import variables — Bob Ross

What variables? You mean truth and the actual reality of the situation at hand? That's a bit of an abrasively dismissive way of describing such, wouldn't you say? But alright then.

Seriously. Imagine yourself just on the crosswalk and having the misfortune of witnessing a child being stabbed. Or something else egregious, whatever suits you. You see the man who discards his knife and then walks nonchalant coming up to the scene just when an officer does, and said man acts in utter shock. You tell the officer "He just stabbed him! He threw the knife over that ledge!". And the officer responds, "oh you're just importing variables into the hypothetical". It is not a hypothetical. It literally happened. At least, allegedly, per the text we're discussing.

I said you were shifting the goal-post because obviously innocence is a key component of murder: no one disputes that and my original comment was a definition of murder. — Bob Ross

Okay, so like I said. Maybe your premise is invalid. Simply, perhaps you're just wrong about one or more things. This is why religion is not generally a "hot topic" in the halls of philosophy. Because faith is belief, and belief is anything you deem fit. It's your right, after all.

You didn't answer my question. I asked why Jesus called himself the promised Person, Messiah, cited in the Old Testament, if the Old Testament is wrong. What is the God of the Old Testament? Is He real or is he a fiction made by people?

Bob, by your reasoning, if "murder is the direct intentional killing of an innocent person and a killing is to end the natural life of a being", then aren't we destined to be murdered by God eventually and intentionally as we lead our innocent ordinary lives? By that reasoning, all human deaths are murders by God. I would argue that If God go and kill someone it isn't murder because they haven't truly died since their soul is immutable and ends up in heaven to face God's judgement. — GregW

↪GregW I don't think that is true. God may indirectly intentionally kill people or let them die; but He does not directly intentionally kill people (notwithstanding just punishment).

What definition of murder are you using? — Bob Ross

Bob, I am using your definition of murder. In Genesis, God directly intentionally cursed man to suffer and eventually die when He expelled man from the Garden of Eden. You have many posts saying that God directly intentionally killed all the Amalekites. I am arguing that God killing us or letting us die is not murder because we are not (yet) dead to God until after His judgement.

Ok, thank you for the clarification. If you are using my definition and leveraging that God is not murdering people because they can't truly die, then no one ever commits murder. Are you accepting that? I want to make sure we are on the same page about the consistent conclusion of your position here.

If I kill an innocent infant, then the same logic would apply: I have not murdered them because they haven't truly died.

That's why I added in the "and a killing is to end the natural life of a being" since rational souls have a supernatural component that the stereotypical idea of killing does not apply.

I don't see the relevance: can you elaborate on how this relevant to the OP?

Let me grant you that Jesus relates himself to the messiah from the OT which, in turn, is related to the God of the OT (the father). My argument demonstrates that the OT gets some stuff wrong about God because God can't do some of the things the OT claims God did; so those portions are false. However, it could be true that some of the other portions are accurate or none of it is. This argument certainly would jeopardize the standard Christian view that the Bible is inerrant.

What variables? You mean truth and the actual reality of the situation at hand? That's a bit of an abrasively dismissive way of describing such, wouldn't you say? But alright then.

When we discuss hypotheticals, they are in a vacuum: they are ceteris paribus. We add in variables to test our reasoning and decipher what we believe. You keep shifting the goal posts because you are not quite envisioning or appreciating this aspect of hypotheticals.

If I say “is it permissible to run a red light all else being equal?”, then it is not a valid response to say “it is permissible if its 1 AM with no traffic and your wife is bleeding out in the car while you rush her to the hospital”. Do you see what I mean?

And the officer responds, "oh you're just importing variables into the hypothetical". It is not a hypothetical. It literally happened. At least, allegedly, per the text we're discussing.

That’s not at all what’s happening. That’s adding context to a real scenario: these are hypothetical scenarios. Do you understand the difference between a hypothetical scenario and a real-life scenario?

Okay, so like I said. Maybe your premise is invalid. Simply, perhaps you're just wrong about one or more things. This is why religion is not generally a "hot topic" in the halls of philosophy. Because faith is belief, and belief is anything you deem fit. It's your right, after all.

