'To be, is to compute'. — Wayfarer

Well, "to compute" ain't intention ...

worth looking at it in the context. She's using 'compute' in the metaphorical sense of taking in information and transforming it for a useful purpose, as metabolism does.

The Bing Bang is just the conventional theory. It's just an aspect of the current model, or conception, which represents a universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. At the same time, however, I don't think that this necessary implies physicalism, let alone a reductionistic/mecahnicistic version of it.

But this conception is just a product of purpose.
... — Metaphysician Undercover

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question.

If the universe is prior in time to life, then potency must also be prior in time to life. It is a feature of time which would be necessary for the creation of life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? It isn't clear how can the intentionality which is present in life arise, in an intelligible way, 'out of' the inanimate, which seems to be without any kind of intentionality. So, either some kind of teleology was present even before the arising of life or it just 'started' with the arising of life. In the latter case, how was that possible? If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology?

The question of whether life, the universe, and everything is in any sense meaningful or purposeful is one that entertains many minds in our day. The mainstream view is probably that the Universe in itself is meaningless, and that whatever meaning we seek or see is projected or manufactured by us, as biological and social beings. The universe itself is kind of a blank slate, ‘atoms and the void’, in Democritus’ terms, constantly being re-arranged through energetic dynamics into a never-ending cascade of forms.

I agree in principle, but I would question the exact way in which this is "mainstream." I don't think it was ever overwhelmingly popular as a position accepted by your average person on the street, or even a majority of people. It was dominant within the narrow silo of Anglo-empiricist philosophy and with some scientists, and I think even that is less true today than it was in the 20th century.

Still, I can see why it might be considered "mainstream" because 'something like it' seems to be a very common framing. That is, "when we put out 'scientist hats on' we must suppose to world is purposeless and valueless. We focus on 'description'" (where "description" is axiomatically assumed to exclude value, which is privatized). This isn't true for all science though. No one expects medical researchers to do this, or zoologists, or even evolutionary biologists, let alone social scientists.

Originally, this sort of separation of value and purpose from a wholly mathematized world (which, of course, excludes value by definition, axiomatically) was a sort of "methodological bracketing." Yet it was quickly absolutized into a full blown metaphysics, first a theistic one where all value and purpose comes from without, an external imposition (e.g. Divine Command Theory), and later in athiest forms that tended to just leave all the old theologically justified assumptions in place, but then chop God out and put the human individual, social community, or a sort of panpsychic "will soup" in its place.

I used to think that the reason we still tended to teach science in terms of 19th century metaphysics (ideas no longer popular in physics itself) was just inertia. The old model was intuitive and no one clear paradigm had come along to replace it, so it continued on by default. I now think there are serious problems with such a narrative.

First, the model isn't intuitive. It makes explaining the most obvious facets of our experience of the world impossible, dismissing most of human experience as in some way "illusory," and leaves all sorts of phenomena, particularly life and consciousness (quite important areas) as irresolavable mysteries. Second, one could easily argue that the very reason 19th century metaphysics hasn't been replaced in the teaching of chemistry, biology, etc. is that alternatives have been denied any inertia of their own by positive efforts to keep the old model in place, including censorship. One can see this in the EES controversy in biology, or in quantum foundations, etc. People get harassed out of their fields for challenging this paradigm, even though it is arguably a major factor in "science skepticism" and the emergence of an entire area of "new age 'science'" (precisely because it leaves so much out).

If one looks back to earlier epochs, one sees that shifts in the "scientific model," that predominates in societies, what C.S. Lewis call the "backcloth," were often resisted for political and ideological reasons. I don't think our own era is any different here. A view that makes all questions of value and purpose "subjective" aligns with the hegemonic political ideology of our era by effectively privatizing all questions of value, all the way down to the level of metaphysics and "what science says is true." It's worth remembering here that the current model grows out of a particular theology.

Such a view, by making all questions of goodness, usefulness, beauty, etc. "subjective" also helps to support the anthropology assumed by classical liberalism. This thin anthropology ("utility" as a sort of black box which decides all intentional human action, but which cannot itself be judged, i.e., volanturism) is hugely influential in contemporary economics and public policy. The entire global political and economic system is organized around such a view, and considerable effort is expended to make man conform to this view of him, to positively educated him in this role (e.g., highly consequential economic "shock treatments" aimed at privatization and atomization).

