A computer can be programmed to assert that it thinks. Doesn't make it so. Descartes was starting from what he knew for sure, which is that he thinks. — Kenosha Kid

I take that to be an argument that Descartes did not know for sure that he thinks. I can agree with that. Thinking does not necessitate knowing. So in thinking, Descartes thought that he was thinking, but that doesn't mean that he knew for sure that he was thinking, because thinking doesn't necessitate knowing.

recisely as much as the empirical sciences. We cannot put spacetime curvature under a microscope: we infer it from indirect evidence, i.e. observations of its effects. This is actually true of all observations. You have no direct observation of your chair: it is all interpretations of effects. — Kenosha Kid

This is why we need a rigorous definition as to what constitutes an "observation". Observation is in general, theory laden. If I see a flash of light at night, I might say that I saw lightning. If you knew that there was no clouds in the area at that time, you might ask me for a better description of what I really did see. Stated observations can be easily tainted by the descriptive terms employed.

Where I differ from you on this subject is that I look at the observation as a creation of the observer, I do not look at it as an effect of what is observed, like you seem to. So I see no necessary causal relation between what is observed, and the noted observation. The existence of hallucinations is evidence toward the truth of my position. And the observer, being a free willing human being is not constrained to describe the observation in any particular way, but does so freely according to one's intent. This is why science needs rigorous principles regarding what constitutes a valid observation.

We use such machines all the time, and class an observation to be a reading of their outputs. — Kenosha Kid

Right, that's one of the places where I think modern science fails us. Machines are used as tools to make measurements, and measurements may make up part of an observation. But notice that the observation proper is the reading of the output, what you called interpretation. And this is a matter of contextualizing the output, because understanding the context is a vital part of interpretation. However, the output from the machine is often taken as an interpretation already, in itself, when the machine cannot even distinguish context.

To my mind real and physical are as natural synonyms as moral and ethical. — Pfhorrest

Real has no implicit substance claim. Of course for a physicalist they will be synonyms (not assuming you are) but i think at this point 'physical' looks like a metaphysical claim when used in physicalism, but it's not. Or if it is, it has problems since the epistemology that generates it is not making that metaphysical claim. It just offers a route to deciding if things are real without a care whether they are physical or not. And hence things are now considered real without mass or extension, for example.

It just offers a route to deciding if things are real without a care whether they are physical or not. — Coben

What does "physical" mean in that sentence? What is the metaphysical claim that (I presume you mean) empiricism isn't caring about there?

I can't think of what "physical" might even mean besides "empirically real", other than absurd guesses that don't even track natural usage of the word like "solid". (E.g. is air non-physical unless it turns out to be made of tiny solid billiard ball atoms bouncing around? If all atoms turn out to be fuzzy local excitations of omnipresent fields does that mean even rocks aren't physical?)

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical. — Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

If all atoms turn out to be fuzzy local excitations of omnipresent fields does that mean even rocks aren't physical?) — Pfhorrest

The first chapter of Eddington’s Nature of the Physical World goes into this idea (although of course things have developed since his day.). But it was around the time he wrote that book that physicists worked out the most of atoms are, in fact, empty space, which naturally lends itself to this kind of speculation.

Perhaps this is a cop out, but I think it's good one: Haven't we (or hasn't philosophy) already been through the mess of this mental/physical game? It's all (actually) physical! It's all (actually) mental! But for this 'actually' to work in either direction requires bending 'physical' or 'mental' beyond recognition.

Isn't this really about attitude?

It’s often said that ‘philosophy makes no progress’, that ‘they’ve been arguing about these questions for millienia but that nothing ever changes’. But what this doesn’t take into account, is that maybe there are those philosophical Illuminati who really do arrive at a revolutionary understanding, one which changes their entire view of reality. But, when they try and communicate that, then ....

What does "physical" mean in that sentence? What is the metaphysical claim that (I presume you mean) empiricism isn't caring about there? — Pfhorrest

It's claiming something about everything that is real, rather than a particular thing. If it if real, then it will be like X. But it need no not be like x. The physical (which I would prefer to call the real) is an expanding set in science, as I said earlier, not just in terms of new members, but in terms of what qualities the thing need have or doesn't have.)

