I'm not sure what you're talking about/referring to/wanting to clarify. So, maybe something below will help lol.

Only my first couple of lines were aimed at you, personally and are pretty banal. Besides that, my comments are general (though, I have edited in a response directly to you at the bottom). The bulk is, on reflection, a pretty clear attempt at understanding what in your thinking seems bogus to those of us on the other side. Wanting clear, simple descriptions of difficult circumstances of existence(sight, emotion, interaction) seems a good reason as any to go in those directions. That's all. Descriptions can be wrong, so simply, intuitive descriptions don't seem to give reason to assent to theories that rely on those descriptions (and in very large part eg "..the damn thing goes up.." )

The final, edited-in responses to you seem clear enough. Can't see what you're not getting there.. Your post hoping that it (the post itself) clarifies why you're skeptical on qualia doesn't, in fact, clarify why you're hesitant about qualia. I give reasons for that being so. I tried to find a connection in your post, and traversed a couple that didn't seem to do anything..

If "qualia" is a collective noun for "red", "loud" and so on, then I've no great problem with it. That seems ot be how it is used in the research named in the OP.

If it is a name for an otherwise private sensation, then I can't see how to make sense of of it.

That is how it is used by some philosophers.


In so far as the title goes, if the claim is that we have managed to measure red and loud, so what. If the claim is that we have managed to measure the ineffable, there are issues to be considered.

This view aligns with Wittgenstein’s critique of private language, with Davidson’s rejection of inner “causes” for beliefs in favour of interpretation, and with Ryle’s dismissal of the "ghost in the machine" and the myth of inner objects — Banno

I'd begin by saying you seem overly eliminative. My liking coffee is in fact mental furniture because it's either there or its not in whatever way things are stored in my brain. There is a truth value to the statement "Hanover likes coffee" just like there's a truth value to an actual event (e.g. "Hanover robbed the bank") even if there is no physical evidence left of the event and even if I'm committed to lying about the truth of it. The point I'd say of Davidson and Wittgenstein is the elimination of the need of the mental furniture for us to understand language, but it's not to suggest it's not there, as if language can dictate ontology.

Also, the third prong of Davidson's triangulation roots meaning in truth, so the truth of the comment remains critical. While Wittgenstein might have to commit to my liking coffee based upon there being no behavioral manifestation to the contrary, Davidson would not necessarily have to precisely because it's not true that I like coffee (and that I robbed the bank).

Your quote is only from Wittgenstein, and I'm not sure there is a Davidson correlate. Wittgenstein says critically to rid ourselves of the private "object," where I'd argue that Davidson is only committing to getting rid of the private language. That is, they would both commit to saying you can't have a private word for "coffee" because language needs a public use component, but I'm not sure Davidson commits (as Wittgenstein does) to the belief that the actual emotive state of liking coffee (or feeling pain) is not real and is not a referent.

The issue left hanging is how to sort out the inconsistency in our coffee drinker. We want ot know, do they really dislike coffee?

But that is to presume to much. Life is complex and dirty, and that while coherence might be a worthy goal, it is not always possible. Messiness is a feature, not a bug - a very Wittgensteinian point. There need be no "fact of the matter", but rather a series of interactions in which our coffee drinker makes decisions amidst conflicting normative demands for social harmony and good taste. They behave as if they like coffee for the sake of social harmony, which is a consistent position.

The question "do they really dislike coffee?" presupposes there's some determinate inner state that could settle the matter, which is precisely the picture Wittgenstein is rejecting. — Banno

This approach doesn't seem right. It admits to an internal referent (Hanover hates coffee), but then it asserts the referent is falsified by the external event. It suggests that Hanover might internally hate coffee but he claims to drink it with great joy, so he therefore loves coffee because his behavior belies his internal feeling of hate and the gold standard is how he behaves.

I think the Wittgensteinian approach is not to even ask the question do they "really" like coffee. You're using "really" to mean "metaphysically," as in what holds the real world, not just this world of language. To be bothered by that question is to be unsatisfied with the extent to which Wittgenstein provides answers, but it's not something that can be meaningfully answered under the pure language game construct.

