The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. — creativesoul

This seems like reasonable speculative animal psychology.

This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. — creativesoul

If you mean to say a cat is unable to think about its beliefs, I would probably have to agree. More speculative animal psychology.

When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs.

Again, speculative animal psychology. We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :)

We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :) — ZzzoneiroCosm

Indeed. They will neither confirm nor deny with language use. They won't tell. Banno has said much the same thing on any number of occasions, telling me to ask Jack(his cat of days gone by).

How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?

If by "holding a belief" you mean having the psychical capacity to think about one's beliefs, sure, then probably a cat doesn't hold beliefs.

If by "holding a belief" you mean having the psychical capacity to think about one's beliefs, sure, then probably a cat doesn't hold beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I do not. The ability to think about one's beliefs is not equivalent to the ability to hold and/or have beliefs. Clearly the former is existentially dependent upon the latter. I've no issue with saying that cats can have and hold beliefs about what's happened, is happening, or is about to happen.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. — creativesoul

Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true?

E.g.: If one believes that Santa Clause is fictional, doesn’t that entail one upholds that “Santa Clause is fictional” corresponds to what is?

Or, more in-tune with the thread, if a cat believes that “it will soon have food” doesn’t that entail that it expects its emotive attitude of “I will soon have food” to correspond to what will be - being in some way surprised or dismayed if it turns out otherwise?

This going on the presumption that truth is understood as “that which corresponds to what is (to include what was and what will be)”.

When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I've no qualm with that. As before, I agree that the sound is meaningful to the cat, and it seems we also agree upon how it became so. It was the bit about the cat holding the account to be true that was the problem.

How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief? — creativesoul

It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology.

You say that thinking about a belief requires language. Which is to say a languageless creature is unable to think about its beliefs.

It seems reasonable, but I wouldn't call it knowledge. It has the ring of reasonable speculation.

It's literally impossible (in my opinion) to imagine the mind of a languageless creature. We can try.



Another way to look at it: while it's true that a cat lacks language, it's possible to conceive of the phenomena of its experience as a kind of symbol-language. So for humans, when I see the word "food" I think of food. For a cat, when it hears the sound of the electric can opener it thinks of food. In this example, the sound of the electric can opener is functioning as a meaning-laden symbol. You might say a word, but that's a stretch. Certainly, it has a kind of symbolic content for the cat.

But again, we run up against the unknowns of animal pscyhology.


---------------------

I've no issue with saying that cats can have and hold beliefs about what's happened, is happening, or is about to happen. — creativesoul

I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true. — creativesoul

So in the case of the electric can opener, I'm okay with saying the cat, when he hears the electric can opener, believes if he runs to the kitchen he'll get a tasty treat. (A belief not about the meaning of the sound of the electric can opener; a belief about "what is about to happen.")

To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen.

So it's easy to leave the notion of meaning out of it, if that's your preference.

*edit - At any rate, the point is that the notion of meaning can be left out.

Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true? — javra

If you go to the opening post of this thread, you'll find a link to the debate that this thread is about. My opening post in that debate does exactly that.

To be clear, you're referring to this post. On first reading, I agree with what is said in it. But I gather that it only addresses proportional formats for beliefs in relation to the issue of truth. This as stated here:

Some say, and rightly so, that when we believe some proposition or another, that we have a particular sort of attitude towards that proposition, and that that belief has propositional content. I would readily agree. When a competent user believes the following proposition...

"The mouse ran behind the tree."

...they believe that that proposition is true. The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. I've no argument against that much.

What I'm asking is how can a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not; so phrased to contrast to belief-in-A) not entail the attitude that X is true?

I ask because I so far disagree with the notion that a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not) can be held without entailing the attitude that X is true - i.e., corresponds to what was, is, or will be. So, if a lesser animal believes-that-X (without this belief being in propositional format), this to me so far entails that it believes-that-X-is-true (or: that X corresponds to what is) - despite there being no linguistic proposition to contemplate.

How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
— creativesoul

It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So, because language less animals cannot speak, it makes it impossible for us to know what language less belief is about or what it consists of? Surely, we need not know everything about language less belief in order to know some things about it. There will always be unknowns. I say that a very disciplined approach to what we can and do know will yield results that are both well-grounded and true.

We can take a Skinnerian approach and analyze languageless creatures in terms of their observable behaviors and its conditioners and reinforcers. But Skinner wouldn't like the use of the word "belief" (mentalism).

