Biosemiosis inverts this framing. We are the machinery that can constrain the world to our own advantage.

Only in a very limited way. We are confined in the machine of the body with very little agency. Apart from a little bit I will call x.

We are modellers of the world for the purpose of regulating the world in a way that it must keep rebuilding and even replicating the delicate biological machine that is "us".

That’s not the we, the machine can do all that itself. We play no role in its development, or maintenance. Apart from a little bit I will call x.

Etc etc.

Consciousness boils down to the habit of predicting the state of the world in every next moment ... so as to be then capable of being surprised by what happens instead and thus learning to make better predictions the next time round.

It is the mind, facilitated by the brain that does all this. Perhaps what you mean by consciousness is self consciousness, which is where the mind becomes conscious of itself and becomes self reflective. This is not the root of consciousness, the root of consciousness was present in us long before we developed larger brains and became self conscious.

That self conscious being is little more than a toddler (who is concerned with x) compared to the complexity of the world and the body he or she finds themselves in.

And a strong sense of self emerges from this prediction-based processing. We know we are the "we" who generated a sense of a world as it was just about to be. Then we are still the "we" who has to halt and start again if the world glitched and we had to restart it from a refreshed point of view.

Again the “we” is not required to perform these tasks, the body can and does do it all by itself.

The Zen ideal for some reason. Sensory deprivation tanks cause the ego to dissolve. It is by having to push against the world that we also feel the us that is pushing. Once the world becomes fully ignorable, so also does our self-image lose its sturdy outline.

Leaving just the “we”. I know, I’ve been there.

What I’m getting at here is that as beings, people, personalities, self aware minds. We are babies, toddlers with a primary school level understanding ( x ) of the world we find ourselves in. We are doing well in our primary lessons. Working out things about the material of the world we find ourselves in. Even things about our own make up, biology psychology etc. But compared to the complexity of the world we find ourselves in, this is a tiny peek, a scratch on the surface of what’s going on. 99.99% of it we don’t have a clue about, or don’t even realise is there going on. And when it comes to why. Or how it came into existence, what mechanism, we don’t have a clue.

There are other approaches to knowledge about these things from religions and eastern philosophies. Which approach from a different perspective. Again we are toddlers.

I see this situation rather like a complex machine like what you describe, into which embryonic minds are introduced (implanted) (I will call these y ) to learn lessons, to grow and develop for some reason. Maybe to learn about good and evil, cooperation compassion. To have agency, to overcome the tendencies to succumb to base urges and desires, to be baby creators.

Now here’s the curious thing. My world and your world are identical, except for one thing, y.
I would suggest that a zombie world could be identical too.

At the end of the day, we don’t know which it is, or if it is something else entirely. We really are in the dark.

Nominalism. Just what Peirce wasn’t. — Wayfarer

You keep accusing me of exactly what I don’t claim. You then post something that nicely supports my systems causality argument. :roll:

I believe the whole universe and all that is in it is a divine mind, realizing its own ideas,

Seeing as you are a fan of AI replies these days, why not check up just how idiosyncratic Peirce’s understanding of “the divine” is.

Peirce understood the divine not as a traditional, anthropomorphic God, but as a creative and unifying force inherent in the universe, manifesting as thirdness and the tendency towards order and habit-taking. He saw it as a principle of continuity and reasonableness that underpins both logic and the cosmos.

Peirce's understanding of the divine is also connected to his evolutionary cosmology, where the universe evolves from a state of potentiality (firstness) towards greater order and habit (thirdness). This process is not deterministic but involves chance and spontaneity, guided by the tendency towards concrete reasonableness.

So follow your cite to its source and you can see that divine mind is poetic licence and reflects Peirce speaking in the spirit of his time and place.

if not physicalism, then what? That is a question that you don't want to deal with, — Wayfarer

Bollocks. The question I am engaged with is “if not monism, then what?” Peirce correctly gives the answer that “monism” is really to be understood as the holism of the triadic relation. The causal story of hierarchically emergent order. Cosmogenesis in short. What is ontically singular is the irreducibility of the triadic logic by which existence gets organised.

That's what I think is the cultural impetus behind the appeals to physicalism and antagonism towards anything perceived as spiritual or idealist. It's the consequence of this division. — Wayfarer

Yes of course religion and science agreed to divide the world between them in this way. But that is ancient history now.

My antagonism is about your constant efforts to frame any comment I might make as reductionist and scientistic. You may need me to dress up in 16th C garb, but I’m too busy with how modern systems thinking actually makes sense of both mind and matter.

You keep accusing me of exactly what I don’t claim — apokrisis

You said "That which is initially some unfiltered instant becomes sharply framed in terms of its particularity within a setting of generality. Firstness as an initial vagueness is transmuted into Firstness as some crisply fixed quality held within a system of interpretance. It becomes seen as a particular instance of the general thing we have learnt to label as "redness". The transformation of "unfiltered instant" into "some crisply fixed quality held within a system of interpretance" - reflects the nominalist tendency to treat qualities as products of classification, not as independently real (as Peirce does). That is conceptual nominalism: the idea that qualities only become real in or through being subsumed under general concepts or categories.

The question I am engaged with is “if not monism, then what?” — apokrisis

It's the same thing. Physicalism is monist, because it presumes only one fundamental substance, matter~energy. The epistemic cut then has to be represented as being an aspect of the physical world, because, if it's not physical.....

