cause-and-effect (CE) is a way of modeling the world and has nothing to do with the world itself although being a useful model. — tim wood

A useful model of the world is useful because it has something to do with the world.

That throws out your notion of a force. — tim wood

Does freedom really have a more secure metaphysical status than causality? Can we be free if we are unable to cause anything?

Does freedom really have a more secure metaphysical status than causality? — Garth

What if it wasn’t a question of more secure, but rather, as secure?

Let's see if we can start to figure out what freedom is, out of deference to you who do not like definitions. — tim wood

Your post is a rather neat example of why I find definitions suspect, presenting nothing of how the word is actually used, but instead inventing esoteric verbalism.

You define freedom as the capacity to act according to one's duty. That's quite at odds with the definition given in those dictionaries that seek to set out how words are actually used, as opposed to how Tim wants them to be used.

So one is left to conclude that when Tim talks about freedom, he is not talking about the same thing as the rest of us. We can safely ignore what he has to say about, because he is not talking about freedom.

...constructing some pseudo-logical monstrosity to justify it post hoc. — Isaac

Yep.

I'm of the opinion that Kant's entire philosophy is built on defining certain things as precisely what they are not, — Garth

The post from Tim quoted here is further evidence for you, Garth.

The OP amounts to "Tim thinks we should do our duty". That is, it amounts to nothing of interest.

I think you're trivializing Tim's argument to some degree. For one thing, since Tim started off the discussion with Kant's definition, we can presume that this thread is about the Kantian idea of freedom. In which case we could treat my argument as the one that is off topic and just consider Kant as introducing specialized language, i.e. jargon.

So one is left to conclude that when Tim talks about freedom, he is not talking about the same thing as the rest of us. We can safely ignore what he has to say about, because he is not talking about freedom. — Banno

This assumes that two different definitions cannot later be shown to be logically equivalent. For example, a circle is "a locus of points equidistant from a center" and it is also a "curve of constant curvature in a plane".

If someone were to say that all circles have three vertices, and then offer in argument that a circle is a plane figure with three sides, one might do well to trivialise their argument. Suggesting that they might later show that the locus of all points equidistant from a given point is also a plane figure with three sides does not help.

Your post is a rather neat example of why I find definitions suspect, presenting nothing of how the word is actually used, but instead inventing esoteric verbalism.

You define freedom as the capacity to act according to one's duty. That's quite at odds with the definition given in those dictionaries that seek to set out how words are actually used, as opposed to how Tim wants them to be used. — Banno

Again from the OP - this your third look:

Following Kant — tim wood

And no small irony: you who don't like dictionaries and definitions, "That's quite at odds with the definition given in those dictionaries."

So one is left to conclude that when Tim talks about freedom, he is not talking about the same thing as the rest of us. We can safely ignore what he has to say about, because he is not talking about freedom. — Banno

Sorry to disturb your nap, but again, the first line of the OP:

Following Kant — tim wood

The OP amounts to "Tim thinks we should do our duty". — Banno

If you think that's what I said, you need new glasses or some other corrective. Because I did not say that, and the point was something else.

The only contribution you have made to this thread is to mention Locke and liberty. Given it refers to Kant and freedom, it would seem you're merely lost.

But an excerpt might help you:

"Freedom is, on the one hand, that faculty which gives unlimited usefulness to all other faculties. It is the highest order of life, which serves as the foundation of all perfections and is their necessary condition. All animals have the capacity to use their powers according to will. Yet this will is not free. It is necessitated through the incitement of stimuli, and the actions of animals, involve a bruta necessitas. If the will of all beings were so bound to sensuous impulse, the world would possess no value. The inherent value of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom in accordance with a will that is not necessitated to action. Freedom is thus the inner value of the world.

"But on the other hand, freedom unrestrained by rules of its conditional employment is the most terrible of all things. The actions of animals are regular; they are performed in accordance with rules that necessitate them subjectively. Mankind apart, nature is not free; through it all runs a subjectively necessitating principle in accordance with which everything happens regularly. man alone is free; his actions are not regulated by any such subjectively necessitating principle; if they were, he would not be free.

"And what then? If the freedom of man were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the result would be the completest savage disorder. There could then be no certainty that man might not use his powers to destroy himself, his fellows , and the whole of nature. Given freedom, I can imagine every kind of lawlessness, if it is not subject to an objective determination. The grounds of this objective determination must lie in the understanding, and constitute the restrictions to freedom. Therefore the proper use of freedom is the supreme rule.

