This is such a misreading :-d - in fact quite the contrary, for Nietzsche taking the sword and cutting their head off is slave morality based on ressentiment.'Turning the other cheek' is 'slave mentality' for Nietsche. — Wayfarer
So...no subject, no moral responsibility and no valid reason for resentment? — John
Nietzsche's central argument for anti-realism about value is explanatory: moral facts don't figure in the “best explanation” of experience, and so are not real constituents of the objective world. Moral values, in short, can be “explained away.” Such a conclusion follows from Nietzsche's naturalism (on the latter, see the competing accounts in Janaway 2007 and Leiter 2013). As we saw in the context of Nietzsche's critique of morality, Nietzsche thinks a person's moral beliefs can be explained in naturalistic terms, i.e., in terms of type-facts about that person. Thus, to explain a person's moral judgments, one needn't appeal to the existence of objective moral facts: psycho-physical facts about the person suffice. Thus, since non-evaluative type-facts are the primary explanatory facts, and since explanatory power is the mark of objective facts, it appears that there cannot be any value facts. Moral judgments and evaluations are “images” and “fantasies,” says Nietzsche, the mere effects of type-facts about agents (D 119). — Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy, by David Papineau
The “inner world” is full of phantoms…: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, hence does not explain anything either — it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent. The so-called motive: another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness — something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deeds than to represent them….
What follows from this? There are no mental [geistigen] causes at all. (TI VI:3) — Nietzsche
What were his father's convictions? My speculation has been that it was a massive emotional response to Schopenhauer's pessimism. But that can't be all..But Nietzsche himself seems trapped in ressentiment, shadowed by his own father's convictions, or why would he so have it in for gentle Jesus meek and mild? — mcdoodle
You nailed Nietzsche's view of it... that resentment is reactive. It's not a type of life that arises from within and expresses outward. It only responds to outward stimulation with "NO!"Then I agree with N, there is a terrible vacuity to the slave morality, what will it find of value beyond the overthrow of the supposed Master? — mcdoodle
But then, isn't there in what N says a strange yearning for the irretrievable noble, the knightly, like Raymond Chandler novels? I bring you, the Uber Detective who knows all, but has barely a personal answer. — mcdoodle
What is morality to you? Is it more about ought statements? Or about guilt, sin, and redemption? — Mongrel
Nietzsche is saying this ideal Australia doesn't exist. The real Australia's hostile actions are completely in line with its nature. It's a predator. It does what predatory creatures do. Think of it as a force of nature and there's nothing to resent (as there's nothing to resent about a volcano or thunderstorm).
So a person who has resentment can't be a self-antirealist without being in contradiction. Does that make sense? — Mongrel
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