cause-and-effect (CE) is a way of modeling the world and has nothing to do with the world itself although being a useful model. — tim wood

A useful model of the world is useful because it has something to do with the world.

That throws out your notion of a force. — tim wood

Does freedom really have a more secure metaphysical status than causality? Can we be free if we are unable to cause anything?

Does freedom really have a more secure metaphysical status than causality? — Garth

What if it wasn’t a question of more secure, but rather, as secure?

Let's see if we can start to figure out what freedom is, out of deference to you who do not like definitions. — tim wood

Your post is a rather neat example of why I find definitions suspect, presenting nothing of how the word is actually used, but instead inventing esoteric verbalism.

You define freedom as the capacity to act according to one's duty. That's quite at odds with the definition given in those dictionaries that seek to set out how words are actually used, as opposed to how Tim wants them to be used.

So one is left to conclude that when Tim talks about freedom, he is not talking about the same thing as the rest of us. We can safely ignore what he has to say about, because he is not talking about freedom.

...constructing some pseudo-logical monstrosity to justify it post hoc. — Isaac

Yep.

I'm of the opinion that Kant's entire philosophy is built on defining certain things as precisely what they are not, — Garth

The post from Tim quoted here is further evidence for you, Garth.

The OP amounts to "Tim thinks we should do our duty". That is, it amounts to nothing of interest.

I think you're trivializing Tim's argument to some degree. For one thing, since Tim started off the discussion with Kant's definition, we can presume that this thread is about the Kantian idea of freedom. In which case we could treat my argument as the one that is off topic and just consider Kant as introducing specialized language, i.e. jargon.

So one is left to conclude that when Tim talks about freedom, he is not talking about the same thing as the rest of us. We can safely ignore what he has to say about, because he is not talking about freedom. — Banno

This assumes that two different definitions cannot later be shown to be logically equivalent. For example, a circle is "a locus of points equidistant from a center" and it is also a "curve of constant curvature in a plane".

If someone were to say that all circles have three vertices, and then offer in argument that a circle is a plane figure with three sides, one might do well to trivialise their argument. Suggesting that they might later show that the locus of all points equidistant from a given point is also a plane figure with three sides does not help.

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On definitions: fascinating that the third section of part two of “Lectures.....” is mostly definitions, part two establishing the background to which the definitions subsequently apply. Just about anything you can think relative to morality or ethics is covered, and would be advisable in following Kant.

You know.......like the OP says.

Following Kant (and subject to correction on the details), the argument here is that freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. — tim wood

If this is mere exegesis, then fine.

If you think you are saying something about freedom and duty, then we have an interesting disagreement.

That is, Kant was wrong.

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What do you want? Kant is not using the term "freedom" in the way it is usually used, hence his argument does not apply to what is usually called freedom.

He's talking about something else.

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Now we know something is the case: either you're wrong or Kant's wrong. And for Kant to be wrong, it must be on his terms. — tim wood

No. You can't equivocate like that. You said...

Where it is legal, many motorcycle riders do not wear helmets. (As a long-experienced rider I am well aware of the charms of helmetless travel, and recognize that there are limited situations when it is relatively safe - traffic not one of those situations - my bona fides and biases up front.)

But what is wrong with it? Simply the heightened risk of being killed or catastrophically injured in an otherwise minor accident of the sort motorcycles are subject to, at a cost the victim cannot himself bear. That is, he, usually a he, hurts everyone, and some greatly. There can be no such freedom to either cause or unreasonably risk such harm.

And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. — tim wood

That is a statement about courses of action, not definitions. What we 'call' such a course of action is not relevant to the normative force you want to impart to it.

I want to return to the OP. It suggests that systems of rights do not determine what is right or wrong. Rights therefore only function for legal purposes as principles for resolving disputes and interpretation of laws. Therefore if you tell someone "Don't do that, it's wrong!" they cannot defend their actions by replying "I have the right to do it!"

There can be no such freedom to either cause or unreasonably risk such harm. — tim wood

Absolutely, at least with respect to freedom as a moral condition, for such is gross disrespect for humanity in general regarding cause, and himself as a member of it, regarding risk.

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I can't make out the point of your post. As to "normative force," — tim wood

You say

I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. — tim wood

Your argument is essentially. ..