So, I think it's worth considering the exact way in which such a view is, and remains, "mainstream." It isn't so much as firmly held belief (although it is for a minority), but more a sort of dogmatic position that is thought to be necessary for "modern society." The privatization of value (and its demotion to illusion), builds support for a particular political theory grounded in volanturism, liberalism. One problem with this is that, if you privatize purpose, goodness, and beauty, you seem to face an inevitable slide towards privatizing truth as well, and making everything into a struggle for power. Indeed, there is a hidden volanturism at the bottom of the model that suggests the Will to Power as the ultimate primitive.

This way of thinking made perfect sense in a world where observation and common experience guided inquiry. But in his Physics, Aristotle extended teleology into cosmology, famously asserting that heavy bodies fall because their “natural place” is the center of the earth. This kind of explanation—while meaningful in its own context—was ultimately, and righfully, displaced by the rise of modern mechanics. Galileo showed that bodies do not fall because of their purpose, but due to forces and motions that could be described mathematically, without reference to final causes. Physics since then has largely dispensed with teleology (to the point where it was practically a taboo!)

Well, these are "inclinations" and "desires" in an analogous sense. They aren't meant to imply consciousness, only the way a thing's nature determines how it interacts with other natures. Prima facie, it is no more anthropomorphic than claiming that rocks and stars "obey" "natural laws." Arguably, the second is actually more anthropomorphic. And is one reflects on the language of "obedience" and "law" that dominates modern science, I think it's easy to guess the type of theology that originally motivated such a shift. Both imply an ordering. The latter just implies a wholly extrinsic, imposed order. First this order was imposed by God. Now it's more common (at least in secular academic philosophy) to see it as a product of man, either "the mind" or "human language," which imposes the order from without.

I would question the exact way in which this is "mainstream." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, so would I, but I'm also doubtful about the corrective narrative you offer. I'm not sure what domain you're quantifying over :smile: , and who the actors in this drama are. This would be an example:

First, the model isn't intuitive. It makes explaining the most obvious facets of our experience of the world impossible, dismissing most of human experience as in some way "illusory," and leaves all sorts of phenomena, particularly life and consciousness (quite important areas) as irresolvable mysteries. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Our" experience? This only applies to people who think philosophically or critically about it. I'd contend that, for most Western adults with an average education, the scientific model is totally intuitive: There's the world out there; scientific method teaches us truths about that world, and shows us how the world works; we can use it predict things and build things; it's been unbelievably successful at doing this, and improving human life. It makes "explaining the most obvious facets of our experience of the world" -- the astonishing order and regularities we discover around us -- possible. What's the problem?!

We on TPF can name some problems, but they simply don't surface unless you stop and think, "Well, what about consciousness? What about values? What about numbers? What about God?" etc. etc. But these questions -- and the move that links them with questions about science -- are not intuitive at all, unless you have a philosophical (or possibly a religious) bent.

This may just be a disagreement about what "intuitive" ought to mean, but all I can say is, given the way I was educated about science in public schools, I'd say my characterization of science, above, is second nature to me, and to most of my peers. It "makes sense": Got a question? Perform a controlled experiment; get the answer. This isn't right, of course, but we're talking about what seems intuitively true, based on education and culture.

This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world. — boundless

It's true, life can't be explained using physics. The structure, development, and behavior of living organisms operate according to a different set of "rules" than physics - the rules of biology. At the same time, all biological phenomena act consistent with our understanding of physics.

It isn't clear how can the intentionality which is present in life arise, in an intelligible way, 'out of' the inanimate, which seems to be without any kind of intentionality. So, either some kind of teleology was present even before the arising of life or it just 'started' with the arising of life. In the latter case, how was that possible? If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology? — boundless

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science. It's not a question of certain chemicals happening to combine in very, very unlikely ways by the random action of molecules jiggling around. There are some who think life is inevitable given a suitable environment. I recommend "What is LIfe - How Chemistry Becomes Biology" by Addy Pross. It's definitely pop-sci, but it's interesting and thought provoking.

A brief précis - 'Hans Jonas's The Phenomenon of Life offers a philosophical biology that bridges existentialism and phenomenology, arguing that life's fundamental characteristics are discernible in the very structure of living beings, not just in human consciousness. Jonas proposes a continuity between the organic and the mental, suggesting that the capacity for perception and freedom of action, culminating in human thought and morality, are prefigured in simpler forms of life.' That is very much the theme of the OP. — Wayfarer

My own Enformationism thesis, coming from a different background --- quantum physics & information theory --- reaches a similar conclusion : that there is a continuity from physical structure to metaphysical forms of animation & sentience.

This Cosmic Process of gradual transformation is a history of phase transitions. And the common factor of post-neo-Darwinian evolution is the causal power-to-transform (e.g. Energy). In the 21st century, scientists were surprised to learn that the creative & vital force is a basic form of Shannon's Entropy vs Negentropy definition of Information ; formerly only known as a mental phenomenon.