[quote

I can't think of what "physical" might even mean besides "empirically real", — Pfhorrest

exactly my point, but it sure sounds like it is saying more. Because it did mean more, openly for a long time, whether used by dualists or monists disagreeing with them. It included claims about substance. And since there is no reason not to just use real or empirically real (though the latter sounds like it is leaving the door open for other types of real) I think it should be dropped.

other than absurd guesses that don't even track natural usage of the word like "solid". (E.g. is air non-physical unless it turns out to be made of tiny solid billiard ball atoms bouncing around? If all atoms turn out to be fuzzy local excitations of omnipresent fields does that mean even rocks aren't physical?)

As far as air, as far as I know that was always included in the physical.

As far as the rocks, notice how you are giving me a kind of have you stopped beating your wife version of the question.

It puts me in the position to deny something about substance. I am focused on the word.. I think physical is a poor word choice since the set of the physical now includes things like you describe there. It is as if a particular metaphysical stand is being taken, when it is not. The word has unnecessary baggage and that baggage has been ignored (quite rightly) when new real things were not at all like stuff in the set earlier, and it sure looks like this will continue. Whatever is determined to be real, even particles in superposition, and even if less 'physical' stuff is found, it will be considered real. We lose nothing by calling it simple real or verified or something similar.

Perhaps this is a cop out, but I think it's good one: Haven't we (or hasn't philosophy) already been through the mess of this mental/physical game? It's all (actually) physical! It's all (actually) mental! But for this 'actually' to work in either direction requires bending 'physical' or 'mental' beyond recognition. — f64

Yes, philosophers have been through this mess already, most notably in ancient Greece. The resolution to this dilemma, developed by Plato and Aristotle, is dualism. Hence the great rise in Christian dualism.

It seems like the modern trend back toward monism is simply a failure of our institutions to teach solid metaphysical principles. So we now have many people approaching metaphysics from other fields of study, without appropriate training in sound principles. Instead of performing a thorough study, the tendency is to think that simplifying an extremely complex field of study, is the right approach. Therefore, what we really need today is people who will take metaphysics seriously.

This is why we need a rigorous definition as to what constitutes an "observation". — Metaphysician Undercover

An observation is a recording of data about a system. That system cannot be a quark, or spacetime curvature, or someone's conscious experience in isolation, since none of these things exist in isolation. But I can observe the outputs of a technology that captures decay rates of pions, or the position of Mercury wrt the Earth and Sun, or the testimony of students as to whether they saw the man in the gorilla suit. Each of these are, according to respective theories, affected by the non-isolatable part: the colour charge of the quark, the curvature of space, the content of the humans' consciousness. If the theories are sound, those effects are discernible in the observations. Otherwise the theories are not sound.

It seems like the modern trend back toward monism is simply a failure of our institutions to teach solid metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

I apologize in advance for this disparaging comment - but this has to be one of the most unintentionally funny comments I have seen on the forum in a long time. "Solid metaphysical principles"? Talk about a contradiction in terms. :lol:

That out of the way, I then said to myself that I needed to be fair - perhaps there is some core set of metaphysical principals that I was previously not aware of. So I did a google search of "metaphysical principals" and, not unexpectedly, came up with a disparate set of contradictory information. Here are some of the top sites that came up:

Christian Philosophy / by Louis de Poissy

Live By These 11 Metaphysical Principles and Create the Life You Truly Desire

The First United Metaphysical Chapel

For completeness I also reviewed the Stanford Encyclopedia as well as Philosphy Basics

All of this confirms my initial reaction - when it comes to metaphysicas there is no agreement on even the most basic concepts.

But I try to keep an open mind - I am out on the forum to learn new things - so perhaps I am wrong. If there are any solid metaphysical principles that should be taught, then clearly all (or most) meta-physicians should agree upon them, yes? So what are these principals?

All of this confirms my initial reaction - when it comes to metaphysicas there is no agreement on even the most basic concepts. — EricH

I think the problem is, there is no adjudicator - no definitive authority to whom one can appeal for the ‘correct’ version - and there seems to be an enormous range of ideas covered by it.

