We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? Williams says we should then regard philosophy as one of the social sciences, which do not attempt or claim that kind of transcendence. — J

Neither science nor philosophy provide a view from nowhere, but what Williams has done is to take applied and derivative thinking (empiricism) and mistake it for a more fundamental and grounding perspective (philosophy).

I see. Yes, we can certainly just reject his premises and standpoint. I wonder, though, whether you're able to accept them for the sake of argument, and help us see whether the argument goes through? If that doesn't interest you, no worries.

He points to a familiar problem: We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? Williams says we should then regard philosophy as one of the social sciences, which do not attempt or claim that kind of transcendence. — J

The duty of philosophers is to formulate ideas, with the aim of finding absolute knowledge, and write them in a concise form. To do this, a basic training in the fields of science and art is required.

[Philosophy can't] claim to be absolute knowledge. — J

Why not? Does Williams have any argument? The multiplication of these threads looks like wishful thinking and prejudice. There is something approximating an argument here:

But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J

<If science seeks knowledge, then philosophy does not>

That's an argument, though a particularly bad one. Does Williams think the following are also sound?

• If science involves thinking, then philosophy does not
• If science makes use of empirical research, then philosophy does not
• If science makes use of interpretation, the philosophy does not

Amusingly, the refutation could also go the other way – philosophy would be shown not to be an absolute conception! — J

No, I don't think so. Feel free to try to show that.

But we are not forced to that result [that philosophy is absolute knowledge]. The absolute status of philosophy would not be required just by their being some absolute conception of the world, but rather by our knowing that there was, and what it was. We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a conception would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know . . . is to ask for more – very probably for too much. — Williams, 303

I think this is ingenious. — J

If you really think this is "ingenious," then why don't you try to explain the argument in your own words?

I will help you by providing an option:

• 1. [The absolute status of philosophy] would only be required if [we knew that there was some absolute conception of the world, and what it was].
• 2. If [we knew that there was some absolute conception of the world, and what it was] then [we would need some reasonable idea of what such a conception would be like].
• 3. If [we knew that there was some absolute conception of the world, and what it was] then [we would not have to know that we have it].
• 4. Therefore, we cannot (or else do not) know that we have that "one piece of philosophy which has absolute status."

The conclusion looks like a non-sequitur, and the reasoning is vague and confusing, perhaps intentionally so. (3) even looks false on its face. So feel free to explain what the argument is supposed to be and how it is supposed to be "ingenious."

(There is a funny scene from a movie or a show where a shyster child "makes change" with the other children's bills, and "ingeniously" always ends up richer himself. I can't recall the title. Williams' argument is reminiscent.)

We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J

The presupposition that a view from nowhere, absolute knowledge, objective reality, exists is the foundation of the orthodox view of what you are calling "natural science." It is metaphysics, philosophy, not science. Is this what you have called "one piece of philosophy which has absolute status?" The problem is that this is just one metaphysical view among many.

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy. — J

This is exactly backwards. Philosophical conceptions of "a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations" include Kant's noumena and Lao Tzu's Tao, along with many others in just about all philosophies. Science has nothing to say about this.

The fly that is stuck in your bottle is pretty simple: "How do I have certainty, given that I am a fallible being?"

The presupposition that a view from nowhere, absolute knowledge, objective reality, exists is the foundation of the orthodox view of what you are calling "natural science." It is metaphysics, philosophy, not science. Is this what you have called "one piece of philosophy which has absolute status?" The problem is that this is just one metaphysical view among many. — T Clark

I kinda wish Williams had left natural science out of his argument about the absolute conception, because I can see it's distracting several posters. But let me try to reply.

Williams has set this up as a "what if". What if we accept what you're calling "the orthodox view"? He's well aware that this is all it is, he's only pointing to it as the view (he was writing in the 1970s) most likely to garner support from those who think an absolute conception, a View from Nowhere, is available. It is, as you say, philosophy, not science.

