As noted, the story only mentions men, most of whom are several centuries old.

Your argument seems to hinge on the idea that there were no children on earth during the Flood; but the very previous chapter, 5, outlines in detail the lineage as normal procreation and Noah is said to have three sons in chapter 6.

Also, it is worth mentioning that these kinds of rejoinders, like Rashi’s, seem to fall prey to violating the principle of parsimony. No where in the OT does it suggest remotely that there were no children or that the beasts were shapeshifters: you’d think it would mention that, or at least not mention things which imply the contrary.

Aquinas doesn't think the word "best" makes sense in that context, given the infinite possibilities

I'll have to think about this: maybe if there are an infinite range of possibility then God would have an infinite amount of 'best' worlds He could create. I am not sure.

By your definition, a person would kills an innocent child in society that has not made killing humans, in any way or means, illegal has not committed murder and, most crucially, apparently, has done nothing wrong.

Murder is the unjustified killing of a person: the direct intentional killing of an innocent person.

Moreover, "God being the law" is partially true and partially false. God IS perfect goodness and perfect justice: His commands are not themselves what grounds what is good or just---it is His nature.

So you are right that there is no other being above Him: He is constrained by His own nature to be perfectly good. So my argument is perfectly valid: if God is all-just (because it is in His nature to be all-just and not merely because you are defining arbitrarily God's commands as what defines justice) and murder is unjust, then God cannot commit murder; but God does commit murder in the OT, so that is not God or they got the facts wrong.

Also, it is worth mentioning that these kinds of rejoinders, like Rashi’s, seem to fall prey to violating the principle of parsimony. No where in the OT does it suggest remotely that there were no children or that the beasts were shapeshifters: you’d think it would mention that, or at least not mention things which imply the contrary. — Bob Ross

Well, the story tells us in one passage there were 2 of each animal, but in another 7 pair of clean animal and 1 of unclean. It tells us the flood was 40 days but in another it was 150. The story fluctuates from calling God Yahweh and Elohim, which supports the theory that this is a tale from multiple sources weaved together and therefore not consistent. Keep in mind the physical impossibility of a rainfall flooding the entire earth and animals of all sorts from polar bears to kangaroos all converging upon the ark at the same time. And there is that whole problem of the Nephilim, the offspring of the gods and mortals which is given as the basis for the flood, further discussed in Enoch, a book that failed to make the canon. Why do we not stop and ask ourselves more about those giants of old who irritated God so much that he killed them by flood? And multiple gods having sex with humans seems so non-monotheistic. Like how do I make that consistent with the absolute monotheism of Deuteronomy?

The point being that I have no idea how to apply the rule of parsimony to this ancient and largely borrowed tale.

Then let's talk about your insistence upon looking only at the text. That isn't the Jewish tradition. They rely upon the oral tradition that was eventually written down in the Talmud, which has as much priority as the Torah for explaining all these things. That is, subtracting out the rabbinic tradition from the source material is not how the source material is supposed to be understood by those who are relying upon it.

Are you proceeding under the theory that the OT was written by God, that it is consistent, or that it can really be used without other documents for a complete understanding? The inconsistencies are not just curious problems that we must rectify, as if a diety of such complexities left them as riddles to challenge us. They are true inconsistencies, formed from too many cooks in the kitchen and preserved for posterity by an ancient editor, who's name or names was lost to time, meaning the scribe was not Moses.

By your definition, a person would kills an innocent child in society that has not made killing humans, in any way or means, illegal has not committed murder and, most crucially, apparently, has done nothing wrong. — Bob Ross

The man would be guilty by divine law, which exists independently of man-made legal systems.

God is all-just (because it is in His nature to be all-just and not merely because you are defining arbitrarily God's commands as what defines justice) and murder is unjust, then God cannot commit murder — Bob Ross

:up:

God does commit murder in the OT — Bob Ross

The religious view is that God has the right to take and give life as He sees fit.

Death is an inevitability, whether it's now or in 100 years. Whether through pain or with ease.