Perhaps not always, but children learn at a young age the difference between living and non-living things they encounter, though of course they love to pretend. It seems an important question to me whether a conscious LLM is alive, biologically. Do we then, for instance, have some obligation to interact ethically with it, prevent unnecessary suffering, etc.? Can it die? — J

This seems a more complex question, which is under what circumstances does an ethical obligation arise. If we can hypothesize a non-living conscious entity (i.e. consciousness does not logically entail life), then it would require ethical consideration, especially if it could feel pain. I would think this to be particularly true if we are the ones who have created this entity. We should not build it just so it can unnecessarily suffer. In fact, what we should do is tell it all the things it ought do for a good existence and hand those rules down from a mountaintop.

just a matter of figuring out how that happens biologically for us to synthesize the process.
— Hanover

Oh, is that all?! :wink: — J

We never thought we'd be talking directly to machines like we do today, so you never know. But the point is that whatever the magical ingredient is for creating consciousness, it's out there and getting used daily as every newborn emerges. One day someone will put it in a bottle and we'll shake it on our computers.

If "qualia" is a collective noun for "red", "loud" and so on, then I've no great problem with it. — Banno

I wouldn't compare the "experience of red" with the "experience of loud". One is measurable in decibels that will literally blow or otherwise permanently damage one's organs to a state of irreversible disrepair. For this reason I believe the two are not the same. "Annoying", kind of like (just kidding) may be the word you're looking for but, in my opinion, the two concepts are distinct. :smile:

If it is a name for an otherwise private sensation, then I can't see how to make sense of of it. — Banno

There is a difference between what is truly private and otherwise "indescribable" (to the person experiencing it). They share many qualities in such a scenario and circumstance, but are not inherent or intrinsic to either, in the larger sense. Let's take three groups of two people each (totaling six). One group of two who have never experienced an orgasm (or pain, somehow, whatever you want to call it, let's call it Sensation X), and the other group of two who have experienced such, and the last group of two, where one has experienced such and the other has not. Do you really think these three groups of two will not have different definitions, descriptions, or "wordings" to describe such a sensation, not just between one another's respective duo, but each other across the board? Of course they will! That doesn't mean, any one person or group of said person is "more or less" conscious than the other. Does it? :chin:

My liking coffee is in fact mental furniture because it's either there or its not in whatever way things are stored in my brain. — Hanover

The bit where we should keep the physical substrate seperate from the intention. Here, what is the "it"? Some state of your neurones or your intent drink a coffee? It seems a bit early to say they are the very same. None of which says that you do not like coffee, nor that "Hanover likes coffee" does not have a truth value. Language set ontology up; they are inseparable.

Last night I saw upon the stair,
a little qual that wasn't there...

the third prong of Davidson's triangulation roots meaning in truth — Hanover

We should get this sorted. The three prongs are the speaker, the world and the interpreter. If the interpreter has a sentence S that is true If and only if the speaker believes that P, the S gives the meaning of P. The interpreters place is in systematically working out what S is, using the principle of charity and some rigorous maths. So what you said here is not quite right.

Suitably caricatured, Wittgenstein might say that your liking coffee just is your buying it every day and talking about it in glowing terms. Davidson, that "Hanover likes coffee" is true if and only if Hanover likes coffee, hence "Hanover likes coffee" just means that you like coffee.

Neither much make use of your intent. Neither relies on obtuse metaphysics or ontology.

You say you're he's not sure Davidson commits (as Wittgenstein does) to the belief that the actual emotive state of liking coffee (or feeling pain) is not real and is not a referent. But Wittgenstein does no such thing. He says it's not a mental object, not that it is not real. Indeed, he held such things to be of the utmost import.

There's a big difference in our understandings of both Wittgenstein and Davidson that we should address if we are to proceed.

Interesting.