-By Kant's definition of freedom, riding without a helmet is not freedom.

-We all think freedom is a good thing.

-We should therefore not ride motorbikes without helmets.

But you equivocate on the meaning of freedom between the first and second point. If riding a motorbike without a helmet is not freedom as Kant defines it then the only thing that follows from that is that we should not ride motorbikes without helmets if we value freedom as Kant defines it.

Since it is nowhere shown why we should do so, nor empirically demonsrated that such a value is likely to be one we all hold, the conclusion has no normative force.

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I do not know what normative force (NF) is, but maybe we don't need to go that way. I will assume there is such a thing, and that it is somehow, someway, more compelling than mere collective agreement. So, would you allow that arithmetic has NF? the idea being that if NF, then relativism is ruled out. — tim wood

My bad. By normative force I simply mean something like persuasive power with regards to action - ie the the difference between saying to someone "you ought not do x" and "you ought not do x because...". the degree to which the 'because...' is persuasive is the normative force of the statement.

And let's block here any form of nihilism. He or she can deny up is up or down is down, represent that up is down, or say that 2+2=5. But the nihilist annihilates truth, and in this truth is presupposed. Our job then, as best we can, to identify it, and to satisfy ourselves that what we think is true, actually is; and then to see if in virtue of being true it possesses NF. — tim wood

I think you make a false dichotomy between nihilism and rationally derived truth, There are other values than rationally derived truth which might give normative force to a statement. for example "If you don't do X no-one will like you" has normative force because (generally) we want to be liked. Us generally wanting to be liked is an empirical observation and anyone denying it would have quite a job of persuasion, so there's little risk of nihilism, but nor is there a rational argument there as to why we 'ought' to want to be liked - we just do. That's why, when I said about your argument having normative force I offered two courses - the rational argument, or the appeal to some value we're likely to hold commonly.

No doubt feeling can add verisimilitude, but is itself an imitation of NF. What is left? I find reason. Do you find anything different? And reason must be before experience, because experience cannot create reason — tim wood

I'm not sure where you're getting this line of argument from, it seems to have no basis that we might share (or are you simply trying to establish that basis?). In the latter case then I'm afraid we do not have common ground from which to argue because I disagree with your axiom here. I believe 'reason' is simply a habit of thinking which has proven useful. The 'proven useful' part is experience. We think in such algorithms as show that 2+2=4 simply because such methods yield useful results, not because such thinking methods are somehow hard-wired into the universe (though they may be somewhat hard-wired into us).

"We hold these truths to be self-evident." We had better, or we hold no truths to be evident at all. — tim wood

Agreed. But it is absolutely evident that we do not all hold the same truths to be self-evident. That there is a need to hold something as self evident to avoid nihilism cannot be held up as an argument in support of any specific such something. Support for some particular something (truth held as self-evident) might come from psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion...but it cannot come from rational argument because rational argument must always take a premise and show a conclusion. If the conclusion is "X should be taken as self-evident" what would the premise there be?

We can sample it, but for immersion you have to go there. — tim wood

It's hard to tell if you're claiming these as empirical observations or rational conclusions. If the latter, the question is the same for each - what is the premise from which you derive these as conclusions? As the former they fail spectacularly in terms of support.

1) Mankind alone is free - we have no reason to believe this. We feel like we're free, but then we also find ourselves making decisions we later which we'd given more thought to, anden masse we seem to make some incredibly self-defeating choices. The jury is very much still out as to how 'free' we are.

2) Mankind alone can make moral choices - The jury is not even really still out on this one. Majority opinion is that at least great apes have morality that is biologically indistinguishable from our own. I can provide citations if you're interested.

3) Reason alone is the original source of moral choices - Again, not even up for debate really. FMRI scan show moral decisions being made involving areas of the brain at times completely separate from those involved in rational decisions. We unequivocally do not make moral decisions solely by rational thought. again, if you require citations I can provide them

4) Morality is the ability to discern and distinguish the right, and to choose accordingly - Yes, I think that's a good working definition.

5) Humanity, in self and community, has value (or it has no value) - Yep, no argument there either.

6) Life in itself has value (or it has no value) - Again, agreed.