Your argument seems to hinge on the idea that there were no children on earth during the Flood; but the very previous chapter, 5, outlines in detail the lineage as normal procreation and Noah is said to have three sons in chapter 6.

Does it? It says Noah has his sons when he is 500 years old. His sons are all a century old when the Flood comes, when Noah is aged 600. Noah's sons are the last births mentioned in the text. If one reads this literally, I'm not sure how fair it is to make assumptions about human life cycles at these scales, particularly if one considers the radically different biology that is being suggested elsewhere.

Also, it is worth mentioning that these kinds of rejoinders, like Rashi’s, seem to fall prey to violating the principle of parsimony. No where in the OT does it suggest remotely that there were no children or that the beasts were shapeshifters: you’d think it would mention that, or at least not mention things which imply the contrary.

There is no "principle or parsimony" for reading historical texts that says: "stick to just one text." Really quite the opposite. We try to confirm things through as many traditions and texts as possible. I am not sure where Rashi got that idea though, if it might have been in an earlier tradition.

There is no "principle or parsimony" for reading historical texts that says: "stick to just one text." Really quite the opposite. We try to confirm things through as many traditions and texts as possible. I am not sure where Rashi got that idea though, if it might have been in an earlier tradition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The biblical rule that provides authority to the rabbis:

Deuteronomy 17:8–11
"If a matter eludes you in judgment... you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God shall choose. And you shall come to the Levitical priests and to the judge who will be in those days, and inquire, and they will declare to you the matter of judgment. And you shall do according to the word which they declare to you... You shall act according to the Torah which they teach you and according to the judgment which they say to you; you shall not deviate from the word they tell you, either right or left."

Consider also:

Exodus 24:12
“And the Lord said to Moses, ‘Come up to Me on the mountain and stay there, and I will give you the tablets of stone, and the law and the commandment that I have written for their instruction.’”

The "commandment" is considered differently than "the law," which is interpreted as the oral tradition that was supposedly passed down from generation to generation, eventually being written into the Talmud. The Talmud is considered as authoritive as the Torah, and it is interpreted by the rabbis. That is, there is an entire legal system devised around these writings, largely given meaning by the rabbis.

It's for that reason that isolated readings of biblical passages have no authority because they ignore other binding writings and binding rabbincal authority. It's not terribly different from legal interpretative systems in secular society, giving priority to various documents and authority to interpreters.

:up:

Exactly, and most Christians have the Church itself as an interpreter, and its most respected saints as anchors. You have the Church Fathers as an anchor point, and within them the "Universal Fathers" who are doctors of the Roman Catholic Church and also among the most respected saints in the East, e.g. the Capaddocian Fathers, Saint Maximus the Confessor, etc., as well as the Apostolic Fathers who wrote within living memory of the Apostles or those they directly taught.

Islam has a similar set of texts and interpretive system. Evangelical Christianity, as dominant as it is in the Anglophone world due to its influence in the US, is quite unique in the Abrahamic tradition in how it deals with scripture and tradition.

I sympathize with your position, since it does seem to me that the OT counts, all else being equal, against God being all-just OR that the OT is not describing God (or potentially divinely inspired).

The point of this OP is to see what people would say who would hold that the OT is divinely inspired

.

Exactly, and most Christians have the Church itself as an interpreter, and its most respected saints as anchors. You have the Church Fathers as an anchor point, and within them the "Universal Fathers" who are doctors of the Roman Catholic Church and also among the most respected saints in the East, e.g. the Capaddocian Fathers, Saint Maximus the Confessor, etc., as well as the Apostolic Fathers who wrote within living memory of the Apostles or those they directly taught.

Islam has a similar set of texts and interpretive system. Evangelical Christianity, as dominant as it is in the Anglophone world due to its influence in the US, is quite unique in the Abrahamic tradition in how it deals with scripture and tradition.

But how are they interpreting it? How do they respond to the things @Hanover said? If you would like to respond to a specific example, then here's one: why does Genesis describe God making light for the earth before the sun?