However, there is something that should be considered. This is that the term ‘metaphysics’ was originally coined in relation to Aristotle’s writing. As is well known, it was coined by a scholar/librarian tasked with categorising Aristotle’s extant writings, and he used the term ‘meta-physica’ to denote those books that came after the books on physics. However, the Greek prefix ‘meta-‘ also has the connotation of being over or above, rather than simply after, and it’s that connotation of ‘beyond physics’ that characterises the use of the word.

But, as you note, once you go ‘beyond physics’ then you’re in an unknown land, terra incognito, about which there are many conflicting claims. Hence, nowadays ‘metaphysical’ is a term that is bandied about to mean all kinds of things by many different kinds of people but generally taken to mean ‘spiritual’ or associated with ‘higher consciousness’ in a lot of different senses.

But, to support Metaphysician Undiscovered’s point, if one were to teach the subject at school or University level, I think it should retain a focus around Aristotelian philosophy, and the way this became discussed and developed by subsequent generations. That means, looking at it through the perspective of history of ideas. That limits the scope of the subject to some extent, although it’s still a formidable subject to study, requiring a lot of reading and deep thought.

I think there’s a core of intelligible concepts that can be found in metaphysics proper and I think the SEP article does a reasonable job of laying it out. The Philosophy Basics page has a lot of outlinks to other topic pages, so is more like an index but it’s still useful.

One of the major, underlying problems is, however, that modern culture is in some sense profoundly hostile to the idea that there can be a valid metaphysic (hence the last heading in the SEP article). One reason is because metaphysics is often associated with theology and/or religious doctrines, which most modern philosophy determinedly rejects (and also why metaphysics proper is often associated with Thomistic philosophy, and hence, Catholicism.) I think it’s necessary to recognise that association if the subject is to be studied, and regardless of one’s own religious or anti-religious ideas. It’s just that for many scientific-secular people, when it comes to metaphysics, there’s an irresistible urge to ‘commit it to the flames’, as David Hume urged at the end of his Treatise. So I think there’s a need to have some sympathy with the subject, and also to find something about it that you can relate to.

I have found a way into it, through the contemplation of Platonic realism, which is the contention that number and other intellectual objects, are real, but immaterial (which obviously entails the falsity of physicalism!) I’m profoundly convinced of the truth of that and it’s given me a perspective from which to read the subject.

An observation is a recording of data about a system. — Kenosha Kid

I think this is a bit off, on a number of different levels.

First, there is no need to assume "a system". There might be an apparatus, designed for the purpose of an experiment, but we cannot simply assume that the apparatus comprises a system unless it is specifically designed with boundaries of isolation to ensure that it actually is a system. To assume "a system" when proper boundaries are not imposed is a mistake.

Next, when a person records an observation, there is a choice made as to the descriptive terms used, as in my example, "flash of light" or "lightning". The wording is itself an interpretation of what was noticed by the observer, and there are often logical inferences inherent within the wording, like in the case of "lightning". When you observe "the outputs of a technology", such inferences are already inherent within the design and programming of the machine, such that the outputs are a mechanized interpretation. So for example, every time that a flash of light inputs the machine, it might output "lightning". So in your example, who, other than the manufacturers of the machine, knows what input is interpreted as the decay of a pion in your example?

The problem being that the interpretive theory is not necessarily sound. The machine may serve the purpose even with faulty interpretive theory. For example, it reports every flash of light as "lightning". You might insist that it doesn't matter what we call it so long as we are consistent. And that is fine, until the machine records a flash of light as lightning, which isn't lightning, then there's a problem. See, "flash of light" is the more general description, and "lightning" more specific. So long as the vast majority of flashes are actually lightning, the machine will remain within an acceptable margin of error. But that machine is operating in a very specific system, and a different environment could render the interpretive theory which is correct under those circumstances, as unsound.

Then so long as the machine is always employed in a similar environment (the same type of system), the faulty interpretive theory will appear to be acceptable. This is a problem with the use of extremely constrained artificial systems, in experimentation. It is the inverse problem of the first problem, which was to assume a system when "system" is not justified by proper boundaries. Here, we have the problem of assuming that theories which are valid within a tight system are also valid in a wider application.