Therefore, the autonomy of Life, and the reflective stage of Mind, are merely intermediate phases in the continuing evolution of our Cosmos, from pure Big Bang Energy through manifold & maniform evolutionary phase changes to the emergence of living Matter, and eventually of thinking Minds. Each new phase of Physics, has "prefigured" a later phase of Metaphysics. :smile:

Emergent Evolution :
EnFormAction theory takes a leap of imagination, to envision a more holistic interpretation of the evidence, both empirical and philosophical. Contrary to the Neo-Darwinian theory of Evolution, EFA implies a distinct direction for causation, toward the top rung in the hierarchy of Emergence, as denoted by the arrow of Time. Pure Randomness would just go around in circles. But selection (Entention) works like the ratchet in a clock-work to hold the latest cycle at a useful, and ultimately meaningful, stable state : a Phase Transition, or a step on the ladder of Being.
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html

I agree in principle, but I would question the exact way in which this is "mainstream." I don't think it was ever overwhelmingly popular as a position accepted by your average person on the street, or even a majority of people. It was dominant within the narrow silo of Anglo-empiricist philosophy and with some scientists, and I think even that is less true today than it was in the 20th century. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's true. The metaphysics of everyday life is different from that of science. Why would you expect anything different? Scientists are trying to do different things than insurance salespeople and truck drivers. Something around half of Americans don't believe the human species developed from previously living organisms without outside influence. That doesn't prove evolutionary biologists are barking up the wrong tree.

We focus on 'description'" (where "description" is axiomatically assumed to exclude value, which is privatized). This isn't true for all science though. No one expects medical researchers to do this, or zoologists, or even evolutionary biologists, let alone social scientists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I see it, the difference between physics and the sciences you describe isn't primarily that physics excludes value while the others don't. It's that for the others, it is much, much harder to exclude outside influences on the results and so it's much, much harder to get clear, definitive answers to questions. Of course all science is value laden - values control what is studied, what questions are asked, and who gets funded. Beyond that, sciences that deal with people directly have to, theoretically at least, deal with those people humanely. The scientific method varies depending on what is being studied, but the basics are the same. It requires standing back and looking at phenomena from a suitable distance, objectivity if you will. That's true of psychology as much as it is chemistry.

If one looks back to earlier epochs, one sees that shifts in the "scientific model," that predominates in societies, what C.S. Lewis call the "backcloth," were often resisted for political and ideological reasons. I don't think our own era is any different here. A view that makes all questions of value and purpose "subjective" aligns with the hegemonic political ideology of our era by effectively privatizing all questions of value, all the way down to the level of metaphysics and "what science says is true." It's worth remembering here that the current model grows out of a particular theology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, science is embedded in the society it operates in and takes on many of the values of that society. Sure, but you make is sound like some sort of conspiracy. The difficulty some scientists have in getting society to accept their well-studied and critical understanding of the world makes it hard to accept the claim that politics is unfairly hindering the inclusion of human values. It is exactly human values - money and power - that is muddying the water.

Such a view, by making all questions of goodness, usefulness, beauty, etc. "subjective" also helps to support the anthropology assumed by classical liberalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does your whole argument rest on the basis of absolute, i.e. non-subjective, morality?

the anthropology assumed by classical liberalism. This thin anthropology ("utility" as a sort of black box which decides all intentional human action, but which cannot itself be judged, i.e., volanturism) is hugely influential in contemporary economics and public policy. The entire global political and economic system is organized around such a view, and considerable effort is expended to make man conform to this view of him, to positively educated him in this role (e.g., highly consequential economic "shock treatments" aimed at privatization and atomization). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you're example makes a point exactly in contradiction to the one you seem to think it does. It is the human values embraced by classical liberalism that corrupt the process. It seems your problem isn't the exclusion of human values, it's the exclusion of the particular values you share.

So, science is embedded in the society it operates in and takes on many of the values of that society. Sure, but you make is sound like some sort of conspiracy. The difficulty some scientists have in getting society to accept their well-studied and critical understanding of the world makes it hard to accept the claim that politics is unfairly hindering the inclusion of human values. It is exactly human values - money and power - that is muddying the water.

How so? People can have ideological blinders and biases without being involved in anything like a "conspiracy."

Consider that in ancient Greece, power structures influenced thought. Socrates was executed after all. Others ended up in hot water. You see the same sort of thing in ancient Rome, or even more so in Islam. This was obviously true within the context of the Latin Church and the Eastern Churches as well. Have we really reached the one time in human history where thought has become free of this sort ideological influence? Is liberalism and our dominant form of scientism truly "the clear light of reason one gets when superstition and error are removed?"

