awareness is the same as non-awareness. That's a contradiction, no?

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra

Read above.

But where did the ego get introduced? Where is the step from "There is something." to "I am aware of something."
The nature of being could be self-fulfilling, self-sufficient. — Heiko

That "could be" is the key phrase. It brings into question the soundness of Descartes' argument.

Heiko

My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am. — TheMadFool

"Cogito" is the first person singular form of "cogitare".

Heiko

That "could be" is the key phrase. It brings into question the soundness of Descartes' argument. — TheMadFool

What I actually wanted to say is that you cannot easily exchange thought for awareness as it might change the argument. I did not read much of Descartes however.

Descartes Hyperjumping To Conclusions

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