Yes, we learn rules from their linguistic expression. If one simply observed an activity and made up so-called "rules" to follow, from the observations, in order to engage in that activity, this would not be a case of learning rules, it would be a case of making up so-called "rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

How is language use any different to these sorts of rule-governed activities? Language use is itself an activity that we are taught how to do, with rules to follow about how to do it properly (or adequately, at least).

Consider the difference Wittgenstein describes between thinking oneself to be following a rule, and to be actually following a rule. Think of this as a part of Wittgenstein's definition of "rule", as a restriction placed on the word's usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can this be a definition (or part of a definition) of the word "rule"? "Rule" means actually following a "rule"?

The meaning of the word is an explanation of its use. Explaining a particular use of a word is describing a rule for its use; describing how the word is used by (e.g.) English speakers. To repeat, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

If actually following a rule is "part of Wittgenstein's definition" of the word "rule", then you acknowledge that a word's definition is initimately linked with the activity of language use; that there are right and wrong ways to use words (or to make sense using words). According to Wittgenstein, "For a large class of cases...the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (PI 43)

I have seen no acceptable logic which leads to this conclusion, and I see no evidence of learning rules in early childhood learning of language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course you have, except that you are blinded by a particular definition of "rule" which you think requires that it must be expressed in language.

I see that people only learn rules after they learn language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using language is following rules. Perhaps you are thinking of language only as some abstract entity, forgetting that we physically use it and are taught the principles governing its use.

If you truly believe this, then you ought to be able to provide some examples. Show me some rules, or even a rule, which is not expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want me to express in language that which I am saying needn't be expressed in language, thereby proving your point that rules are only expressed in language? Okay I'll try. Off the top of my head:

Corporate culture is an understood set of behaviours which are often not explicitly expressed in language. That's one example. Also, rules and laws are often made explicit only after there has been some transgression of the implicit, understood principles of conduct. There's also pets. Sometimes we train pets to respond to particular verbal commands. We might say that our pet understands to do (or not do) something, or behave a certain way, even though the pet doesn't speak English, and we might never make the rule explicit - to the pet - in English. We might instead train the pet to follow rules only with food rewards or verbal reprimands. Finally, there is language itself. When children are trained how to use language, they learn "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure" for the activity of language use, which is a definition of "rule(s)". Obviously, children don't already know the principles that govern (i.e. the rules of) speaking English before they learn how to speak English.

Mentality is whatever you think it is, and from which whether images are part and parcel of it, is then determinable. We are not saying imagination, because we already said mentality. If it was the ability to bring up images, then they are presupposed and the question remains as to their part and parcel. — Antony Nickles

I have the feeling if this is not just a trap, it is a guessing game or riddle; which, of course, I can't help but play/try to solve. If calling up an image has to be accepted as essential to "mentality", and it is not related to imagination, then... mentality is the group of stuff you can do by yourself, like talking, remembering? I feel like this is too trivial to be right.

I discovered where you got your writing style. — Mww

Ohhhh, found out! Yes, I have read too much Cavell. The reason I picked that up is that I find it respectful and an acknowledgement that this is a claim on you, not an explanation/statement, and there is the possibility I have not got it right and there might be additional evidence to be considered (but specifically not that I can take it however I want for any purpose).

after dropping out all those stupefying cogito interruptus parentheticals — Mww

Tangential to the extreme. I've found the point is that part of philosophy is listening to what interests you, and another point is that this is not a theory so much as an investigation, one that opens avenues for further inquiry, so there are a lot of questions left unanswered, which is separately an essential part of OLP: that you answer the questions Witt etc. asks, for yourself, to see what they are seeing for yourself (what Grammar is shown be the examples).

“...And what we mean (...) to say, like what we mean (...) to do, is something we are responsible for....”, pg 197

.... is merely a reiteration of that which has always been the case, long before this article was written, because the rules for what is meant by what is said, are never simultaneously established in the saying, but already completely established beforehand in the relation between the words said and the conceptions thought, from which they arise. — Mww

I'll let the formulation of Grammar as "rules" go for now, and say I agree that Grammar has been established beforehand (as part of learning and joining society), though "completely" is also a bit far, as seeing that "we are responsible for" "the saying" does play an extra part because, once said/done, we are bound to our expressing, acting, "responsible for" having said it, for answering why, how, among all the possibilities and among what part of the context is important, we said this now, here--we are called out by it, seen in it. And also to point out that Witt and Austin's goal is that our lives ([all] our judgements, distinctions, interests, in this language-game) are attuned to these words (concepts**), not that words "arise" from "concepts" (as in "ideas" I would guess) which are thought (casually, or otherwise). Witt's idea of "concepts"** (completely different) is a grouping of regular and complex parts of our lives (language games) like justice, meaning, understanding, but also, forgiving, threatening, sitting in a chair, pointing, learning a series, seeing, seeing an aspect, and that each of these have their own Grammar (roughly, ways they work, as they are part of our lives); the point being that an investigation of those shows us something about our philosophical issues (not to justify those claims, again, as it were, like Cavell says).

And to which the question regarding images becomes its most relevant. — Mww

And here I think I can say that if the idea that I am guessing as the answer to the riddle--of "concepts" being thought (then?) turned into words--is what you mean by "mentality', then I would say Witt is trying to diagnose the reason people are drawn to that picture by showing how public "meaning" and language are, and how "understanding" is relational (see comments above) at a point where knowledge reaches its limits.

Rorty is the only one here that really makes sense as having 'learned from' OLP – many of these guys probably hadn't even read it or weren't aware of it. — Snakes Alive

They didn’t have to read it to have absorbed the essence of its advances. Do you think that olp’s ideas are proprietary, that they don’t belong to larger movements in philosophy that includes hermeneutics , phenomenology, pragmatism, constructivism, social constructionism, philosophy of science?

I have no interest in 'team continental' versus 'team analytic' nonsense, which this post smacks of. — Snakes Alive

My post smacks of a respect for continental as well as any other style of philosophizing that can offer important ways to understand ourselves, which is why I don’t limit myself to one particular strand. My ‘team’ is all of the above. The list I offer includes writers who integrate insights from many disciples and styles of philosophy.
I particularly recommend Zahavi, Ratcliffe and Gallagher , all of whom are thoroughly versed in Wittgenstein as well as analytic approaches, pragmatism and hermeneutics, and combine all these with the work of Husserl, Merelau-Ponty and Heidegger in order to arrive at vital new models in cognitive science pertaining to the understanding of affect , psychopathology , intersubjectivity and perception.
So in that spirit I’m hoping you’ll reconsider your claim that philosophy is no better now than it was before olp.
You have a passion for olp writers. Why not expand your horizons and explore a new generation of thinkers taking the next step.

This is totally off-topic and has nothing to do with the thread. No one asked you for a list of philosophers you happen to like, which is all this amounts to. If you have something to contribute on the topic, then I'll respond, but this is just not it.

I have 'expanded my horizons' – I'm talking about OLP in this thread because that is what the thread is about, not because, somehow, that's the only thing I ever managed to read.

