So we are not really in conflict - just talking about different things. Fair enough. As it happens, I regard the history, origin and purpose of ideas as of interest, even importance, in understanding their meaning. However, if your quotation is indeed from Kant, I'm not equipped to do more than try to follow the conversation. For the record, I think I'm talking about what it is to act rationally in the context of probability, an issue that puzzles me greatly.I agree it is a skimpy version of the idea, and it is a fragment of the practice itself. I was thinking to highlight the history, the origin and purpose the idea represents, rather than its manifestation as a practice. — Mww
It is indeed a test that is often proposed in real life. So it is relevant to say, not that a bet is no test of confidence, but that interpretation of a given decison is complicated by the fact that a bet is the result of weighing risk (disutility) against reward (utility) in the context of one's confidence. Confidence alone does not determine a (rational) decision.“The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is (…) his firm belief, is a bet.” — Mww
I sort of understand this and don't disagree with it.Furthermore, in Kant, there are those beliefs in the purely empirical domain of which maintaining the firmness of them is irrational in which case some tests are failed, but there are others in the purely moral domain, the firm maintenance of them is necessary, in which case every test is passed. — Mww
I'm not sure I quite get this. Mind you, my grasp of what people mean by metaphysics is, let us say, weak. I don't quite see why what I am saying about betting degrades anything that you are doing. After all, you know it all already and don't seem to have any problem putting it aside for the purposes of your conversation.When push comes to shove, it seems to me elaboration of the idea into a practice degrades the dialectic regarding it, to a psychologically-bounded exhibition, when it started as a metaphysical idea. — Mww
Well, your reaction is not unhelpful to me, so thank you for that. I won't bore you any further on the subject.And this is what happens when skimpy versions are filled out. Or….bloated, as some might say (grin) — Mww
So it is relevant to say, not that a bet is no test of confidence, but that interpretation of a given decison is complicated by the fact that a bet is the result of weighing risk (disutility) against reward (utility) in the context of one's confidence. Confidence alone does not determine a (rational) decision. — Ludwig V
I'm not sure what the model is, but the other components are pretty obvious. Perhaps the Bayesian theory works - I wouldn't know how to assess it. Can we run the process in a lab and assess whether it gets the answer right - or what?You may be groping your way towards Bayesian statistical decision theory. As I have said before, there are 4 components: model, data, prior, utility. That is enough to make a 'rational' decision. I'd prefer to say it provides a principled or formalized decision-making process. It doesn't stop you having an unreasonable model, prior or utility. — GrahamJ
I didn't know I was challenging it - though one might have thought that a two-valued logic would have a problem - not with the probability of a coin toss, but with degrees of confidence.That our deliberations rarely fit propositional or predicate logic clearly and unambiguously does not undermine the use of propositional or predicate logic. It may still provide a model for our reasoning. — Banno
I see. Do we care whether the two are the same thing?He shifts the question from “Is this belief true?” to “Is this belief coherent with my other beliefs and actions?” — Banno
Only if you can read it correctly.So will you go to the fridge or keep watching the game? Your choice showsyour preferences and what you think is so. — Banno
Only if you can read it correctly. — Ludwig V
Perhaps "correctly" is over-stating it. But it is also possible to revise my interpretation in the light of more and better information or even to actually misinterpret my actionBut neither of us want to say that. — Banno
As is mine.I assure you, my mind is completely unfurnished. — Ludwig V
Yes, indeed. But if we are to do so consistently, we might do well to presume a few things. Ramsey doesn't tell us how to be certain. He tells us what it means to be coherently uncertain — to reason, act, and believe in a way that fits together, even when the world is incomplete, and we are fallible.But it is also possible to revise my interpretation in the light of more and better information or even to actually misinterpret my action — Ludwig V
Well, I can see that a Dutch book would be a bad idea. On the other hand, there is the possibility of a "Czech book", in which the probabilities add up to less than 1. Wikipedia, which is never wrong, tells me that always pays out to the gambler.In Bayesian probability, Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti required personal degrees of belief to be coherent so that a Dutch book could not be made against them, whichever way bets were made.
That sounds wonderful, and better than the sceptical bewailing of our failure to match the traditional expectations.He tells us what it means to be coherently uncertain — to reason, act, and believe in a way that fits together, even when the world is incomplete, and we are fallible. — Banno
I'm not sure what the model is, but the other components are pretty obvious. Perhaps the Bayesian theory works - I wouldn't know how to assess it. Can we run the process in a lab and assess whether it gets the answer right - or what?