7) The right is in accordance with a reverence for life and humanity - It certainly seems to be, but consider acts of bravery in war, these may well involve killing an 'enemy'. I think reverence for life and humanity is part of it, but it's complicated in times of conflict.

8) In order to act morally, one must be free to act - Not so sure on this one. There does seem to be some necessity to have free choice (if we're forced to do a 'good' thing, that is rarely seen as virtuous), but I'd be sceptical that a definition requires us to know the 'true' extent of someone's freedom. Were that the case we'd never be able to properly use the word. It must be sufficient that there's a general appearance of freedom (ie no-one's putting a gun to your head). I see no reason why that need extend to the absence of psychological drives to act. Such drives are, after all, just as much part of 'us' as our rational thoughts.

9) Duty is the obligation to act in accordance with morality - Seems like another good working definition.


10) Realization of purpose under morality is the highest aim of mankind - Empirically difficult to see how this is true. as a rational conclusion it requires a jump from identifying that which is moral to identifying an absence of other equally pressing objectives - something you've not yet done.

The helmetless rider in traffic harms no one, until he is subject to the routine accident that every experienced rider assumes, knows, will happen sooner or later. But for the helmetless rider, the accident that may have just scraped some denim and maybe some skin, that he should bounce up and walk away from, is instead death, whether a living death or a dead death. At the least is a devastated family. And nearby is a rehabilitation hospital that takes on brain-injury cases, and that care is so long and expensive only the state and federal government can afford it, i.e., me for sure and maybe you!

The helmetless spirit inhabits every level where there is ignorance or stupidity. And in a crowding world, mere personal moral failure becomes offense in fact. — tim wood

Right - so this ^ is all what I mean by post hoc rationalisation. Nothing you've said here is false, but it is 'selected' to achieve an end (helmetless riding is bad, helmeted riding is not). Where, in your assessment of potential harms is the particulate pollution that even helmeted riding produces - arguably more damaging than the occasional motorcycle accident? Where the risk to other road users simply by virtue of unnecessary travel - all motorised vehicles are dangerous, the leading cause of death in many places? Where the harm caused simply by buying the bike - unfair working practices, modern slavery derived components...? I could go on.

The point is simply that regardless of our conclusions about the flaws or otherwise in your moral framework, it is without a doubt that it's application is post hoc - you already know what sorts of things you'd' like to turn out to be 'right' and which you'd like to turn out to be 'wrong'. They're generally the things which seem good to you. I can guarantee you that if a moral algorithm ever produced the result that you should murder your wife you simply wouldn't do it, you'd presume you'd made a mistake somewhere. Why? Because you already know it's wrong. It's not like maths. I have no feeling about the 'right' answer to a complicated sum, but I already know which answers to complicated moral dilemmas feel wrong.

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My only objection is regarding the title itself, Freedom AND Duty for it's a contradiction. Freedom means we're is at liberty to do whatever we want but duty implies that we're not. An odd couple these two.

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Yep.

freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. — tim wood

Odd.

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The point that I, @Isaac and @TheMadFool have made remains: You are not using Freedom in the same way as the rest of us. Your account is therefore irrelevant to discussions of freedom per se.

All you have done is define freedom as doing one's duty, then claimed that freedom is doing one's duty. Trivial and irrelevant.

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You're again avoiding the issue.

Depends on "want." I want my coffee in the morning. I am "at liberty" to get it, and "free" to choose my means. But am I free wrt to the having of it? Not really. Fortunately for me no question of duty that I know of arises directly out of my having my coffee. But if I move 3,000 lbs. of steel, burning non-renewable fossil fuels, taking the time for a 12 miles round-trip, contributing my increment to the dangers of the road, which in the presence of snow and ice are not trivial, for cup of expensive bitter-flavored hot water, am I being a reasonable man? What say you? — tim wood

Why can't you just say that freedom - being able to do whatever we want - is either an impediment or an obstruction for the good, that duty - being unable to do whatever we want - is what defines the good?

In a Kantian universe good means certain morally meaningful duties, obligations to either perform or not perform certain actions but we're completely free with respect to whether we accept to live by this Kantian moral code or not.

Thus, to append to what you said, and I quote, "freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty (OR NOT)".

It's kinda like having the freedom to either become a member or not become a member of a club (the Kantian club) but once you're a member you have to follow the rules (Kantian duties). :chin:

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