Nothing about my definition of murder is faith-based or religious: I don’t know why you went there.

To be clear, if you reject that murder definitionally has to do with killing an innocent person then you are using a definition that is completely and utterly foreign to the modern justice system. A definition that includes killing guilty people would imply that there may be scenarios where what normally is considered legitimate self-defense is murder and scenarios where normal murder is not self-defense and yet not murder or manslaughter.

Ok, thank you for the clarification. If you are using my definition and leveraging that God is not murdering people because they can't truly die, then no one ever commits murder. Are you accepting that? I want to make sure we are on the same page about the consistent conclusion of your position here.

If I kill an innocent infant, then the same logic would apply: I have not murdered them because they haven't truly died. — Bob Ross

Bob, here's the flaw in your logic. You cannot compare yourself to God. Just because God does not commit murder does not mean that no one ever commits murder. If you kill an innocent infant, then you have committed murder even though to God the infant is not truly dead. But to you, and more importantly to the justice system, the infant is dead. Just because the murdered infant is not dead to God does not mean that you are absolved of this evil act.

Then you need to refurbish your position. You said that God does not murder because when he kills us we don't truly die. This applies to all killings within your view.

You need to clearly define what murder is and then apply that standard to God's killings. So far you just keep ad hoc patching your view. You say God can't murder because you don't really die, but we both agree that's false; so now you are appealing to God just being special.

I'll ask you again: how do you define murder?

I agree that there are legally justified killings. If you commit a legally justified killing, then you will likely not be in trouble with the law. let's look at a hypothetical example. God asked a man to hijack an airplane and crash it into a building full of evil people. In obeying God's command, is he justified in killing thousands of people? Is this a justifiable killing in a court of law? — GregW

Your hypothetical assumes God assessed the evil of the people within the building and determined that their death would save the world from greater harm, or perhaps he assessed their just dessert to be death by airplane. That is, this was not the killing of innocent people, and it would go somewhere along the lines of any other preemptive response (like self defense) or just punishment.

This is not to suggest that when someone believes God tells them to do something that they are justified in doing it or that that there isn't real danger in relying upon what you believe the will of God is when you act. Your hypothetical, strictly construed, is that God directed the order, so here we know it was God's will.

We can hypothesize a rational basis for any decision. As in, should I use a baby as a baseball bat? In a typical day, no you probably shouldn't do that, but suppose the only way to save a village from complete annihilation is to beat back the attackers with a slinging baby? Maybe the act itself would bring such fear to the attackers, they'd leave the village alone for millenia. But this ridiculous hypothetical makes an important assumption: you know with certainty the baby as weapon will be effective, you know with certainty that there are no lesser alternatives, and you know that without it, your whole village will die.

How can you know all this? You know it because your hypothetical asserted it when it said the information came form God.

Back to Amalek. We are working within a scenario where we know God is talking to the actors in the story. There have been miracles of plagues and the parting of the sea and God seems to be having fairly open conversations with Moses. Presenting this story as myth, a work of fiction, but with a consistency among its characters, we say of course the response to Amalek was justified. We have a super-hero built in the story that is always right.

I don't see the relevance: can you elaborate on how this relevant to the OP? — Bob Ross

You didn't reply to my last post here, so I don't know what you think about it. The current discussion started from the point that I replied to your post, in which you were saying that OT is wrong.

Let me grant you that Jesus relates himself to the messiah from the OT which, in turn, is related to the God of the OT (the father). My argument demonstrates that the OT gets some stuff wrong about God because God can't do some of the things the OT claims God did; so those portions are false. — Bob Ross

Why didn't Jesus Himself say that portion of the OT is false? How could Jesus miss such an important thing in His teaching, if the purpose of His teaching is to complete the prophecy as well?

↪Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

"This idea occurred to me as a part of an argument that God cannot be a utilitarian: ...... So there is no maximum amount of goodness that God could create, just as there is no largest integer. But utilitarianism requires us to cause the maximum amount of good possible. Therefore God cannot be a utilitarian."