So no, the "one piece of philosophy which has absolute status" -- or seems to; this is Williams' question -- is the one that would declare what does or doesn't have absolute status. Science may or may not figure in this. And it doesn't matter whether you think science has that status, or not. Either declaration, yea or nay, is going to appear as a philosophical statement claiming to demarcate an important area of human inquiry.

Apologies if my OP didn't make this sufficiently clear, though as I say, by starting with the so-called orthodox view of science as a potential absolute conception, Williams may have made the issue more confusing than it needs to be. I hadn't realized that until reading your, and others', responses.

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy.
— J

This is exactly backwards. — T Clark

So, same response here. I have no idea if Williams believes this. I certainly don't. He's giving us a way to frame his question about absolute conceptions that he hopes will be familiar to his readers. His question -- and mine, in this OP -- is not about which absolute conception, if any, is correct. The question is about whether the argument I quoted succeeds in removing the onus of "absolute conception" from the "piece of philosophy" that claims to know that there is an absolute conception, yet presents itself as "merely local."

The whole thing is an attempt to see whether this house of conceptual cards can stand -- whether Williams has saved it, or only saved the appearances.

Maybe read the quote from his p. 303 again, in the light of all this?

↪Joshs I see. Yes, we can certainly just reject his premises and standpoint. I wonder, though, whether you're able to accept them for the sake of argument, and help us see whether the argument goes through? If that doesn't interest you, no worries. — J

Williams’s position is fallibilist. He rejects the view from nowhere. There may be an absolute reality but we don’t have to claim that our philosophical accounts of this absolute can themselves be known absolutely in order to make progress in our understanding of reality. We can do this through local, embodied and situated practical inquiries.

There may be an absolute reality but we don’t have to claim that our philosophical accounts of this absolute can themselves be known absolutely in order to make progress in our understanding of reality. We can do this through local, embodied and situated practical inquiries. — Joshs

Good. That's how I read Williams' position as well. But the question remains: Does the move he makes in the material quoted from p. 303 suffice to show how this is possible? Williams says that we don't have to know either 1) that there is an absolute conception, or 2) what it is. Short of such knowledge, philosophical statements, including this very "piece of philosophy", are exempted from self-contradiction; as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the conception is, my talk about it can remain "local."

In short, I can be right about this, but not assert it as a piece of knowledge. As long as I don't say I know that I've got it right, I've avoided the trap.

Do you think this works, or is it only clever?

Your whole OP revolves around a highly unclear quote that you in no way attempt to clarify:

But we are not forced to that result [that philosophy is absolute knowledge]. The absolute status of philosophy would not be required just by their being some absolute conception of the world, but rather by our knowing that there was, and what it was. We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a conception would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know . . . is to ask for more – very probably for too much. — Williams, 303

On top of this, the quote is itself a response to an objection, which is itself a response to a position of Williams'.

So:

1. What is the objection that Williams is responding to in the quote?
2. What is the position of Williams' that the objection is responding to?

In short, I can be right about this, but not assert it as a piece of knowledge. As long as I don't say I know that I've got it right, I've avoided the trap. — J

"As long as I don't say I know that I've got it right, then I've avoided the trap/objection." So what is this trap/objection that Williams is trying to avoid? Is it the "trap" wherein a philosopher might claim to know something? :yikes:

He points to a familiar problem: We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J

What is problematic in that formulation is the hidden or implicit metaphysics in the modern conception of science. A part of that is the assumption that the natural sciences, or nature, or our conception of nature, is in principle complete or able to be completed, as others have said. But then these founding assumption are themselves ignored, meaning that the natural sciences cannot be complete in principle, as they neglect the very foundational assumptions upon which they rest.

Scientific objectivity is methodological - it's about designing studies, collecting data, and interpreting results in ways that minimize bias and personal influence. It involves using controlled experiments, peer review, replication, and statistical analysis to separate reliable findings from subjective impressions. The goal is to let the evidence speak for itself, regardless of what the researcher might personally prefer to find.