Hardly, right? It doesn't seem like our era should be unique. It's just that ideology is more transparent when one lives within it, especially when it has "gone global."

I think you're example makes a point exactly in contradiction to the one you seem to think it does. It is the human values embraced by classical liberalism that corrupt the process. It seems your problem isn't the exclusion of human values, it's the exclusion of the particular values you share.

Ha, well that was exactly the point I was trying to make. "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth) only exist in your head, as a privatized projection, a sui generis hallucination produced by the mysterious, but ultimately mechanistic mind," obviously isn't neutral. It is not a view that arose through sheer substraction, i.e., just "stripping away old narratives and superstitions," to get to the "clear view of reason." It is itself an ideological construct, a particular tradition. And the motivations for it have been variously political, economic, religious, etc., as well as philosophical. The idea of freedom as primarily being "freedom from constraint," and "the ability to do anything" (i.e. freedom as power/potency) seems quite relevant here too (and it's a notion of freedom that comes out of early-modern theology, man being the image of a God who was sheer will).

Does your whole argument rest on the basis of absolute, i.e. non-subjective, morality?

I'm not sure. Obviously, the conclusion that privatizes value and purpose, and renders it somehow "illusory," seems less flawed if it is somehow right (I don't think it is though). But I don't think my point really relies on making a judgement one way or the other, since we could also just say that we merely lack warrant to reach this sort of conclusion—that the conclusion is reached for other reasons, and that it relies on questionable presuppositions. I mean, a lot of ethics in this tradition (e.g., Hume) don't argue to anti-realism, so much as assume it, and then try to show that their assumption cannot be challenged (crucially, based on what they consider to be acceptable evidence). The common anti-realist move (which we can see on display in other threads up right now) is not to "prove" anti-realism, but rather to assert it and then to deny any counterarguments (arguably, to just set the bar for evidence arbitrarily high).

That is: "I don't have the burden of proof because I am saying something doesn't exist." But with things as basic as truth and goodness, this seems extremely questionable to me. For one, the hardcore eliminativist can do the exact same thing with consciousness. They can claim it doesn't exist, and easily stonewall any attempt to demonstrate its existence. Does that mean we don't exist? Denying that anything is ever good or bad for us seems on par with this. I have never met, or even heard of, a single person who espouses such a view who actually acts like they have the courage of their convictions here. In that, it is like radical skepticism.

Well, I was thinking of some of the more extreme premises of the reductionist model. For example:

-Your thoughts, planning, and sensation of volition never play any causal role in your actions because everything is determined by atoms "bouncing" in the void. Whether you accept or come to believe this or not also just comes down to such "bouncing," and has nothing to do with your "reasons," "truth," "validity," etc. except accidentally.

-Nothing is good or bad. It's not bad for a man to get hit by a bus, nor is it bad for a rat to eat rat poison. Serial killers and child molesters are ultimately no worse (nor any better) than saints. The cosmos is meaningless and valueless, and values a sort of illusion.

-Consciousness is epiphenomenal. You don't pull your hand away from a stove because it hurts, but rather because atoms have bounced in a certain way.

-Sunsets aren't beautiful. This is an illusion that takes place in your brain.

Etc.

The first three are among the most counterintuitive things I can think of. Indeed, Plato offers 1 and 3 up as a reductio conclusion against the mind-body being analogous to a tuning in the Phaedo.

It's true, life can't be explained using physics. The structure, development, and behavior of living organisms operate according to a different set of "rules" than physics - the rules of biology. At the same time, all biological phenomena act consistent with our understanding of physics. — T Clark

Notice that I wasn't saying that biology is inconsistent with the known law of physics, but I admit that I was unclear. My point was that properties like goal-directed behavior/intentionality isn't understandable in terms of the known physical laws.

I think that a non-reductionist physicalist can agree with what I was saying.

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science. It's not a question of certain chemicals happening to combine in very, very unlikely ways by the random action of molecules jiggling around. There are some who think life is inevitable given a suitable environment. I recommend "What is LIfe - How Chemistry Becomes Biology" by Addy Pross. It's definitely pop-sci, but it's interesting and thought provoking. — T Clark

Thanks for the reference! Anyway, I wasn't trying to reject abiogenesis or anything like that. But I am not sure if all the properties that we observe in living beings (i.e. behaving as a distinct 'whole', goal-directedness, striving for survival and so on) can be explained in terms of the known chemical and physical laws. I really can't see how such properties can be understood in a reductionist (or 'weakly emergentist'*) paradigm.