"What then is the condition under which freedom is restricted? It is the law. The universal law is therefore as follows: let you procedure be such that in all your actions regularity prevails. What does this restraint imply when applied to the individual? That he should not follow his inclinations. The fundamental rule, in terms of which I ought to restrain my freedom, is the conformity of free behaviour to the essential ends of humanity. I shall not then follow my inclinations, but bring the under a rule. He who subjects his person to his inclinations, acts contrary to the essential end of humanity; for as a free agent he must not be subjected to inclinations, but ought to determine them in the exercise of his freedom; and being a free agent he must have a rule , which is the essential end of humanity...". (Lectures on Ethics, Kant, 122-123, trans. Infield.)

-----

He goes on with, "All evil in the world springs from freedom," it being necessary, then, to "take a stand on maxims" and self-restrain with rules, which become self-regulating duties. And duties, in turn, not based in inclinations, but in "reverence for humanity." This being the basis for all morality. Thus to act in accordance with duties in reverence to humanity is the highest function of freedom. Yielding to inclination impairs that capacity, and to the extent one is constrained from being able to act in accordance with freedom, one is by that much, unfree.

On definitions: fascinating that the third section of part two of “Lectures.....” is mostly definitions, part two establishing the background to which the definitions subsequently apply. Just about anything you can think relative to morality or ethics is covered, and would be advisable in following Kant.

You know.......like the OP says.

Following Kant (and subject to correction on the details), the argument here is that freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. — tim wood

If this is mere exegesis, then fine.

If you think you are saying something about freedom and duty, then we have an interesting disagreement.

That is, Kant was wrong.

If this is mere exegesis, then fine.
If you think you are saying something about freedom and duty, then we have an interesting disagreement.
That is, Kant was wrong. — Banno

Sorry, you already crossed the boundary on "fine." Yours amounts to shoot first, ask after. And your claim, the form of it, is always interesting because it stakes a definite claim. Now we know something is the case: either you're wrong or Kant's wrong. And for Kant to be wrong, it must be on his terms. And you have torpedoed neither-nor, so it's either-or, you or Kant. And since Kant is an open book, you must have your case already made. Go for it. Educate Or in terms of your comments in this thread, man up! You have the floor.

What do you want? Kant is not using the term "freedom" in the way it is usually used, hence his argument does not apply to what is usually called freedom.

He's talking about something else.

Kant is not using the term "freedom" in the way it is usually used, hence his argument does not apply to what is usually called freedom. — Banno

And who said he was or it was? But you said he was wrong, and having taken that territory, it's his "freedom" you're stuck with - and I doubt you can hold even one square-inch of it.

By my count you have made nine posts to this thread, and nothing constructive. What's up?

Now we know something is the case: either you're wrong or Kant's wrong. And for Kant to be wrong, it must be on his terms. — tim wood

No. You can't equivocate like that. You said...

Where it is legal, many motorcycle riders do not wear helmets. (As a long-experienced rider I am well aware of the charms of helmetless travel, and recognize that there are limited situations when it is relatively safe - traffic not one of those situations - my bona fides and biases up front.)

But what is wrong with it? Simply the heightened risk of being killed or catastrophically injured in an otherwise minor accident of the sort motorcycles are subject to, at a cost the victim cannot himself bear. That is, he, usually a he, hurts everyone, and some greatly. There can be no such freedom to either cause or unreasonably risk such harm.

And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. — tim wood

That is a statement about courses of action, not definitions. What we 'call' such a course of action is not relevant to the normative force you want to impart to it.

I want to return to the OP. It suggests that systems of rights do not determine what is right or wrong. Rights therefore only function for legal purposes as principles for resolving disputes and interpretation of laws. Therefore if you tell someone "Don't do that, it's wrong!" they cannot defend their actions by replying "I have the right to do it!"

There can be no such freedom to either cause or unreasonably risk such harm. — tim wood

Absolutely, at least with respect to freedom as a moral condition, for such is gross disrespect for humanity in general regarding cause, and himself as a member of it, regarding risk.

That is a statement about courses of action, not definitions. What we 'call' such a course of action is not relevant to the normative force you want to impart to it. — Isaac

I can't make out the point of your post. As to "normative force," try the excerpt above in the post to Banno.

It would seem that life is essentially purposeful. That reason is the best guide to realizing that purpose. That freedom, rightly understood, is the necessary condition for realizing it. That reverence for self and others is part of the guidance. And that anything that constrains, impairs, distracts from that freedom makes that person less free.