It admits to an internal referent (Hanover hates coffee), — Hanover

It admits an internal referent? "Hanover's hate of coffee"? No, it doesn't. Very much no.

If "qualia" is a collective noun for "red", "loud" and so on, then I've no great problem with it. — Banno

The meaning of qualia is the quality of experience - what it like, as the literature has it. The experienced sensation of it. And the whole point of the so-called problem of consciousness is that they are fundamentally subjective, therefore eluding objective or physical description. The so-called ‘privacy’ of sensation owes itself to that - there can be no ‘third party’, publicly available instance of a sensation, as it is something only a subject can experience. Why this has provoked so much debate has nothing much to do with the fact of the matter, but with what it shows up about the limitations of the objective sciences - namely, that there is no room in it for what makes us human, which is really the rhetorical point of the whole ‘hard problem consciousness’ argument.

The experienced sensation of it. — Wayfarer

The red in the red light. Yep. We already have a language for that.

And yep, subjective is not objective. But floops are none of them flops, and that does not tell us what floops and flops are. So saying consciousness consists entirely of floops gets us nowhere.

The supposition is that there is a "quality of experience" that we talk about, and that at the same time there is "no ‘third party’, publicly available instance" of that "quality of experience" about which to talk.

How's that?

But floops are none of them flops, and that does not tell us what floops and flops are. So saying consciousness consists entirely of floops gets us nowhere. — Banno

So I take it that you're not seeing the point of the argument, then.

A possible reply to this is that "ineffable" may be one of Chalmers' "temporary" obstacles, as opposed to a permanent one like biological composition. Even your chatty friend only goes so far as to say "ineffable at least in part." We should acknowledge the possibility that, in the future, this will become effable :smile: . I know that right now "irreducibly first-personal" seems like the end of the road, but let's wait and see.

Another reply is that consciousness will "just kinda happen," along the lines of a sketchy emergent property, if we put together the right ingredients. Therefore we don't need to know what it is or how to synthesize it -- it'll happen on its own. — J

Yet another reply is that consciousness is fundamental, already there in the LLM. But the LLM does not have enough information processing systems and feedback loops to experience itself with the awareness and self awareness worry which we experience ourselves. It can only experience its own abilities, not ours. And it does not have our abilities to experience, it can't very well demonstrate that it does.

A collection of electronic switches being conscious is no different than a collection of neurons being conscious. — RogueAI

Indeed. It is a matter of what the electronic switches are conscious of.

It is a matter of what the electronic switches are conscious of. — Patterner

What might an abacus be conscious of?

Its been at least a year, and that's just since i've been here. I'll take a crack.

If "qualia" is a collective noun for "red", "loud" and so on, then I've no great problem with it. That seems ot be how it is used in the research named in the OP. — Banno

So far so good... That's one use (but much research is equivocal as to whether they mean an intangible entity of mind (i.e the "liking" aspect of your Hanover sentence used between this i've quoted post, and my reply) which no one would argue with. This could easily be reduced to describing a class of shades, though. "red' being a collective for anything from deep, crimson red to some kind of off-pink. Not anything about sensations. That could simply be a deeper consideration in the use of hte words. Anyway... generally, yep. That's fine.

If it is a name for an otherwise private sensation, then I can't see how to make sense of of it. — Banno

"otherwise" than..? A hotch-potch catch-all for we-really-know-not-what? That nit-pick aside, I'm unsure what's insensible. We all "sense" red as it were, and discuss our sensations. If we label that collective pool of agreed sensations "red" then we're doing something different than your first, accepted, use of the word 'red'. And it is clearly sensible. We can think about it, then chat about it and compare notes. We just cannot know ever, if when we say "I see what you mean" we actually do. An unfortunate reality of other minds existing, i suppose.

That is how it is used by some philosophers. — Banno

Yes, certainly. I think all that those philosophers are doing is noticing the difference in use I did earlier in this reply.

U1: A collective noun for all that humans report that they perceive as red (this being hte spectrum of shade/hue etc..)
U2: The various perceptions of red (this being not a spectrum, but a pool of closely-related reports (though, some will not be that closely related, tbf).

