Sure, but that's not an argument against the position that I and others are taking. — Sam26

You're not in conflict with anyone. :up:

:ok:

We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth. — Banno

That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). Any more than we need to recognise mysteriously subsistent individuals ("the present King of France" etc. if they can't be just fictive or hypothetical terms, empty and non-referring).

How it could look for suitably deluded cats is a question not at all clarified by this metaphysical extravagance.

Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.

It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.

It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not. — creativesoul

For me, the debate hinged on how you and @Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.

Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.

Here are three statements we might make:

(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.

(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.

(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.

I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false.

If so, then your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event) should be considered propositional, and how (3) should be best understood (i.e., as assumed above or else as being equivalent to (2)).

Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition. — creativesoul

Could be. What's the significance of the topic from your point of view?

It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.
— creativesoul

For me, the debate hinged on how you and Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.

Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.

Here are three statements we might make:

(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.

(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.

(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.

I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false. — Andrew M

As earlier, I would not invoke "states of affairs". Banno's use was rejected, and rightly so.

...your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event). — Andrew M

Whoa!

Either (1) is one of three different statements that we might make about events, or (1) is the event being described. It cannot be both at any time. (1) is either a statement or it's an event. If it's both, it's an equivocation of key terms, and that is adequate ground for rejection.

(1) is clearly identified as one of a trio of statements we might make about events.

(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can.

(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can. — creativesoul

:up:

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else that can potentially be stated). So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated). — Andrew M

Whatever else can potentially be stated?

:brow:

That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno.

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else that can potentially be stated) — Andrew M

Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated?

So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false). — Andrew M

Part of what makes statements true or false anyway...

Whatever else can potentially be stated?

:brow:

That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno. — creativesoul

No, that's a distinction between the world (which we can potentially talk about) and our talk about the world.

So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).
— Andrew M

Part of what makes statements true or false anyway... — creativesoul

What else do you have in mind?

Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated? — fdrake

Yes.

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated).
— Andrew M

Whatever else can potentially be stated?

:brow:

That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno. — creativesoul

No, that's a distinction between the world (which we can potentially talk about) and our talk about the world. — Andrew M

No? Try this...

States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...

We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not.

I would add that as you used the terms above, events, relations, and whatever else can potentially be stated are all states of affairs. Look for yourself.

So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).
— Andrew M

Part of what makes statements true or false anyway...
— creativesoul

What else do you have in mind? — Andrew M

Language less belief and the content thereof. You are focusing upon irrelevancy.

You?

Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated?
— fdrake

Yes. — Andrew M

Is omniscience a fashionable aim these days?

States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...

We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not. — creativesoul

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. And that is what is meant by a true statement. (To say of what is that it is, etc.)

Of course we can speak falsely, which just means that we failed to describe the world as it is (i.e., there was no such state of affairs).

Also, if need be, we can say that a state of affairs obtained or failed to obtain (just as we can say that an event happened or not, or a relation holds or does not hold, etc.).

Language less belief and the content thereof. You are focusing upon irrelevancy.

You? — creativesoul

I don't follow your comment. What irrelevancy?

Is omniscience a fashionable aim these days? — creativesoul

No, it's a post-truth world...

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unaccountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?

Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.
— creativesoul

Could be... — frank

Oh, it most definitely is, but it's not the only part. He does not seem to continue wanting to have this conversation when it gets to the point that his position is shown to depend upon one of two different falsehoods. We never quite get to setting the criterion/standard for exactly what it makes the most sense for us to say counts as "language-less belief". That is the standard by which we can tell if another is guilty of anthropomorphism.





Language-less belief cannot consist of language. It can consist of things that are themselves existentially dependent upon language, if and when those are directly perceptible, such as red cups full of hot Maxwell House coffee. All belief including cups is itself existentially dependent upon language, for the cup is. Language less belief can consist of that which is existentially dependent upon language, just not language use itself(no predication).

Predication is enabled and/or otherwise facilitated by the fact that language-less belief already consists of a plurality of different things. This further speaks to the first two of three beliefs explicated earlier in the debate. It is also germane to positions seeking some shared 'structure' between language less belief and linguistic belief. Mentalese is the wrong way 'round. Evolution demands that linguistic belief emerge from non linguistic. Semiotics fails miserably here as well, with it's attempt to break all meaning down into semantics and syntax. Syntax describes particular patterns in the structured order of meaningful marks. Some meaning is prior to such marks.





The bridge between language less belief about what's happened or is happening and meaningful expressions thereof is built directly upon and by virtue of correlations being drawn between different directly perceptible elements of those events. When one begins drawing correlations between the names of directly perceptible things and their referent(between "Jack" and Jack), one begins to be able to think(express their thought and belief about what's happened and/or is happening) aloud via naming and descriptive practices about those same events and elements therein.

One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree, and one need not know that one is doing so in order to be able to look for mice behind trees. They look there because they believe that they will find the mouse.

All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of a creature drawing correlations between different things. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief(drawing the correlations). All language less belief about what happened or is happening is capable of being true or false despite it's inability to be stated by the creature themselves. Some of it actually is true. Arguably most. Some true belief exists in it's entirety prior to language use.

The language less belief that the mouse ran behind the tree, and the simple statement thereof share the exact same truth conditions, because they are about the very same things. The statement need not be made in order for the belief to be formed and/or held. Such belief is prior to linguistic expressions thereof.