Philosophical detachment, on the other hand, is more about an existential stance toward knowledge and experience. It involves stepping back from immediate emotional investment or personal attachment to outcomes. A philosopher might cultivate detachment to see issues more clearly, to avoid being swayed by passion or self-interest, or to maintain intellectual humility about the limits of human understanding.

The key difference is that scientific objectivity is primarily about method and process, while philosophical detachment is about attitude and perspective. So the former provide criteria which can be validated in the third person, whereas the latter requires subjective commitment. So modern philosophy finds itself caught between two impulses: the traditional philosophical concern with wisdom, meaning, and understanding (which seems to require some form of first-person insight), and the modern demand for empirical rigor and third-person validation. The result is that philosophical detachment itself becomes suspect - how can you verify that someone has achieved it? How can you test whether it actually leads to truth rather than just personal satisfaction? Which explains why so much of contemporary philosophy focuses on conceptual analysis, logical argumentation, and empirically-informed theories rather than the exploration of ways of being.

So, there's real difference between the scientific and the philosophical attitude towards these questions, but it's very hard to articulate in terms that are acceptable to the former. From a scientific perspective, if you can't specify what would count as evidence for or against a claim, if you can't operationalize your concepts, if your insights can't be independently verified - then you're not really saying anything meaningful. The scientific framework becomes the measure of what counts as legitimate knowledge.

And as the scientific framework is by definition is reliant on conditions, then nothing whatever can be said about any supposed philosophical absolute which by definition is unconditional. That's the problem in a nutshell.

Looks like you are not going to get the science toothpaste back in the tube.

Could have been worse; it might have read

He points to a familiar problem: We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that religion aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J

:wink:

added: or
"what if we accept the idea that revelation aims to provide that knowledge"
or
"what if we accept the idea that mysticism aims to provide that knowledge"
and so on.

Looks like you are not going to get the science toothpaste back in the tube. — Banno

I know! It's a perfectly valid and interesting topic -- what to make of science and its defenders as an absolute conception -- but not the one I was hoping to address, picking up from Williams.

I agree with a great deal that you're saying. I think Williams might too, because as @Joshs pointed out, he does not espouse a scientific View from Nowhere, and as I was trying to explain, he mentions it only as a convenient point of reference to help locate what he's really asking about.

Maybe I can phrase Williams' problem using this:

the natural sciences cannot be complete in principle, — Wayfarer

Let's grant that. Williams is asking, If philosophy asserts this, is it asserting a piece of absolute knowledge? It's certainly a striking and important assertion, if true; the question is, what is its claim to being knowledge, and of what sort? Is it "merely local" -- that is, the product of a philosophical culture which cannot lay claim to articulating absolute conceptions of the truth?

I don't think Williams much cares whether science, or scientism, would agree that the target truth claim is indeed absolute knowledge. What he wants to know is, Does philosophy say that it is? And isn't this self-contradictory, if we stipulate that local news is the only kind you're going to get on the Philosophy Channel?

As you can see, Williams suggests a solution that involves rejecting the claim to knowledge: "we would need some reasonable idea of what such an [absolute] conception would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it." And I'm asking, is this legit? By remaining agnostic about the absolute truth of "The natural sciences cannot be complete in principle", have we succeeded in saying something about an absolute conception ("a reasonable idea of what it would be like") without claiming to know it, or affirming it to be absolutely true? In a way, yes, but don't we want to say more? Or can the "more" only happen from some version of an absolute conception? We can see how the snake swallows its own head . . .

added: or
"what if we accept the idea that revelation aims to provide that knowledge"
or
"what if we accept the idea that mysticism aims to provide that knowledge"
and so on. — Banno

Right. Williams' question is about the idea of an "absolute conception," not any one in particular.

But having said that, I remain unclear as to the "very original move", so let me reflect it back to you, see if I have it right.