They didn’t have to read it to have absorbed the essence of its advances. Do you think that olp’s ideas are proprietary, that they don’t belong to larger movements in philosophy that includes hermeneutics , phenomenology, pragmatism, constructivism, social constructionism, philosophy of science? — Joshs

I think that, in a thread about OLP, coming in and listing a bunch of random philosophers who never engaged with it and have nothing in particular to do with it is not helpful – to claim that they somehow assimilated all of its points without being aware of it is then absurd. Philosophical movements are contingent historical things, and you can't magically grasp them without engaging with them. And no, what goes under the moniker of 'OLP' is not just Wittgenstein, which your post heavily implies.

This is totally off-topic and has nothing to do with the thread. No one asked you for a list of philosophers you happen to like, which is all this amounts to. — Snakes Alive

More off-topic than this?

I don't think philosophy died – it just went on doing pretty much what it did before when people got bored of one way of doing it and moved on. It's a matter of historical contingency and fashion. It’s not any better now than it was then, though. — Snakes Alive

I think that, in a thread about OLP, coming in and listing a bunch of random philosophers who never engaged with it and have nothing in particular to do with it is not helpful — Snakes Alive

No, it would be terribly unhelpful. The nerve of me.
A recent paper by one of my random philosophers, Shaun Gallagher:

Doing phenomenology with words:

“Abstract
I'll argue that in some historical discussions between phenomenologists and analytic philosophers of mind we can find complementary phenomenological methods. One method follows along the line of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The other follows the kind of analysis of speech-acts, avowals and “unstudied speech” proposed by Ryle and Austin in what they called their phenomenologies of our in-the-world, enactive use of language. I propose that one might conceive of combining these methods into a 'double phenomenology’. One place where this double phenomenology can do some work is in the area of social cognition.“

http://www.ummoss.org/gall17doublePhen.pdf

Here are other philosophers on my list who have specifically engaged with Austin:

Jacques Derrida : Signature Event Context
Matthew Ratcliffe:Trauma, Language and Trust

Philosophers who engaged with Wittgenstein:

Jean Francois Lyotard: The Differend ( the book is centrally influenced by Wittgenstein)
Eugene Gendlin: What Happens When Wittgenstein Asks "What Happens When ...?
Dan Zahavi: Expression and Empathy

Philosophical movements are contingent historical things, and you can't magically grasp them without engaging with them. — Snakes Alive

I think you’re wrong about that. I read Wittgenstein and olp after having read phenomenology and deconstruction, and concluded that the essential ideas of Witt, Austin and Ryle (not the details of methodology of course ) were not only pre-supposed by those approaches, but the phenomenological and deconstructive perspectives thought more radically about the basis of language than olp did.

This article is not about OLP.

This article is not about OLP. — Snakes Alive

I sent the link to the OP of this thread a few weeks ago, and he seemed quite enthusiastic about reading it. In fact , we debated a number of the authors on my list with regard to their engagement with, or critique of, olp. So if the OP thought it was worth his time to engage in lengthy discussion with me on his thread on these issues, maybe you should take a hint.

Well, I just did read it. It's about the Royaumont Meeting of 1958, the division between analytic and continental philosophy, and the extent to which analytics may have been, or could be construed as, sympathetic to phenomenology or engaging in it.

but the phenomenological and deconstructive perspectives thought more radically about the basis of language than olp did. — Joshs

Again, I don't care that you prefer some philosophers over others, or thought they were super deep or whatever. It's just not relevant to the thread. Nor is the fact that at some points in history, some continental philosophers have engaged with or cited some analytic philosophers.

If you want to start talking about why you think these connections are appropriate, citing the works and how they interact, in a way that demonstrates you know what you're talking about, I'd be game. As of now, you're again, as Banno mentioned earlier in the thread, just making this about a random handful of philosophers who happen to be your favorites. But no one cares who happen to be your favorites.

Much of OLP was, and I think should still be seen, as destructive to philosophy, and is a matter of 'seeing through' it. — Snakes Alive

There is much made of some OLP philosophers, Moore, Austin, etc., taking OLP as solving skepticism. And some who take Witt as either solving it or making analytic philosophy a confusion that can and should be undone (permanantly), as I believe is Rorty's stance. But I think Cavell is on to something when he talks about "the truth of skepticism", which builds on Witt's seeing the limits of knowledge (and thus our responsibility), which also is a thread which bridges the gap between analytical and continental philosophy (as everything is not explained through manipulating a general theory of language/knowledge). I do believe the methods and revelations of OLP are capatible with traditional philosophy (taking the good from the bad).

For me it clicked with Cavell's Knowing and Acknowledging, which I've just realized, references Malcolm.

Suppose we're going through the forest and we hear rustling, so we go to investigate. We look beyond and in a clearing there's an animal. We are close enough to see it perfectly clearly. You say it's a wolf, and I say it's a fox. When you protest, I ask, how can that possibly be a wolf? It looks and acts like a fox – it has all the features typically associated with a fox. But you protest, and say 'I grant you that – it has all the characteristics of what we would normally call a fox. Nevertheless, it is a wolf.' — Snakes Alive

This records the fact that traditional philosophy strips away our ordinary criteria and any context in the attempt to generalize for universality and ensure certainty by fixing the picture of language, even with identity for particulars (Austin works very hard picking out Goldfinches). The step we really run into trouble with is the need for justification that it is a "real" fox.

This records the fact that traditional philosophy strips away our ordinary criteria and any context in the attempt to generalize for universality and ensure certainty by fixing the picture of language, even with identity for particulars (Austin works very hard picking out Goldfinches). The step we really run into trouble with is the need for justification that it is a "real" fox. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I think for the most part philosophy is bad inquiry, and bad inquiry is often mistaken for deep inquiry. Realizing this often causes philosophers to panic and ask after the conditions of good inquiry. What makes OLP interesting is the realization that these conditions are tied to conventions of language use in a certain way, since philosophy is primarily a conversational enterprise.

I think we just don't know very much about how to think well, or how our languages work. A major part of that is out not understanding the way that the conditions under which we ask questions affects their intelligibility and the truth of their potential answers. In this respect, it's the radical pragmatists like Travis that carry on the OLP legacy, if anyone. Philosophy itself as a first-order discipline is fairly tedious to me at this point, because once you see through its small bag of tricks you recognize them everywhere, and you can't be duped anymore The OLP philosophers are in large part responsible for that kind of realization (though the positivists and some others helped, and I imagine, though I have not personally witnessed, that you could traverse the same path by Kantian means) – it only has any interest, for me, as something to be studied anthropologically, as a clue as to human cognition and its weird quirks and defects.

Is OLP still alive and kicking? I have read that Searle is the last proponent of OLP. I admittedly don't know much about OLP or ILP

How is language use any different to these sorts of rule-governed activities? — Luke

In rule governed activities, if I have any doubts about what I ought or ought not do, I can consult the rules. I see a semblance of rules for mathematics and logic, and some sketchy ambiguous rules for reading and writing. But although I can find a little guidance on pronunciation, I really can't find any comprehensive set of rules for talking, which constitutes the majority of language use. In my experience, I see that people learn to talk, and do so adequately without reference to rules. And if I have doubts about how to express what I want from someone else, there are no rules for me to refer to. That is how language use is different from a rule-governed activity. For the majority of its activities there are no rules to consult if one has doubts about what ought or ought not be done, but a rule-governed activity has rules which can be consulted.