Peirce speaking in the spirit of his time and place.... — apokrisis

You always use that excuse to deprecate Peirce as idealist. 'Oh, he was a man of his times, he didn't know about systems science'. He was a thoroughgoing idealist, he said it himself many times. (He was before Moore and Russell's rebellion against idealism.) The 'holism of the triadic relation' is only an aspect of Peirce's ouevre, but it's the part biologists have appropriated for their purposes. I'm sure that Peirce would see the Cosmos as alive.

Peirce understood the divine not as a traditional, anthropomorphic God, but as a creative and unifying force inherent in the universe, manifesting as thirdness and the tendency towards order and habit-taking.

Sure. No problem with that at all. Besides, I never advocate for belief in God. There's no creator God in Buddhism. And that passage sounds like something you would find in many philosophies.

My antagonism is about your constant efforts to frame any comment I might make as reductionist and scientistic — apokrisis

I didn't introduce those terms. I said 'physicalist', which is how you described yourself. About the fact, as I said, and to which you didn't respond, that your system has no real place in it for human beings, as several others have commented. And the fact that the only place for organic life in your model is as kinds of heat sinks. What is there to like about that?

reflects the nominalist tendency to treat qualities as products of classification, not as independently real (as Peirce does). — Wayfarer

How can Firstness be independently real? Either Peirce’s logic is understood to be irreducibly triadic or it’s not.

So that is enough nonsense now.

The Universe is a hierarchy of constraints. But note that constraints are more a passive than an active thing. It is like putting a fence around a flock of sheep. The fence is just there, but by its presence the sheep are more limited in their free action

So the basic symmetries of Nature – the Noether symmetries that create the conservation laws – act like boundaries on freedoms. Spacetime is a container that expresses Poincare symmetry. It says only certain kinds of local zero-point fluctuations are possible. All others are prevented. — apokrisis

Well, good point. And, in fact, if they were 'active', then, it would be like saying that there is a 'World Soul' or that the universe is a living being. If that were the case, it would not be a physicalist model, anymore.

So, the only viable route for a physicalist to explain life and mind in physicalist terms seems to be what you are proposing here. A non-reductionist kind of physicalism where global constraints are properties of the wholes which allow, when the right conditions are met, the arising of life.

I am not convinced that this strategy works and fully explains the arising of life and mind due to the fact I am not convinced that these passive 'allowances' have enough explanatory powers. For instance, I can't imagine a mathematical model that explain the arising of 'life' as a particular state. But I can't say that it is impossible.

Certainly, even if it is correct, one might still ask why these allowances were there in the first place. Of course, there might be no 'because'...

(Slighty edited for clarification)

Of course such systems reflect the intentionality of their makers. Still, there is no reason to think they have an intrinsic source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

Don't you think that it is correct to say that the intentionality is intrinsic to the system? If something is made for a specific purpose, isn't that purpose intrinsic to the thing? I mean, I see how you would separate the cause from the effect, in the case of efficient causation, but in the case of final cause, wouldn't you say that the purpose of an intentionally designed thing inheres within the thing itself, as a defining feature. If something is not used according to its purpose, it is not the thing which it was meant to be.

Take language for example. If we do not assume that the meaning intended by the author, inheres within the written material, then we are free to interpret it in any arbitrary way. However, interpretation must stay true to the author's intent, therefore we must assume that the meaning, the purpose inheres within the words as expressed.

Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know. As such it reflects human ignorance, not physical indeterminacy. — Dfpolis

That's pure sophistry. If the states are not known, then clearly you cannot assert with any justification that it is "not physical indeterminacy".

But if they were known, then it could not be called "entropy". Therefore it is impossible that they could be known, or else we could not call it "entropy". Since it is impossible to be known, it is necessarily physical indeterminacy.

Interesting. Could you give me a reference, please? — boundless

Look into Plato's "tripartite soul".

Conservation laws have been repeteadly confirmed in experiments — boundless

Actually, every experiment done demonstrates that energy is not conserved. The loss is known as entropy. This is why we cannot have one hundred percent efficiency, or a perpetual motion machine, So contrary to what you say, conservation laws have been disproved repeatedly in experiments.

Finally you might be getting it. — apokrisis

I get it. But as I've told you before, I find it irrational. I find denial of the principle of sufficient reason irrational. I think that anytime we stop trying to understand something, by assuming that it simply cannot be understood, that is irrational. Therefore we must assume that anything, and everything, can be understood. The principle of sufficient reason applies, or else when we find something difficult to understand we will conclude that it is one of those things which cannot be understood, and we will give up on trying. And that is irrational behaviour.

Cause is about the constraint of fluctuation. The world seems organised and intentional because in the end, not everything can just freely happen. Order emerges to constrain chaos. — apokrisis

OK, but don't you think that there is a reason why "not everything can just freely happen"? I mean, if specific constraints apply, then shouldn't we assume that there is a reason why those constraints apply, and not others? So when "order emerges", wouldn't you think that there is a reason why it is this order instead of another order. That is the fundamental metaphysical question of being qua being, as laid out by Aristotle, why is there what there is, instead of something different.

To say that things just emerged that way, for the sake of constraining chaos, "order emerges to constrain chaos", doesn't answer the question. In fact, it's extremely ambiguous. On the one hand "emerges" seems to imply that things evolve this way by mere chance, but "to constrain chaos" implies that there is purpose behind this evolution from the very outset. But even if this is proposed as the purpose behind the evolution, from the very beginning, it is nothing but what you apprehend as the purpose, and that may be completely different from the real purpose.

Notice that if we assign purpose as behind it, we must assume a real purpose, that of the causal agency. This is what happens with the common theory of evolution. We assign the purpose of "survival". But this is just what we apprehend as the purpose, within our theory. But if we assign purpose, in this way, then we need to assume real purpose of a agency behind evolution, and our theory of "survival" may not correctly represent the real purpose.