Our problem: If philosophy allows that some other discourse - science, religion, mysticism, revelation... provides an absolute account of the truth, then what is left for Philosophy?

Well, the come back is that philosophy still has at least that it's science, religion, mysticism, revelation or what ever that provides an absolute account of the truth... this becomes the last bastion of philosophy.

But then philosophy does lead to at least this little bit of absolute knowledge... and so philosophy's having allowed that some other discourse is the source of absolute knowledge is itself an absolute knowledge...

But then the "very original move", that even if philosophy provides a conception that includes the idea of absolute knowledge, this doesn’t entail that philosophy knows that the conception is itself true in an absolute sense. It's still presumably the science or religion or revelation or mysticism that performs this task...

How is that? Is that close enough?

Then this seems to me very close to what we have been discussing concerning philosophy as plumbing.

I might as well also play with the toothpaste, while I'm here.

The claim that science seeks a "view form nowhere" is a misrepresentation. Science seeks a view from anywhere. It phrases it's pronouncements in terms that maximise the contexts in which they can be taken as true.

Since the cardinality of contexts is undefined, there is no end to what science has to say.

But then philosophy does lead to at least this little bit of absolute knowledge... and so philosophy's having allowed that some other discourse is the source of absolute knowledge is itself an absolute knowledge...

But then the "very original move", that even if philosophy provides a conception that includes the idea of absolute knowledge, this doesn’t entail that philosophy knows that the conception is itself true in an absolute sense. It's still presumably the science or religion or revelation or mysticism that performs this task...

How is that? Is that close enough? — Banno

Very close. I bolded in an absolute sense to make it even clearer. Philosophy is going to talk about some other inquiry's absolute conception, and talk about it in a way that remains tied to non-absolute conceptions. The things phil says about these absolute conceptions are not put forward as true beyond the historical or cultural context of the philosopher -- they are not "known to be true" in the same way that the absolute conception knows things to be true.

I think that is what Williams is suggesting.

Then this seems to me very close to what we have been discussing concerning philosophy as plumbing. — Banno

Interesting. I'll reflect on that. You may be right, precisely because I'm not happy with that conclusion, and want more from philosophy! Which leads me to view Williams' move with suspicion. Can the mere avoidance of self-reflection or self-appraisal still leave philosophy able to say what it wants? Well, I guess that very much depends on who's doing the wanting. :smile:

To be continued . . .

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy. — J

The idea of “reality” was created by philosophy and is not what scientific practice produces, thus one reason why philosophy is “larger” than science (is prior to it, as it were). The basis of any stability, predictability, universality, and certainty (“facts”) of science is based on its method, not its correlation to a “real” world. Because the practice is repeatable, and not dependent on us (can be done by anyone—is not “local”), is what gives science its power, and also allows it to be (really) wrong sometimes.

The claim that science seeks a "view from nowhere" is a misrepresentation. Science seeks a view from anywhere. — Banno

Fair enough. "View from Nowhere" has gotten entrenched, via Nagel, but maximal contexts makes sense. And Nagel didn't mean science in particular.

The things phil says about these absolute conceptions are not put forward as true beyond the historical or cultural context of the philosopher -- they are not "known to be true" in the same way that the absolute conception knows things to be true. — J

Ooooo nice...

Trouble is I don't think any of science, revelation, mysticism or whatever can have "absolute knowledge"... 'casue I don't see how we can make that sort of phrase work.

Sure. Williams assumes that the "absolute knowledge" problem is real. If one has already settled that satisfactorily for oneself, then this is merely an interesting argument to look at.

Ok. Guess I'll just watch for a bit.