*BTW, I think 'weak emergence' is a form of reductionism. Nothing really 'new' arises in the case of 'weak emergence'. What 'emerges' is just a convenient abstraction that allow us to make simpler explanations.

Well, I was thinking of some of the more extreme premises of the reductionist model. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course you were. This is the dark, problematic side of scientism. I don't know how we'd settle the question of whose "intuitiveness" we're talking about here, yours or mine or some Average Jill's, if there really is such a person. I'm only saying I think it likely that, until these knotty questions are posed, it remains something like "intuitively true" for most Westerners that the sunny Popular-Mechanics view of science is just fine, and deeply reflective of how the world actually operates.

Still, I can see why it might be considered "mainstream" because 'something like it' seems to be a very common framing. That is, "when we put out 'scientist hats on' we must suppose to world is purposeless and valueless. We focus on 'description'" (where "description" is axiomatically assumed to exclude value, which is privatized). This isn't true for all science though. No one expects medical researchers to do this, or zoologists, or even evolutionary biologists, let alone social scientists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. That's why I say 'probably'. But then, as I mentioned, the essay which prompted my response was one by Massimo Pigliucci, who is quite a visible internet philosopher on stoicism and the like, and he wrote:

First of all, the scientific worldview holds that physical processes alone, operating through natural selection and other mechanisms, are sufficient to explain the emergence of all phenomena including consciousness and reason, without requiring any overarching purpose. Of course both Nagel and Goff object to this, but the reality is that the scientific worldview has been incredibly successful in practice, while the sort of metaphysics these authors keep pushing has done absolutely nothing to advance our understanding of the world and represents, in fact, a sliding back to the Middle Ages, if not earlier.

Second, and this is an elaboration of the point I have just made, teleological explanations simply fail to provide concrete mechanisms for how cosmic purpose would actually operate in physical reality. There is truly nothing there to be seen.

So he articulates exactly the kind of positivist dogma that I have in my sights. And plenty of people believe it, including plenty of philosophers. (That's why there's space for the books of Daniel Dennett and D M Armstrong - they provide defenses for the kind of materialism that few of them would actually advocate, but at least can refer to when asked - let them do the dirty work :-) )

So, I think it's worth considering the exact way in which such a view is, and remains, "mainstream." It isn't so much as firmly held belief (although it is for a minority), but more a sort of dogmatic position that is thought to be necessary for "modern society." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite right, but it's very infuential. But here's an interesting thing: those Pew Research surveys which report on beliefs and attitudes, say that a significant percentage of people who identify as atheist still believe in a 'higher power' of some kind. In this matter, it's very hard to pin down hard borders. My long experience on Internet forums, is that there are only a few committed materialists in Piggliuci's mold, but that it's a background belief for a lot of the uncommitted - the idea that 'of course' the Universe comprises nothing other than matter-energy going about its purposeless activities.

Well, these are "inclinations" and "desires" in an analogous sense. They aren't meant to imply consciousness, only the way a thing's nature determines how it interacts with other natures. Prima facie, it is no more anthropomorphic than claiming that rocks and stars "obey" "natural laws." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No God, No Laws, Nancy Cartwright, discusses whether the idea of 'natural laws' which proscribe outcomes is meaningful in the absence of deity.

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science — T Clark

Of course, but it easily slides into 'nothing-but-ism' - that life is 'nothing but' a specific combination of complex chemicals reacting in very specific conditions to give rise to something like a long chain reaction. That was very much the kind of idea Daniel Dennett pushed, in books like Darwin's Dangerous Idea. The philosophical point about the irreducible nature of life, is that life is not reducible to chemistry. A vast debate, of course, but of note:

The idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’ implies that information is ontologically different from chemistry, but can we prove it? Perhaps the strongest argument in support of this claim has come from Hubert Yockey, one of the organizers of the first congress dedicated to the introduction of Shannon's information [theory] in biology. In a long series of articles and books, Yockey has underlined that heredity is transmitted by factors that are ‘segregated, linear and digital’ whereas the compounds of chemistry are ‘blended, three-dimensional and analogue’.

Yockey underlined that: ‘Chemical reactions in non-living systems are not controlled by a message … There is nothing in the physico-chemical world that remotely resembles reactions being determined by a sequence and codes between sequences’.

Yockey has tirelessly pointed out that no amount of chemical evolution can cross the barrier that divides the analogue world of chemistry from the digital world of life, and concluded from this that the origin of life cannot have been the result of chemical evolution. This is therefore, according to Yockey, what divides life from matter: information is ontologically different from chemistry because linear and digital sequences cannot be generated by the analogue reactions of chemistry.