The religious view is that God has the right to take and give life as He sees fit.

But, then, murder is not the direct intentional killing of an innocent person. It would have to be defined some other way, and different than it being merely an illegal killing.

Does it? It says Noah has his sons when he is 500 years old. His sons are all a century old when the Flood comes, when Noah is aged 600. Noah's sons are the last births mentioned in the text. If one reads this literally, I'm not sure how fair it is to make assumptions about human life cycles at these scales, particularly if one considers the radically different biology that is being suggested elsewhere.

I see your point: upon thinking about it more, I think this is a fair and reasonable rejoinder. I don’t think the great flood mentions or implies there are children and there are plenty of mentioning of abnormal biology.

EDIT: It is worth noting, though, that the lineage part does suggest that they are procreating (instead of God manually creating them), so it's still kind of suspect that there are no children at all. Especially if people are said to be doing immoral things: that usually involves sex.

What are your thoughts on the other two examples I gave in the OP?

There is no "principle or parsimony" for reading historical texts that says: "stick to just one text." Really quite the opposite. We try to confirm things through as many traditions and texts as possible. I am not sure where Rashi got that idea though, if it might have been in an earlier tradition.

What I was referring to is the principle that the simpler explanation that explains the data is the one we should use. I believe this would be used by historians.

But how are they interpreting it? How do they respond to the things Hanover said? If you would like to respond to a specific example, then here's one: why does Genesis describe God making light for the earth before the sun? — Bob Ross

I am not Rabbi Hanover, so I'll cite to ChatGPT, which is generally forbidden here, but I offer it to provide you a glimpse perhaps into what I'm talking about:

Key Rabbinic Interpretations:
The "Or HaGanuz" (אור הגנוז) – the Hidden Light:

Midrash (Bereishit Rabbah 3:6) and Talmud (Chagigah 12a) teach that the light created on the first day was a special, transcendent light.

This light allowed one to see "from one end of the world to the other."

Because of its purity and power, God hid this light after the first few days of creation and reserved it for the righteous in the World to Come.

The sun and stars, created on the fourth day, are seen as "cloaks" or physical vessels to carry light going forward.

Rashi’s View (Genesis 1:3):

Rashi, citing Midrash, holds that the initial light wasn’t the same as the sun’s light.

It was an independent illumination that allowed for the division of day and night even before the celestial bodies existed.

Philosophical and Kabbalistic Views:

Maimonides (Rambam), more rationalistic, tends to allegorize these verses and sees "light" as symbolic of form, potential, or divine emanation.

Kabbalistic sources (like the Zohar) associate the first light with divine emanation—a manifestation of God’s presence, not bound by physicality.

Literal Harmonizers:

Some rabbinic commentators, like Ibn Ezra, try to harmonize with natural observation by suggesting that “light” was created in a diffuse or unlocalized form first, and only later gathered or fixed into celestial bodies.

He suggests perhaps the sun already existed but was not yet assigned its calendrical role until day four.

Your questions (all of them), trust me, have all been answered in one form or the other over the past couple thousand years.

Yeah, but don't those seem like highly ad hoc explanations? The Rabbi, granting Chatgpt even got it right, is inventing a new kind of light to explain it when the simpler answer is that the author had no clue how light works OR the author was trying to convey something spiritual.

I'll try a different approach, as I don't intend to restate what I've already said.

Considering other common forms of death in antiquity, death by flood isn't exactly a bad way to go. Would you also think, e.g., death by tuberculosis or dysentery to be God "murdering?" Or dying at 60 of heart disease? People rarely lived past that back then. I don't get where we draw the line between God "murdering" and there being an ok death that isn't "God murdering" if we adopt this absurd view that God "murders."

Secondly, if a set of pre-existent rules binds God, then he is not God. Creation (which includes rules) proceeds from God.