As quantum field theory says, Nature is ruled by the principle of least action. All paths are possible, but almost all the paths then have the effect of cancelling each other out. That Darwinian competition selects for whatever path is the most optimal in thermal dissipative terms. — apokrisis

This is an example of a theoretical purpose. it's just what the theory presents as "the purpose". But unless we know the agency which acts as causation, and know its reasons for acting that way, we cannot in any way claim that this is the real purpose.

And this is a fact proved to many decimal places. Quantum calculations of physical properties like the magnetic moment of an electron take into account all the more attenuated background probabilities that faintly contribute to the final measured outcome. The tower of cancellations that results in the final sum over histories. — apokrisis

Probabilities prove the accuracy of the statistics, they don't even approach the purpose for the action. So it is false to claim that QFT proves that nature is ruled by the principle of least action. A very small portion of nature, observation of which produces those statistics, supports that principle.

So the basic symmetries of Nature – the Noether symmetries that create the conservation laws – act like boundaries on freedoms. Spacetime is a container that expresses Poincare symmetry. It says only certain kinds of local zero-point fluctuations are possible. All others are prevented. — apokrisis

Now you are blatantly contradicting yourself. Above, you were saying that global constraints are emergent, they emerge to constrain chaos. But here you are positing foundational constraints, fundamental constraints on freedom which are not emergent but prior to, or coexistent with, basic freedom. Where do these constraints come from? If constraints are by nature emergent, then how can there be foundational constraints?

I'm not disputing agency. I'm defining it properly in terms of naturalistic metaphysics. — apokrisis

I would correct this to adequately represent what you say, as 'you are not disputing agency, but describing it in a contradictory, irrational way'.

The maxim is: "If it can happen, it must happen". If something is not forbidden, it will occur. — apokrisis

This, the principle of plenitude, requires the physical reality of infinity, infinite time, for its validity. And acceptance of the physical reality of this principle produces all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem.

Apokrisis’s explanation is effectively that the movement and life force we observe is like water flowing downhill. It doesn’t need an animating force, it naturally flows to the lowest point. The whole biosphere is just another cascade of entropy and once there is no gradient left, the world will return to stillness and we will be just ghosts. — Punshhh

That's a good way of putting it. Life thrives in the eddies of negentropy. It appears like the activities of life are contrary to the overall flow of entropy, but in reality by apokrisis' philosophy, we must accept that these eddies are just a part of that flow.

Look into Plato's "tripartite soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I was familar with the concept but admittedly I never tried to apply it to understand how to solve the interaction problem. I'll try to reflect on this.

Actually, every experiment done demonstrates that energy is not conserved. The loss is known as entropy. This is why we cannot have one hundred percent efficiency, or a perpetual motion machine, So contrary to what you say, conservation laws have been disproved repeatedly in experiments. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. The second law of thermodynamics is quite depressing in fact. It says that not only we can't 'generate' energy but also that we will never be able to use the total energy there is. Some of it will inevitably fall outside our control.

Questions of the meaning of life long predate the scientific revolution, so it is suspect to make it somehow responsible for a fundamental human question such as this.

What your essay seems to miss is the notion of hierarchy in purpose. Of course, biological life is full of purpose, at every scale. But at every point where purpose is found, one can ask what purpose does that serve?

Take for instance the poop machine.

https://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/05/poo-machine-by-wim-delvoye.html?m=1

At every stage of the poop machine, one can ask what its purpose is, and receive a perfectly reasonable answer. But at the final stage which produces poop, when you ask, "and what is the purpose of that?", you find only silence. The end result, and therefore the entire machine, is ultimately purposeless.

The same can be asked of life itself. Despite all the purpose we can identify in all the facets of life, one can still ask, what is the purpose of all of it? And here too, one may encounter silence. With or without science.

But it emphasises that the behaviour of organisms is not wholly explainable by mechanism - which is a metaphor - but as a self-organizing, value-directed engagement with the world. — Wayfarer

It is certainly true that living beings have organic integrity and self-directed (aka immanent) activity. So, as a result of their form, organisms act in a way that non-living matter does not. Still, this activity is potential in non-living matter. So, mechanists are correct in saying that the same laws guiding non-living matter guide the behavior of living matter. Still, those laws do not provide a full explanation. They allow, but do not imply life. To have life, we need to specify forms of matter that can live. It is those forms, as Aristotle saw, that make the difference between living and non-living matter.

I presented a conference paper on value in April. In it, I argued that valuing is a two step process. First, we must recognize something as valuable. Such recognition requires awareness/consciousness of our response to an object -- a form of self-awareness called "knowledge by connaturality." Most organisms give no evidence of being self-aware. Second, it requires commitment -- an act of will by which we make the valuable actually valued. Again, most organisms do noting to make us think that they possess a will. Instead, they respond automatically and mindlessly to their environment.

So, we can only say that non-conscious forms of life "interpret" or "value" only by anthropomorphizing, and doing so abuses language by stripping interpretation and valuing of their essential, conscious and intentional character.

That’s the point phenomenology and enactivism insist on: that organisms are subjects, not just systems. — Wayfarer

Again, this abuses language. Beings are subjects in light of their capacity to enter into subject-object relations -- specifically, knowing and willing. Things that simply interact, even if that interaction involves immanent, or self-directed, activity, are not thereby in a subject-object relation, and so do not qualify as subjects.