Explaining a particular use of a word is describing a rule for its use; — Luke

This is what is known in philosophy as a category mistake. You are talking about "a particular" and you switch it for a general, "rule". To explain a particular use of a word requires a description which is designed for the uniqueness of that particular instance of use. And this cannot be done through reference to a general rule. The general rule will not distinguish that particular instance of use from another, and therefore will not explain the meaning which is specific to the particular context.

This is exactly why language cannot be a rule-governed activity. Each instance of language use occurs in a particular and unique set of circumstances, and the meaning must be designed, created, for that specific context. General rules cannot give us what is required for creating meaning which is designed for the peculiar, unique, features of the particular circumstances. Nor can general rules therefore, explain a particular use of a word. To explain any particular instance of use of a word we must refer to the particularities of the context in which it was used, because the meaning was designed in relation to that context. General rules are insufficient.

Corporate culture is an understood set of behaviours which are often not explicitly expressed in language. — Luke

This is meaningless babble to me. I have no idea what you mean by "corporate culture", or "understood set of behaviours". But I'll repeat what I said already, a pattern of occurrences does not constitute a rule. It is the description of those occurrences which is the rule. So "understood set of behaviours" refers to description, in words, and therefore is expressed in language, despite what you assert.

Also, rules and laws are often made explicit only after there has been some transgression of the implicit, understood principles of conduct. — Luke

So let's see what you're saying here. I am doing something you dislike, then you state a rule to prevent me from doing it, and you present me with that rule. Now you want to argue that I was knowingly breaking the rule before you even presented me with the rule. Your claim that I understood the principles of conduct before you presented me with the rule is imaginary fiction. "Implication" requires logic, which requires stated premises. So there is no such thing as "implicit" rules without language.

There's also pets. Sometimes we train pets to respond to particular verbal commands. We might say that our pet understands to do (or not do) something, or behave a certain way, even though the pet doesn't speak English, and we might never make the rule explicit - to the pet - in English. — Luke

To "understand" does not require following a rule. You are simply begging the question, assuming that one cannot understand without following a rule. To understand requires some sort of empathy. The nature of this, identifying with the other, I have been discussing with Josh, but it really cannot be characterized as following rules. I described my experience of understanding another as presuming to allow the other's intention to become my own, such that I do what I think the other wants me to. The fact that it is presuming allows for the reality of misunderstanding. You might think that it's odd to believe that a dog or cat has intention, and that it allows my intention to become its own, and that's why it does what I want it to do, but it's no odder than believing that such animals "understand", and clearly these animals act with purpose.

Finally, there is language itself. When children are trained how to use language, they learn "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure" for the activity of language use, which is a definition of "rule(s)". Obviously, children don't already know the principles that govern (i.e. the rules of) speaking English before they learn how to speak English. — Luke

That a person behaves in an habitual way does not demonstrate that they have learned "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure". If this were true, then we'd have to conclude that birds, insects, and probably even single celled beings have learned the regulations governing conduct and procedure.

Of course you have, except that you are blinded by a particular definition of "rule" which you think requires that it must be expressed in language. — Luke

It's an inductive conclusion. All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. I've already invited you to disprove this principle, and I'm still waiting, as your attempts seem to have failed. Until you provide that proof, I'll adhere to my reasoning.

Not really – it's more that as a strand of philosophy it's been subsumed into the larger analytic ethos. There are a few defenders of the approach left, like Oswald Hanfling and Avner Baz, and you could say that Charles Travis and so on are doing something similar. But it's more used as an accusation than anything (to be an 'ordinary language philosopher' is like being a 'behaviorist' or a 'positivist,' etc. – it means you're wrong).

Recently Nat Hansen made the case that certain strands of experimental philosophy were in effect doing a contemporary ordinary language philosophy, but I don't really buy it.

I'll let the formulation of Grammar as "rules" go for now, and say I agree that Grammar has been established beforehand (as part of learning and joining society), though "completely" is also a bit far, as seeing that "we are responsible for" "the saying" does play an extra part because, once said/done, we are bound to our expressing, acting, "responsible for" having said it, for answering why, how, among all the possibilities and among what part of the context is important, we said this now, here--we are called out by it, seen in it. — Antony Nickles

“Completely” wouldn’t be a bit too far, if there is a time frame earlier than, or in addition to, learning and joining society. It seems to me, that if the onus is on each of us to take responsibility in the saying, if we are “bound to our expressing”, we’d want something more authoritative than the meager accolades of society. That which merely assuages the ego, as in, “Hey, you expressed that correctly! Good for you!!”, comfortably disguised as “Ok, fine; you’re playing by the rules”....isn’t the taking of responsibility. Yours is the beforehand as part of learning/joining, but with no true account of the extra part of being bound by the responsibility in expression because of agreement with the rules.

Your form of OLP wants to turn what it looks at as learning/joining, into rote instruction. There should still be an account for how learning is done. Your OLP wants to account for responsibility in expression by a subject, but doesn’t account for the authority within the same subject, by which the responsibility is obtained. It follows that the rules are contained in the subject, antecedent to, and hence authority for, any expression whatsoever.

What your OLP doesn’t understand is that rules are a euphemism in the accounting for language. The brain doesn’t use rules; they only appear in the discussion of the brain’s activity. It shouldn’t be a contention that whenever language is in use, something necessary is occurring beforehand. Otherwise, we are nothing but mere playback machines, to which, of course, responsibility in expression cannot pertain.

There is absolutely nothing whatsoever contained in “Finnegan’s Wake” relating to particle physics, but Gell-Mann named the first-ever exposition of a particular member of it, a “quark”. Point being, no matter the word, somebody somewhere at some time, determined its relation, and that determination had nothing to do with learning or joining society, but rather, contributed to a society for its members to learn.

But I get it, honest, I do. There are immeasurably more people these days, so few new experiences, so few new words. Everybody uses the same words, but with uncommon intimations, which facilitates an examination of the expressive ambiguities of the many at the exclusion of the compositional certainty of the one. Just beats the hell outa me how so much emphasis can be attributed to that which takes no account of its fundamental conditions. Incredible waste of time and effort, I must say.
————

And to which the question regarding images becomes its most relevant.
— Mww

And here I think I can say that if the idea that I am guessing as the answer to the riddle.... — Antony Nickles

See what I mean? What I posed as just a simple question, you turned into a riddle. There is no reason to do that, there’s no hint in being a mere question that there is a disguised sublimity contained in it. You, of your own accord, before even considering a response, thought my expression as having qualities not justified by the words used in it.

I would say Witt is trying to diagnose the reason people are drawn to that picture by showing how public "meaning" and language are, and how "understanding" is relational (see comments above) at a point where knowledge reaches its limits. — Antony Nickles

People generally aren’t drawn to that picture, your “concepts" being thought (then?) turned into words”. They haven’t a clue that’s what happening, because it’s all theory. Could be no one does that. So why diagnose a reason for something that is no more than speculative theoretic?

By showing how public meaning and language are......what?

To show how understanding is relational....has already been done.