The Talmud is considered as authoritive as the Torah, and it is interpreted by the rabbis. That is, there is an entire legal system devised around these writings, largely given meaning by the rabbis. — Hanover

Talmud helps us apply Torah, but Torah is the holier, more primary text. If you're looking for a complete code of halakha just go to Shulchan Aruch or Mishneh Torah and skip the Talmud, but the authors of those respective books would never say that their texts hold equal weight to the Torah such a claim would be horrible blasphemy. Those works are Judaism's best attempts at halakha (religious law) formulation, but a major thinker like Maimonedes would argue that understanding is to be prioritized over the simple rule following of religious law.

Talmud helps us apply Torah, but Torah is the holier, more primary text. — BitconnectCarlos

Thanks for confirming.

Sort of, but that would be immune to the strongest part of my argument; which involves the children. We could dispute plausbly either way if, for example, there were any healthy adults which could be held to be an Amalekite proper and I am willing to concede, given the seemingly identity relation between being an Amalekate and a part of the cult, that there weren't any. — Bob Ross

Okay, that's fair. I just wanted to try to impress the idea that the Amalekite culture and the Amalekite religion/cult go hand in hand, and if we want to get into the exegesis we could show that it is specifically the abominations associated with the Amalekites that God is concerned with. The question, "Why the Amalekites?," is something we ought to keep in mind. It would be a significant mistake to assume that this is how God/Israel deals with every people-group. But let's move on to children.

At the end of the day, I emphasize the children, although I understand you are setting that aspect of it aside for a second, because it is really implausible in my mind that there were no Amalekate children and it seems like they would be a part of the ban. — Bob Ross

I think it is reasonable to assume that there were Amalekite children and that they were part of the ban.

1. The God of the OT commanded Saul to put the Amalekites under the ban
2. There were innocent children among the Amalekites
3. Therefore, the God of the OT commanded the killing of the innocent
4. The killing of the innocent is unjust
5. Therefore, the God of the OT is unjust — Leontiskos

In the first place I would want to note that in our Western society which strongly values individualism, the individual is the central agent and the child is often seen to be his own person, so to speak. I saw the new Superman movie (which I did not think was very good) and there is a scene where Clark's father is telling him that parents don't shape their children's lives, but instead give the children tools with which to shape their own lives. That a pretty standard individualistic sentiment, and it would in no way have been the view of ancient peoples.

To oversimplify, the ancient world is going to see the child as strongly shaped by their environment—both "nature" and "nurture"—whereas our own culture tends to see the child as a free agent who largely transcends their environment. I think we have veered too far in the "libertarian" direction, and I think that a factual or statistical analysis would show that children are deeply influenced by environment and culture.

A second consideration is the question of support mechanism. Suppose Israel wipes out the adults. Would they have the resources to absorb all of the children into their own numbers? That seems unlikely, and neither is it clear that the children would be overly cooperative at that point or even when they grow older. So there is the simple logistical problem, where there is a people-group who practices abominations (human sacrifice, cannibalism, rape, demon worship, etc.) and you have to address the problem. How do you address it? Given that the adults are not able to be reformed, they must be imprisoned or killed, and imprisonment of such a large number would have been impractical in that day (if not in ours as well!). So what do you do with the children? How do you view the children? Similarly, what is best for the children? Should they be left to live without parents and support? Should they be left to grow up into evil cannibals (in the case where their parents are not killed)? Should they be abandoned to their fate if they cannot be incorporated and supported? I don't see any obvious answers here. Indeed, the command to kill the children is much like a command to pull out the weed by its root, so that it does not regrow.

Now your argument is apparently thinking in terms of commutative justice, where the child is the agent, the agent has done nothing wrong and is therefore innocent, and therefore the child cannot be harmed and certainly not killed.

So at this stage we have three considerations which cannot be altogether ignored:

• Individual agency vs. group agency
• How to address the problem of abominations which have become embedded in a people-group
• The injustice of killing the individual, including children

The injustice argument has a certain preeminence given that it is trading in exceptionless norms. More explicitly, if the Amalekite children have a right to life, then it is unjust to kill them. So we probably want to ask whether they do in fact have a right to life, even though they are Amalekite children.