But a life is also like a tool. To be used because used or not, it will soon enough fail. Rust or rot if unused, or in use worn out, worn away. And this just the question of best use.

I want to return to the OP. It suggests that systems of rights do not determine what is right or wrong. Rights therefore only function for legal purposes as principles for resolving disputes and interpretation of laws. Therefore if you tell someone "Don't do that, it's wrong!" they cannot defend their actions by replying "I have the right to do it!" — Garth

Seems to me about right. One might pause over the multiple meanings of "right" in play here. And to be sure, sometimes people correctly defend their actions by affirming that law notwithstanding, they do in fact have the right in question, the law being wrong. It's the difference between proscriptive/prescriptive, proactive/reactive, before-/after-the-fact. Applications of law need particulars, the what happened; moral prescriptions usually more general, the what should happen out of what could happen.

Kant's term is maxims, which I understand to be general rules. One tries to discern the right general rule under which to subsume some action, which makes the enterprise more art than science, with a premium on an unscientific good will. And Kant makes explicit that contradictory maxims cannot be in play. One makes a determination in favour of the better and any others fall away.

None of this to be confused with, or have anything to do with, so-called "freedoms" and "rights" more properly called license, even liberty, or just unrestrained capability. Under these, I am free and have rights to commit any crime at all - until stopped, but more usually just to waste my life and all its possibilities.

Metaphorically, Kant's arguments are like a microscope through which he examines and explicates a complex piece of machinery, the arguments powerful lenses in careful alignment. And if one does not understand the purposes or operations of such a microscope, the how it works or what for, or fails to align his or her eye with the eyepiece, or has the lenses out of alignment, then nothing will be seen. But these matters being in order, the view is clear and what is seen relatively simple, and even seeming obvious.

I can't make out the point of your post. As to "normative force," — tim wood

You say

I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. — tim wood

Your argument is essentially. ..

-By Kant's definition of freedom, riding without a helmet is not freedom.

-We all think freedom is a good thing.

-We should therefore not ride motorbikes without helmets.

But you equivocate on the meaning of freedom between the first and second point. If riding a motorbike without a helmet is not freedom as Kant defines it then the only thing that follows from that is that we should not ride motorbikes without helmets if we value freedom as Kant defines it.

Since it is nowhere shown why we should do so, nor empirically demonsrated that such a value is likely to be one we all hold, the conclusion has no normative force.

Imo, yours the exact right kind of post that should appear on TPF. Short, concise, sharp, substantive - I appreciate it! Now the ball in my court, if I can hit it back. I won't do as good a job as you.

I do not know what normative force (NF) is, but maybe we don't need to go that way. I will assume there is such a thing, and that it is somehow, someway, more compelling than mere collective agreement. So, would you allow that arithmetic has NF? the idea being that if NF, then relativism is ruled out.

And let's block here any form of nihilism. He or she can deny up is up or down is down, represent that up is down, or say that 2+2=5. But the nihilist annihilates truth, and in this truth is presupposed. Our job then, as best we can, to identify it, and to satisfy ourselves that what we think is true, actually is; and then to see if in virtue of being true it possesses NF.

The shortest reply is that there are things we should do. But if left at that, I fear you might want to beat me about the head and shoulders with a stick. Not because you would do that, but because that is how I sometimes feel when I'm told what I should do. But at the same time would you agree that such a response has more to do with the messenger than the message?

Let's then set aside anger and indeed all feeling in the face of the should. No doubt feeling can add verisimilitude, but is itself an imitation of NF. What is left? I find reason. Do you find anything different? And reason must be before experience, because experience cannot create reason, though it may instruct it.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident." We had better, or we hold no truths to be evident at all. But what are they? Kant answers comprehensively and at length, in different places and ways, and to bring that here is like emptying a lake with a bucket. We can sample it, but for immersion you have to go there.

Some of what follows may be quotes; none of the sense is original with me, though I may add a twist.
1) Mankind alone is free.
2) Mankind alone can make moral choices.
3) Reason alone is the original source of moral choices.
4) Morality is the ability to discern and distinguish the right, and to choose accordingly.
5) Humanity, in self and community, has value (or it has no value).
6) Life in itself has value (or it has no value).
7) The right is in accordance with a reverence for life and humanity.
8) In order to act morally, one must be free to act.
9) Duty is the obligation to act in accordance with morality.
10) Realization of purpose under morality is the highest aim of mankind.
11) It follows, then, that moral actions are the only actions of moral worth, that they fall under duty, and that to act in accordance with them requires freedom, and that to the extent that freedom is diminished, the individual is not free.
----

I think a modern understanding of animals differs from and is more expansive than Kant's, but he observed our obligations, duties, to animals "are" indirect duties toward mankind.