At this point, one would expect to hear from Yockey how did linear and digital sequences appear on Earth, but he did not face that issue. He claimed instead that the origin of life is unknowable, in the same sense that there are propositions of logic that are undecidable. — What is Information? Marcello Barbieri

Gödel, again.

Hardly, right? It doesn't seem like our era should be unique. It's just that ideology is more transparent when one lives within it, especially when it has "gone global." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've already acknowledged that societal values and political considerations influence what is considered worth studying, knowing. And you're right - same as it ever was. But you didn't address the main point of my comment. This intrusion of societal influence into science is exactly the opposite of what you call "this sort of separation of value and purpose from a wholly mathematized world (which, of course, excludes value by definition, axiomatically)." It is the intrusion of values into science that has corrupted it.

Ha, well that was exactly the point I was trying to make. "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth) only exist in your head, as a privatized projection, a sui generis hallucination produced by the mysterious, but ultimately mechanistic mind," obviously isn't neutral. It is not a view that arose through sheer substraction, i.e., just "stripping away old narratives and superstitions," to get to the "clear view of reason." It is itself an ideological construct, a particular tradition. And the motivations for it have been variously political, economic, religious, etc., as well as philosophical. The idea of freedom as primarily being "freedom from constraint," and "the ability to do anything" (i.e. freedom as power/potency) seems quite relevant here too (and it's a notion of freedom that comes out of early-modern theology, man being the image of a God who was sheer will). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's really frustrating I can't get you to acknowledge that the characteristics you seem to deplore - a bias for reason, mathematics, and freedom from constraint - are human values just as much as "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth)" are.

-Nothing is good or bad. It's not bad for a man to get hit by a bus, nor is it bad for a rat to eat rat poison. Serial killers and child molesters are ultimately no worse (nor any better) than saints. The cosmos is meaningless and valueless, and values a sort of illusion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This fairly common response seems to me to be a misread of relativism. Or perhaps it's a read of naive relativism.

There may well be no objective values written into the structure of the cosmos. Our universe doesn't protest when a baby dies, nor does it celebrate when a theist shows mercy towards an enemy. But this doesn't mean that "nothing is good or bad" in any meaningful sense. It means that good and bad are creations, let's call them emergent, intersubjective, historical, biological, cultural, and personal. They are not illusions, but human projections of experience, language, a social conversation, and biological response. Do we need more than this?

Your example is a man being hit by a bus. From the perspective of the cosmos, it is likely irrelevant. But from the standpoint of community, family, a loved one, it's a tragedy and a source of legitimate sorrow. We are social animals and we experince pain and loss. This doesn’t become nothing simply because it lacks metaphysical grounding of some kind. The fact that it's relative doesn't make it meaningless.

Likewise, the difference between a serial killer and a saint isn't a metaphysical one, but that doesn't make it trivial. The values by which we differentiate them are based on shared human concerns: suffering, trauma, fear or flourishing, trust, and love. These values vary across cultures and time, sure, but they're not arbitrary. They arise from how we are embedded in the world and with one another.

A relativist doesn’t have to deny that moral language is of use in our world: they just deny that it reflects some absolute, God’s-eye-view or Platonic realm of moral truth.

a bias for reason, mathematics, and freedom from constraint - are human values just as much as "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth)" are. — T Clark

Nice. :up:

The issue for some is that goodness, truth and beauty emanate from God; are a reflection of God's nature. Take them away and quesions emerge.

But I am not sure if all the properties that we observe in living beings (i.e. behaving as a distinct 'whole', goal-directedness, striving for survival and so on) can be explained in terms of the known chemical and physical laws. I really can't see how such properties can be understood in a reductionist (or 'weakly emergentist'*) paradigm.

*BTW, I think 'weak emergence' is a form of reductionism. Nothing really 'new' arises in the case of 'weak emergence'. What 'emerges' is just a convenient abstraction that allow us to make simpler explanations. — boundless

This really confused me. You say that weak emergence is the same thing as reductionism. I'm ok with that, although I don't think it's quite accurate. I'm not a reductionist. I asked myself - "Well, how come you don't talk about strong emergence?" So I went back through your comments in this thread and found this:

It is understandable why some try to explain away the intentionality, 'holism' etc which seem to be present in life as illusions (i.e. living beings behave 'as if' they have those properties...). It is perhaps the only consistent way to account for these properties. Some, instead, try to explain these things in a 'strong emergent' model, which seems to be unintelligible. So IMO these difficulties point to the possibility that, indeed, the reductionist/emergentist models are wrong and we need something else. — boundless

You write off strong emergence as "unintelligible" but your fall back position is a universe infused with intentionality. You reject an established, if sometimes controversial, scientific principle with a wave of your hand and then point us at elan vital as the answer to our questions.

