but a framework for what it would be to act coherently, given one’s own beliefs and preferences. — Banno
I don't understand your enthusiasm for Ramsey. (Not that I've actually read him!). But the idea that induction is really just about probability is not that uncommon.You are right that there is a lot going on here, and plenty more to be said. People do not act rationally. Leaving aside the question of whether they ought act rationally, Ramsey has given us a part of the way to understanding what it is to act rationally. Not a theory of how people actually think, not a theory of what beliefs are true, but a framework for what it would be to act coherently, given one’s own beliefs and preferences. — Banno
...isn't the sort of thing that Ramsey is claiming, from what I can work out. He's not necessarily basing the bet on some series of accepted truths but on degree of belief, measured through betting behaviour, and arguing in favour of follow the axioms of probability to avoid incoherence....you would bet more on f(e) given f(a), f(b), f(c), f(d) than you would on (f)c given f(a), f(b)... — Ludwig V
It's more that this is an implementation of "what we do" that is coherent; or perhaps better, shows is what coherence might look like....what's wrong with Hume's custom or habit, based on our general heuristic of association? Or Wittgenstein's "This is what I do." — Ludwig V
I think that's pretty close to what Ramsey is doing - moving past the problem of induction, getting to the point of how it is we behave.Or we could just stop treating induction as a poor man's deduction. — Ludwig V
but that's not quite right. He's not saying that f(a) and f(b) implies f(e) is a better bet than just f(a). He;s not saying anything about f(a)'s truth or falsity at all. He's instead talking about the degree to which you and I believe f(a).Ramsey instead says given f(a) and f(b), how much would you bet that f(c)? and develops a logic around this. — Banno
Is it possible to tie it into Williamson's concerns? — Moliere
There's an intricate relationship between degrees of belief and belief in probabilities, which I find confusing. It looks to me as if "S has a x degree of belief in p and S believes that p has a probability x. Are they equivalent? If there's a difference, what is it?we can have degrees of belief, and deal with them in a rational fashion. — Banno
Do you mean "He's not claiming that "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief as a justification." or "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief as a datum even though it is arbitrary from a rational point of view".He's not claiming that "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief. — Banno
Shouldn't that sentence end with f(e)?He's not saying that f(a) and f(b) implies f(e) is a better bet than just f(a). He;s not saying anything about f(a)'s truth or falsity at all. He's instead talking about the degree to which you and I believe f(a). — Banno
Yes. But those details are what give you the evidence of the degree of belief, or confidence.The nature of and how much the bet, and by whom the validity of the ground of the bet is judged, is irrelevant, with respect to its occurrence. — Mww
Yes, I can see that - roughly. But Ramsey, apparently is not doing that. Ramsey is by-passing inductionHence the implied correspondence to induction, which serves a subject as sufficient rational justification a priori for the construction of his empirical beliefs, while not being sufficient for their proofs. — Mww
Well, given that it was written in 1787 and Ramsey was writing in the 1920's, it would seem to follow. Which would be interesting, but I don't think it would change any of the arguments.The point being, of course, all of this has been done before, in which case should be found, if not the congruent thesis, then at least a conceptually similar initial condition, merely clothed in new words. — Mww
Now a point of indifference in a philosophical debate is a point of agreement.
An alternative method might be, rather than demanding an absolute resolution, begin with points of indifference or agreement — shared constraints, overlapping commitments, common ground. From these, construct a framework of reasoning that remains coherent, though incomplete or evolving.
Ramsey shows the formal consistency of such a method, given the axioms of his system. — Banno
But those details are what give you the evidence of the degree of belief, or confidence. — Ludwig V
One way to highlight the difference between this view and representationalism is this: Imagine that we discover an alien being, of unknown constitution and origin, whose behavior and overall behavioral dispositions are perfectly normal by human standards. “Rudolfo”, say, emerges from a spacecraft and integrates seamlessly into U.S. society, becoming a tax lawyer, football fan, and Democratic Party activist. Even if we know next to nothing about what is going on inside his head, it may seem natural to say that Rudolfo has beliefs much like ours—for example, that the 1040 is normally due April 15, that a field goal is worth 3 points, and that labor unions tend to support Democratic candidates. Perhaps we can coherently imagine that Rudolfo does not manipulate sentences in a language of thought or possess internal representational structures of the right sort. Perhaps it is conceptually, even if not physically, possible that he has no complex, internal, cognitive organ, no real brain. But even if it is granted that a creature must have human-like representations in order to behave thoroughly like a human being, one might still think that it is the pattern of actual and potential behavior that is fundamental in belief—that representations are essential to belief only because, and to the extent to, they ground such a pattern. Dispositionalists and interpretationists are drawn to this way of thinking. — SEP Article on Belief
There's an intricate relationship between degrees of belief and belief in probabilities, which I find confusing. It looks to me as if "S has a x degree of belief in p and S believes that p has a probability x. Are they equivalent? If there's a difference, what is it? — Ludwig V
Oh yes, those. You say it (a proposition) is only a description (of a state of affairs) until asserted of reality? Until then, proposed but not yet carried, I suppose? — bongo fury
Thank you. But it is better not to bore on about something to someone who is not interested. But since you've opened the door.... Even if you are not interested, there may be others who are.Do you have more? Didn’t mean to shut you off. — Mww
I don't have a problem with the general idea. But I do have a problem with the skimpy version of the idea that we have here. It is a fragment of the practice of betting - a gesture towards something that could be much more illuminating if it were taken out of the arm-chair and into real life.Those conditions incorporated in a bet I make, what kind and how much, or even the one I wouldn’t, give YOU the evidence of the degree of my belief, and the confidence in it. This becomes quite apparent, when I admit you are more justified in betting greater on the sun rising tomorrow, than I am betting there is life on other planets we can see. — Mww
I can see that. On the other hand, it can help to know the context....Ehhhhh….dialectical precedent has it that responses to a quote are subjectively more honest without the influence of the author’s name, which is often detrimental to the message on the one hand, or tautologically affirms it on the other. — Mww
Not enough for me. But I can manage without that information.That, and my clandestine supposition that 1787 would be a sufficient clue. — Mww
Believe me, there is no chance that I am going to knowingly posit anything "inner" or "private" in the sense that Wittgenstein was talking about.There need be no inner fact about belief that can diverge from one’s consistent actions. — Banno
In one way, that's fair enough. But if you think it through, you find a world of complication and illumination. At least, I do, because I keep returning to the puzzle what probability actually means. (I'm particularly interested in what probability actually means in a single case.) The betting issue brings that out. Hower, Ramsey is only taking a first step. See above.It seems that for Ramsey the degree that one is willing to bet constitutes the partial belief. A belief is not "private" or "subjective", but measurable, and comparable with other beliefs. — Banno
Yes. I was talking about something else. I think I can be a little clearer.The relationship, then, is not between "degrees of belief and belief in probabilities", but between degree of belief and willingness to act. Consider willingness to act as an extensional substitute for degree of belief. — Banno
But I do have a problem with the skimpy version of the idea that we have here. It is a fragment of the practice of betting — Ludwig V
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