Expert chess players are able to play with no physical board. — Wayfarer

Right, but we don't even need to concede that much. Even a game like football, in which physicality is not optional, cannot be said to be "identical" with the players and the field. There is a mental or conceptual element involved, without which no one could understand what a football game was.

So, analogically, mental activity can't be called identical to physical activity. It might depend upon it -- supervenience, anyone? -- but a purely physical description of brain processes will not get you to the content of a thought. The challenge for a philosopher is to explain, if they can, why this has to be the case; in other words, why this isn't simply a limitation of our current technology. "Imagine what we'll know about brains in 100 years!" the physicalist urges us. "Why, we'll be able to 'read off' any thought you have by analyzing the neuronal activity." But does this make neurons and thought identical? The scientist needs the philosopher to clarify, at this point.

Right. So, would the rules of the game be somewhat analogous to a form in the Platonic sense?

"Imagine what we'll know about brains in 100 years!" the physicalist urges us. "Why, we'll be able to 'read off' any thought you have by analyzing the neuronal activity." — J

There are very impressive displays of this kind of ability in current technology. Subjects imagine a yacht, and, hey presto, the system displays a yacht uncannily like what the subject has imagined (well, according to the subject.) But then, those systems are 'trained' for hundreds of hours on particular subjects, and 'learn' to associate patterns with images. In other words, a lot of technology and scientific expertise is interpolated between the subject and the display. So I question the sense that this can all be accounted for in physical terms, as the scientific expertise that is used to engineer these systems are also the subject of the experiment. The 'images' aren't simply 'there' in the brain, waiting to be seen, like a astronomical object: they're constructed using the very faculties that the science is seeking to explain. So there's a problem of recursivity.

Doesn't causation just explain the "why" of some event or substance? We usually think in terms of efficient causation, in which one is identifying the (moving) cause that brought about some effect.

Asking, "What caused it?," seems to be asking what accounts for its existence. Thus in the most general sense you have Aristotle's four causes, which are meant to explain the being of substances. — Leontiskos

Yes, in the most general sense, "cause" and "reason" can be used interchangeably, and Aristotle's four causes are better understood as a classification of the types of explanations. Nowadays, when we use 'cause' in a more specific sense, we usually mean something like Aristotle's efficient cause.

But whether you are asking in a more general or more specific sense, the question still requires context to be meaningful. "Why a duck?" asked out of the blue, makes about as much sense as "What's the difference between a duck?" You can ask for the reason of a duck being in this place at this time (if that seems surprising), or perhaps you want to know about its plumage color or its evolutionary history or why it was served for dinner - all potentially sensible questions that can be answered in causal terms (i.e., by reference to how we understand the world to be hanging together). But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question.

Yes, in the most general sense, "cause" and "reason" can be used interchangeably, and Aristotle's four causes are better understood as a classification of the types of explanations. Nowadays, when we use 'cause' in a more specific sense, we usually mean something like Aristotle's efficient cause.

But whether you are asking in a more general or more specific sense, the question still requires context to be meaningful. "Why a duck?" asked out of the blue, makes about as much sense as "What's the difference between a duck?" You can ask for the reason of a duck being in this place at this time (if that seems surprising), or perhaps you want to know about its plumage color or its evolutionary history or why it was served for dinner - all potentially sensible questions that can be answered in causal terms (i.e., by reference to how we understand the world to be hanging together). But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question. — SophistiCat

But aren't Aristotle's four causes attempting to answer questions such as, "Why a duck?" The explanation for a duck will presumably include why it is in this locale, why its plumage is of a certain color, and what its evolutionary history (and genesis) is.

The crucial question asks whether such causal questions are disparate or interrelated. For example, whether Aristotle's efficient cause and material cause can both be named by the same name (i.e. "cause"). To take a simplistic example, someone might say, "We can't ask what causes ice. We can ask whether ice requires H2O and we can ask whether ice requires low temperatures, but those are two different questions." The answer is that they are two interrelated questions, and that to give the cause of ice we will need to answer both questions (and others as well). One cause/reason for ice is H2O and another cause/reason for ice is low temperatures, and yet they are both causes and they will both be needed to explain, "What accounts for the ice's existence." Surely someone who understands these two things about ice understands what accounts for ice's existence more than someone who does not understand these two things (ceteris paribus).