To show how understanding is relational to a point where knowledge reaches its limits.....I can’t unpack that. Knowledge has it limits, but such limits don’t have anything to do with understanding. We can understand a possibility without ever knowing the reality of it.

Witt and Austin's goal is that our lives ([all] our judgements, distinctions, interests, in this language-game) are attuned to these words (concepts**), not that words "arise" from "concepts" (as in "ideas" I would guess) which are thought (casually, or otherwise). — Antony Nickles

I understand that. Even if our lives are attuned to these words, it still would seem relevant to say where these words come from.

Witt's idea of "concepts"** (completely different) is a grouping of regular and complex parts of our lives (language games) like justice, meaning, understanding, but also, forgiving, threatening, sitting in a chair, pointing, learning a series, seeing, seeing an aspect, and that each of these have their own Grammar (roughly, ways they work, as they are part of our lives) — Antony Nickles

I don’t have a problem with calling all those things “concepts”. I would only say the objects of those concepts are what’s part of our lives. Seeing is a concept; what is seen is the object of the concept of seeing; learning is a concept, a series is the object learned about, etc.

What does the double asterisk and the (completely different) attached to “concepts” mean, from the point of view of Witt and OLP?

Have their own Grammar (roughly the way they work).....sounds an awful lot like rules to me. And we’re right back where we started.

So....nothing on images? Familiar with the science of visual thinking? From mention by Einstein, 1942 to books by Pinker, 2007, and originating as a speculative condition for human cognition, in Kant, 1781, the idea has been around quite some time. Being around much longer than OLP isn’t sufficient reason for it being better, but it is sufficient reason for OLP to account for the possible validity of it.

I think we just don't know very much about how to think well, or how our languages work. — Snakes Alive

I think seeing how our language and philosophy can get moving is a major accomplishment of OLP. And I enjoyed Heidegger's What is Called Thinking? (thinking as "being called"). The idea that thinking is more like external problem solving and about our attitude and approach (an ethical epistemology).

A major part of that is our not understanding the way that the conditions under which we ask questions affects their intelligibility and the truth of their potential answers. In this respect, it's the radical pragmatists like Travis that carry on the OLP legacy, if anyone. — Snakes Alive

It's been a while with pragmatism for me but I found it settled onto practical matters, as if philosophy's problems could be side-stepped. But I do find more of a sense of truth, and that the conditions of intelligibility are specifically under consideration, with OLP by Witt, Austin, and Cavell. And I would consider the first two as only superficially understood and thus still relevant (necessary). And the sense of hope for our providing answers for ourselves is what Cavell is doing to breath life and usefulness into philosophy (both analytical and continental--literary, film, politics, etc.)--along the lines of Emerson's call for "self-reliance".

Is OLP still alive and kicking? I have read that Searle is the last proponent of OLP. I admittedly don't know much about OLP or ILP — emancipate

Searle and Derrida talking past each other made it seem like the life was drained out of OLP. And so many of its early practitioners came to the conclusion (or were taken to, i.e., Witt) that OLP either solved or dissolved radical skepticism in showing how philosophy's singular focus on certainty and knowledge overlooks all the varied ways each of our concepts work and our part in that. I think Stanley Cavell has done the most to advance the lessons from early OLP (very effectively continuing its method at the beginning of his career).

:rofl:

Well, the Mac I use is not that antiquated, but thank you very much for that providing link.

In general, without yet having read the article you've provided(I'll report back after having read through it enough that I feel confident that I've understood it), the benefit of OLP seems to me to be two-fold. First, folk like Moore show us how certain philosophical tenets/approaches(Russell's???) lead to absurdity, such as not being able to effectively explain why we cannot say something true about ourselves like "it's raining outside, but I do not believe it", when we've no issue at all saying much the same thing about another. Or why so many people refuse to understand that simply knowing what "this is a hand" means proves beyond any reasonable doubt that there is an external world(Witt's private language argument aims at much the same thing, but he struggled with the infinite regress of justification as his remarks throughout OC show).

Another broader benefit leads us to consider specific situational circumstantial context aside from just the statements and/or words being used as a method or means to correctly translate and/or better understand another's meaningful language use. This bit has a few things in common with folk like Heiddy, as well as speech act theorists. It expands the scope of our metacognitive endeavors and considerations seeking to understand how meaning works. I understand that many reject the very notion of one single overarching theory of meaning, simply because there has yet to have been an acceptable one(one that is amenable to evolutionary progression, and is somehow relevant and/or explanatorily powerful enough to exhaust the acceptable parts of all the rest, while also being able to explain the unacceptable parts).

There are numerous papers written that show the shortcomings of conventional academic understanding when it comes to an acceptable theory of meaning. This shortfall has produced many many notions that i find personally unacceptable, but I do not want to get sidetracked here.




I'm puzzled by the lack of clear unambiguous distinction being drawn between statements and belief statements when discussing things like Moore's paradox or Gettier.

Moore's paradox shows that self-contradiction is a natural occurring limit upon our belief, and that there is a difference between accounts of belief and belief. One cannot believe that both statements are true when talking about oneself, but we've no issue believing or saying that it's raining outside but another does not believe it is(both are true regarding another).

The reason/acceptable description/explanation for this has gone largely unnoticed as best I can tell. There is a clear distinction that needs to be drawn and maintained between the truth conditions of a statement(when spoken by an individual that believes the statement) and the statement itself - when take in general - completely divorced from the individual believing speaker. Sometimes, they are remarkably different.

"It's raining outside" is a true statement if it's raining outside. "It's raining outside" is believed true if one believes that it is raining outside and knows how to talk in such a way. Thus, one cannot believe both, that "It's raining outside, and I do not believe that it is(raining outside)".

With Gettier, the difference between the truth conditions of a statement and the truth conditions of a belief(statement) expressed with the same marks is remarkably undeniably different. So, in this way, what one believes does indeed play a determinative role in what it takes for that belief to be true.

"The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" when taken as a statement of Smith's own belief has remarkable different truth conditions than that very same statement when completely divorced from Smith. When considering Smith's belief, "the man with ten coins in his pocket" is Smith himself. Smith did not get the job. Smith's belief was not true.

The same approach shows the shortcoming of "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona". When considering Smith's belief that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true, we can also confidently know that Smith does not believe that Brown is in Barcelona. Rather, if he believes the disjunction is true, it is because he believes Jones owns a Ford. The only thing that makes his belief true is if Jones owns a Ford, whereas the disjunction is true if either of the disjuncts is... again only when we take that statement completely divorced from the believing speaker.

These, and many more examples of philosophical problems are the result of not getting meaning right to begin with. Meaning arises/emerges within belief formation. Getting meaning right requires getting belief right.

So far 'we've' not.

OLP helps by virtue of expanding the focus upon more than just the words.

Meta either cannot or will not set aside his framework...
— creativesoul

I do this intentionally, to demonstrate to people like Antony who take agreement, "our coming together", "our shared lives" as a fundamental premise, that their premise is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Weird that you'd hold up a physical permanent connection such as conjoined twins as your example of what ought count as "our shared lives". Quite sad that you'd use that example to justify your claim that their premiss is false. Ironic that you'd use common language in order to do so.

Is that "ironic" in the sense of funny, and sad in the sense of distressing?
Lol, now that's irony!