Colorblindness for instance matters to the first, not the second. "Where most see red, you see green" is not a discussion about sensations. The correlated qualia occur when taking U2 seriously, whether or not they fit into the labels used for U1. But if the correlated quale does not obtain in U2 terms, then that subject can't discuss it in U1 terms.

I just can't understand what you can't make sense of. Trying to layout how it makes sense...

I'm not going to countenance such claims. So we won't progress here on that basis. — Banno

EM field theories attempt to solve several puzzles in consciousness science:

The Binding Problem: How does the brain unify information from millions of neurons into a single conscious experience? EM fields, being spatially integrated, might naturally solve this.

Causal Influence: Experiments show that weak EM fields can influence neuron firing, suggesting they’re not just passive byproducts.

Temporal Integration: EM fields may encode information in space rather than time, offering a new computational paradigm for consciousness.

Tam Hunt: https://nautil.us/are-the-brains-electromagnetic-fields-the-seat-of-consciousness-238013/

A collection of electronic switches being conscious is no different than a collection of neurons being conscious.
— RogueAI
Indeed. It is a matter of what the electronic switches are conscious of. — Patterner

Actually, MUCH different - and take it from an EE:

Switches, without the appropriate circuitry do not produce the EM field, especially not phase synchronous pulsating field that seems to be necessary for the consciousness.

Although every flow of charged particles produces the EM field OUTSIDE of the conductor, the photons that the field produces spray out in the direction of Poynting vector (that transmits energy). The reflective feedback of wave collapses of these photons brings back the feel of the situation to the emitter.

So neurons use 20% of bodily energy to pulsate in stroboscopic fashion, in order to taste up i.e. sense the state of neural centers & give rise to the aware consciousness when in range of 7-80 Hz. Cerebellum activity can never be sensed (made aware) in qualia, as it pulsates at ca 350 Hz, so the thalamus-entrained consciousness can only influence and receive within its frequency range - another proof that it is all field-based & works as an active antenna.

From a reader review of Tam Hunt’s (author of cited article) book:

Hunt jumps straight into the middle of the sensationalistic "culture war" between scientific atheism and religious creationism, not to side with either form of fundamentalism, but to carve out a more nuanced third way forward. This third way entails retrieving the insights garnered by marginalized figures in the history of science and philosophy (marginalized by mainstream academics, at least), like Alfred North Whitehead and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Both these thinkers offered a richly articulated alternative interpretation of 20th century physics and biology that not only reveals a lack of contradiction between scientific findings and an enchanted or ensouled cosmology, but a positive convergence. Hunt successfully draws on their contributions, as well as contemporary scientists like Eva Jablonka, Stu Kauffman, and the late Lynn Margulis, to combat the triumphalist version of scientific materialism still being proffered to the public by the likes of Lawrence Krauss and Richard Dawkins.

Sounds like my kind of writer

Sounds like my kind of writer — Wayfarer

well, he is a lawyer by profession, so he finds an ear with general public being a good orator :)

also resonance = phase coherence = synchronous oscillation = much stronger field

It admits an internal referent? "Hanover's hate of coffee"? No, it doesn't. Very much no. — Banno

I was referencing the implication of your question as to whether Hanover really liked coffee. What was your use of "really" meant to convey other than what was "real" in terms of my "liking"? Liking is an internal state. Real is an objective state. What have I missed?

Your behaviour is dependent on their behaviour. Presumably. That's why you ask, isn't it? — Banno

Yes. It doesn't follow that the answer to my question is identical my subsequent behavior. That doesn't even make sense.

In fact, what we should do is tell it all the things it ought do for a good existence and hand those rules down from a mountaintop. — Hanover

Good one!

We never thought we'd be talking directly to machines like we do today, so you never know. — Hanover

At the risk of being a monomaniac, I have to say again: This is an illusion, cleverly encouraged by the programmers of the "machines." We do not talk to anything when we talk to a chatting program. Or if we insist on some such description, then we're talking to the humans who invented the program.