"Solid metaphysical principles"? Talk about a contradiction in terms. — EricH

I think I can conclude with a high degree of confidence, that you have never studied metaphysics.

All of this confirms my initial reaction - when it comes to metaphysicas there is no agreement on even the most basic concepts. — EricH

This is exactly why a very thorough study of metaphysics is required before one can obtain a satisfactory level of understanding in the field. A very significant amount of effort and hard work is required to make sense of what appears to be incoherent nonsense at first glance. It is also probably why most modern metaphysics has gone soft, it requires an awful lot of work to be a good metaphysician.

But I try to keep an open mind - I am out on the forum to learn new things - so perhaps I am wrong. If there are any solid metaphysical principles that should be taught, then clearly all (or most) meta-physicians should agree upon them, yes? So what are these principals? — EricH

Every human being can judge whether a principle is solid or not, and we all judge them in our own way. So it appears to me, that what you are lacking is confidence in your own capacity to judge metaphysical principles. I do not think I can give you what you need. Judgement is an activity, requiring technique, which is developed through practice.

Hi. I think that some people do have rare experiences that they can't communicate. If they try, they don't enjoy a sense of being believed and/or understood. So we have esoteric things. But it's tricky when such things are advertised or argued for. This is why lots of religion looks so bad. Instead of excluding it recruiters recruiters, and of course there's a fee.

Really I don't like physicalism. I do think it's more or less false or circular, or a vague expression of attitude. Another poster commented on the Lebenswelt being fundamental. That's more like it. An irreducible pluralism of grandmothers and pencil sharpeners and square roots. Our soggy category systems are always just useful lies perhaps.

The resolution to this dilemma, developed by Plato and Aristotle, is dualism. Hence the great rise in Christian dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I like dualism more the monism in this case. Perhaps we can even talk of a spectrum and not a sharp distinction. Basically we have both words in our vocab to begin with because it's a vital distinction for us. Monism seems to be of the form: "actually, black is white." (Or white is black.)

A very significant amount of effort and hard work is required to make sense of what appears to be incoherent nonsense at first glance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have many more important things to do with my life than to make sense of incoherent nonsense.

So it appears to me, that what you are lacking is confidence in your own capacity to judge metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot assert this with 100% certainty, but I have a high level of confidence that - at best - metaphysics is a form of poetry in which people attempt to express vague feelings of, umm, well - and here I get stuck - I'm not quite sure what it is they're trying to express. I get that you are dissatisfied with the notion that everything (whatever "everything" means) is explicable in terms of a physical reality (AKA physicalism). But once you get beyond the physical, language falls apart - there are no clear definitions and you end up with a word salad - and no two people can agree on anything.

I have found a way into it, through the contemplation of Platonic realism, . . . . and it’s given me a perspective from which to read the subject. — Wayfarer

Don't let my carping stop you folks. If believing this stuff helps you with your life then who am I to stop you? It seems harmless enough in the scheme of things.

And if you can come up with a set of metaphysical principals that you metaphysicians can agree on - and if they are not coherent nonsense? I will keep an open mind.

So it appears to me, that what you are lacking is confidence in your own capacity to judge metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot assert this with 100% certainty, but I have a high level of confidence that - at best - metaphysics is a form of poetry in which people attempt to express vague feelings — EricH

No, you've misunderstood what @Metaphysician Undercover is saying. He's saying that you lack the confidence to arrive at the the same judgements he's arrived at. If only we could all be so confident as to agree with MU - we can but dream...

we cannot simply assume that the apparatus comprises a system — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we're getting too silly. Of course an apparatus is a system.

Not necessarily, that's the point. When the apparatus is faulty, or in some way deficient in its capacity to be what it is supposed to be, it cannot be said to be a system. This is because a "system" is an artificial thing designed for a purpose. If the apparatus fails in the attempt to fulfill the conditions of the described "system" it cannot truthfully be said to be that system. And since the operation of that apparatus falls outside the boundaries of the described system, or any other described system, it's true function is unknown, so it cannot be a system at all.