Certainly if we think of agency in terms of groups instead of in terms of individuals, then it is no longer clear that the Amalekite children have a right to life. More specifically, it is no longer clear that the Amalekite children are innocent, given that they are inextricably bound up with an abominable group.

Note that when thinking in terms of group agency rather than individual agency, children of the Edomites, for example, are innocent in virtue of their people-group and therefore do have a right to life. Or more simply, the commandment against murder applies straightforwardly to them. So the criterion of innocence has not been abandoned, but is rather being interpreted and applied differently.

Anyway, those are three of the basic data points I think we would need to consider when thinking about the Amalekite children.

If so, then how do you explain the fact that God punished Saul for sparing some animals? Doesn't that suggest that God was including everything that lived in the City itself? — Bob Ross

At the very end of that clip I suggested this is addressed quite well (beginning at 1:11:45). If you didn't get a chance to watch those 18 minutes I would recommend it.


P.S. The reason you aren't getting a lot of direct answers to your argument in this thread is simply because it is a very difficult argument to address. For that reason I'm not sure whether I will succeed in giving you a satisfactory answer either, but I think these considerations complicate the initial picture quite a bit.

Considering other common forms of death in antiquity, death by flood isn't exactly a bad way to go. Would you also think, e.g., death by tuberculosis or dysentery to be God "murdering?"

Are you confusing an action with an allowance. God is doing the flooding (by willing it); whereas a person with cancer right now was through privations of what God wills—God is not willing it.

It’s the difference between me killing someone and letting them die.

Secondly, if a set of pre-existent rules binds God, then he is not God. Creation (which includes rules) proceeds from God.

God is not bound by rules; but that doesn’t mean He isn’t bound by His nature. His nature is perfectly good which binds Him: the modality of ‘rules’ is irrelevant to that point.

Again, you are taking a divine command theorist approach and this is very flawed. Things are not good merely because God wills them: God has to will them in a way that is good because He is goodness itself—His nature is perfectly good.

Okay, that's fair. I just wanted to try to impress the idea that the Amalekite culture and the Amalekite religion/cult go hand in hand, and if we want to get into the exegesis we could show that it is specifically the abominations associated with the Amalekites that God is concerned with. The question, "Why the Amalekites?," is something we ought to keep in mind. It would be a significant mistake to assume that this is how God/Israel deals with every people-group

That’s fine by me.

I think it is reasonable to assume that there were Amalekite children and that they were part of the ban.

:up:

In the first place I would want to note that in our Western society which strongly values individualism, the individual is the central agent and the child is often seen to be his own person, so to speak
…
A second consideration is the question of support mechanism.

I am having a hard time parsing your argument. Let me offer some arguments I think might be extractable from your elaboration. I’m going to use loose arguments and I am not intending to put words in your mouth.

Argument from Group Agency

1. A person’s innocence or guilt is determined relative to the group’s innocence or guilt.
2. A person that has done nothing wrong themselves but is a part of a group that is guilty is thereby guilty (just the same).
3. Murder is the direct intentional killing of an innocent person.
4. The Amalekite group was guilty (of relevant crimes to potentially killing them).
5. The Amalekite children had done nothing wrong.
6. The Amalekite children were guilty by association with the Amalekite group (2).
7. Therefore, killing the Amalekite children was not murder.

Is this an argument you would endorse?

Briefly, I would say that I would deny 2. Ethics is person-centric, not group-centric; but then, again, maybe you would rejoin that this is ‘libertarian modernism’.

Argument from Mercy Killing

1. A person that could be mercy killed or left to endure a serious and fatal life (such as leaving them to starve to death because no one can feed them) should be mercy killed.
2. The children of the Amalekites would have been left to starve, because the Israelites lacked the resources to integrate them into their society properly, and inevitably die in insufferable ways.
3. Therefore, the children should have been mercy killed.

Is this an argument you would endorse?

Briefly, I would say this is consequentialistic; and I would deny it on those grounds. Murder is not allowable if letting a person live would result in grave consequences for that person—including insufferable death.