Or we can take a mentalistic view and try to imagine what goes on in the mind of a languageless creature. More speculative and of a different epistemological order: I wouldn't expect the results to be in the form of knowledge, rather of theory. (Skinner's reductionism was, of course, an attempt to set psychology on a more scientific foundation; and behaviorism remains the most scientific branch of psychology, as far as I know.)


Do you agree with this?: The study of languageless belief centers on the psychology of languageless creatures.

Or do you envision a logic-centered, armchair approach?: If a languageless creature holds a belief the belief must logically be of the nature of X.

I reject the rules of entailment on the grounds that using them to characterize another's belief can lead us to say that another believes something that they do not. Gettier shows this nicely. The rules of entailment allow a change to the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which is to change the meaning of his belief entirely, and proceed to talk about something other than what Smith believes. So, just because "I have ten coins in my pocket and I will get the job" entails "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", it does not follow that Smith's belief was true because it was not about someone else, it was about himself, and thus, his belief could only be true if he got the job. The second case is a bit more complex, but amounts to the same thing; an accounting malpractice.

That much aside...

The belief that approach is about statements of belief. Language less creatures do not make those. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree requires only a creature capable of directly perceiving the events leading up to the situation. A cat can believe that a mouse is behind a tree without having the attitude that "a mouse is behind a tree" is true. The former is about the mouse, the tree, and the relationship between them, whereas the latter is about the belief.

My own appraisal is that you’ve misread what I’ve said: entails the attitude that X is true; not the fact that X is true.

But OK.

Are those the only options, and are our options mutually exclusive? I would say that the first steps would be more of an armchair approach to set out the necessary criterion. What counts as a language less belief? There are certain things we already know cannot be included in such belief.

My own appraisal is that you’ve misread what I’ve said: entails the attitude that X is true; not the fact that X is true. — javra

Perhaps, but is it of any consequence?

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?

Sounds like a good starting point. :)

While I don't want to drag this into the mire:

Perhaps, but is it of any consequence? — creativesoul

Yes, the difference between attitude and fact is of significant consequence.

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not? — creativesoul

Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree.

Playing around

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?
— creativesoul

Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree. — javra

Having an attitude that X corresponds to what is amounts entirely to an attitude about X. If X is the belief, then having an attitude towards X is having an attitude towards the belief. Do you see the problem here?

Cute. :)

Obsessed. :lol:

No, its in fact what I'm point out.

Consider the simplistic case of perception, for example. One's perception of X can either be true or false. Same with a lesser animal's. When a lesser animal innately trusts what it perceives, it un-reflexively believes what it perceives to so be; and, in so doing, it holds the implicit (un-contemplated) attitude that what it perceives is true. Same as we do on most all occasions. "Is that a real tree that I see?" hardly ever enters into the equation of our believing that the tree we see in fact is, i.e. we hold an implicit attitude that our perceptions are true most always. And, arguably as with at least more intelligent lesser animals (like great apes for one example), we are only uncertain about what we perceive when it conflicts - of fails to fit into - the coherent / consistent body of all associated perceptions and their assumed relations: the "I can't believe my eyes" attitude.

Granting that we believe what we see, do we not then necessarily assume what we see to be true - this even when we do not contemplate our former and present perceptions in terms of propositional beliefs? After all, it's only after the fact that we analyze via analysis of propositional beliefs.

Obsessed — creativesoul

Obsession is a kind of inspiration. I'm familiar with it.

To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This sounds more like the conventional theories of meaning which presuppose symbolism. I'm not averse to them entirely.

Obsession is a kind of inspiration. I'm familiar with it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I find it absolutely necessary in order to achieve many goals, particularly those involving inventing new things. Novelty.

If X is equal to a mouse is behind a tree, then X is either the belief or the events/situation. Are you saying that in the belief that approach it is the latter of the two? Because it seems to me that it is the former.

So then, back to where we were...

What can we know, beyond any doubt, about language less belief?

Again: belief-that-X ... hence, belief - that - event/situation. Where X is event/situation.

I'm going to withdraw from this conversation for the time being.

As compared to believe that - event/situation - is true? I've no issue that I see with belief - that - event situation, but it's the "is true" part that is problematic for me.

What can we know, beyond any doubt, about language less belief? — creativesoul

Well, Sextus Empiricus is one of my favorites, so if you're in search of what's "beyond any doubt," I might not be much help.



Maybe this is a good place to start:

All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.

Possibly better:

Languageless belief is non-propositional.

All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.