Williams is asking, If philosophy asserts this, is it asserting a piece of absolute knowledge? It's certainly a striking and important assertion, if true; the question is, what is its claim to being knowledge, and of what sort? Is it "merely local" -- that is, the product of a philosophical culture which cannot lay claim to articulating absolute conceptions of the truth? — J

So if it’s a philosophical claim, then how is it to be adjudicated? Surely that would require some framework within which the expression “philosophical absolute” is meaningful. I suppose when Williams asks whether, if we were to possess such an insight, we must know we possess it, he’s invoking the Cartesian expectation that a genuine absolute insight would be, as Descartes claimed of the cogito, apodictic — self-certifying by virtue of its subject matter.

But if we never say more than “here’s what an absolute would be like if there were one,” have we said anything of consequence? Or would it have been better not to have asked the question?

I think what we're experiencing here is a version of what Richard Bernstein called the Cartesian anxiety: the fear that unless we can affirm an absolute with certainty, we’re condemned to relativism. But perhaps that anxiety itself arises from a false dichotomy: philosophical reflection can meaningfully trace the limits of conditioned knowledge without pretending to stand outside of it. When I said that 'the natural sciences cannot be complete in principle,' I'm not making a metaphysical declaration from on high but reflecting critically — and necessarily — on the conditions of intelligibility that science presupposes but doesn't (and doesn't necessarily need to) account for. That stance doesn't claim to possess the absolute — but it does require that we be open to 'the unconditioned' as a necessary item in the philosophical lexicon. Which we're generally not!

(Here's a relevant piece of analytical philosophy on this subject, The unconditioned in philosophy of religion, Steven Shakespeare, which makes the case for the necessity of 'the unconditioned' in place of a putative deity in this debate.)

@J

“We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a [absolute] conception [of the world] would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it.” Williams

In the spirit of the argument, what I am pointing out is that the “need” (desire) for certainty created the “absolute conception of the world”. It is philosophy that created “what such a conception would be like”, and it was its job to understand that reason for such a framework (“idea”)—to “know that [why] we have it”.

as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the conception is, my talk about it can remain "local." — J

That is philosophy’s claim, but it neither claims it “absolutely”, nor “locally”, as these are predetermined, created standards.

Maybe read the quote from his p. 303 again, in the light of all this? — J

I went back and reread the OP and your response to my comment, as well as all the other posts on this thread. But I don’t get it. I can’t even figure out what the question on the table is. It’s frustrating because this is exactly the kind of question I like best.

Let’s leave it at that. I’ll follow along and see what I can get out of this.

@Banno

If philosophy asserts [knowledge about what an absolute conception is] is it asserting a piece of absolute knowledge? …what is its claim to being knowledge, and of what sort? Is it "merely local" -- that is, the product of a philosophical culture which cannot lay claim to articulating absolute conceptions of the truth? — J

I think what we're experiencing here is a version of what Richard Bernstein called the Cartesian anxiety: the fear that unless we can affirm an absolute with certainty, we’re condemned to relativism. — Wayfarer

Without a full and exhaustive (-ing), discussion of what “knowledge” is, let’s assume we are all pretty much right that our desire for certainty (an absolute) is a unachievable standard we created; that philosophers (humans) have always wanted knowledge to be math-like—elevating science as the closest (to: complete, predictive, universal, abstract, etc). The presumed fallout without that is chaos, which @"Wayfarer” rightly points out is equally imagined.

Can the mere avoidance of self-reflection or self-appraisal still leave philosophy able to say what it wants? — J

reflecting critically — and necessarily — on the conditions of intelligibility that science presupposes... — Wayfarer

A philosophical claim has its power only in as much as you see it for yourself. We are not “avoiding” reflection; that is exactly the method. But it is not reflection on the “self” as much as “the conditions of intelligibility”, put otherwise, the interests we all have in this or that practice (not our personal interests). Thus knowledge of something is uncovering the particular criteria for judgment of identity, completion, correctness, etc. to itself (a practice). Now, of course, one may dissent, disagree, live against our practices, opt out, but the key is philosophy is able to make what is presumed (say, the need for an absolute)—what is: not “known”—made “intelligible” (as in, aware of/explicit).