Life ends in death, and risk a part of life. Being unavoidable, the right and wrong of actions including risk-taking become a matter of proportion. The helmetless rider in traffic harms no one, until he is subject to the routine accident that every experienced rider assumes, knows, will happen sooner or later. But for the helmetless rider, the accident that may have just scraped some denim and maybe some skin, that he should bounce up and walk away from, is instead death, whether a living death or a dead death. At the least is a devastated family. And nearby is a rehabilitation hospital that takes on brain-injury cases, and that care is so long and expensive only the state and federal government can afford it, i.e., me for sure and maybe you!

The helmetless spirit inhabits every level where there is ignorance or stupidity. And in a crowding world, mere personal moral failure becomes offense in fact.

I do not know what normative force (NF) is, but maybe we don't need to go that way. I will assume there is such a thing, and that it is somehow, someway, more compelling than mere collective agreement. So, would you allow that arithmetic has NF? the idea being that if NF, then relativism is ruled out. — tim wood

My bad. By normative force I simply mean something like persuasive power with regards to action - ie the the difference between saying to someone "you ought not do x" and "you ought not do x because...". the degree to which the 'because...' is persuasive is the normative force of the statement.

And let's block here any form of nihilism. He or she can deny up is up or down is down, represent that up is down, or say that 2+2=5. But the nihilist annihilates truth, and in this truth is presupposed. Our job then, as best we can, to identify it, and to satisfy ourselves that what we think is true, actually is; and then to see if in virtue of being true it possesses NF. — tim wood

I think you make a false dichotomy between nihilism and rationally derived truth, There are other values than rationally derived truth which might give normative force to a statement. for example "If you don't do X no-one will like you" has normative force because (generally) we want to be liked. Us generally wanting to be liked is an empirical observation and anyone denying it would have quite a job of persuasion, so there's little risk of nihilism, but nor is there a rational argument there as to why we 'ought' to want to be liked - we just do. That's why, when I said about your argument having normative force I offered two courses - the rational argument, or the appeal to some value we're likely to hold commonly.

No doubt feeling can add verisimilitude, but is itself an imitation of NF. What is left? I find reason. Do you find anything different? And reason must be before experience, because experience cannot create reason — tim wood

I'm not sure where you're getting this line of argument from, it seems to have no basis that we might share (or are you simply trying to establish that basis?). In the latter case then I'm afraid we do not have common ground from which to argue because I disagree with your axiom here. I believe 'reason' is simply a habit of thinking which has proven useful. The 'proven useful' part is experience. We think in such algorithms as show that 2+2=4 simply because such methods yield useful results, not because such thinking methods are somehow hard-wired into the universe (though they may be somewhat hard-wired into us).

"We hold these truths to be self-evident." We had better, or we hold no truths to be evident at all. — tim wood

Agreed. But it is absolutely evident that we do not all hold the same truths to be self-evident. That there is a need to hold something as self evident to avoid nihilism cannot be held up as an argument in support of any specific such something. Support for some particular something (truth held as self-evident) might come from psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion...but it cannot come from rational argument because rational argument must always take a premise and show a conclusion. If the conclusion is "X should be taken as self-evident" what would the premise there be?

We can sample it, but for immersion you have to go there. — tim wood

It's hard to tell if you're claiming these as empirical observations or rational conclusions. If the latter, the question is the same for each - what is the premise from which you derive these as conclusions? As the former they fail spectacularly in terms of support.

1) Mankind alone is free - we have no reason to believe this. We feel like we're free, but then we also find ourselves making decisions we later which we'd given more thought to, anden masse we seem to make some incredibly self-defeating choices. The jury is very much still out as to how 'free' we are.

2) Mankind alone can make moral choices - The jury is not even really still out on this one. Majority opinion is that at least great apes have morality that is biologically indistinguishable from our own. I can provide citations if you're interested.

3) Reason alone is the original source of moral choices - Again, not even up for debate really. FMRI scan show moral decisions being made involving areas of the brain at times completely separate from those involved in rational decisions. We unequivocally do not make moral decisions solely by rational thought. again, if you require citations I can provide them

4) Morality is the ability to discern and distinguish the right, and to choose accordingly - Yes, I think that's a good working definition.

5) Humanity, in self and community, has value (or it has no value) - Yep, no argument there either.

6) Life in itself has value (or it has no value) - Again, agreed.

