Compatibilism is the only thing that makes sense of code law because, even if code law is predicated upon free choice, choices are, factually, not genuinely free much of the time.

If our application of code law, in order to not succumb to external causation, must be predicated on free choice (something I tried to demonstrate here:https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9908/all-that-matters-is-choice), and not every relevant choice is free, then it seems to me that code law would need to take into account external factors. Even if one doesn't assume determinism, it seems that even choices that are purported to be free of external causation really aren’t totally free. If a man robs a liquor store to get money to satisfy his son’s insatiable appetite for jalapeno laden cheesesteaks, he wouldn’t have done it if not for his son’s insatiable appetite for jalapeno laden cheesesteaks. This external appetite contributed to the action, and, thus, while maybe he had the opportunity to choose otherwise, the appetite affects the choice, making it not a genuinely free choice.

Since code law must be predicated entirely upon genuine free choice in order to be applied without respect to external causation there is a contradiction; there are without a doubt mostly or wholly unfree choices that result in actions that result in very specific laws being broken. Thus, code law must either necessarily preclude genuine free choice, or take into account proximate, external causes for non-arbitrary, non-random choices. If it precludes genuine free choice, people’s choices are the result of external factors and they couldn't have chosen otherwise, and, thus, they cannot be held responsible for their actions. The escape hatch is to assert that only the freedom to act exists, but, even then, genuine free choice is precluded; external, proximate factors affecting the choice would remain.