They have to negotiate their environment in order to survive and to maintain homeostasis. — Wayfarer

Yes, but that does not make them subjects in the sense humans are.

A heart isn’t just a pump; it's something that beats for the sake of circulating blood within an organism — Wayfarer

Yes, organisms have immanent activity. That is not the same as being able to value and interpret.

If organisms were nothing but deterministic physical systems, how would anything ever have evolved? Evolution doesn’t work on pre-programmed machines — it works on organisms that can vary, explore, adapt, respond in ways that are not reducible to mere stimulus-response mechanics. — Wayfarer

Deterministically, by the laws of nature transforming the initial state of the universe. Deterministic genetic variation and mutation produce variant offspring that are selected by processes guided by the same laws of nature.

We have no reason to think that any non-conscious organism does more than respond to stimuli determinately.

Don't you think that it is correct to say that the intentionality is intrinsic to the system? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, its original purpose will be reflected in its form. That is not the same as the object, itself, having an intention = being a source of intentionality.

That's pure sophistry. If the states are not known, then clearly you cannot assert with any justification that it is "not physical indeterminacy". — Metaphysician Undercover

Please! I told you what entropy means. You can accept what I say, or not. But, if it means what I say, it does not mean that the system is subject to indeterminacy. I suggest you read a bit more about entropy.

It's not phenomenology at all. There's a glaring omission in your model, as philosophy, but as it's situated squarely in the middle of the blind spot of science, I'm guessing it's something you wouldn't recognize. That blind spot is the consequence of the methodical exclusion or bracketing out of the first-person ground of existence. — Wayfarer

Since Philosophy is primarily the study of Metaphysics (meaning), its practitioners are more likely to focus on the subject than the object on any topic. And, the "blind spot" is the blurry blob that we see out of the corner of the eye. Both kinds of observers may be missing something important. I won't jump in the middle of this finger-pointing, except to list a few excerpts from a recent non-technical article on the notion of a Blind Spot in Science. :cool:


The Blind Spot
by Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser & Evan Thompson
(two physicists and a philosopher)
https://aeon.co/essays/the-blind-spot-of-science-is-the-neglect-of-lived-experience
Note --- my bold & italics

# Two Worldviews : "Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is)."

# Metaphysics : "Experience is just as fundamental to scientific knowledge as the physical reality it reveals."

# The black hole in Science : "Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness.""

# What is Physical? : "We reject this move. Whatever ‘physical’ means should be determined by physics and not armchair reflection. After all, the meaning of the term ‘physical’ has changed dramatically since the 17th century. Matter was once thought to be inert, impenetrable, rigid, and subject only to deterministic and local interactions."

# What is Real? : "Alfred North Whitehead . . . . he argued that what we call ‘reality’ is made up of evolving processes that are equally physical and experiential."

# Ding An Sich : "Scientific materialists will argue that the scientific method enables us to get outside of experience and grasp the world as it is in itself."
Note --- "Ding an sich : It denotes the idea of an object or reality as it exists independently of human perception and understanding, a realm beyond our direct experience". {Kant's version of Plato's Ideal)
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=ding+an+sich

# Methodological Exclusion : "In general terms, here’s how the scientific method works. First, we set aside aspects of human experience on which we can’t always agree, such as how things look or taste or feel."

# Exclusion Delusion : "To finally ‘see’ the Blind Spot is to wake up from a delusion of absolute knowledge. It’s also to embrace the hope that we can create a new scientific culture, in which we see ourselves both as an expression of nature and as a source of nature’s self-understanding. We need nothing less than a science nourished by this sensibility for humanity to flourish in the new millennium."

# Summary : "Such an approach not only distorts the truth, but creates a false sense of distance between ourselves and the world. That divide arises from what we call the Blind Spot, which science itself cannot see. In the Blind Spot sits experience: the sheer presence and immediacy of lived perception"
.

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. — boundless

If it can be detected, it is usable. If you are proposing a type of energy which cannot be detected, then that's not really energy, is it? Energy, by definition is the capacity to do work. The idea that there is such a thing as energy which is not usable energy is just contradiction.

Deterministic genetic variation and mutation produce variant offspring that are selected by processes guided by the same laws of nature. — Dfpolis

"Selected" implies choice. Do you think that processes governed by deterministic laws are capable of making choices?

Yes, its original purpose will be reflected in its form. That is not the same as the object, itself, having an intention = being a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

I think you\ll need to explain this proposed difference to me Df. How would you characterize the difference between intentionality in the sense of an object having a purpose, with this purpose being reflected in its form, and an object being a source of intentionality?

To me, any human being, which you might say is a source of intentionality, was actually given that intentionality by its parents, and this is just another case of purpose being reflected in the form. See, your proposed classification "being a source of intentionality" requires that you show that intentionality can actually begin within a thing, as the source of that intentionality. But intentionality is hereditary.

Please! I told you what entropy means. You can accept what I say, or not. But, if it means what I say, it does not mean that the system is subject to indeterminacy. I suggest you read a bit more about entropy. — Dfpolis

You said;
"Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know."

Clearly, if entropy means that the system "can produce a macroscopic state we may know", and "entropy" refers to the measure of possible corresponding microstates, then indeterminacy is implied. The very nature of possibility is indeterminacy. It is not the case that the physicists believe that the actual corresponding microstate could be known. If that were the case, it would not be called "entropy" because the information would be available to them. Why do you deny the obvious? You are trying to shape the meaning of "entropy" for your own purpose. Indeterminacy is fundamental to the current understanding of physical systems. And "uncertainty" is understood as an aspect of the system which may be measured as entropy.