I've laid non linguistic meaningful true belief about what's happened or is happening down at your doorstep all packaged up in one neat little bundle. No need for deity. No need for cosmic judgment. No need for language use. Now, to be clear, our understanding all of this certainly requires language. However, all three - belief, meaning, and truth - emerge onto the world stage prior to language use via thought and belief formation(correlations drawn between different directly perceptible things). Therefore, neither truth, nor meaning is existentially dependent upon language.

What's the significance you ask?

Given the shameful fact that there has yet to have been an acceptable theory of meaning, it seems relatively germane to me.

This non linguistic belief exposition also speaks to the stark differences between what's said and what's believed. That has implications for Moore's paradox as well as the liar, and all it's reinforcements. But, notably it speaks to the difference between what makes belief statements true and what makes statements true(when there is a difference between the two but both are being characterized with the exact same marks). What one believes(belief) most certainly plays a determinative role in what would make a statement thereof true. What one believes is part of what makes their own statements thereof true. For example, Gettier conflates here by forgetting that Smith is talking about himself. He's not alone either.

Smith's belief is about himself, and as such it isn't true if anyone else gets the job!


P.S.

Oh, and having a good grasp upon belief and the role it plays in our lives also helps one to navigate the world with as few unhappy unexpected results and/or surprises as possible, regardless of the particular situation one may find oneself in.

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
— Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise inexplicable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out? — bongo fury

:point:

Loaded questions



You seem to be looking to disagree on things that, as far as I can tell, we have no real disagreement about.

The content of a true belief is a state of the world which we, as human beings, can potentially represent in language. Would you agree with that?

Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated? — fdrake

Yes. — Andrew M

:up:

Let's put it in more formal terms, I'll label the formalisation (DPC) for "doctrine of propositional content".

(DPC) For every (*) event E there exists (**) a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E )

Do you agree with that formulation?

The implicit domain of quantification of the existential quantifier ( ** ) hides rather a lot of the issue, I think. Here are a few thoughts about assigning a domain to each quantifier.

(1) The class of events ( * ) universally quantified over is all events at all times. The second quantifier (**) is given the same domain.

This raises a question of time.

Say if you truncated the domain to events which occurred 10 billion years ago, at that time there would be events but no statements, so the existential quantifier is false since there do not exist statements at that time, so the whole thing would be false because there would be events without statements - and thus events without corresponding statements.

To restore the truth of the conjecture, those troublesome events which occurred 10 billion years ago can find their corresponding statements now. That seems fine, as the domain is posited to be all events and all times. However, DPC then turns on this hypothetical connection between events which occurred 10 billion years ago and statements now for all events 10 billion years ago. If there did not exist an S(E) at the time of E, S(E) must have occurred later. In turn, that raises the questions, why would DPC be a property of the world if it only applies after the advent of declarative sentences? If it's part of metaphysics, it's not part of the metaphysics of nature; it did fine in the truncated domain.

(2) One way of sidelining this issue would be to claim that the universal quantifier is over all events and all times, but the existential quantifier ranges only over the class of all statements. That gives us a few sub cases:
(2a) statements are events, effectively this is a collapse back into case (1)
(2b) some statements are events, some statements are not events - this is very wooly, under what conditions is a statement an event and under what conditions is it not? I'll not consider it further unless I have to.
(2c) No statements are events, all events are not statements.

Left with (2c), this commits someone to the doctrine that statements are not events; and if they are not events they could not be asserted (unless assertions are not events!). That raises questions regarding how statements work if they need not be the events of their assertion. An ontology of statements as distinct from speech acts. In this case, DPC seems to turn on a construal of statements as a kind of abstraction which is distinct from the speech acts of their assertion.

Loaded questions. — Andrew M

Not the first, though:

So is the second sentence a typo, — bongo fury

Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

One way or the way other, please clarify.

(DPC) For every (*) event E there exists (**) a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E )

Do you agree with that formulation? — fdrake

No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.

If a purported event were not representable in language, then we would find ourselves up against the private language argument. We would have no grounds for calling it an event.

This raises a question of time. — fdrake

As you note, many events occurred billions of years ago which haven't been (and perhaps never will be) represented by anyone. Given the language criterion above, there can be such events and they will have state independently of anyone's representations. That's just how we've set up the language game.

No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever. — Andrew M

So your claim's more like:

(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).

?

The content of a true belief is a state of the world which we, as human beings, can potentially represent in language. Would you agree with that? — Andrew M

Thanks for asking. As earlier, I would not invoke states of the world or states of affairs.

What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief? Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things.

You seem to be looking to disagree on things that, as far as I can tell, we have no real disagreement about. — Andrew M

Not looking to disagree, just simply pointing out that you've been equivocating "states of affairs" in the same way that Banno does.

All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

And putting the ability into practice, presumably?

Ok, and you say that such creatures might have no language? Do you mean none at all, and if so, roughly what are you counting as language?

No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.
— Andrew M

So your claim's more like:

(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).

? — fdrake

Yes, that seems OK.

Any event can be characterized by a statement. Whether or not it ever is, is a separate matter.

What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief? — creativesoul

My purpose there was to distinguish them in a dependency sense. First-order beliefs are about the world. Second-order beliefs are about statements about the world.

Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things. — creativesoul

OK, so consider the scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.

That the cat chased after the mouse suggests that the cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.

If we agree about that, then the question is what to make of the that-clause "the mouse ran behind the tree". I think we would agree that it describes an event that occurred independently of the cat's belief, and also independently of language.

Now I think that is what you mean by language-less belief. And also that this characterizes much of human belief as well. Is that correct?