Philosophy itself as a first-order discipline is fairly tedious to me at this point, because once you see through its small bag of tricks you recognize them everywhere, and you can't be duped anymore — Snakes Alive

Again with the attack on philosophy. Since I can’t give you a list , I’ll give you an incredibly skimpy summary of my claim justifying the continued vitality of philosophy after Witt and olp. You will have to provide your own summary of what you think this movement has done to destroy the self-justification of ‘philosophy’ as you understand it, but I have a pretty good idea of what the term means to you.
I certainly know what a dirty word philosophy was to Rorty. But then I thought he read Heidegger and Derrida badly , and. missed the point of phenomenology.
So here’s my very thin summary. Witt and olp shows us that meaning emerges out of contexts of interaction , not as the result of a subjective mind mirroring an independently existing objective world via concepts , and using words to refer back to these concepts. Philosophy before olp was constantly trying to erect what Rorty called ‘skyhooks’, removing it from contextually driven human interaction.

So far so good. But phenomenology takes this interactive thinking one step further, or rather, one step back. Rather than beginning from a notion of interaction as that which takes place between persons, it begins from temporality. That is to say, prior to my interacting with another person, my interaction with myself moment to moment is already an interaction with another, my exposure to an outside. So this kind of philosophy begins from difference, transformation, contextual change , the in-between, rejecting everything that Rorty disdained about metaphysically grounding philosophizing. This radically temporal discourse doesn’t claim to negate or ‘’refute’ the analyses of Witt or olp, but it makes them derivative and abstractive of a more primary basis of the social.
Well , I warned you this would be way too brief a summary.

“Completely” wouldn’t be a bit too far, if there is a time frame earlier than, or in addition to, learning and joining society. It seems to me, that if the onus is on each of us to take responsibility in the saying, if we are “bound to our expressing”, we’d want something more authoritative than the meager accolades of society. That which merely assuages the ego, as in, “Hey, you expressed that correctly! Good for you!!”, comfortably disguised as “Ok, fine; you’re playing by the rules”....isn’t the taking of responsibility.

Yours is the beforehand as part of learning/joining, but with no true account of the extra part of being bound by the responsibility in expression because of agreement with the rules. — Mww

What I was trying to say is it is not responsibility "in" the expressing, it's "to" the expression, so it's not learning "completely" or expressing correctly (in "agreement" with a concept's Grammar) it is being answerable to it once you've done/said it. As, based on the examples above, we ask: "Did you intend to shoot the donkey?"--as if intent is not (always) first. We are bound to answer for what we've done (or shirk it), thus the need for excuses--"no, my finger accidentally slipped on the trigger." To continue to be intelligible and explaining along the different ways under each concept (or refusing to; or pushing it into another context).

Your form of OLP wants to turn what it looks at as learning/joining, into rote instruction. There should still be an account for how learning is done. — Mww

I agree with accounting for learning, though not as sociology so much as it shows how we grow with our concepts, as our practices. Witt spends a lot of time showing how learning a concept is being able to continue a series.. even into new contexts. I would call it training more than rote when done overtly but most of our learning society's alignment along the lines of our judgments, identity, what counts, what matters, what our shared interests are, in each concept: as in meaning, learning, understanding, apologizing, etc., is just by growing up and assimilating into our society/culture. These are not learning "rules", but, our sharing lives (though not as justification).

Your OLP wants to account for responsibility in expression by a subject, but doesn’t account for the authority within the same subject, by which the responsibility is obtained. It follows that the rules are contained in the subject, antecedent to, and hence authority for, any expression whatsoever. — Mww

Our criteria (Grammar) for what we do/say (our concepts as practices) are public, prior to us. The question of authority is interesting as, in expressing, at times, we assert our self, "I say this!" (Emerson roughly) to assert/create our self as separate (averse to conformity Emerson says). We are our own authority in this regard--our responsibility is to the consequences of and questions about our actions. We may break, stretch our Grammar as well because of their not being our justification, or we their cause.[/quote]

It shouldn’t be a contention that whenever language is in use, something necessary is occurring beforehand. — Mww

I'm not sure if you mean it shouldn't have to be said (it should be uncontested) or that no one should say that something is occurring beforehand, so I'll just take it as the first and say that Witt would say it is not (necessarily, every time) how "language is used", as in my intent or causality, but "looking" at a concept's "use" (afterwards), which is to say which option (his term is: in which "sense") of a concept (see "I know" in the OP above now) and how that fits with the context of the situation and context of the Grammar of the concept. So to say "something" is "occuring" beforehand, makes a lot of assumptions which I believe would come from the picture Witt and Austin are trying to shed light on. Many things have occurred beforehand; all of our lives lead up to the possibilities of our concepts (even Witt's builders need to be familiar with calling, pointing, counting, etc., to be able to ask for something).

Point being, no matter the word, somebody somewhere at some time, determined its relation, and that determination had nothing to do with learning or joining society, but rather, contributed to a society for its members to learn. — Mww

Language does have the ability to be set (terms, labels, etc.) yet even in this limited case there is a relation, even if it is determined, to our lives (e.g., the builders' "world" of concepts). The assumption that all of our concepts are created by naming, say, idea=word, word=world, is the picture that Witt is investigating in the PI.

Everybody uses the same words, but with uncommon intimations, which facilitates an examination of the expressive ambiguities of the many at the exclusion of the compositional certainty of the one. — Mww

What you call "fundamental conditions" I think OLP would consider part of the standards desired (for certainty, control, my specialness) which Witt shows creates the picture of referentialism or the interior. As if you control the use and (intimations) of our language; the words being the same but that "I" at least know, am certain, about what I "mean". That every expression has the possibility of ambiguity in it because of the picture that "I mean" something specific (their composition is certain) but the other has their own "I understand", thus ambiguity is inherent in every communication, instead of being situational, contextual--"meaning", as "intending", only coming up when something unexpected happens (as worked out in the examples above).

What I posed as just a simple question, you turned into a riddle. There is no reason to do that, there’s no hint in being a mere question that there is a disguised sublimity contained in it. You, of your own accord, before even considering a response, thought my expression as having qualities not justified by the words used in it. — Mww

Hmmm.."simply"? You failed and refused to explain or define the term "mentality" that you were using, saying it was "whatever I think it is". Thus, I had to guess what you meant or work out what I made of it backwards from the context of everything else--if that is not a riddle, it was mysterious or, at the very least, coy. To say "there's no hint", and that the "qualities" of expressions can not be seen by me, or that "I turned' it into something, is wrapped up in the picture that you control an expression's "qualities" (I, and Cavell, would say its implications), and that "the words" make your intention certain (or, the other way, that your intention is in those certain (fixed) words) because they can be understood independently (the picture that words stand on their own is the way philosophy strips the context out of our expressions). This picture is how we can avoid the responsibility to what we (and others) express; that, apart from what you want, you can be read by what you say, and that our expressions can be made more intelligible if necessary and we remain answerable to them (as possible obfuscations, tricks, etc.) Our word is our bond Austin will say.