But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question. — SophistiCat

I think that's the question that Aristotle and Darwin were attempting to answer, if in different ways. I don't see why it isn't a sensible question, nor why there would be no way to answer it. After all, the answers of Aristotle and Darwin both go a long way towards answering that very question.

If we hold to anything remotely like the PSR then I think causality is inevitable, because it is what accounts for phenomena (whether in your general or specific sense). Now it is true that giving a full account of an event or substance would be an ambitious project, but I want to say that the notion of cause/reason (aitia) is fairly clear, even if it is subtle.

I find it hard to understand causation, properly, in physical terms. I've been reading a bit of Kim lately and "near enough" seems the best level of explanation we can get for causation of any kind, really. Practically, there are inarguables: heat causes X, speed causes X and so on.. But how? *sigh*.

Surely everything we know is part of a causal cascade instigated by a demiurge. While mental activity is mini demiurges (us) learning what’s involved in instigating things.

But how? *sigh*. — AmadeusD

At some level it's going to be fundamental. There's not going to be a deeper "how" sometimes, eventually it's gonna be "because those are the rules".

Like when one object hits another object and the interaction causes both to change speed - equal and opposite reaction, conservation of momentum - the "how" might not really satisfy you. Are you okay with "because that's just how it works"?

There is no 'mental' reality that exists apart from the physical.
— Philosophim

Them. They are physical. Their brain is physical. Again, this is very much like a computer cycling through one's and zero's in the machine. Just because its not emitting light that we can see, doesn't mean that physical processing isn't happening. — J

would the rules of the game be somewhat analogous to a form in the Platonic sense? — Wayfarer

Interesting. "Form" does seem to be in the neighborhood somewhere. We could perhaps give an ideal description of a particular instance of a game, noting exactly what happens. It could be perfectly accurate. We would then have something in addition to "the players" and "the field," namely an account of events. But without the rules, we're still unable to give even the crudest story of the game. This somewhat resembles the notion of form, which can encompass both organization and intention.

The issue for me here, and this goes direct to Kim i guess, is that we need not then fall into a "physicalism of a kind" to explain the oddities which physicalism proper doesn't seem to grasp fully.
We could just as well say well, the mind interacts with the body because that's how it is. We can't explain it, but we have literally endless evidence.

I don't know what physicalism of a kind means.

I don't think the mind thing is comparable. There are physical facts that are simple enough to be modelled by an equation - that's the perfect candidate for something being fundamental, and therefore the prefect candidate for something being a "brute fact" as it were.

Minds, on the other hand, seem complex and ever-changing - a human-scale mind is nowhere near a brute fact, and if it interacts with a body, there will be a particular way it interacts with a body. For example, it didn't seem to interface with the toes directly, it interacts with the brain and the brain moves the toes. So "the mind interacts with the body because that's how it is" is many steps removed from a brute fact, in comparison to, say, something like the Schrödinger equation, which because of its relative simplicity is a candidate for being close to a brute fact.

I see some, what I take to be, confusion in the direction of how these things work, so forgive if something seems out of step...

There are physical facts that are simple enough to be modelled by an equation — flannel jesus

I do not think causation is one, though. Predictability obtains, sure, but no explanations can be found. We can model effects from causes, but we can't model mechanisms sufficiently low-level to explain the causation. So I take your point that these are separate considerations, but..

We can predict, with 100% certainty, that a conscious thought will alter the body (or, vice verse.. we can't know, or even know if its' a reasonable question at this stage). That we cannot explain this doesn't seem to do much. We can't explain (properly) why momentum of body+another body = movement (inter alia) ). I entirely accept that these are things we can objectively model and that this sets them apart from what I'm suggesting. But I do not think the framework for understanding how to react to these facts changes. We know this thing happens, and we can't access even the right realm to figure out why (i presume you would nneed to not be a human mind to do this). Similar with physical causation, you'd need to be askance from it to explain it fully from without.

I do not think causation is one, though — AmadeusD

Causation itself isn't even in the category of things we're talking about. It's the meta-category of those categories of things. Minds interacting with bodies is a type of causation. Heat causing x or y is in the category of causation.