It is certainly true that living beings have organic integrity and self-directed (aka immanent) activity. So, as a result of their form, organisms act in a way that non-living matter does not. Still, this activity is potential in non-living matter. So, mechanists are correct in saying that the same laws guiding non-living matter guide the behavior of living matter. Still, those laws do not provide a full explanation. They allow, but do not imply life. To have life, we need to specify forms of matter that can live. It is those forms, as Aristotle saw, that make the difference between living and non-living matter. — Dfpolis

Thank you for your comments, and pleased to have found some common ground. Many of the contemporary theorists I'm reading refer to this aspect of Aristotle's philosophy (his Biology is, I think, considered relevant in ways that his Physics is not. Some say he anticipated the idea of DNA, though obviously not the molecular detail.)

So, we can only say that non-conscious forms of life "interpret" or "value" only by anthropomorphizing, and doing so abuses language by stripping interpretation and valuing of their essential, conscious and intentional character. — Dfpolis

Here, however, is where I would draw attention to the emerging school of thought known as 'enactivism' or 'embodied cognition'. This school of thought enlarges the meaning of intent (or value or purpose) beyond that which only conscious subjects are able to entertain. There's quite a large literature on the subject, and it is difficult to summarise, so I've asked Google Gemini to create a primer for it, which explains some of the key concepts and texts. Strictly speaking, the main subject of its enquiries are cognition, rather than consciousness per se, however, as you can surmise, there is considerable overlap in these terms. So it is not a matter of 'abusing language' - the terms are being used in a broader way, and in a new context.

As a corrollary to this, I think the theorists in these schools would question whether organisms at any level of development act solely in accordance with the principles of physics and chemistry. As has been pointed out by the mainstream biologist Ernst Mayer 'The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information.' Even simple organisms strive, persist, and preserve themselves which has been illustrated in the activities of the slime mould, which is a single-celled organism with no identifiable brain whatever (for which see How the Universe Thinks without a Brain).

Yes, but that does not make them subjects in the sense humans are. — Dfpolis

No contest! But, again I am working with a rather broader concept of subject-hood than conscious subjectiivity. (The term for the sense of 'being a subject' is 'ipseity' which is being extended somewhat through these new disciplines to encompass the awareness of organisms less developed than the higher animals.)

I fully acknowledge that this way of thinking is new to me, I still have much more to study and absorb, and I may therefore be mistaken in my presentation of these ideas. But I think to make that judgement some familiarity with the key texts and concepts is required.

Deterministic genetic variation and mutation produce variant offspring that are selected by processes guided by the same laws of nature. — Dfpolis

As I understand it, a better understanding of epigenetics undermines the idea that genetic variation is purely deterministic. Variation can be systemic, responsive, and developmentally mediated, not just molecular noise filtered by selection. Organisms are not just passive recipients of selective pressures — they are active participants in shaping their own evolutionary and developmental environments.

Questions of the meaning of life long predate the scientific revolution, so it is suspect to make it somehow responsible for a fundamental human question such as this. — hypericin

On the contrary, the idea that the Universe can be understood in terms of undirected physical interactions and processes is very specific to post-scientific revolution. And I question that pre-moderns would typically wonder about ‘the meaning of it all’, as existence in those times was very much circumscribed by custom and your place in the social hierarchy (not that this was necessarily a good thing.)

The real ‘crisis of meaning’ is very much associated with the advent of modern technological and (post) industrial culture. And again the absence of meaningful social structures is not necessarily negative, as individuals are much more at liberty to pursue their own ends. But it can’t be denied that feelings of alienation, disconnectedness, loneliness and anomie are characteristic of modern culture and that this is often underwritten by a sense of meaninglessness.

What your essay seems to miss is the notion of hierarchy in purpose. Of course, biological life is full of purpose, at every scale. But at every point where purpose is found, one can ask what purpose does that serve? — hypericin

I didn’t say nor imply that there isn’t a hierarchy of meanings. At the most basic level the organism’s purpose, and the overall aim at which all of its constituent parts are engaged with, is persisting, staying alive. This drive animates (literally) all living creatures.

I presented a conference paper on value in April. In it, I argued that valuing is a two step process. First, we must recognize something as valuable. Such recognition requires awareness/consciousness of our response to an object -- a form of self-awareness called "knowledge by connaturality." Most organisms give no evidence of being self-aware. Second, it requires commitment -- an act of will by which we make the valuable actually valued. Again, most organisms do noting to make us think that they possess a will. Instead, they respond automatically and mindlessly to their environment.

Self awareness is not required for step one, or step two. I observe my chickens doing this every day*.
I suggest that all biological organisms have these abilities, albeit in very simple forms, or in embryonic form. That humans and other primates act in the same way most of the time and that the difference between all organisms and humans is only a higher mind function, a more complex and integrated intellectual process, that these primates possess.

*two examples. If I give my chickens a choice of foods at the same time. They will have already decided which one is their favourite. They have remarkable acuity and often know from your actions if you are preparing their favourite food from subtle signs in your behaviour. Secondly when it comes to selecting a roost. They will spend hours looking for and deciding about a suitable roost. They will often try good candidates numerous times before deciding on the one they will use. Once the decision is made they show great determination to roost there even if you chase them away, you might place them in one of the other favoured roosts, but they will not roost there. Their minds are already made up.

Yes, my son's two chooks are continually complaining, in a chook kind of way, that they're tired of the feed they're given, and make a great show of excitement whenever there's a suggestion that some special treat might be forthcoming.