People generally aren’t drawn to that picture, your “concepts" being thought (then?) turned into words”. They haven’t a clue that’s what happening, because it’s all theory. Could be no one does that. So why diagnose a reason for something that is no more than speculative theoretic? — Mww

This is complicated (it took the whole PI to draw it out), but the idea is that humans have a desire for certainty, and a fear of our human frailty (failings), and philosophers slide from there into radical skepticism, which, along with our ability to understand words without context, allows for a theoretical philosophical picture of how (all) language works, which skips over our human frailty and separateness.

By showing how public meaning and language are......what? — Mww

How much language and our concepts are public (rather than determined by me); that they are meaningful to (all of) us in the ways our lives are attuned "in judgments" Witt will say (not only in definitions of words). #242.

To show how understanding is relational to a point where knowledge reaches its limits.....I can’t unpack that. Knowledge has it limits, but such limits don’t have anything to do with understanding. — Mww

I give examples of "understanding" above, but the "limit" of knowledge is just to say knowledge is not our only way of relating to the world. This was the point in my post on the lion quote where "I know you are in pain" is not an expression of knowledge as information, but knowing as acknowledging (Cavell says)--I accept or reject (this is how it works, it's Grammar) the (moral) claim of your pain on me. Emerson will say "Character is higher than intellect". I've also realized Cicero was onto something when he insisted that a speaker had to be "virtuous".

I don’t have a problem with calling all those things “concepts”. I would only say the objects of those concepts are what’s part of our lives. Seeing is a concept; what is seen is the object of the concept of seeing; learning is a concept, a series is the object learned about, etc. — Mww

I don't think I need to disagree with this characterization of what "objects" are, and, if you are saying that Witt's "concepts" (practices as it were) are not an "object", I would also let that go. I guess this just means you think something needs to be an object to be part of our lives. Then I'm not sure what to say to get you to see that "seeing", "sitting in a chair", apologizing", "intending", "understanding", "continuing a series", are "part of our lives"; maybe to say that by: the "way we live" I mean our judgments, distinctions, ways to identify, etc. with each concept. There is a quote by Austin above that Banno put up from which I draw out this sense in a response.

What does the double asterisk and the (completely different) attached to “concepts” mean, from the point of view of Witt and OLP? — Mww

The ** was left in by mistake. I incorporated the list of what Witt would consider "concepts" into the sentence. I have differentiated them as "practices", but "thinking", "intending" etc. are also these type of concepts and calling them "practices" is a little off. The point being that a "concept" for Witt is not like an "idea" of something, or, say, conceptual--just language.

Have their own Grammar (roughly the way they work).....sounds an awful lot like rules to me. — Mww

Well this one is a toughy. I'd say read from #200-#300 in PI or Cavell's essay The Argument of the Ordinary (with Ryle), but off the top of my head: we don't "follow" Grammar, as we do rules; that Grammar is more open-ended; they can be extended into new contexts or broken but still be recognizable; they can be vague or highly specific, and rules are too fixed and determinative; rules gives the impression that we "set" Grammar; and there is some sense of arbitrariness of when a rule applies, but, frankly, I've forgotten more about this than I ever learned, so you can't take my word for it.

So....nothing on images? Familiar with the science of visual thinking? From mention by Einstein, 1942 to books by Pinker, 2007, and originating as a speculative condition for human cognition, in Kant, 1781, the idea has been around quite some time. Being around much longer than OLP isn’t sufficient reason for it being better, but it is sufficient reason for OLP to account for the possible validity of it. — Mww

Well, as I said, I wasn't sure where to start--and I do not have experience with any of that. All I can put out there is that I think OLP's early intent on accounting for the desire for the picture of language as something internal (meaning, thought, intention, "mental activity" Witt will say) attached to or corresponding to a word or object, lessens its interest in anything else "mental". That isn't to say that they don't account for it; Witt looks at what we mean when we say "I imagine" as a way of seeing our concept of imagination (imagining) and also the activity of bringing up an image for yourself. Also, part of OLP is "imagining" cases, though that's neither here nor there I think. As Witt says, none of this is to attempt statements of facts or theories, so the science of any of this would be moot upon what the implications are when we say "I imagine..". (Also not to say philosophy is not accountable to the discoveries of science, but that they are two separate methods in two separate fields--though it has not always been that way.)

Other than OLP's take on thinking, I was influenced by Heidegger's What is Called Thinking? and Emerson's framing of thinking as passive reception, rather than active; but Witt would say "thinking" is more like solving a problem (guessing, testing, imagining cases...). That is not to say that people do not "think" as philosophy is accustomed to picturing it, but that I would call that, all of the things above, except, (talking) to yourself.

If you want to make a thread about phenomenology, fine. I would even talk about it there. I don't think your description of it is right – phenomenology at its heart was a neo-medieval enterprise with Kantian and Platonist influences – but regardless, none of this has to do with OLP. Phenomenology in general has nothing to do with OLP – their milieus were too different, and their practitioners didn't overlap, so they shared few if any concerns or methodologies.

Phenomenology in general has nothing to do with OLP – their milieus were too different, and their practitioners didn't overlap, so they shared few if any concerns or methodologies. — Snakes Alive

Not sure how to respond to that since I don’t know what olp means to you. I’m on more familiar ground with Wittgenstein , and I’d say that a fair amount has been written recently connecting him to phenomenology.

phenomenology at its heart was a neo-medieval enterprise with Kantian and Platonist influences — Snakes Alive

Medieval? How so? Many of today’s philosophies have Kantian and Platonic influences so you may have to be a bit more specific( perhaps in a new thread). Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology , had many influences, including DesCartes, Kant , Hume
and Brentano, but his notion of the cogito and the subject-object relation transcended these. Merleau-Ponty showed the influence of Hegel, but again his work transcended Hegel. And then there’s the phenomenological work of Eugene Gendlin, who was a friend of mine. He credited Dilthey, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty , Marx and Heidegger.

Not sure how to respond to that since I don’t know what olp means to you. I’m on more familiar ground with Wittgenstein , and I’d say that a fair amount has been written recently connecting him to phenomenology. — Joshs

I don't have any thoughts on what it means 'to me,' but 'OLP' typically refers to a few strands of thought in analytic philosophy, mostly spurred by exegesis of Moore and Wittgenstein, as well as the work of Austin, that had a boom in popularity in England, especially in Oxford following the second world war. To see what it is, it's best just to read it – some of its major works can be found in the 'Linguistic Turn' collection, ed. Rorty, the 'Ordinary Language' collection, ed. Chapelle, and 'Philosophy and Ordinary Language,' ed. Caton.

Medieval? How so? Many of today’s philosophies have Kantian and Platonic influences so you may have to be a bit more specific( perhaps in a new thread). Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology , had many influences, including DesCartes, Kant , Hume
and Brentano, but his notion of the cogito and the subject-object relation transcended these. Merleau-Ponty showed the influence of Hegel, but again his work transcended Hegel. And then there’s the phenomenological work of Eugene Gendlin, who was a friend of mine. He credited Dilthey, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty , Marx and Heidegger. — Joshs

This wouldn't be the thread for it, but phenomenology was effectively begun by Brentano, and the notion of intentionality he used and that Husserl took up is a medieval one that involves thought directed at an in-existent object.