“we have to know that we have [an absolute conception of the world]. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know” -Williams

Thus we have multiple uses or senses of know happening at once without distinction, “we have to know [as in: understand (be aware of) the criteria] that we have [for] an absolute conception of the world… To ask not just that we should know [be aware], but that we should be [absolutely certain] that we know [have the right criteria].

But I don’t get it. I can’t even figure out what the question on the table is. — T Clark

It's confusing because if you just say it plainly it is seen to be silly, so it has to be dressed up in a lot of cryptic language that one must then refuse to clarify.

@J's professor, Bernard Williams, is allergic to the idea that philosophers have knowledge (and so is @J). So this is what happens:

• Williams: "Philosophers definitely don't have knowledge, but I am happy to grant that scientists have knowledge."
• Interlocutor: "If philosophers such as yourself know that scientists have knowledge, then don't you have that knowledge?"
• Williams: "Hmm... [Insert indecipherable paragraph from OP here]."
• Williams: "In short, I can be right about this, but not assert it as a piece of knowledge. As long as I don't say I know that I've got it right, I've avoided the trap."

So the idea is that philosophers can't have knowledge, even though they know that scientists have knowledge, and this is okay as long as philosophers say, "I am right about my claim that scientists have knowledge, but I am not saying I know that scientists have knowledge." *

If you like you can replace "knowledge" with "absolute knowledge" and then ask @J what the heck "absolute knowledge" is supposed to be (and you can do the same thing for any other such substitution).

Normal philosophers without an allergy to knowledge just say that they know that scientists have knowledge, and that this knowing is of course itself knowledge. So the philosopher at the very least has some knowledge, namely the knowledge that scientists have knowledge, and since the normal philosopher is not allergic to knowledge the world will not collapse upon admitting that he knows something.


* Note how intimately connected this is to @J's continual claims that there can be non-assertive assertions. The non-knowledge-claim about being right is for @J an example of his non-assertive assertion. Or in other words, the knowledge claim that isn't a knowledge claim is just one of those assertions that isn't an assertion, so it's not ad hoc at all! lol

Thus we have multiple uses or senses of know happening at once without distinction, “we have to know [as in: understand (be aware of) the criteria] that we have [for] an absolute conception of the world… To ask not just that we should know [be aware], but that we should be [absolutely certain] that we know [have the right criteria]. — Antony Nickles

I linked earlier to an article by Steven Shakespeare on the unconditioned in philosophy of religion. One of his key points is that “the unconditioned” might serve as a more open-ended alternative to the term “God” in philosophical discourse, especially when trying to speak about the absolute without presuming a theistic framework. The unconditioned, as he frames it, is not just another necessary being in all possible worlds—it’s that in virtue of which any world, or any necessary being, is intelligible at all.

This seems to resonate with the question Williams raises: can philosophy speak meaningfully of something absolute without claiming to know it in the apodictic, Cartesian sense? Maybe what’s needed isn’t absolute knowledge but an orientation toward the limits of conditioned thought—a recognition that philosophy, at its best, gestures beyond what it can fully capture.

I’m not claiming any esoteric insight, but I’d suggest that to speak of the unconditioned meaningfully may require not just analysis but transformation: something more like philosophical detachment than scientific objectivity. And that, I think, also points toward a different conception of knowledge than the scientific—one closer to insight or self-knowledge. It’s not often found in the dominant strains of Anglo-American philosophy, but it’s much more characteristic of certain strands of European and Asian thought.

If you like you can replace "knowledge" with "absolute knowledge" and then ask J what the heck "absolute knowledge" is supposed to be — Leontiskos

I can’t help think it must be something like gnosis or one of its cognates - subject of that rather arcane term 'gnoseology' which is comparable to 'epistemology' but with rather more gnostic overtones. In any case, it is knowledge of the kind which conveys a kind of apodictic sense, although that is a good deal easier to write about than to actually attain.