I find it hard to understand causation, properly, in physical terms. — AmadeusD

I think this is a central point, and I would just say that causation is not physical. I am surprised to see that there are a lot of claims within this thread which presuppose that causation is physical.

heat causes X — AmadeusD

"Heat causes water to boil."

Is this cause, in itself, physical? I doubt anyone would claim such a thing unless they are coming from an a priori physicalist paradigm. What is at stake is a kind of relation between heat and water, and I don't see how such a relation could be construed as physical.

Similarly:

The term Causation is a physical term that describes types of temporal organisation. — I like sushi

No, I don't think it is a "physical term." When one billiard ball collides with another and causes it to move, our talk of "cause" is not talk of something that is physically instantiated. Even when we speak about a transfer of kinetic energy, we could be talking about mathematics or physics (i.e. motion), but we are not speaking about a physical entity. Transfers and relations and even motion are not physical entities. They are meta-physical or rather meta-material.

Note too that causation does not merely describe the temporal organization of billiard balls. "At t1 the cue ball had w position and the 9-ball had x position; and at t2 the cue ball had y position and the 9-ball had z position." There is nothing inherently causal about such descriptions of temporal organization. It's rather important to recognize that when Hume talks about causation as constant conjunction, he has redefined the term and is technically equivocating. Hume means, "Given my presuppositions I can't make sense of causation as anything other than constant conjunction; therefore causation is constant conjunction." But causation isn't constant conjunction. That's not what the word means. The Occasionalists who influenced Hume explicitly held that constant conjunction (i.e. Occasionalism) is not causation.

I think this is a central point, and I would just say that causation is not physical. I am surprised to see that there are a lot of claims within this thread which presuppose that causation is physical.....When one billiard ball collides with another and causes it to move, our talk of "cause" is not talk of something that is physically instantiated — Leontiskos

How is it not? How did the fall in temperature not cause the water to freeze, or the corrosion of the main support beam not cause the bridge to fall? If causation is not physical, what is it?

How is it not? How did the fall in temperature not cause the water to freeze, or the corrosion of the main support beam not cause the bridge to fall? — Wayfarer

Well look at your own examples. Are you claiming that a temperature reduction is physical? Or that corrosion is physical? Or taking my own examples, are energy and its transfer physical? Is motion physical? Is a relation between two physical objects physical?

Are you claiming that a temperature reduction is physical? — Leontiskos

Yes. How is it not? It is measurable with a physical instrument, and observable in the effects it has on matter.

Yes. How is it not? It is measurable with a physical instrument, and observable in the effects it has on matter. — Wayfarer

There are a lot of assumptions here, but let's take a step back.

You are saying, "Δ-temperature caused the water to freeze." So even if we grant for the sake of argument that Δ-temperature is itself physical, what is in question is the cause. What is in question is Δ-temperature qua cause.

Causation does not appear explicitly in physical ontologies. — SophistiCat

Would someone list within their physical ontology, "Δ-temperature caused the water to freeze"? I mean, if causation were physical then Hume would have just pointed to it. It would be a physical thing.

A Paul Davies quote seems appropriate, although I don't know if it helps any. From The Demon in the Machine:

Like information, energy can be passed from one physical system to another and, under the right conditions, it is conserved. So would one say that energy has an autonomous existence? Think of a simple problem in Newtonian mechanics: the collision of two billiard balls. Suppose a white ball is skilfully propelled towards a stationary red ball. There is a collision and the red ball flies off towards a pocket. Would it be accurate to say that ‘energy’ caused the red ball to move? It is true that the kinetic energy of the white ball was needed to propel the red ball, and some of this energy was passed on in the collision. So, in that sense, yes, energy (strictly, energy transfer) was a causative factor. However, physicists would not normally discuss the problem in these terms. They would simply say that the white ball hit the red ball, causing it to move. But because kinetic energy is instantiated in the balls, where the balls go, the energy goes. So to attribute causal power to energy isn’t wrong, but it is somewhat quixotic. One could give a completely detailed and accurate account of the collision without any reference to energy whatsoever. — Paul Davies

- Good.