I commend your cleverness and ingenuity here; but I think this is fallacious. Goodness is not quanitified over like an atom: it isn’t a concrete being but, rather, a property that concrete beings can have.

...... — Bob Ross

You may be right, Bob, although I don't fully understand your argument. Mine was directed against utilitarians. Since you are not a utilitarian, it would probably have been better for me not to have brought it up. We agree that God must be just, and that is what is troubling you about the O.T. So I'd rather not discuss any further here the question of whether there is any limit to the amount of goodness God could create, but rather use my limited time to try to address your concerns about slavery.

You didn't reply to my last post here, so I don't know what you think about it. The current discussion started from the point that I replied to your post, in which you were saying that OT is wrong.

I may have missed something: I apologize. I still don’t see the relevance of:

Why didn't Jesus Himself say that portion of the OT is false?

Given Jesus failed to address the OT’s mistakes and given him referring to himself as the messiah and that the OT is errant, it follows that Jesus probably wasn’t God.

With respect to your post you linked:

You do when you relate evil as privation of good. Good and evil are fundamental features of our experiences. We humans mostly prefer good over evil because of our genes. So we are biased.

Goodness is the equality of essence and esse; so it follows that badness is the privation (inequality) of essence and esse. So badness to goodness is like darkness to light.

You would have to provide a different account of goodness to make it work with your view that evil is some positive, real thing out there. My point was that I am a privation theorist about evil; so I do no think it is just as unreal as darkness.

:up:

Feel free to let me know your thoughts on Biblical slavery.

C: EXODUS SLAVERY AND INDENTURED SERVITUDE

This is talking about beating slaves (or perhaps indentured servants) as permissible:

When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod and the slave dies under his hand, he shall be avenged. But if the slave survives a day or two, he is not to be avenged, for the slave is his money.

This is talking about raping women, selling women into sex slavery, and the implicit permissibility of polygamy (although I will keep the whole passage so not to misconstrue the other parts)(emphasis added):

When a man sells his daughter as a slave, she shall not go out as the male slaves do. If she does not please her master, who has designated her for himself, then he shall let her be redeemed. He shall have no right to sell her to a foreign people, since he has broken faith with her. 9 If he designates her for his son, he shall deal with her as with a daughter. If he takes another wife to himself, he shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or her marital rights. And if he does not do these three things for her, she shall go out for nothing, without payment of money.

......

ACCUSATION(S)

Rape, slavery, and indentured servitude are unjust and God cannot commit an injustice; so Exodus cannot be Divinely inspired. — Bob Ross

1. The first passage (Ex 21:20-21) is about beating slaves, as you say: specifically, beating them to death. Saying it is not to be punished is not the same as saying it is permissible. In the Ten Commandments there is one against murder!

2. It is not altogether clear to me that the second passage (Ex 21:7-11) is about raping women and selling them into sex slavery. Verse 9 suggests that the daughter who is sold becomes a wife or something like a wife. If she is not a wife, then the man who bought her (or his son) would be committing adultery, which is also forbidden in the Ten Commandments.

Be that as it may, in the Old Testament we already see the commandments to love God and neighbor (Mt 22:34-40, Dt 6:5, Lev 19:18) A father who sold his daughter into any kind of undesirable situation would be not loving his daughter.

Polygyny is tolerated, but I think its portrayal is never favorable, frequently unfavorable. Look at all the troubles resulting from the multiple wives in the families of Abraham, Jacob, and David!

3. A wise and just lawgiver will sometimes permit acts that are wrong, because the evils of repressing them are worse than the evils of allowing them. (Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 96, A. 2 ) As Jesus said in the New Testament, "For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginnning it was not so." (Matthew 19:8)

Is it not the same with the regulations concerning slavery?