Similarly, the holistic process we call "Life" emerges from a convergence of natural laws & causal energy & material substrates that, working together, motivate inorganic matter to grow, reproduce, and continue to succeed in staving off entropy. — Gnomon

Sorry I missed your post. Anyway, assuming that what you are saying here is right, we should ask ourselves to explain how it can be right. Life has goal-oriented behavior, how does that 'emerge' from something that doesn't have anything like that. And assuming that in some ways it can, can we give a theoretical explanation for that?

If there were some kind of 'latent intentionality' in the inanimate or even in the universe as a whole, it can be perhaps the emergence of living beings with goal-oriented behavior might more be easy to understand. If, however, there is such a thing, do we still have a 'physicalism'?

If it can be detected, it is usable. If you are proposing a type of energy which cannot be detected, then that's not really energy, is it? Energy, by definition is the capacity to do work. The idea that there is such a thing as energy which is not usable energy is just contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps 'unusable' is a wrong way to call it. 'Uncontrollable' would be better. You can't make a perfect thermal machine because some energy is dispersed as heat and that heat can't be recovered and used again as work.

In any case, the fact that the first principle of thermodynamics tells us that energy is conserved would suggest that the conservation of energy in a closed system doesn't contradict the second law, that is entropy increases in a closed system. It is quite difficult that all physicists got that wrong for centuries.

This school of thought enlarges the meaning of intent (or value or purpose) beyond that which only conscious subjects are able to entertain. — Wayfarer

I think it is better, perhaps, to use terms like "agency" rather than "intent". The latter generally gets restricted to consciousness. The former may introduce ambiguity, because inanimate agency, as efficient causation, is acceptable language. But when we use "agency" we enable understanding of Aristotle's powers of the soul, the potentia. These are things such as self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. In our understanding of these 'powers', it is common to attribute them to the material aspect of the being, the concept of matter being used to account for that potential.

Rejection of dualist metaphysics leaves the agency involved with the powers of the soul, as efficient causation. However, under Aristotelian principles, the soul is required as the form, the actuality which actualizes the various powers. What is important in Aristotelian biology is the idea that the powers are not constantly in action, sensation takes a break in sleeping for example. This is why the powers are classed as potentials, requiring actualization from the soul itself. We can consider actualization as a form of selection, even choice, at some fundamental level, because something must select which potentials to actualize. Scientism and physicalism will reduce this selection process to efficient causation, and represent it as a sort of reflex action, the organism responds to the activities of its environment in the way of efficient causation. But clearly this cannot adequately account for the way that the organism selects from possibilities in response.

Aquinas made an extensive inquiry and investigation into the nature of "habit". That term as used by Aristotle refers to properties of an organism and the Latin reflects this as what the being "has". What the being has, is a propensity to act in a particular way, and this is a habit. Aquinas inquired as to where the habit is properly located, where does it reside. And, if my memory serves me properly he eventually saw the need to attribute habits to the potential for action, rather than to the action itself. This is a difficult concept, because properties are generally aspects of the form, which is the actuality. So here we are attributing an act, or the inclination to act in a particular way, to the potential itself. This readily translate to the idea that matter itself has a propensity to act in specific ways.

Have a look at the primer I had created on enaction.

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. — boundless

If it can be detected, it is usable — Metaphysician Undercover

It is clear that you do not understand physics. So, you should not use it as the basis for your theories.

"Selected" implies choice. Do you think that processes governed by deterministic laws are capable of making choices? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already explained that, in my view, the laws of nature are intentional. Whose intentions are they? Clearly, not those of the mindless matter they guide. So, they evidence an immaterial source usually called "God." So, God's choice of laws selects the variants in evolution. That means that purely physical processes are predetermined.

Yes, its original purpose will be reflected in its form. That is not the same as the object, itself, having an intention = being a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

I think you\ll need to explain this proposed difference to me Df — Metaphysician Undercover

If you cannot understand the difference between a wine barrel having a purpose and a wine barrel thinking, further explanation will not help.

But intentionality is hereditary. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is not reason for me to respond further.

And I question that pre-moderns would typically wonder about ‘the meaning of it all’, as existence in those times was very much circumscribed by custom and your place in the social hierarchy (not that this was necessarily a good thing.) — Wayfarer

What do you think of this quote?

Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity... What profit hath a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun? — Ecclesiastes 1:2-3

I didn’t say nor imply that there isn’t a hierarchy of meanings. At the most basic level the organism’s purpose, and the overall aim at which all of its constituent parts are engaged with, is persisting, staying alive. This drive animates (literally) all living creatures. — Wayfarer

You didn't say there was no hierarchy. But you neglected to mention it, though it is crucial to the topic. See my example of the poop machine.

People today are well aware of biological purpose, including their own. I once saw a tee-shirt that read "Born. Work. Fuck. Die." As if to say,

"Yes, my life has a certain purpose. I spend much of my time meeting biological purposes: working to sustain myself, and reproducing, or at least trying to do so. And yet, what is the meaning of all that? If these purposes are not themselves grounded in a higher purpose, they collapse into purposelessness."

Even though the world is suffused with biological purpose, this does not answer the charge that life as a whole is without purpose.

So it is not a matter of 'abusing language' - the terms are being used in a broader way, and in a new context. — Wayfarer

The problem is, that specialized, technical uses of terms are fine in the narrow communities that employ them. However, they can be entirely misleading in a broader community, such is this one, where they have altogether different denotations and connotations. So, for example, when I use Aristotelian terms of art, such as "immanent activity," I explain them in common language, e.g. as meaning self-directed activity.