Here's a link to a famous paper on emergence "More is Different" by P.W. Anderson. It's not long.

It's really frustrating I can't get you to acknowledge that the characteristics you seem to deplore - a bias for reason, mathematics, and freedom from constraint - are human values just as much as "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth)" are

I haven't said anything about about a bias towards or away from reason. If anything, modernity, and particularly the Reformation, is a reaction against reason (e.g. fideism). Modern thinkers tend to be far more skeptical about the limits of human knowledge and the capacity of reason to lead and organize human life (i.e., its holding proper authority over the appetites and passions). Just compare Plato or Saint Augustine, with thinkers like Hume or Nietzsche.

Second, how can one argue for "reason" while denying the targets of reason, i.e. truth for theoretical reason, goodness for practical reason, or beauty for aesthetic reason. If these are all illusory, or sentiment, what exactly is reason?

The Pythaogreans not withstanding, the reduction of reason to something like computation is absent from the pre-modern philosophy, both in the West, and as far as I know also from the East. So the particular view I am objecting to can hardly be "human nature," if it doesn't show up before around 1700.

People have always valued freedom from constraint. I am speaking towards the distinctively modern tendency to absolutize this as wholly definitive of freedom. That is, "freedom simply is power" at the limit.



I'd question if this even still "anti-realism?" You seem to be assuming that realism = some sort of naive two worlds Platonism, else it is anti-realism. But that's not how I'm using the term, nor how it is usually used. Normally, it means there is no truth as to values (sometimes caveated to "moral values.") To call values emergent, isn't to say they aren't real. Although, if one wants to claim that they emerge from culture and language, this would seem to imply that nothing good or bad can ever happen to non-human animals, which seems false.

The philosophical point about the irreducible nature of life, is that life is not reducible to chemistry. — Wayfarer

No, life is reducible to chemistry, it's just that it is not constructable from chemistry.

...no amount of chemical evolution can cross the barrier that divides the analogue world of chemistry from the digital world of life,. — What is Information? Marcello Barbieri

Says who? Show me some evidence. Give me some inkling of a reason to believe this might be true.

I've had my say. I'll leave it at that.

I'd question if this even still "anti-realism?" You seem to be assuming that realism = some sort of naive two worlds Platonism, else it is anti-realism. But that's not how I'm using the term, nor how it is usually used. Normally, it means there is no truth as to values (sometimes caveated to "moral values.") To call values emergent, isn't to say they aren't real. Although, if one wants to claim that they emerge from culture and language, this would seem to imply that nothing good or bad can ever happen to non-human animals, which seems false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I was assuming, from your posts, that you argue from God or Platonism.

My view is that relativist can argue that values are real - but they are contingent. For the theist, this is generally not good enough.

Says who? — T Clark

I linked to the source, it has ample documentation.

I've already acknowledged that societal values and political considerations influence what is considered worth studying, knowing. And you're right - same as it ever was. But you didn't address the main point of my comment. This intrusion of societal influence into science is exactly the opposite of what you call "this sort of separation of value and purpose from a wholly mathematized world (which, of course, excludes value by definition, axiomatically)." It is the intrusion of values into science that has corrupted it.

Also, I'm curious, do you really think there can be a "science free from values?" You say there has been an "intrusion." Does this imply that there was there a time where values hadn't yet corrupted science?

Isn't preferring truth to falsity itself a value? Or what of "good" evidence, "good" argument, or distinctions between science and pseudoscience? The whole project seems essentially value-laden to me. Likewise, any sort of applied science necessarily also involves goals, i.e., choice-worthy ends.

I am not sure if "valueless science," is a realistic, or even coherent goal. It might be a contradiction in terms. I think the goal of a "valueless science," is itself the product of the particular variety of scientism we are discussing. Maybe there is an added wrinkle, in that it sets up this goal, and then hypocritically violates it, but I'd say the problem is more the goal itself.

This isn't ubiquitous though. The Baconian idea of the mastery of nature runs very strong in the modern sciences, and there, "what we want," is crucial. The problem is that this view also tends to occlude, or deny questions about what we ought to want.

My view is that relativist can argue that values are real - but they are contingent. For the theist, this is generally not good enough.