4. "Modern readers are distressed by the inclusion of laws concerning slavery in this biblical code (Ex 21:1-11, 20-21, 26-27, 32), but for ancient peoples, including Israel, slavery was simply an unquestioned reality and a part of life. When the laws of the Covenant Code are compared with other ancient Near Eastern law codes, it is worth nothing that they emphasize limiting the duration of slavery (Ex 21:1-6), protecting the marital rights of female slaves (Ex 21:7-11), and providing sanctions against the abuse of slaves (Ex 21:20, 26-27)." ---John Bergsma and Brant Pitre, A Catholic Introduction to the Bible: The Old Testament (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2018), ch. 7, "Exodus", p. 181.

5. To sum up: the laws given in the Old Testament restrained evil gradually, not suddenly, because of the hardness of men's hearts.

6. Re-reading the OP, I've just noticed that you anticipated a reply along these lines and have said that it turns God into a consequentialist. I don't think it does, but please give me some time to reflect on that before repeating your objection ....

Given Jesus failed to address the OT’s mistakes and given him referring to himself as the messiah and that the OT is errant, it follows that Jesus probably wasn’t God. — Bob Ross

Probably or certainly!? If God fails to convey His message, then He is not God.

Goodness is the equality of essence and esse; so it follows that badness is the privation (inequality) of essence and esse. So badness to goodness is like darkness to light.

You would have to provide a different account of goodness to make it work with your view that evil is some positive, real thing out there. My point was that I am a privation theorist about evil; so I do no think it is just as unreal as darkness. — Bob Ross

I would like to bring you to the crux of our discussion: You mentioned that evil exists, but it is not real. Don't you see a problem in this statement? I am afraid that you need to read through our discussion to see why we reached such a crux.

Probably or certainly!? If God fails to convey His message, then He is not God.

I don’t see why that would be the case. Although maybe you are getting at a divine hiddenness objection.

I would like to bring you to the crux of our discussion: You mentioned that evil exists, but it is not real. Don't you see a problem in this statement?

I see why you see an issue; but there is none. I distinguish between being and reality; and you don’t.

Something has being if it is; but something is real if and only if it is a member of reality.

For example, the color orange that I see, phenomenally, has being but is not a member of reality—so it exists but is not real. A chair is real because it has being and is a member of reality.

I would view darkness more like having being in the sense of the color orange and less in the sense of the chair; but granted it is an absence which is different than the color orange.

The problem with this rejoinder is that it reduces God to a consequentialist. E.g., He codifies rules about slavery because no one would have listened to Him if He spoke the ethical truth that it is wrong; ....

God cannot be a consequentalist: an action's permissibility can be influenced by the circumstances, but some actions are clearly bad or good in-themselves and actions like murder, rape, etc. are bad in-themselves. He cannot tip the scales of an immoral act because the consequences of doing it would be a greater good: God does not weigh actions on a scale of the most good for the most people. — Bob Ross

Agreed, God cannot be a consequentialist. But how does making restrictions on slavery, to make it less evil, turn Him into one?

Suppose I am a state legislator in a country where abortion is permitted up to "viability". I believe that abortion, the deliberate killing of an unborn human being, is always wrong. I vote for a bill prohibiting abortions after six weeks of pregnancy, with penalties for abortion providers, no penalties for the mothers, and no exceptions except life of the mother. This law, if it could be enforced, would drastically reduce the frequency of the injustice of abortion, and that is my intent. Does that make me a consequentialist? Am I having an abortion myself? Am I providing abortions or helping someone to have one? Am I telling people it is okay to have abortions?

The law is on the books, but it can't be enforced. Then the nation's Supreme Court reverses Roe v. Wade, turning abortion law back to the states. The barbarians come into my state with their money and their ads and flood the airwaves and tubes with an actor saying "I wouldn't want my 15-year old daughter to go through the pain of having to bear a child conceived by rape", etc.---not noticing or caring that he'd be wanting to kill his own grandchild---and they have a referendum and the people pass a state constitutional amendment to make abortion legal again up to "viability".

I tell you that to prevent that I would have voted for a six-week ban with exceptions for rape and incest, and I'm no consequentialist. I think it would be my duty to make clear, publicly, my opposition to abortion under any circumstances, and my reasons for voting for the limited ban.