The writers you're referring to are part of when phenomenology was just assimilated into the general soup of continental philosophy, and so lost most of its unique identity and methodological concerns (much in the way that OLP was subsumed into the soup of analytic philosophy more generally, and so lost its specific identity). The authors your bud mentions here are just general big names that all continentals read, and besides Merleau-Ponty, aren't even especially related to phenomenology (though like with much in philosophical movements, people sometimes retroactively declare every author to be everything).

In my experience, I see that people learn to talk, and do so adequately without reference to rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Children are often corrected when they learn to talk, by parents, teachers and others. They may not be taught explicit rules - that's my point - but they are still taught how to speak properly, and this training constitutes "the regulations or principles governing the conduct" of language use. As the Google definition of the word "rule" states, such regulations or principles can be either "explicit or understood".

And if I have doubts about how to express what I want from someone else, there are no rules for me to refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

You will do so in language, presumably, and one that is understood by the other person.

That is how language use is different from a rule-governed activity. For the majority of its activities there are no rules to consult if one has doubts about what ought or ought not be done, but a rule-governed activity has rules which can be consulted. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are rules you can consult if you have doubts about what ought or ought not be done with language, e.g. dictionaries, thesauri, rules of syntax, other fluent speakers, written examples, etc. Language is a tool. Learning how to use a hammer won't tell you when or where you should hammer, either.

This is exactly why language cannot be a rule-governed activity. Each instance of language use occurs in a particular and unique set of circumstances, and the meaning must be designed, created, for that specific context. — Metaphysician Undercover

If every use of language were this unique, then we could never use or understand language from one situation to the next, nobody would ever be able to learn a language, and dictionaries would not be possible. There's a good reason why I don't need you to define every word in each of your posts.

This is meaningless babble to me. I have no idea what you mean by "corporate culture", or "understood set of behaviours". — Metaphysician Undercover

Look it up.

So there is no such thing as "implicit" rules without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the dictionary definition I gave earlier, a rule is: "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

Unless you have a more authoritative reference other than your personal say-so?

Sometimes we train pets to respond to particular verbal commands. We might say that our pet understands to do (or not do) something, or behave a certain way, even though the pet doesn't speak English, and we might never make the rule explicit - to the pet - in English.
— Luke

To "understand" does not require following a rule. You are simply begging the question, assuming that one cannot understand without following a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's part of the dictionary definition of "rule": "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

If a dog can be trained to respond appropriately to the command "sit" as well as a child can, then they understand the meaning/use of the word, even though a dog would not be able to understand an articulation of this "regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of" language use (i.e. an articulation of this rule).

I described my experience of understanding another as presuming to allow the other's intention to become my own, such that I do what I think the other wants me to. The fact that it is presuming allows for the reality of misunderstanding. You might think that it's odd to believe that a dog or cat has intention, and that it allows my intention to become its own, and that's why it does what I want it to do, but it's no odder than believing that such animals "understand", and clearly these animals act with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit.

When children are trained how to use language, they learn "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure" for the activity of language use, which is a definition of "rule(s)". Obviously, children don't already know the principles that govern (i.e. the rules of) speaking English before they learn how to speak English.
— Luke

That a person behaves in an habitual way does not demonstrate that they have learned "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure". If this were true, then we'd have to conclude that birds, insects, and probably even single celled beings have learned the regulations governing conduct and procedure. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't mention habit. You've overlooked the training.

It's an inductive conclusion. All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. I've already invited you to disprove this principle, and I'm still waiting, as your attempts seem to have failed. Until you provide that proof, I'll adhere to my reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Put simply, you're mistaken. The dictionary defintion I have repeatedly given states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You appear to be using a special meaning of the word "rule" that excludes the (unarticulated) "understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity".

Well, the Mac I use is not that antiquated, but thank you very much for that providing link. — creativesoul

Well, I guess I am the winner then with a '96 iMac.

folks like Moore show... why so many people refuse to understand that simply knowing what "this is a hand" means proves beyond any reasonable doubt that there is an external world(Witt's private language argument aims at much the same thing, but he struggled with the infinite regress of justification as his remarks throughout OC show). — creativesoul

Well, OLP moved on from Moore's standard of the contradiction of what everyone knows to be true (granting that my Moore is hella rusty), through Austin to Witt focusing on the implications when a concept is expressed in a context and shared language. I'll be interested to hear what you think of the Cavell, as his reading of Witt is that he does not go so far as Moore (solving skepticism; or dismissing it, actually) and leaves the threat of skepticism open and as a lesson regarding the limitation of knowledge (that we are in a position to each other and to what we say that is beyond knowledge).

Another broader benefit leads us to consider specific situational circumstantial context aside from just the statements and/or words being used as a method or means to correctly translate and/or better understand another's meaningful language use. — creativesoul

I'm concerned by the sense we are categorizing contexts to "correctly translate" what someone else is saying. As if reducing Austin's contribution to merely cataloging what people (can? must?) mean in certain circumstances (rather than describing how expressing specific concepts, as in practices, are differently meaningful). And as if the way our concepts worked was baked into the world (the circumstances) and determines what is said--taking our responsibility for our expressions out of the equation. That being said, the essay by Cavell will skirt that line of the "must" of our shared criteria in a different way.

I'm puzzled by the lack of clear unambiguous distinction being drawn between statements and belief statements when discussing things like Moore's paradox or Gettier. — creativesoul

On pp. 190-191 (x) in the PI Witt uses examples of what we say to make the claim that "I believe" is a hypothesis, a conviction ("I think it's going to rain), a disposition, and not a measure of uncertainty compared to a statement that can be true or false (as Austin's examples are meant to show are not the only kind of statements, nor the only expressions with the value of truth).

Moore's paradox shows that self-contradiction is a natural occurring limit upon our belief, and that there is a difference between accounts of belief and belief. One cannot believe that both statements are true when talking about oneself, but we've no issue believing or saying that it's raining outside but another does not believe it is (both are true regarding another). — creativesoul

Witt will describe this as our inability to infer our conviction in our expressions--it can be said that "I do not see or hear myself [my conviction]". That the look of "I believe..." tempts us to look at believing differently in ourselves. Cavell will frame this that I do not accept my expressions, where I believe the other because they say it.

There is a clear distinction that needs to be drawn and maintained between the truth conditions of a statement (when spoken by an individual that believes the statement) and the statement itself - when taken in general - completely divorced from the individual believing speaker. Sometimes, they are remarkably different. — creativesoul

There are two things going on for me here. One I like is that we are measuring that there is a difference between a statement and the expression of a statement (at a place and time; that I own). Now, that being said, the abstraction ("divorcing") of statements from their expression removes a context for them, which allows for the creation of criteria for certainty, universality, etc. in general--as in the difference between a "true" (certain, universal) statement and a statement of belief (uncertain, contingent).

I understand that many reject the very notion of one single overarching theory of meaning, simply because there has yet to have been an acceptable one(one that is amenable to evolutionary progression, and is somehow relevant and/or explanatorily powerful enough to exhaust the acceptable parts of all the rest, while also being able to explain the unacceptable parts). — creativesoul

OLP's initial mission (with Austin and Witt) was specifically to show that there is not "one single overarching theory of meaning"; to bring our expressions back to the ordinary criteria of each of our concepts.