The thing is, it runs decision to action. The question here is whether you can run it backwards to read from action to decision. The difficulty is that most readings will be underdetermined, I suppose. — Ludwig V
OK. That makes sense.The model is your idea of how some aspect of the world works. It provides the probabilities of various outcomes. — GrahamJ
I'm trying to keep the enthusiasm for Bayes in proportion by anchoring our conversation in how we do things, or how we think we do things, when we aren't relying on Bayes. I'm trying to work out whether we can rely on Bayes or not. At present, the assumption is that we can. My mind is not made up.You have talked quite a bit about making decisions under uncertainty - about medical treatments, weather forecasts, coin-tossing, and beer in fridges. I was replying to all of that and I may have confused things by quoting a particular paragraph. I wasn't trying to 'run it backwards' to interpret a decision. — GrahamJ
I hope it's clear that I am not advocating doing induction using probability. Better to drop induction all together and instead look at how a bit of maths can help show us if our beliefs - held for whatever reason, or no reason at all - are consistent.Instead of seeking justification for induction, (Ramsey) explains how we act as if inductive reasoning were valid. — Banno
Help with consistency is always a good idea. Dropping induction, I fear, may be more difficult. Pavlovian conditioning works at levels beyond the reach of voluntary control.Better to drop induction all together and instead look at how a bit of maths can help show us if our beliefs - held for whatever reason, or no reason at all - are consistent. — Banno
I prefer this Humean explanation. But I thought that since the fifties and sixties, we had all given up worrying about the deductive invalidity of induction. Why are we revisiting the past? I'm sure the Bayes process has its place, but I don't really see why induction needs to be replaced or even can be replaced. There is one thing the Bayes process can do that cannot be done any other way - it can give us some help in dealing with one-off probabilities. (Not even induction can do that!)Instead of seeking justification for induction, he explains how we act as if inductive reasoning were valid. — Banno
Do we have a disagreement? — Banno
The key word there is "revising".We have it from Ramsey and others that there are solid statistical methods for comparing and revising various beliefs, and we agree that these are A Good Thing. — Banno
Well, gambling was important in the development of probability theory from the beginning. So it's no surprise that it crops up here. More than that, it's true that people do sometimes challenge a claim that they disagree with by suggesting the proposer puts their money where their mouth is. But I'm irritated that, in this context, people talk as if the size of the bet is somehow an index of the strength of the belief. Outside of artificial situations in labs, that's just not the case. A bet is a balance between risk and reward assessed in the context of the degree of confidence and in the wider context of the bet.The betting structure shows gives us a way of understanding what a belief and preference amount to, using just behaviour. — Banno
I'll look forward to that.This needs a good example. I'll work on it. — Banno
The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken—a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.
Who will take my bet, and at what odds? Should I be prepared to trust anyone who did take it? — Ludwig V
You put the difference very neatly. Only, I didn't intend it as a criticism, but as an analysis.Ramsey offers a minimal account of the nature of belief, while the Bayesian account assigns a value to a belief without specifying what that belief might be. Ramsey gives an account of belief’s nature; Bayesianism gives a rule for belief’s revision. — Banno
Well done! I found a copy of the chapter on some obscure web-site, but couldn't find any attribution - which was a little frustrating.Got it: — Moliere
Yes. You see how your thinking is conditioned by risk and reward in relation to your resources. Yes, of course, it is a non-standard, even contrarian, decision, but nonetheless, the amount you will bet is not an index of your belief, but the result of several interacting factors. To fnd the strength of belief, you have to work through all those factors.I'll bet the same against you, on the odds that it doesn't -- given I have nothing and I could win on the bluff I might as well. — Moliere
I like the twist that events will take you back to philosophy, because there has to be agreement on the outcome.I distrust betting on the whole. It's a test of who is right and who is wrong -- so I can persuade a person to bet against that the LNC* is false in at least one circumstance, and then provide the argument from the liar's sentence (which will certainly not persuade), and we'd be right back doing philosophy again rather than betting. — Moliere
I'm sorry. I don't remember what the buy-in was.That's what I meant to imply by the 1 million dollar buy in before. — Moliere
I'm sorry. I don't see what you are getting at.The philosophical move is from the action representing the belief to the action constituting the belief. — Banno
I can see the link between the two. But I don't see how that fits with what @Banno says.So, bets, promises, posts on one hand and paying up, following through, and reading on the other. — Moliere
I can see the link between the two. But I don't see how that fits with what Banno says. — Ludwig V
To call something misleading is to say it leads somewhere—but crucially, somewhere we didn’t intend, or that doesn’t fulfill the function we took ourselves to be engaging in. That’s not the same as saying there is a metaphysical end-point we ought to be led to; rather, it’s to say that a particular use diverts us from how the practice normally works or what it aims at internally. — Banno
The reason for reading the canon is to improve on it. But in order to "improve" on it, one does not need already to have an idea of the perfect or ultimate item.
— Banno
Yes. In the arts, "improve" might better be thought of as "develop" or "enrich" or, of course, "react wildly against"! — J
I suggested an example -- the battle of the bands -- in which we don't appear to need a constitutive idea of "best" in order to choose a winner. (Remember, we're both agreeing to reject that other reading of "best" which simply defines it as "top choice." That's not constitutive. That would be like saying that piety is what the gods love. It provides no content.) — J
So now I ask you,mustmaythe bestgood philosophyrelegatedevote itself to identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models? — Fire Ologist
Or is there more to it that can still be rigorous andought tocan be the work of philosophers? — Fire Ologist
The simple point is that we can deal with our present situation without positing some absolute. — Banno
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