One could give a completely detailed and accurate account of the collision without any reference to energy whatsoever. — Paul Davies

I mostly think they couldn't. They might not use the word "energy," but the words they would use would mean the same thing as energy.

But energy is not physical. It is a property of physical systems. It is a way to account for the interactions that take place within a system.

So even if we grant for the sake of argument that Δ-temperature is itself physical, what is in question is the cause. — Leontiskos

I think the onus is on you to show why it's in question.

I think the onus is on you to show why it's in question. — Wayfarer

The cause is in question because this is a thread about causality. We are not talking about Δ-temperature. We are talking about causality. So to talk about Δ-temperature apart from causality is beside the question.

To simplify it a bit, you might say, "The billiard cue was the cause; the billiard cue is physical; therefore some causes are physical." And I would point out that the billiard cue qua billiard cue is not in question. It is the billiard cue qua cause that is in question, and such a thing is not obviously physical. Indeed, prima facie, it is not physical at all. The-billiard-cue's-causing-the-motion-of-the-cue-ball is certainly not physical in the way that the billiard cue is physical.

What is at stake is a kind of relation between heat and water, and I don't see how such a relation could be construed as physical. — Leontiskos

The transfer of certain particles from heated air (or metal, i guess) into the water, ramping up the potential kinetic energy in the water until it cannot contain the energy, and must "boil" to let off heat which it cannot contain.
That seems a physical causation train. Is that not what you're looking for? Given the Davis quote and your response, I have to say there seems a trapdoor:

One could give a completely detailed and accurate account of the collision without any reference to energy whatsoever. — Paul Davies

No, they couldn't. Without explaining what's happened at the moment of impact, we have no reason to think that a collision would cause movement, descriptively (we obviously do practically). Explaining what's happened at the moment of impact would be something of the form of my (likely inaccurate) description of heat causing water to boil.

Δ-temperature caused the water to freeze. — Leontiskos

No, I don't think that's right. Δ-temperatured air (sic) causes water to freeze. The air, when in contact with the water reduces the energy in the water to the point that its constituents cannot move rapidly enough to remain fluid. These are all physical. Temperature is a way to notate the complicated relationship between mass and energy, right? Can't see the gap, myself, which you are trying to fill. But I also don't see the explanation I'm looking for either...

I mean, if causation were physical then Hume would have just pointed to it. — Leontiskos

Not if he was insufficiently resourced to do so. It may be that Hume didn't understand the transfer of energy sufficiently to understand that there are some non-trivial and non-variable ways in which that energy transfer occurs (and temperature seems to be one.. the ratios of mass/energy retention would act as a "cause" in this sense - that could, i suppose, be called non-physical but I presume you see how that's misleading and not what you're after).

To be clear, none of this is particularly intended to support a physicalist account of causation. As noted, I don't understand how it occurs. But it seems to me we can get much further on the physicalist account than you're allowing. I would suggest some of Kim and Chalmers chats about causation in the mind/brain complex could be instructive as they are extremely detailed and minute.

But energy is not physical. It is a property of physical systems. — Leontiskos

Which obtains, solely, in a physical, measurable domain. The premise seems wrong in this light... It is physical. We just can't grok quite how to describe that tension adequately.

I want to say that causality is not physical because causality is a principle and principles are not physical. Or else negatively, because that which is physical can be directly seen, touched, and interacted with, and yet none of this is possible when it comes to causality.

Now we could say that the principle of causation which obtains among billiard balls “supervenes” upon the billiard balls. That’s fine, and it is a second-order consideration. Similarly, if in Euclidean geometry we have a set of points, lines, and curves, it does not follow that distance belongs to the same genus as points, lines, and curves. Distance is a second-order notion, and likewise, the distance between two physical objects is not itself physical. One reason we know this is because distance is infinitely divisible whereas physical objects are not infinitely divisible. So we cannot manipulate distance directly, but only indirectly by altering the points, lines, curves, or physical objects in question. Now someone might say, “If distance is not physical, what is it?” In the first place I would say that it doesn't really matter what it is, given that my point is that it isn't physical. In the second place I would say that it is mathematical. Of course the physicalist would claim that mathematics is physical, but his is a very unintuitive claim.