So where does this leave the God of the Old Testament? Did He speak against slavery through the prophets or the rabbis? Not all that they said would have been recorded, so we don't know. Except, what's this?

And if thy brother-Israelite is brought by poverty to sell his own liberty to thee, do not submit him to bondage with thy slaves; let him work in thy household as if he were a hired servant or a free alien, till the year of jubilee comes. Then, with his children, he must be restored to his kindred and to his ancestral lands. The Israelites know no master but me, their rescuer from Egypt; they must not be bought and sold like slaves; do not use thy power over him, then, to treat him ill, as thou fearest God’s vengeance. Your men-slaves and women-slaves must come from the nations round about you; or they must be aliens who have come to dwell among you, or children of theirs born on your soil; these you may hold
as chattels, passing them on to your children by right of inheritance, as belonging to you in perpetuity; but you must not lord it over your brother-Israelites. — Leviticus 25: 39-46, Knox translation

Does this passage contradict the other (Ex 21:7-11)? If so, I will not be so bold as to draw any and all logical consequences from it. But rather, doesn't the other passage apply to the case where a man has broken the law by selling his daughter, and moderate her circumstances?

Hmm ... I feel like I'm ranting more than expressing myself with proper logical clarity. And you might object that my declaring "I am not a consequentialist", either on behalf of myself or of the state legislator, does not prove that I'm not or he isn't, any more than a man's declaring "I have always known that I am the Queen of England" proves he is so.

So let's get down to the logic, shall we?

Could we start with a definition of consequentialist? I mean, I think everybody understands something like "Consequentialism ... is simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences .... the most prominent example is probably consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act ...." (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consequentialism/)

So what I'm trying to ask is:

1. What kind of consequentialist do you think the O.T. God would have to be? I mean, for example, an act or rule based consequentialist, and what idea of the kinds of properties of consequences, such as pleasure and pain, that are relevant, etc.

2. How does His making rules to mitigate slavery, without prohibiting it entirely make Him a consequentialist of that kind?

What are your thoughts on the other two examples I gave in the OP?

Well, in the case of the law, I think it's important to consider that there is a difference between what God wills and what God permits. I don't think the law is intended as a guide for ideal behavior. The law restrains existing practice. The section you cited is not a positive commandment. It would perhaps be more challenging to consider some of the positive commandments re punishments (some of which seems excessive), or even the practice of animal sacrifice.

Yet in considering the law it seems important to consider the entire historical purpose of the law within the context of God's relationship with man.

Since plenty seems objectionable to modern eyes there, I would think the overarching question would be: "if God was good, could God have given a tribal, near eastern group like the Hebrews this sort of law, or would a "good God" necessarily have to give them a more enlightened law?

I am not sure this question is all that different from: "if God is good, would God allow near eastern culture (really all cultures) to develop these sorts of practices?" Either way, God is allowing these practices. I am not sure if questions of guilt by commission (giving the law that doesn't go far enough) versus omission (contexts without a law) are that different when it comes to divine causality, or at least it isn't clear to me why it should make a difference in this case, when the law was going to be broken anyways. Basically: could a "good God," have given no law at all, but then if a "good God" does give a law, it must be an ideal one?

It seems relevant here that even the commands that were given, even in the context of signs and wonders, were immediately disobeyed. If God knew that even a "slow pitch" law that conformed to contemporary standards would be ignored or abused, what exactly would be the purpose of an even higher standard, which would likely be ignored to an even greater extent? But then the prophets begin to expand upon the law and its spirit. So, one could see it as more or a process. Our culture tends to be quite individualistic, but I think this makes more sense if one thinks of God as working with Israel over centuries, and man across history.

I don’t see why that would be the case. Although maybe you are getting at a divine hiddenness objection. — Bob Ross

We are talking about a God who is Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Omnipotent. Such a God, for example, could present Himself to individuals, so there would be no doubt, and teach the correct way to live life, so there would be nothing wrong. Why does God hide from us? Prophecies have all failed!

I distinguish between being and reality; and you don’t. — Bob Ross

I do.

something is real if and only if it is a member of reality. — Bob Ross

That says nothing to me. To me, real means actually existing as a thing, whether it is different modes of experience or beings.