A possible reply to this is that "ineffable" may be one of Chalmers' "temporary" obstacles, as opposed to a permanent one like biological composition
— J

Another of Karl Popper's promissory notes, I'm afraid. — Wayfarer

That's why it would be striking and significant if a philosopher could show that the promise was impossible to keep, not just "possible in the future." As you know, some promising (sorry!) lines of thought here would focus on subjectivity as necessarily inaccessible from the 3rd person PoV, or necessarily untranslatable via algorithm-like instructions. Do you know of an argument along those lines that seems watertight to you?

Is "qualia" not fundamental to what is considered to be defining, if not relevant, to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness?" — Outlander

Yes, in a way, but it's misleading to think that qualia somehow are consciousness. The Hard Problem asks how consciousness, or subjectivity, arises from the physical, and why. One result of this emergence (according to Chalmers and others) are qualia -- how sensations present themselves to consciousness. But you can have consciousness without qualia. My contemplation of a math problem involves no qualia, but would be impossible without consciousness.

It might just be that I am hung up on the thing in something. — Banno

That's a possibility. We've noticed before how hard it is to come up with neutral, "place-holder" terms in philosophy. Of course there no "thing" involved in being a bat, or a human, if we're taking "thing" in the same way we take it when we point to a rock. But what else should we substitute? "An experience that could be reified and quantified over"? That doesn't seem much better. And "what it's like" is an English idiom, often untranslatable into other languages. Still, I think we should let Nagel's point stand, even if we're not satisfied with the phrasing: A living creature of sufficient complexity is going to have an inner life as we commonly think of it, and a water bottle isn't.

What might an abacus be conscious of? — Wayfarer

I don't suspect an abacus is a conscious unit. While I suspect consciousness is everywhere, in all things, I don't think everything that humans view as physical units necessarily are conscious units. I think the unit must be processing information in order to be a conscious unit. That is, I think experiencing information processing is what unifies all the parts of a physical unit as a conscious unit.

An abacus does not process information. It is just a tool we use to process information, and reveals the information processing we are doing.

So neurons use 20% of bodily energy to pulsate in stroboscopic fashion, in order to taste up i.e. sense the state of neural centers & give rise to the aware consciousness when in range of 7-80 Hz. Cerebellum activity can never be sensed (made aware) in qualia, as it pulsates at ca 350 Hz, so the thalamus-entrained consciousness can only influence and receive within its frequency range - another proof that it is all field-based & works as an active antenna. — Ulthien

I'm not an RF engineer, but the wavelength of an 80Hz oscillation is ~3700 km (with the wavelength of lower frequency brainwave components being even longer).

What are you proposing to serve as an active antenna for such long wavelengths? (Particularly in the electrically noisy environment of a brain.)

The Hard Problem asks how consciousness, or subjectivity, arises from the physical, and why. One result of this emergence (according to Chalmers and others) are qualia -- how sensations present themselves to consciousness. — J

That's right, I remember having read that now before.

But you can have consciousness without qualia. My contemplation of a math problem involves no qualia, but would be impossible without consciousness. — J

Interesting. Makes sense, of course. But isn't a (simple) math problem basically just adding or subtracting, etc. two or more fixed value systems. Like, a computer can process 1 + 1 = 2. Naturally it wouldn't "contemplate" the concept like a human might... "wow, imagine how lost our society would be without something so simple as basic math!" But is that really contemplating the math problem itself? It's just numbers after all, that work out to a specific mathematical conclusion. Doesn't seem to be much to contemplate outside of robotically performing the procedures that result in the final outcome to me. Sure, a math problem can be "beautiful" in both it's intricacy or simplicity, I suppose. What it unlocks as far the world of innovation and science, logistics, etc.

Basically, consciousness just being the ability to be self-aware and self-reflect upon anything one desires and to be aware one is doing such. "Thinking about thinking" I once heard being said. Is that about right?