Argument from Evil Cleansing

1. An extremely evil idea deeply rooted in a society, culturally, should be eradicated.
2. Eradicating such an extremely evil idea is infeasible without killing off most of the population.
3. Therefore, one should kill most of the population of a society that has a deeply rooted extremely evil idea.

Is this an argument you would endorse?

Briefly, I would say that this also is consequentialistic at heart. I don’t think it is permissible to do evil in order to eradicate evil.

P.S. The reason you aren't getting a lot of direct answers to your argument in this thread is simply because it is a very difficult argument to address. For that reason I'm not sure whether I will succeed in giving you a satisfactory answer either, but I think these considerations complicate the initial picture quite a bit.

That’s fair, but aren’t you a Christian? I’m curious what you make of these difficult passages: does it affect your faith?

Things are not good merely because God wills them: God has to will them in a way that is good because He is goodness itself—His nature is perfectly good. — Bob Ross

God is reality. The dynamic essence of reality, according to the Hebrew conception. I believe God is good, but he is reality first. If he is good, his idea of goodness is simply beyond our common-sense understanding. This is the same God who sent snakes and plagues to the Israelites in the desert and swallowed up Korah's family whole. The same God who slew the Egyptians' firstborn from the highest to the lowest, and even included animals in that count.

In some ways, I find the NT God more terrifying. In the OT, he'll kill you, but he never threatens you with eternal damnation. If you want to define God as the Form of the Good, you can worship that, but you're better off reading Plato. I'm not even sure what the point would be of worshipping the Form of the Good; wouldn't it just be a one-way relationship?

The Rabbi, granting Chatgpt even got it right, is inventing a new kind of light to explain it when the simpler answer is that the author had no clue how light works OR the author was trying to convey something spiritual. — Bob Ross

Which part of the midrash or Talmudic passage cited do you contend doesn't support the interpretation?

My comment just points out you didn't explore those cites or other rabbinic commentary because you've already decided upon a hermeneutic that demands author intent determine meaning. Notwithstanding the Creation myth passages clearly provide distinct stories strewn together and you have no basis to suggest the original author(s) ever expected their tale to be taken as a literal account.

Is the interestiing part of Aesop's fox and grape fable that it accurately describes human behavior or that foxes can speak?

My point here is simply to say if you've arrived at literalist method of interpretation within the four corners of the document, you will reject others, but just appreciate you're using language differently.

Wittgensteinian speaking, you're a different form of life.

God allowing human evil is necessary in order for us to have free will; and we need that to choose Him. This does allow, then, for humans to commit atrocities against each other. — Bob Ross

Is there free will in heaven?

Is there free will in heaven? — night912

That is a very good question! If Heaven is the final destination for those who repent, and if these individuals are free, then they could commit sins in Heaven as well!

That is a very good question! If Heaven is the final destination for those who repent, and if these individuals are free, then they could commit sins in Heaven as well!

Or, if free will exist in heaven and evil doesn't exist, then it's possible that God could create a world where no evil exists and free will also exist. That means that God chose to create a world where evil exist.

Or, if free will exist in heaven and evil doesn't exist, then it's possible that God could create a world where no evil exists and free will also exist. That means that God chose to create a world where evil exist. — night912

I don't equate evil with sin, but I understand what you are trying to say.

Okay, those are reasonable attempts to capture my arguments and good responses in turn. :up:

First, let me try to elaborate on the second consideration I gave. Consider this argument:

1. It is impermissible to indirectly kill an infant
2. Killing an infant's parents will indirectly kill the infant (if left to itself)
3. Therefore, it is impermissible to kill an infant's parents (for any reason, so long as you cannot support the infant)

Would you agree with that argument? Because anyone who accepts that argument simply cannot justify killing the Amalekite parents, regardless of what the parents have done, unless of course all of the infants can be supported. That is one way of seeing how the second consideration comes to bear on the issue. Specifically, it is the idea that the Amalekite adults who should be killed cannot be killed because they have infants (and thus the Amalekites will simply keep infants as a defense strategy).