Not doing so abuses language. The reason is simple. Language only works if its signs, words and sentences, evoke the same meaning in the author and the audience. If they do not, the author will fail to communicate his/her thought. That happens here when you use terms like "interpret" as you do. Ask yourself how many people on this forum have understood and accepted your views? Hasn't your language stood in the way? Don't people object to your words and fail to understand your ideas?

It may very well be that you have important insights to communicate, but to do so, you need to reformulate your insights using terms with shared meaning.

As a corrollary to this, I think the theorists in these schools would question whether organisms at any level of development act solely in accordance with the principles of physics and chemistry. — Wayfarer

Vitalism died a century ago for lack of evidence. Yes, DNA presents us with a mechanism not discussed in physics and chemistry; however, it is compatible with physics and chemistry. It uses no new principles of action, it only makes actual a form of action that physics and chemistry see as possible and explainable, given the existential form. So, it seems to me, your theories are looking for the wrong thing. It is not the principles, which specify what is possible, that are transcended. Rather, it is that matter has taken a form not anticipated by those who developed the principles.

The term for the sense of 'being a subject' is 'ipseity' which is being extended somewhat through these new disciplines to encompass the awareness of organisms less developed than the higher animals. — Wayfarer

The problem is that "awareness" is synonymous with "consciousness," and we have no evidence that these organisms do more than react in complex ways. While there are grades of contents we are conscious of, there are no grades of consciousness per se. Either one is aware of contents, or one is not. The idea of grades of consciousness is invoked to support the idea that consciousness evolved and is, therefore, reducible to physical principles. Since there are no grades, this is a fallacious line of thought.

We need to be very careful not to blur sharp lines.

As I understand it, a better understanding of epigenetics undermines the idea that genetic variation is purely deterministic. Variation can be systemic, responsive, and developmentally mediated, not just molecular noise filtered by selection. Organisms are not just passive recipients of selective pressures — they are active participants in shaping their own evolutionary and developmental environments. — Wayfarer

I agree that organisms shape their environment. That is not incompatible with them acting determinately. They do not choose to do what they do, they just act according to their nature.

Self awareness is not required for step one, or step two. I observe my chickens doing this every day* — Punshhh

Thank you for your helpful comment. I agree that many animals go through my two steps. They sense alternatives, then process and select one. They also have clear preferences, at least about food.

Further, I agree that we can call these preferences "values." The question is whether their valuing is the the same as, or only analogous to, human valuing. It seems to me it is only analogous, because the difference is not "only a higher mind function, a more complex and integrated intellectual process," it is a difference in kind of mental process.

With whales having brains that weigh 15 or 20 pounds, we may not have the most complex neural processing of any species. What is clear is that we are conscious of some of the information our brain processes, and that consciousness cannot be explained by physical science (see my article on the Hard Problem of Consciousness).

Consciousness adds a new aspect to our valuing, because when we come to value something or someone, we not only have a new response to it, we have a new intentional relation. If I commit to someone, I make their good my good in a way that cannot be captured by a physical description.

Note: I am not saying that only humans are conscious, only that we lack evidence of consciousness in other species.

Sorry I missed your post. Anyway, assuming that what you are saying here is right, we should ask ourselves to explain how it can be right. Life has goal-oriented behavior, how does that 'emerge' from something that doesn't have anything like that. And assuming that in some ways it can, can we give a theoretical explanation for that? — boundless

The Materialist explanation for the evolutionary emergence of animated & motivated matter is based on random accidents : that if you roll the dice often enough, strings of order will be found within a random process*1. But they tend to avoid the term "Emergence", because for some thinkers it suggests that the emergence was pre-destined, presumably by God. And that's a scientific no-no. So, instead of "emergence", they may call Life a fortuitous "accident".

However, another perspective on Abiogenesis*2 is that the Cosmos is inherently self-organizing. And that notion implies or assumes a creative goal-oriented process, and ultimately Teleology. My personal Enformationism*3 thesis is an attempt to provide a non-religious philosophical answer to the mystery of Life & Mind emerging from the random roiling of atoms. But if you prefer a "theory" from a famous & credentialed philosopher, check-out A.N. Whitehead's book Process and Reality*4. :smile:



*1. Order from Chaos :
Yes, order can indeed arise from chaos in various contexts, including evolution. While often perceived as random and unpredictable, chaotic systems can, under certain conditions, exhibit self-organization and lead to the emergence of new structures and patterns. This is observed in natural phenomena like ecosystems and even in the formation of stars and planets.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=evolution+order+from+chaos

*2. Abiogenesis :
The origin of life, or abiogenesis, is a complex scientific question with no single, universally accepted answer. However, the prevailing hypothesis is that life arose from non-living matter through a process of increasing complexity, starting with simple organic molecules and culminating in self-replicating entities enclosed within membranes. This process likely involved the formation of a habitable planet, the synthesis of organic molecules, molecular self-replication, self-assembly, and the emergence of cell membranes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=how+did+life+emerge

*3. Enformationism :
A philosophical worldview or belief system grounded on the 20th century discovery that Information, rather than Matter, is the fundamental substance of everything in the universe. It is intended to be the 21st century successor to the ancient worldviews of Materialism and Idealism. An Update from Bronze Age to Information Age. It's also a Theory – of – Everything that covers, not just matter & energy, but also Life & Mind & Love.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

*4.Process Teleology :
Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy redefines teleology, moving away from a predetermined, goal-oriented view to one of creativity and becoming. In his system, the universe is not static but constantly evolving through processes of "becoming". Teleology, in this context, is not about reaching a preordained end, but rather about the ongoing creative advance and the integration of past and present within each moment of experience.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=whitehead+process+teleology

Consciousness adds a new aspect to our valuing, because when we come to value something or someone, we not only have a new response to it, we have a new intentional relation. If I commit to someone, I make their good my good in a way that cannot be captured by a physical description.