I would say that there is an analogy between the second-orderness of distance and the second-orderness of causality.

The transfer of certain particles from heated air (or metal, i guess) into the water, ramping up the potential kinetic energy in the water until it cannot contain the energy, and must "boil" to let off heat which it cannot contain.
That seems a physical causation train. Is that not what you're looking for? — AmadeusD

I think that's the sort of thing a physicalist would claim, but I think it involves a lot of metaphorical language and hypothesizing. Likewise, we could say that kinetic energy is transferred from one ball to another, and given that kinetic energy is physical this is a physical phenomenon. The problem as I see it is that "kinetic energy" is a kind of reified formalism - a theoretical entity that is imagined to be substance-like and yet is not held to actually exist, at least not with any certitude.

Beginning with Newton we have become less picky about the presence of such theoretical entities. Newton gave his account of gravity in mathematical terms and simply transgressed the convention which required him to provide the means by which one body acted upon another via gravitational force. His account was therefore criticized for being a matter of "spooky" or "occult" action - a kind of invisible or unaccountable influence at a distance of one body upon another. Newton was nonplussed. He didn't believe that his causal-mathematical account required any theoretical means—physical or otherwise—to justify it.

No, they couldn't. Without explaining what's happened at the moment of impact, we have no reason to think that a collision would cause movement, descriptively (we obviously do practically). Explaining what's happened at the moment of impact would be something of the form of my (likely inaccurate) description of heat causing water to boil. — AmadeusD

There is a gap present within, "We do not descriptively but we obviously do practically," and also within, "my (likely inaccurate) description." With Newton we might simply skip the one half, arguing that we have no need to give a description of what happens within the collision if our description will inevitably be inaccurate. Of course I'm simplifying this a bit, but the point is that when we talk about causality we aren't really talking about a physical thing. Maybe the gravitational influence of one planet on another is physical, but maybe it's not. Newton's causal account in no way commits itself to the idea that there must be a physical intermediary between the planets, and I think the same is true for causality taken generally.

No, I don't think that's right. Δ-temperatured air (sic) causes water to freeze. The air, when in contact with the water reduces the energy in the water to the point that its constituents cannot move rapidly enough to remain fluid. These are all physical. Temperature is a way to notate the complicated relationship between mass and energy, right? Can't see the gap, myself, which you are trying to fill. But I also don't see the explanation I'm looking for either... — AmadeusD

I would again say that "energy" is a highly theoretical entity, and is not obviously physical.

To be clear, none of this is particularly intended to support a physicalist account of causation. As noted, I don't understand how it occurs. But it seems to me we can get much further on the physicalist account than you're allowing. I would suggest some of Kim and Chalmers chats about causation in the mind/brain complex could be instructive as they are extremely detailed and minute. — AmadeusD

Okay. I suppose I am saying that the proposition that causation is necessarily physical ought to be a conclusion rather than an assumption. Also, I would say that the very fact that we can talk about causation without committing ourselves to physicalism (or to a physicalist account of causation) just goes to show that the concept is not inherently physical.

Which obtains, solely, in a physical, measurable domain. The premise seems wrong in this light... It is physical. — AmadeusD

I wouldn't say that "solely" is yet in evidence. Now we are apparently talking about efficient causation, and efficient causation will admittedly be quasi-physical. But things get tricky once we ask whether mathematics is an efficient cause of a particular gravitational force, or whether energy is an (intermediating) efficient cause on the billiard table. It at least seems fairly clear that energy is of a different genus than the two billiard balls.

I would probably say that energy is also second-order in that it is a potentiality. For example, a car with a given engine, weight, and amount of fuel will have a certain amount of potential energy. The energy is not physical; it is potential. It represents a real fact about the car's capacities which supervenes on various physical characteristics of the car.

Donald Davidson's "Anomalous Monism": mental events are identical to physical events while maintaining that there are no strict, exceptionless laws that govern mental phenomena (mental anomalism). So every mental event is also a physical event, and that mental events cannot be predicted or explained by physical laws, and vice versa.