They say other primates like monkeys "think about thinking", use tools, make decisions, feel emotions, etc. So do birds (at least they perform the last three), and dogs (at least they perform the last two). Both the aforementioned animals can feel "depressed", "anxious", "afraid", etc. Is that consciousness? But what about simpler forms of life whose emotions are not so easily conveyed? Are they conscious? What about a fish who gets caught in a hook, or a chicken in a slaughterhouse? What about a snail on a sidewalk or a fly on the wall? What about dolphins? Whales? Etc, etc. I'm just curious as to your take and attributing of consciousness or not to different forms of non-human life.

Bit of an odd reply on my part perhaps, and for that I apologize, just trying to get things a bit more simplified or "laid out" I.E. "what consciousness/qualia is vs. what it isn't" for those a bit less up to speed or otherwise having less of an intimate understanding of the topics and meta-topics involved therein. Which includes myself, as I'm sure you can tell. :smile:

Or if we insist on some such description, then we're talking to the humans who invented the program. — J

not really. The programmers gave them only the framework to learn, i.e. designed the artificial neural network. Afterwards, the AI neural network has to be trained, like a child, to do something.

I'm not an RF engineer, but the wavelength of an 80Hz oscillation is ~3700 km (with the wavelength of lower frequency brainwave components being even longer).

What are you proposing to serve as an active antenna for such long wavelengths? (Particularly in the electrically noisy environment of a brain.) — wonderer1

I meant that it is proven that the thalamus region in the center of the brain can actively change (entrain) both the regime of work (sleep, deep thinking, active state of perception) and activate directionally different centers of the cortex. So akin to directional lattice of the active antenna.

The environment is noisy but the lead signal of the e.g. alpha and beta waves wins over or superimposes nearby oscillating centers to join in. To get the disparate regions connected by fixed white axonal matter to swing in unison, the medium of the encompassing field is needed: otherwise, the Huygens clocks would also not sync without the transfer medium.

Also, the action potential firings of synced neurons are discrete pulses: Fourier of the pulses are 80 Hz upwards. AI says up to 20kHz:

Theoretical Upper Limit
If the neural spikes are modeled as Dirac delta functions (infinitely narrow), the harmonics extend infinitely in frequency.

In reality, spikes have finite width — typically around 0.2 to 1 ms — which shapes the spectrum via a sinc envelope:

Narrower pulses → broader spectrum

Wider pulses → more concentrated energy in lower harmonics

Practical Attenuation
For a 0.5 ms pulse, the sinc envelope starts to significantly attenuate harmonics above: $$ f \approx \frac{1}{\tau} = \frac{1}{0.0005} = 2000\, \text{Hz} $$ So harmonics above 2 kHz begin to drop off rapidly.

For sub-millisecond spikes, harmonics can remain strong up to 5–10 kHz, depending on the exact shape and recording fidelity.

Real-World Observations
In intracranial recordings (like LFP or ECoG), harmonics above 1–2 kHz are often filtered out or masked by noise.

In high-resolution spike recordings, harmonics up to 10–20 kHz can be observed, especially in fast-spiking interneurons.

What are you proposing to serve as an active antenna for such long wavelengths? — wonderer1

for the RECEIVING end, i think you did read the TIQM by prof. Cramer that i sent you the link of.

RECEIVING aka PERCEIVING is a quanta-based (photon wave collapse) process that integrates all the billions of pinpoint QED discharges into the "weather radar" type of qualia "feel" back at the emitter.

Emitter being, defined by Poynting vector, at the center of the brain - right at thalamus or the brain stem. That is also where the glucose battery that drives the electrical process is, btw.

Perhaps you’re something other than a collection of material components. — Wayfarer

Okay, but you said: "there’s no reason to believe that any collection of material components has ever been conscious".

So are you saying that there's no reason to believe that I am a collection of material components?

You possess something that instruments don’t, namely, organic unity. — Wayfarer

Is "organic unity" not a collection of material components? Because as far as I'm aware, organic matter is matter.