For example, the color orange that I see, phenomenally, has being but is not a member of reality—so it exists but is not real. — Bob Ross

I cannot see how this follows given my definition of real.

I agree that there are legally justified killings. If you commit a legally justified killing, then you will likely not be in trouble with the law. let's look at a hypothetical example. God asked a man to hijack an airplane and crash it into a building full of evil people. In obeying God's command, is he justified in killing thousands of people? Is this a justifiable killing in a court of law? — GregW

Your hypothetical assumes God assessed the evil of the people within the building and determined that their death would save the world from greater harm, or perhaps he assessed their just dessert to be death by airplane. That is, this was not the killing of innocent people, and it would go somewhere along the lines of any other preemptive response (like self defense) or just punishment.

This is not to suggest that when someone believes God tells them to do something that they are justified in doing it or that that there isn't real danger in relying upon what you believe the will of God is when you act. Your hypothetical, strictly construed, is that God directed the order, so here we know it was God's will. — Hanover

Hanover, you appear to be saying that as long as you are certain that the order cane from God, you are justified in the killings of thousands of people. Sadly, I think that most people agree with you. Today, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and religious leaders have ordered men to fly airplanes to drop bombs into buildings full of people, innocent or not. These are all considered to be legally justified killings, we no longer need to use God for justification.

Then you need to refurbish your position. You said that God does not murder because when he kills us we don't truly die. This applies to all killings within your view.

You need to clearly define what murder is and then apply that standard to God's killings. So far you just keep ad hoc patching your view. You say God can't murder because you don't really die, but we both agree that's false; so now you are appealing to God just being special.

I'll ask you again: how do you define murder? — Bob Ross

Bob, we are at loggerheads because not only can't we agree on the definition of murder, but we also can't agree on the definition of death. A murder must have a dead victim. If the victim is alive, then it's not murder. My position, my argument is that God did not commit murder in the Old Testament because not only is God perfectly good but also the people He supposedly murdered is not truly dead.

Let me use you in a story as an example. You were with your friend living an innocent ordinary life when God appears and struck you with a thunder bolt. Your friends all said that you were murdered by God when they buried you. You were brought to heaven, body and soul., and in the presence of God, you asked: Him why did you murdered me? God replied, Bob, I didn't murder you, you're still alive. But since you accuse me of murdering you, you are dead to me. You immediately disappeared from the presence of God. Now you are truly dead. Bob, let me ask this, were you murdered by God on earth as well as in heaven?

The person who says that being killed in the hand of a God who is Just and All Wise is wrong is wrong! Of course, after accepting that such a God exists.

I appreciate your thoughts!

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).

Moreover:

Suppose I am a state legislator in a country where abortion is permitted up to "viability"

I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

I tell you that to prevent that I would have voted for a six-week ban with exceptions for rape and incest, and I'm no consequentialist

I see the appeal, but that would be a consequentialistic move. You are saying that you would endorse a bill that explicates that in the case, e.g., of rape it is not wrong to abort when you know it is wrong. It is intrinsically wrong to abort in the case of rape and subsequently immoral to advocate or permit abortion in the case of rape. To permit it anyways is to do something immoral as a means towards the good end of mitigating the evil of abortion.

Does this passage contradict the other (Ex 21:7-11)?

No, Leviticus is coinciding with it, in fact. The author is saying, just like Exodus, Israelites cannot own each other as slaves: they can, however, own other nations as slaves. This is a common practice and rule back then: we also see it in Islam.

Could we start with a definition of consequentialist?

I accept the definition you gave from standford. I would say it is a family of normative ethical theories that fundamentally posits that the intrinsic badness of an act is either irrelevant to or not real as it relates to evaluating wrong and right action.

1. What kind of consequentialist do you think the O.T. God would have to be?

I am not sure. Rule consequentialism is a phony version of consequentialism though: that one doesn’t really meet the definition you gave IMHO, although people would consider it one.

I am going to stop here and let you respond.