How is it not? How did the fall in temperature not cause the water to freeze, or the corrosion of the main support beam not cause the bridge to fall? If causation is not physical, what is it? — Wayfarer

A more clumsy way to address this issue is to think about a cause in terms of a consequence relation. So in response to a question about the cause of ice we might provide a consequence (or "conditional" if you prefer): <If water continues to cool then it will eventually freeze>.

Now supposing the consequence really does represent a cause, is it physical? Is the if-then relation that obtains in reality between water and temperature a physical thing? The water is physical, and the cold temperature is physical, and the ice is physical, but is the relation that describes and accounts for the transformation itself physical? And consider the world in which water never freezes. Surely that world has one less physical thing than our world, given that it lacks ice. But does it lack a second physical thing, namely the causal relation described by the consequence?

The water is physical, and the cold temperature is physical, and the ice is physical, but is the relation that describes and accounts for the transformation itself physical? — Leontiskos

Surely. The precise mechanism is very well understood, in terms of molecular dynamics.

You’re right that causality as a principle isn’t a material object—but that doesn’t mean causation between physical events isn’t physical. The principle may be abstract, but the relation it captures is physically real and measurable. So, if I say “the high temperature caused the water to boil,” I’m referring to a physical state change governed by known physical laws, not invoking an abstract metaphysical principle.

Now supposing the consequence really does represent a cause, is it physical? Is the if-then relation that obtains in reality between water and temperature a physical thing? The water is physical, and the cold temperature is physical, and the ice is physical, but is the relation that describes and accounts for the transformation itself physical? — Leontiskos

The description of the relation is of course not physical—it’s verbal or symbolic, a product of language or mathematical formalism. No argument there: the sentence “cold temperatures cause water to freeze” is composed of words, not ice crystals. And likewise, the water is composed of H₂0, not phonemes.

But the relation being described—namely, the causal link between temperature and phase change—is a physical phenomenon. It reflects real, observable, and measurable interactions in the physical world. Water molecules slow down at lower temperatures; hydrogen bonds lock them into a crystalline lattice. That’s not a metaphor, that’s molecular physics.

So while talking about causation involves non-physical symbols (words, formulas), the causation itself in this case—between temperature and freezing—is every bit as physical as the molecules involved.

But the relation being described—namely, the causal link between temperature and phase change—is a physical phenomenon. It reflects real, observable, and measurable interactions in the physical world. Water molecules slow down at lower temperatures; — Wayfarer

But why do you think that a relation between physical things is physical? Why do you think the speed of water molecules is a physical thing? Again, do you think that the world where a molecule changes speed has one more physical thing than the world where the molecule does not change speed? If a molecule's speed is physical then it seems that you must hold this.

Beyond that, Hume's response would be, "You have seen the constant conjunction between slow-moving water molecules and the formation of ice, but where is the cause? How do you know that it is the slow-moving molecules which cause ice?" The cause is itself neither observable nor measurable in the way you suppose.

And consider the world in which water never freezes. Surely that world has one less physical thing than our world, given that it lacks ice. But does it lack a second physical thing, namely the causal relation described by the consequence? — Leontiskos

-

The description of the relation is of course not physical—it’s verbal or symbolic, a product of language or mathematical formalism. No argument there — Wayfarer

I think I was pretty clear that I was talking about the "relation that obtains in reality between water and temperature." I did use the word "describe," but within the clause, "describes and accounts for the transformation." So I am not attempting to talk about mere words.

The billiard balls are under the influence of gravity the whole time and gravity plays a role in the movement and trajectory of the balls and plays a part in the collision. Yet gravity is a force operating (in an unknown way) at a distance from a median point within a in a very large ( in the part played by the planet earth) group of atoms. Acting against a median point amongst another group of atoms.
The white ball holds a force (momentum) as a group of atoms, but not from a median point, but as a group as a whole. That force is only a force in that the white ball is moving relative to the red ball. But perhaps the white ball isn’t moving, but the red ball, the snooker table and the planet are moving towards the white ball with an equivalent force and the white ball is stationary. In which case that same force is now held by the red ball. So in this case the red ball causes the white ball to move.

This would suggest that the cause of the change in momentum of the two balls could be given to numerous different forces, held in various different points in the system. Depending on which perspective the observer is coming from.

*