Similarly, suppose that (1) is false and that one is permitted to indirectly kill an infant in certain circumstances. In that case a command to kill infants could be reasonably interpreted as a command to indirectly kill infants by killing their evil parents.

Another argument would be as follows. God is allowed to "kill," given that every time anything dies God has "killed" it. Life and death are in God's hands. Can God delegate such a prerogative to the Israelites in special cases, such as that of the Amalekites? If so, then this "mercy killing" of an infant is not per se unjust, and it actually provides the infant with the best option, given the alternatives.

Let me respond to a few things:

Argument from Evil Cleansing

1. An extremely evil idea deeply rooted in a society, culturally, should be eradicated.
2. Eradicating such an extremely evil idea is infeasible without killing off most of the population.
3. Therefore, one should kill most of the population of a society that has a deeply rooted extremely evil idea.

Is this an argument you would endorse?

Briefly, I would say that this also is consequentialistic at heart. I don’t think it is permissible to do evil in order to eradicate evil. — Bob Ross

2. A person that has done nothing wrong themselves but is a part of a group that is guilty is thereby guilty (just the same). — Bob Ross

The first thing I would say here is that someone who intentionally remains attached to an evil group is evil, and has bound themselves to the consequences of that group. But this doesn't apply to infants or small children.

Note though that collateral damage is part of war, and that it bears on the question of directly intended killing versus indirectly intended killing. Often innocents are casualties of war, and often this is foreseen, but there is a difference between intending to kill an innocent and foreseeing an innocent's death as a side-effect. This is all related to our conversation about indirect intention and double effect.

That’s fair, but aren’t you a Christian? I’m curious what you make of these difficult passages: does it affect your faith? — Bob Ross

Yes, I am a Christian. I would say that, first, I am not God and therefore I do not expect to understand everything. Second, there are many different ways to approach these issues, and the video from Akin highlights some of the different approaches. A lot of it relates to whether some text is literal or figurative, and whether one takes the text to be inerrant. I actually like Fr. Stephen De Young's approach because it is not too liberal or wishy-washy, it is rigorous, it is contextually robust, etc.

With that said, your argument is not bad. Perhaps such an argument must push us into more liberal exegetical approaches. Or perhaps such an argument must push us away from the Old Testament altogether. That's possible. I am not there myself, but I do know some people who take such routes.

So you are right that there is no other being above Him: He is constrained by His own nature to be perfectly good. So my argument is perfectly valid: if God is all-just (because it is in His nature to be all-just and not merely because you are defining arbitrarily God's commands as what defines justice) and murder is unjust, then God cannot commit murder; but God does commit murder in the OT, so that is not God or they got the facts wrong. — Bob Ross

Bob, your argument is not perfectly valid. It is only partly valid. You argued that God is perfectly good
and cannot be evil. You argue that if "God does commit murder in the OT, then that is not God, or they got the facts wrong." This is a valid argument. But when you said that God committed murder, your argument became invalid. I would argue that God did not commit murder in the Old Testament, He did not murder the Amalekites because they were not truly dead. God only destroyed their flesh and brought them to judgement. God's judgement and justice is perfect. You are only truly dead when you are dead to God.

Or perhaps such an argument must push us away from the Old Testament altogether. That's possible. I am not there myself, but I do know some people who take such routes. — Leontiskos

I don't see how Christianity can do this. Jesus frequently references the Old Testament, so the Christian exegetical approach to those passages would be something along the lines of "Jesus is referencing irrelevant texts" if we were to discard or "push away" the OT. Who or what would that make Jesus? Maybe a conman.

- I agree, and yet Jesus has become one of the most plastic figures in history. People make him in their own image, texts be damned.

* Note that when I spoke about the possibility of being pushed away from the OT, I was prescinding from the question of Christianity. Such a thing may or may not invalidate Christianity (even though I think it generally would).

Note that when I spoke about the possibility of being pushed away from the OT, I was prescinding from the question of Christianity. — Leontiskos

Could you elaborate?