"if God was good, could God have given a tribal, near eastern group like the Hebrews this sort of law, or would a "good God" necessarily have to give them a more enlightened law?

Not quite. As I mentioned to another person on this thread:

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).
…
I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

Why does God hide from us?

Yes, so your argument is from Divine Hiddenness. This assumes that it is better for God to reveal Himself constantly to people throughout history than for them to come to know Him from His effects/creation; and I am not so sure that is true, although I get the appeal.

That says nothing to me. To me, real means actually existing as a thing, whether it is different modes of experience or beings.

I am saying that some things exist but are not real: do you agree with that in principle?

Bob, we are at loggerheads because not only can't we agree on the definition of murder

You never provided a definition of murder: I am still waiting to hear it.

Your defense of my charge of God committing murder is that no one can commit murder on earth because no person actually dies completely when they are “killed”.

 You were with your friend living an innocent ordinary life when God appears and struck you with a thunder bolt.

Everyone would call this “God killed you”. For you, you couldn’t say that because you didn’t actually die. How would you describe it?

 Your friends all said that you were murdered by God when they buried you.

Let’s take a step back, though: you are saying that God didn’t kill me—let’s forget if it’s murder for a second. Do you agree God killed me?

You were brought to heaven, body and soul., and in the presence of God, you asked: Him why did you murdered me?

This is incoherent with the hypothetical as outlined before this sentence. If God struck you down with a thunder bolt, then your body lost its life—you were killed: you are dead. Now, your soul has a faculty of mind which is immutable because it is immaterial; so although the body and the soul’s faculties which pertain to bodily/material functions ceases, the mind continues to live. You have now posited that God either did not end your body’s life—kill you—but instead teleported you to his “throne” to judge you OR God did in fact kill you and then resurrected your body. Which is it in your view?

 Now you are truly dead

You are equivocating the killing of a person in the natural sense of the body dying and the soul be killed.

Hanover

Hanover, you appear to be saying that as long as you are certain that the order cane from God, you are justified in the killings of thousands of people. Sadly, I think that most people agree with you. Today, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and religious leaders have ordered men to fly airplanes to drop bombs into buildings full of people, innocent or not. These are all considered to be legally justified killings, we no longer need to use God for justification. — GregW

Yeah, but you entirely misunderstand my post. If you posit that God, the knower of all, in fact said that X is the best course, then that is by definition the best course.

You are discussing politicians declaring knowledge of what God dictates to justify their behavior.

Else, given what Bob Ross has said, I am not convinced he would find this persuasive. He would ask whether it is permissible to "kill" a demon for their future crimes, Minority Report-style. — Leontiskos

It's not a speculative preemptive strike, but one where we know what will happen if we relent because the warning was from God, not just some UN inspectors who might be wrong. — Hanover

So if the knowledge of the future (i.e. foreknowledge) is certain then preemptive action is not unjust? The only problem with Minority Report was that the precogs did not provide perfect certainty?

I think this raises problems of justice, even apart from the can of worms it opens regarding free will. I don't think knowing someone's crime in the future is sufficient justification for an act in the present that would be justified in response to their crime in the present. I don't think we can punish for future acts, or even act preemptively in that particular way. But such a stance depends on free will, and you might deny demons free will, in which case the dispute would turn on whether the Amalekite infant is a demon who lacks free will or a human who possesses free will.

The hypothetical just seems to demand the conclusion. If all things considered, the right thing is to do X, we must do X. So, you then posit a god who is able to fully consider all things completely accurately, including how this might impede upon free will, and he says do it, then by definition, you should it.

If the computer says mate in 12 and it gives you the moves, then those are the best moves. I get how giving the moves might be wrong because it deprives the players the chance to play themselves, but there could be an instance where it's better not to all things considered.

"God says do it, therefore you must do it," simply begs the question against the argument you are up against, namely, "The true God would never tell you to do such a thing." If the OT God is God, then it is correct to follow his advice. But the whole question is whether the OT God is God. Or in this sub-case, the question is whether God would tell you to do what is unjust, i.e. killing someone in response to an act that they will perform some time in the future.