This is the problem with your idea that an apparatus is necessarily a system. It produces a false sense of certainty through the assumption that the apparatus necessarily fulfills the parameters of the system. And with this false sense of certainty, systems theory deceives us. The unknown is brought into the system, and accounted for through probabilities, as evident in nonlinear systems, and the illusion that what is actually outside the system, the unknown, is within the system, as known. So systems theory allows that the boundaries of a system are breached, while creating the illusion that they are not, by treating it as a "system" which implies such boundaries. Allowing this contradiction, to persist, unchecked is a deception which creates a false sense of certainty.

Not necessarily, that's the point. When the apparatus is faulty, or in some way deficient in its capacity to be what it is supposed to be, it cannot be said to be a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is. It is a system in an undesirable state, but it is still a system.

This is because a "system" is an artificial thing designed for a purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is extremely wide of the mark. A carbon atom is a system of fermions. It is neither artificial nor does it have a purpose, although it is certainly useful.

Yes, it is. It is a system in an undesirable state, but it is still a system. — Kenosha Kid

This is a failure to adhere to a rigorous definition of "system", which very clearly would lead to faulty observations. The apparatus is not doing what it's supposed to do, but it still serves the function which it is supposed to serve, only in an "undesirable" way. Come on Kenosha Kid, you know better than to say something like that.

A carbon atom is a system of fermions. — Kenosha Kid

This is a good example of the faulty use of "system" which I described in my last post. A "system" requires defined boundaries. When the boundaries cannot be well defined, as is the case with an atom, one might attempt to incorporate the unknown boundaries into the description of the object, as variables, to create the illusion of a "non-linear system". But in reality a non-linear system is not a system at all, because the boundaries are unknown and this contradicts any rigorous definition of "system".

I'm not quite sure what it is they're trying to express. — EricH

Then why do you assert a "high level of confidence"? Are you highly confident that you are unsure? I'll call you Socrates then, you're sure that you're unsure.

But once you get beyond the physical, language falls apart - there are no clear definitions and you end up with a word salad - and no two people can agree on anything. — EricH

Why would you say this? Do you think that every word used must always refer to a physical object in order for language to be useful? That would be very strange if it were the case. In reality, agreement between individuals is much easier when the terms and conditions are more vague and general than precise and specific, because the commitment required for that agreement is less restrictive.

I cannot assert this with 100% certainty, but I have a high level of confidence that - at best - metaphysics is a form of poetry in which people attempt to express vague feelings of, umm, well - and here I get stuck - I'm not quite sure what it is they're trying to express. — EricH

That's some of it, but don't forget all the attempts to prove things that people really want to believe. Proofs of God, proofs of free will, proofs that the world is good, that 'our' way of life is superior. A cynic might speak of methodical rationalization, and then a second cynic might tease the first for thinking that either of them are getting by without their own rationalizations. For instance, 'rationalization' is part of a story about the human mind.

But once you get beyond the physical, language falls apart - there are no clear definitions and you end up with a word salad - and no two people can agree on anything. — EricH

I think I know what you mean and agree with you, but perhaps 'physical' is not the ideal word here. There are lots of noncontroversial aspects of reality. People can play chess without getting lost in semantics, but it doesn't matter how the queen is shaped, only that there's no sincere argument about which piece is the queen.

'Word salad' is also a bit harsh. Maybe it's more like subcultures. If a small group of people read and write all the papers about exotic thinker X, they slowly develop a lingo. It's quite understandable that outsiders would ask if this lingo has any power or relevance in what you might call a 'physical' sense. I'd call it a lifeworld sense.

Can the works of X cure cancer, get me to Mars, etc.? Or do the words only make the insiders happy? I suspect that really believing any orienting grand narrative makes people happy. It may be investment in the narrative rather than the narrative that does the work.

This is a failure to adhere to a rigorous definition of "system", — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean your typically esoteric definition? I wouldn't class that as a failure. It's important to have consensus in language. Adhere to that and you will make fewer communication errors. Since I introduced the word into the convo, you can take it as read that I mean it in the normal sense of interacting parts comprising a whole, not whatever arbitrary definition you insist upon after the fact.

I’d be interested in Kenosha’s input on this.

