"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience." — Wikipedia
My point here in this thread, is that if there really is no detectable difference between p-zombies and normal humans, then what actually is the difference? — dukkha
The difference is the one described in the definition. P-zombies don't have consciousness. — Michael
So the difference here is that you don't attribute consciousness to p-zombies, whereas you do attribute consciousness to 'normal' people. — dukkha
You can't escape the fact that this is you attributing consciousness. You are here personally saying that x has consciousness. — dukkha
My point is that this really is no difference at all. The only difference here is whetheryou personally attribute consciousness to the person or not. This has nothing to do with actual, transcendentally existing conscious experiences which are somehow in relationship to this person before you. All it is is you basically going "that person over there is conscious, and therefore isn't a p-zombie", and nothing else. — dukkha
So the difference here is that you don't attribute consciousness to p-zombies, whereas you do attribute consciousness to 'normal' people. — dukkha
So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that? — Wayfarer
If physicalism is the case, then all behavior is the result of physical processes. — Marchesk
But this is precisely what is at issue. In other words, that begs the question. It is precisely the difference between a corpse and a human being: the corpse is indeed 'purely physical', but then, it's a corpse. It's not going to tell you what a nice day it's having. — Wayfarer
The reason it doesn't beg the question is because we have neuroscience, biology, chemistry and what not to understand the behavior living systems without referencing consciousness. — Marchesk
we're not sure when and if machines cross over into being conscious. — Marchesk
At this time, I don't believe that any machine possesses any degree or amount of conscious experience whatever, so no amount of addition will address that deficiency, a million times zero is still zero. — Wayfarer
The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device. If you asked it a question which involved how it felt about something, or what meant something to it - 'what is the most beautiful/hideous/moving thing you ever saw?' - then obviously it would have to emulate a response that was emotionally convincing. But this is like the Turing Test taken to a far higher level of difficulty. It would have to fake memories, attachments, preferences, and so on - without any basis for such abilities. They would all be simulated.
So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that? — Wayfarer
The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device. — Wayfarer
It would be a biological creature physically identical to humans. — Terrapin Station
But even if a machine becomes conscious one day, how would we ever know? A computer might insist all day long that it is a "real live boy", but that could simply be the result of clever programming, so who will believe it? And this is the point of the OP - we judge other minds to exist, extrapolating from our own, but we don't really know. — Real Gone Cat
The notion of the p-zombie is simply incoherent. The idea of a being who acts just like us but exhibits no consciousness simply does not hold up to scrutiny. The p-zombie is an oxymoron - perhaps with poetic value, but not philosophical. — Real Gone Cat
The whole discussion is simply an abundant illustration of the intellectual bankruptcy of what passes for 'philosophy' in the American academy. — Wayfarer
Where I disagree with the p-zombie argument is that I think the idea is incoherent rather than conceivable. — Terrapin Station
Is it possible for a concept to be incoherent yet conceivable? — Real Gone Cat
So can something be incoherent, but still conceivable? — Real Gone Cat
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