7) The right is in accordance with a reverence for life and humanity - It certainly seems to be, but consider acts of bravery in war, these may well involve killing an 'enemy'. I think reverence for life and humanity is part of it, but it's complicated in times of conflict.

8) In order to act morally, one must be free to act - Not so sure on this one. There does seem to be some necessity to have free choice (if we're forced to do a 'good' thing, that is rarely seen as virtuous), but I'd be sceptical that a definition requires us to know the 'true' extent of someone's freedom. Were that the case we'd never be able to properly use the word. It must be sufficient that there's a general appearance of freedom (ie no-one's putting a gun to your head). I see no reason why that need extend to the absence of psychological drives to act. Such drives are, after all, just as much part of 'us' as our rational thoughts.

9) Duty is the obligation to act in accordance with morality - Seems like another good working definition.


10) Realization of purpose under morality is the highest aim of mankind - Empirically difficult to see how this is true. as a rational conclusion it requires a jump from identifying that which is moral to identifying an absence of other equally pressing objectives - something you've not yet done.

The helmetless rider in traffic harms no one, until he is subject to the routine accident that every experienced rider assumes, knows, will happen sooner or later. But for the helmetless rider, the accident that may have just scraped some denim and maybe some skin, that he should bounce up and walk away from, is instead death, whether a living death or a dead death. At the least is a devastated family. And nearby is a rehabilitation hospital that takes on brain-injury cases, and that care is so long and expensive only the state and federal government can afford it, i.e., me for sure and maybe you!

The helmetless spirit inhabits every level where there is ignorance or stupidity. And in a crowding world, mere personal moral failure becomes offense in fact. — tim wood

Right - so this ^ is all what I mean by post hoc rationalisation. Nothing you've said here is false, but it is 'selected' to achieve an end (helmetless riding is bad, helmeted riding is not). Where, in your assessment of potential harms is the particulate pollution that even helmeted riding produces - arguably more damaging than the occasional motorcycle accident? Where the risk to other road users simply by virtue of unnecessary travel - all motorised vehicles are dangerous, the leading cause of death in many places? Where the harm caused simply by buying the bike - unfair working practices, modern slavery derived components...? I could go on.

The point is simply that regardless of our conclusions about the flaws or otherwise in your moral framework, it is without a doubt that it's application is post hoc - you already know what sorts of things you'd' like to turn out to be 'right' and which you'd like to turn out to be 'wrong'. They're generally the things which seem good to you. I can guarantee you that if a moral algorithm ever produced the result that you should murder your wife you simply wouldn't do it, you'd presume you'd made a mistake somewhere. Why? Because you already know it's wrong. It's not like maths. I have no feeling about the 'right' answer to a complicated sum, but I already know which answers to complicated moral dilemmas feel wrong.

I can guarantee you that if a moral algorithm ever produced the result that you should murder your wife you simply wouldn't do it, you'd presume you'd made a mistake somewhere. Why? Because you already know it's wrong. — Isaac

Not quite, and being not quite, not at all. "Murder" would never be moral. As to killing, it's conceivable that she should be killed, but not that I should do it. The reason being that marriage is a peculiar, unique contract - if married you'll understand, if not, probably not. But this does not preclude the possibility of the necessity of my doing it - but in that case not a should.

We're in a taffy pull with 400 lbs. of taffy, you pulling one way, me another, to see who gets the biggest piece - and I want it all. But mastering so much taffy is its own problem, and if we don't reduce the amount, it will grow and overmaster us. So lets join forces in at least this regard, to try to keep the discussion lean and as simple as possible, and to keep in mind our ultimate goal as shared understanding and truth seeking (and my getting all the taffy).

I did not intend the helmetless rider as a destination, but rather as way-point and directional sign. But if we can generalize him, perhaps as HR, he'll do. A qualification: we all do ignorant things; that's the human condition. And if we persist in them, that's the stupid condition - this definitional, and also imo correct.

What does HR do? He puts me at disproportionate risk of damage, harm, injury, death. No one claims that risk in itself is wrong; as we both have noted, life is risk and then we die. The issue of proportion then matters.

There are other values than rationally derived truth which might give normative force to a statement. for example "If you don't do X no-one will like you" has normative force because (generally) we want to be liked. — Isaac

I acknowledge, but if this is NF, then I have to exclude it. The reason being that in liking or wanting, to that extent we're not free, but rather subject-to. A matter of having a liberty. Agreed, the word "freedom" is commonly used here, and well-understood, but it cannot stand because it's a contrary to the freedom Kant has in mind.