I would suggest keeping relativism and anti-realism separate. They are two distinct things. Almost every thinker is a relativist and contextualist to some degrees (as respects both truth and values). If you're a child's parent, it's good to scoop them up if they have fallen and start to cry. If you're a stranger, not so much. The appropriateness of the action depends on the context. Likewise, it might be extremely rude, and thus judged to be bad, not to bow to one's elders in some cultural setting, but not in another culture. Platonism, or Christian and Islamic "Neoplatonism," had no real issues with this sort of relativism.

Normally, when "relativism" is invoked as a sort of boogeyman or target of critique, it is a radical form of relativism that implies anti-realism. But you can have one without the other. For instance, health can be judged good, and peanuts a healthy food (i.e. health promoting), but this obviously doesn't hold for the person with a fatal peanut allergy (e.g., "everything is received in the manner of the receiver.").

From the perspective of the cosmos, it is likely irrelevant.

Does the cosmos have a perspective? I am not sure if I would say that anything is true from the perspective of the cosmos either. At least, if I am understanding the idea correctly. Maybe I'm not. What would it mean for something to be good, beautiful, or true from "the perspective of the cosmos?"

The metaphysical accounts of goodness I am most familiar with instead tie it to being (and unity, i.e. the way in which anything is really any distinct thing at all). So, the goal-directedness of life is a paradigmatic example here. But this also means that the measure of goodness will tend to be beings, self-determining wholes, with the highest measure being persons. The cosmos is often considered an ordered whole here, but not as a person, and so not as the highest measure of goodness. A key idea here is that aims unify parts into true wholes, and it is persons who most properly possess aims and unify themselves towards them, although obviously human persons can participate in organizations (a common good), and these are no doubt important as well.

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. — boundless

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound.

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question. — boundless

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose.

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions. — boundless

I don't see how this is meaningful.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? — boundless

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent.

If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology? — boundless

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology?

I linked to the source, it has ample documentation. — Wayfarer

I did what I will admit was a quick scan and I didn’t see any answer to my specific request which was show me some evidence that “no amount of chemical evolution can cross the barrier that divides the analogue world of chemistry from the digital world of life”

Great, thanks for the clarification. Food for thought.

I would suggest keeping relativism and anti-realism separate. They are two distinct things. Almost every thinker is a relativist and contextualist to some degrees (as respects both truth and values). If you're a child's parent, it's good to scoop them up if they have fallen and start to cry. If you're a stranger, not so much. The appropriateness of the action depends on the context. Likewise, it might be extremely rude, and thus judged to be bad, not to bow to one's elders in some cultural setting, but not in another culture. Platonism, or Christian and Islamic "Neoplatonism," had no real issues with this sort of relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nicely put.

However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose.

I think it would be more appropriate to say "knowledge" in English perhaps; "all men by nature desire to know." This is why the life of contemplation is the highest form of life for Aristotle (Ethics, Book X). The mind, being "potentially all things," can possess all perfections in this way (at the limit). All appetites are ultimately towards a sort of union, and knowledge is the highest form of union.

First of all, the scientific worldview holds that physical processes alone, operating through natural selection and other mechanisms, are sufficient to explain the emergence of all phenomena including consciousness and reason, without requiring any overarching purpose. Of course both Nagel and Goff object to this, but the reality is that the scientific worldview has been incredibly successful in practice, while the sort of metaphysics these authors keep pushing has done absolutely nothing to advance our understanding of the world and represents, in fact, a sliding back to the Middle Ages, if not earlier.

Second, and this is an elaboration of the point I have just made, teleological explanations simply fail to provide concrete mechanisms for how cosmic purpose would actually operate in physical reality. There is truly nothing there to be seen.
— Massimo Pigliucci

So he articulates exactly the kind of positivist dogma that I have in my sights. — Wayfarer

The biologist-philosopher's statement is neither "positivist" (i.e. only fact / observation-statements are meaningful) nor "dogma" (i.e. not defeasible or fallibilistic) but aptly describes the practices-efficacies of (a-telic) modern physical sciences in contrast to pre-modern 'idealist' metaphysics (e.g. Plato-Aristotle, neoplatonists, fideists, scholastics). The latter attempts to fill the current / persistent gaps in the former with mechanism-free – mysterious – woo :sparkle: which is an appeal to ignorance rather than lucid acknowledgements that "we don't know yet". I've no doubt Pigliucci, as well as most philosophically sophisticated modern scientists, would agree that the physical sciences are applied metaphysics which actually work (i.e. reliably generate good explanations for physical phenomena and processes).

A relativist doesn’t have to deny that moral language is of use in our world: they just deny that it reflects some absolute, God’s-eye-view or Platonic realm of moral truth. — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

The essence of scientism is the attempt to apply the methods of science to the questions of philosophy.