Sorry my chickens do this too. It’s intrinsic in the pecking order relationship.
I’m not here to argue, because I agree with 99% of what you say. What prompted my to respond was my misreading of “consciousness”. I use it in a different way and what you call consciousness, I call self consciousness(which we observe in higher primates and humans). Whereas I regard my chickens as conscious. While they are not self conscious, they exhibit pretty much every other mental process that happens in humans. Crucially they have sentience, a feeling and knowledge as present in the world. But in some way, difficult to pin down, they don’t have that extra feedback loop of self consciousness, that we have. I don’t see this (in the chicken) as a lesser experience, but rather a more stream of consciousness, direct involvement in their world. Whereas humans indulge in self reflection, pondering, self conscious absent mindedness etc.

What do you think of this quote? — hypericin

It came to mind as I wrote, but in the context, it is not a counsel of despair, rather a spiritual admonition regarding the emptiness of worldly achievements

People today are well aware of biological purpose, including their own. I once saw a tee-shirt that read "Born. Work. Fuck. Die." As if to say, — hypericin

What are the basic drives that animate animals according to darwinian biology - that would be the 'four fs' - fighting, feeding, fleeing and reproduction. And as evolution is now the secular creation story this attitude is a consequence. But human purposes being reduced to biological drives is a recipe for despair, it fails to honor what makes us different. And what your post reflects is actually the very crisis of meaning which has been precipitated by the collapse of values.

The meaning crisis refers to a widespread feeling of emptiness, disorientation, and lack of purpose in modern life, often characterized by feelings of depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation. It's a societal condition where individuals struggle to find meaning and connection in their lives, potentially leading to ineffective coping mechanisms and a sense of disconnection from communal and sacred aspects of life. This crisis is fueled by factors like secularization, loneliness, and a loss of traditional narratives and structures.

And central to that, is the sense of purposelessness driven by the narrative of a meaningless cosmos onto which individuals are purported to project meaning. 'Consume, be silent, die.'

It may very well be that you have important insights to communicate, but to do so, you need to reformulate your insights using terms with shared meaning. — Dfpolis

They are not insights of my own, rather I’m trying to express those developed in the primer I generated. (I'm not wishing to come across as pedantic, but there are many new concepts and terms in this field which need to understood to make sense of the idea.)

Rather, it is that matter has taken a form not anticipated by those who developed the principles. — Dfpolis

That's pretty well what I'm saying. It is not vitalism. Vitalism posits a special non-physical "life force" or élan vital that distinguishes living beings from inanimate matter. It's metaphysical and implicitly dualist.
Enactivism, by contrast, sees life and mind as implicit in the dynamic interactions between organism and environment. It avoids invoking any extra force, instead considering organisms as embodied, autonomous systems engaged in meaningful activity. This is why the term 'being' is specific to the organisms. Beings act, whereas things are only acted upon.

The claim isn’t that rudimentary organisms possess rational or even sensory intentionality — but that what we call intentionality at higher levels of cognition is rooted in the more basic organismic fact of self-directed activity. Even Aristotle’s notion of the soul as the form of a living body entails that living things are not simply moved but move for the sake of something — even if that’s just continued existence. This 'for-the-sake-of' structure is already a teleological — and in that sense, proto-intentional — orientation.

Sorry my chickens do this too. It’s intrinsic in the pecking order relationship. — Punshhh

Being in a pecking order does not make the other's good your good.

What prompted my to respond was my misreading of “consciousness”. — Punshhh

Yes, "consciousness" can mean what I call medical consciousness -- a certain state of responsiveness as opposed to being "knocked out."

. This 'for-the-sake-of' structure is already a teleological — and in that sense, proto-intentional — orientation. — Wayfarer

OK.

For anyone interested: a primer on ‘enactivism’ and ‘embodied cognition’, generated by Google Gemini, reviewed and edited by me. Contains a brief overview of key terms, concept, and readings in enactivism.

Nice work and useful. I wish this had been around a few years ago. :wink:

@Dfpolis - I hear your concerns about conceptual clarity, especially regarding the distinctions between vegetative, sensitive, and rational. I want to clarify that when enactivist or biosemiotic perspectives speak of ‘intentionality’ in relation to basic life forms, they are not proposing that such organisms possess beliefs or conceptual intentions in the sense that rational sentient beings do.

Rather, the claim is that a rudimentary, pre-conceptual kind of directedness — a teleological orientation toward what is beneficial or harmful — is already implicit in the way living systems maintain themselves. This isn’t to collapse the distinctions between kinds of beings, but to suggest that what we know as intentionality in its mature form has developmental roots in the self-regulatory dynamics of life itself.

Enactivism doesn’t deny the classical distinctions drawn from De Anima, but it provides a different way of framing the continuity between life and mind. It focuses on the enactive structure of living beings — how they bring forth a meaningful world through their activity. In this sense, it can be seen as an interpretation of Aristotle’s principle of the soul as the form of a living body — particularly in his account of perception and movement, where the organism is already responsive in a way that presupposes some mode of purposiveness.

But you could quite rightly say it is a kind of ‘neo-Aristotelianism’ as it is very different to Aristotelian Thomism, but then, it also draws on a considerable amount of scientific discovery since those times. But hopefully an elaboration rather than a contradiction.