John A. Wheeler said ‘no phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon’. Wheeler also coined the term ‘the participatory universe’, saying ‘ The universe does not exist “out there,” independent of us. We are inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears to be happening. We are not only observers. We are participators. In some strange sense, this is a participatory universe.’ The ‘participatory universe’ is a term that Wheeler in particular is associated with.

I think this is where today’s understanding of physics tends to undermine traditional physicalism, insofar as that form of physicalism assumes the ‘mind-independence’ of the physical domain. So long as participation is acknowledged as fundamental, then physicalism in the traditional sense of the universe being ‘out there’, separate from, and indifferent to, the observer, is no longer tenable. Mind, then, becomes an integral or inextricable aspect of the whole.

That reminds me of something I was just thinking about, with you in mind, earlier today. I was thinking about this thread, and about my own ontology, and how better to convey my ontology to you. And I thought of saying, in reference to your non-Cartesian kind of dualism, a dualism of form and substance, that my account differs in holding that there isn't a dualism there, but not by denying form as I expect you would expect. Rather, I hold that everything is formal, and the only thing that makes some forms "substantial", concretely instantiated, while others generally are not, is that they are parts of the same formal structure that we are (ourselves being entirely formal structures as well), and therefore we experience them, because we interact with them.

So on the one end of a spectrum of sorts, you have that reality in the abstract is just a formal structure. On the other end, you have that reality in the concrete is entirely experiential. These are both things you might call "mental". The physical world, the ordinary stuff with which we are most familiar, like rocks and trees and tables and chairs, is stuff in the middle of that spectrum: those are abstract structures that we suppose are a part of the abstract structure that is our world, on account of (and held to account by) our concrete experiences.

The mental-as-in-experiential and the mental-as-in-abstract are just the extreme aspects of physical things that are left once you've completely removed the other aspect: the mental-as-in-abstract is just what's left when you remove all experientiality from the (ordinarily physical) object of your consideration, and the mental-as-in-experiential is just what's left when you remove all abstraction from the (ordinarily physical) object of your consideration.

But it's still all continuous and unified with the physical, the same kind of stuff as rocks and trees and tables and chairs. The things that you might want to consider nonphysical are just the extreme ends of that continuum.

Well, thanks, and I appreciate the care you've gone to, to spell that out. I started responding to it, but have saved that response, as I've just raised another kind of point in the post above, and would like to see if there's a response to that first. I will come back to your post later.

You mean your typically esoteric definition? I wouldn't class that as a failure. It's important to have consensus in language. Adhere to that and you will make fewer communication errors. Since I introduced the word into the convo, you can take it as read that I mean it in the normal sense of interacting parts comprising a whole, not whatever arbitrary definition you insist upon after the fact. — Kenosha Kid

The problem here is that we're talking about the reliability of scientific observations, not the capacity for common vernacular. In science, "system" has a very specific definition involving boundaries, such that any "whole" which you are talking about is defined by its boundaries. If the boundaries of the proposed "whole" are really unknown, or nonexistent, and the observer applies systems theory in interpretation, which pretends that the nonexistent boundaries are there and known, in order to treat what is observed as a "system", then obviously the observations will be unreliable.

This is a good example of what Wayfarer refers to as the "participatory universe". The proposed "whole", being the observed object, is a fabrication of the observer, created for the sake of applying systems theory. And systems theory works, because it is formulated to allow that something which is not really a system (has no definite boundaries), can be treated as a system. So the result is fabricated objects (systems), and therefore fabricated observations.

The problem here is that we're talking about the reliability of scientific observations, not the capacity for common vernacular. In science, "system" has a very specific definition involving boundaries, such that any "whole" which you are talking about is defined by its boundaries. If the boundaries of the proposed "whole" are really unknown, or nonexistent, and the observer applies systems theory in interpretation, which pretends that the nonexistent boundaries are there and known, in order to treat what is observed as a "system", then obviously the observations will be unreliable. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've heard of an "open system"?

An "open system" is one with empirically verifiable boundaries, which allow specific materials to cross the boundaries, like a living cell. It is not a system with boundaries which are unverifiable, and unknown, therefore arbitrary.