That is, if you're going to argue that moral freedom includes the ability to determine the moral action on the basis of what you like or don't like, then we're irreconcilable (as to the idea in question, but I certainly have my likes and dislikes too). And this would become my effort to convince you of your errors, you resisting. And of course, you relying on what you want and like, my efforts DOA.

This certainly not a complete answer to yours, but as far as this goes, are we on common ground?

My only objection is regarding the title itself, Freedom AND Duty for it's a contradiction. Freedom means we're is at liberty to do whatever we want but duty implies that we're not. An odd couple these two.

Freedom means one is at liberty to do whatever we want — TheMadFool

Depends on "want." I want my coffee in the morning. I am "at liberty" to get it, and "free" to choose my means. But am I free wrt to the having of it? Not really. Fortunately for me no question of duty that I know of arises directly out of my having my coffee. But if I move 3,000 lbs. of steel, burning non-renewable fossil fuels, taking the time for a 12 miles round-trip, contributing my increment to the dangers of the road, which in the presence of snow and ice are not trivial, for cup of expensive bitter-flavored hot water, am I being a reasonable man? What say you?

Yep.

freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. — tim wood

Odd.

Tell me you do not understand Kant, or have no exposure to his thinking, or not read any of him, that in sum you actually do not understand this thread.

The point that I, @Isaac and @TheMadFool have made remains: You are not using Freedom in the same way as the rest of us. Your account is therefore irrelevant to discussions of freedom per se.

All you have done is define freedom as doing one's duty, then claimed that freedom is doing one's duty. Trivial and irrelevant.

Which means that you do not understand this thread. But let me see if I have a sense of what you mean: Banno, "I can wave my arms around, therefore I am and must be free!"

In the ballpark? Yes? No?

You're again avoiding the issue.

Depends on "want." I want my coffee in the morning. I am "at liberty" to get it, and "free" to choose my means. But am I free wrt to the having of it? Not really. Fortunately for me no question of duty that I know of arises directly out of my having my coffee. But if I move 3,000 lbs. of steel, burning non-renewable fossil fuels, taking the time for a 12 miles round-trip, contributing my increment to the dangers of the road, which in the presence of snow and ice are not trivial, for cup of expensive bitter-flavored hot water, am I being a reasonable man? What say you? — tim wood

Why can't you just say that freedom - being able to do whatever we want - is either an impediment or an obstruction for the good, that duty - being unable to do whatever we want - is what defines the good?

In a Kantian universe good means certain morally meaningful duties, obligations to either perform or not perform certain actions but we're completely free with respect to whether we accept to live by this Kantian moral code or not.

Thus, to append to what you said, and I quote, "freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty (OR NOT)".

It's kinda like having the freedom to either become a member or not become a member of a club (the Kantian club) but once you're a member you have to follow the rules (Kantian duties). :chin:

The only issue is that you don't like the way Kant understands freedom, and you refuse to address it while at the same claiming he's wrong. In short, you're just being annoying, and, you have still made zero positive, useful, or constructive comment here. Ok, fine, you're right and the rest of the world is wrong. Now you're famous, and that and a dollar will buy you a cup of coffee at some gas stations. So I request you spare yourself the trouble of wasting your own time and mine, and go write somewhere else. And if' you're moved to make any positive contribution, we'll see how that goes, but at the moment you've got nothing. .

but we're completely free with respect to.... — TheMadFool

with respect to anything you can conceive of that you can do, according to you. But it's interesting that you refuse to consider Kant, insisting that your understanding of "freedom" is all there is. And especially weird from Banno who has made clear he doesn't like. definitions and thinks they derail discussion.

Two points: 1) Kant thought rather a lot about freedom and morality, and him being among the twelve strongest thinkers in the history of the planet it seems at best ignorantly cavalier to call him wrong out of hand. And 2) I don't see where he's wrong, but rather by my lights right.

I've acknowledged that the word freedom has various usages; I think Kant's is the ultimately correct usage. In any case his arguments are in terms of his usage. If you think he's wrong make your case and quit with the word games - but you will have to have some understanding of him first.

It appears your use of freedom is confined to just raw capacity. By that do you mean that I am free to commit any crime or horror or bad thing conceivable? That's a narrow understanding of freedom if it's yours.

You argue that freedom means being free to accept or decline Kantian understandings. You are also free to suppose 2+2=5 and deny it equals 4. But you know too much arithmetic for that, so you don't. Try knowing a little more Kant.