Meaning arises/emerges within belief formation. Getting meaning right requires getting belief right. — creativesoul

So once meaning is internalized, we can have certainty and feel like we have avoided metaphysics through a general theory about how meaning is said and then understood, if only we could get it right, or get science involved, or... anything but take away our control over "meaning" (as it is public) and put us in the position of being responsible for what we have said.

Children are often corrected when they learn to talk, by parents, teachers and others. They may not be taught explicit rules - that's my point - but they are still taught how to speak properly, and this training constitutes "the regulations or principles governing the conduct" of language use. As the Google definition of the word "rule" states, such regulations or principles can be either "explicit or understood". — Luke

To be corrected is not to be taught a rule. My point is that there is no such thing as a regulation or principle which governs, that is not explicitly stated. You could keep denying this forever if you want, but you'll have no success at persuading me that I'm wrong unless you show me how such a rule might exist, if it does not exist as an expression in language.

The issue appears to be, that if rules of language use don't exist as an expression of language, then the rules do not exist within the public domain. If they are public, then where else could they exist if not as language? So we must turn to the private, internal domain of the individual to find these implicit rules, if they are real. Within the internal, private, we find what I called (for lack of a better word) "principles", in my discussion with Josh. The argument is that there is a very significant need to distinguish these private "principles", which serve as some sort of guidance to free willing, intentional choices, and public "rules", which are explicit regulations that govern conduct. The difference is immediately evident in the role of correction.

There are rules you can consult if you have doubts about what ought or ought not be done with language, e.g. dictionaries, thesauri, rules of syntax, other fluent speakers, written examples, etc. Language is a tool. Learning how to use a hammer won't tell you when or where you should hammer, either. — Luke

None of those, and all of those together, do not tell me how to express my self coherently. They are not rules for how to talk. The hammer is a good example. There are no rules for how to use a hammer, so long as you do not damage private property, or injure someone.

Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit. — Luke

How is intention irrelevant, when to follow a rule is to intentionally act according to the rule? If we remove the relevance of intentionality, this just produces the ambiguity required for you to freely equivocate between following a rule in the prescriptive sense, and following a rule descriptively. You do recognize the difference between these two don't you? If we remove the role of intention, as Antony proposes, then you might make the absurd claim that a person could unintentionally follow a prescriptive rule, by appealing to the descriptive sense, like physical objects follow the laws of physics, then concluding that intentional acts like talking are acts of following rules in that sense. But that's not what we're talking about, we're talking about people in freely chosen activities. So hiding the role of intentionality is clearly a misrepresentation, which is unacceptable because it produces a misunderstanding of equivocation.

Put simply, you're mistaken. The dictionary defintion I have repeatedly given states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You appear to be using a special meaning of the word "rule" that excludes the (unarticulated) "understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity". — Luke

This is evidence of your delusion. You think that the dictionary definition provides a stated rule for how the word "rule" must be used, and if I step outside the precise boundary of your interpretation of that stated rule, I am necessarily mistaken.

Witt spends a lot of time showing how learning a concept is being able to continue a series.. even into new contexts. — Antony Nickles

Isn’t that reducible to experience? If context stands for the the myriad distinguishable opportunities for using a concept, doesn’t that presupposes the time and place of them, which is the same thing as experience? It follows that a possible miscommunication using a common concept can be merely a matter of uncommon experiences.
—————

People generally aren’t drawn to that picture, your “concepts" being thought (then?) turned into words”. They haven’t a clue that’s what happening, because it’s all theory. Could be no one does that. So why diagnose a reason for something that is no more than speculative theoretic?
— Mww

This is complicated (it took the whole PI to draw it out), but the idea is that humans have a desire for certainty, and a fear of our human frailty (failings), and philosophers slide from there into radical skepticism, which, along with our ability to understand words without context, allows for a theoretical philosophical picture of how (all) language works, which skips over our human frailty and separateness. — Antony Nickles

I grant that humans have the innate desire for certainty, but I reject they fear their failings, at least on the same scale as they desire certainty. But I suppose OLP’s idea of failing has to do with general language use and because humans are always talking, they’re always in fear of failing in their language use. So...even while we are aware OLP has exposed what it considers a problem, has it done anything to fix it? What does a philosophical picture of how all language works, actually do for human frailties, other than seeming to disregard them?

Ironically, you and I are in the same leaky boat here, insofar as the average smuck on the street doesn’t care how my speculative epistemology works, and he doesn’t care about your how all language works. On the other hand, is it the case that for sufficient importance, procedures are in place to prevent failings in language use, so in that sense, there is a fix, albeit hardly philosophical.
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The point being that a "concept" for Witt is not like an "idea" of something, or, say, conceptual--just language. — Antony Nickles

A concept is just language? You know...I think I might know a reason why he comes up with that. It is impossible to have language without concepts, so if I speak, I must already have the ground for speech. Or writing, or communication in general. Combine that with this somewhat less than satisfying metaphysical gem (A50/B74), “....(spontaneity in the production of conceptions)....”, in that nobody likes the idea of stuff just popping up unexplained. So for Witt, the spontaneity is relinquished for the objective manifestations of concepts in language. But he’s just kicked the speculative can down the philosophical road, wouldn’t you say, in that we still need to know what makes language possible.
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By showing how public meaning and language are......what?
— Mww

How much language and our concepts are public (rather than determined by me); that they are meaningful to (all of) us in the ways our lives are attuned "in judgments" Witt will say (not only in definitions of words). #242. — Antony Nickles

OK. The “how much” was missing from your original and my C&P of it.

Kinda tautologous, but ok. Language not public isn’t really language anyway, right? Didn’t somebody say there’s no such thing as private language? Even that ubiquitous “voice in my head” manifests in the same speech as I would use publicly.

Concepts, on the other hand, as I’ve hinted before, always originate privately, by the first instance of it, and which usually, but not necessarily, subsequently become public in the communication of it. For which we must fall back on spontaneity....but, so be it? Not many choices in the matter, actually.
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All I can put out there is that I think OLP's early intent on accounting for the desire for the picture of language as something internal (meaning, thought, intention, "mental activity" Witt will say) attached to or corresponding to a word or object, lessens its interest in anything else "mental". — Antony Nickles

Agreeable, in principle, yes. The lessening interest in anything else mental would be redundant, hence not necessary. This is part of the certainty humans desire, as you said. All certainty is a relative judgement, once a judgement is made, there’s no profit in belaboring that judgement. It remains possible nonetheless, to replace it with a better one, a more certain one, which is merely an interest of its own.

off the top of my head: we don't "follow" Grammar, as we do rules; — Antony Nickles

Also agreed, in principle. The rules I’m concerned with are not something to be followed, as in some sort of objective conformity. Rules in the sense I’ve been using, merely indicate a logical significance in accordance with a complementary system, the empirical knowledge of which we have no privilege. It’s the same as, we don’t know why that happened but there must have been a reason for it....this theory doesn’t tell us how this happens but if it wasn’t in conformity to a rule we can say it wouldn’t have happened.

Probably doesn’t relate to your Grammar....just thought I’d throw it at you, see if it sticks.