I want to say that causality is not physical because causality is a principle and principles are not physical. — Leontiskos
it does not follow that distance belongs to the same genus as points, lines, and curves — Leontiskos
One reason we know this is because distance is infinitely divisible whereas physical objects are not infinitely divisible. — Leontiskos
Likewise, we could say that kinetic energy is transferred from one ball to another, and given that kinetic energy is physical this is a physical phenomenon. — Leontiskos
I would again say that "energy" is a highly theoretical entity, and is not obviously physical. — Leontiskos
I am saying that the proposition that causation is necessarily physical ought to be a conclusion rather than an assumption — Leontiskos
he very fact that we can talk about causation without committing ourselves to physicalism — Leontiskos
It at least seems fairly clear that energy is of a different genus than the two billiard balls. — Leontiskos
The energy is not physical; it is potential. — Leontiskos
I think the concept of causality can be a very useful one, depending on the situation. At other times, it can be misleading. — T Clark
When an investigation determines the cause of a plane crash, this is of course useful. — J
But I'm confident the investigators also mean it to be true. Is there any reason to withhold that designation, in such a case? — J
Causality and truth are apples and oranges. — T Clark
Okay, but how does any of that help your thesis which holds that causality is physical? — Leontiskos
Yet, we are aware of things that do not exist for us through abstractions. We are 'aware' of abstractions. — I like sushi
Of course the onus is on non-physical positions to help physicalist positions rethink what 'physical' means now and coudl mean under a cognitive paradigm shift — I like sushi
I don't quite see this. Aren't you saying that the statement "{some set of Xs} caused the plane crash" has to be true, in order to be of use? How then is causality an "apple" in regard to such a statement? The predication seems the same as in any other similarly phrased statement, and would follow the same inferential rules. — J
But aren't Aristotle's four causes attempting to answer questions such as, "Why a duck?" — Leontiskos
I think that's the question that Aristotle and Darwin were attempting to answer, if in different ways. — Leontiskos
The explanation for a duck will presumably include why it is in this locale, why its plumage is of a certain color, and what its evolutionary history (and genesis) is. — Leontiskos
Causality is not the same thing as truth. Causality is a relationship between events. Truth is a characteristic of statements - propositions. — T Clark
Is "If P then Q; P; therefore Q" about events or propositions -- or both? It can be given either a causal or a logical construal. — J
There is no such thing as the cause of a thing, simpliciter, with no context of who is asking and for what purpose. — SophistiCat
But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question. — SophistiCat
To take a simplistic example, someone might say, "We can't ask what causes ice. We can ask whether ice requires H2O and we can ask whether ice requires low temperatures, but those are two different questions." The answer is that they are two interrelated questions, and that to give the cause of ice we will need to answer both questions (and others as well). One cause/reason for ice is H2O and another cause/reason for ice is low temperatures, and yet they are both causes and they will both be needed to explain, "What accounts for the ice's existence." Surely someone who understands these two things about ice understands what accounts for ice's existence more than someone who does not understand these two things (ceteris paribus). — Leontiskos
↪Philosophim I am asking what you think. You sound like you are buried in the physicalist reductionist camp. What flaws are there with this position? — I like sushi
I question that the brain can be described in solely physical terms or as a physical thing. — Wayfarer
But a living brain exists in constant flux, generating experiences, meanings, and novel responses that seem to emerge from, but aren’t reducible to, these physical substrates. — Wayfarer
Even if successful, it would miss the semantic content, the intentions, the meaning being imparted. — Wayfarer
'It would be possible', wrote Einstein, 'to describe everything scientifically, but it would make no sense; it would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.' — Wayfarer
How any combination of neurochemicals can 'produce' or equate to an idea or some neural content is currently completely unknown. — Wayfarer
By what means? Its the current scientific consensus. — Philosophim
Take an instrument. Take air. Alone they are physical substrates. Combine them together over time and you have interactions. But those actions cannot occur without the existence of the two physical identities. — Philosophim
If you don't include the meaning, content, and intentions, then of course they aren't included. If you do, they are. — Philosophim
At any rate, I think the really interesting question is that of mental causation - of how ideas and thoughts can have physical consequences, as they plainly do. I don't think it's an insoluble problem, but I think that the assumption the brain is a physical thing is the wrong place to start.
Otherwise, what I see is an endless word game being played. — jgill
Yes and this issue is a good example, it’s quite a simple issue when one realises that causes regress to a first cause. Unless they are the result of an intelligent mind. In which case in order to regress to a first cause, it would mean that the agency in the first cause had in mind, Beethoven’s fifth, or Hamlet, (or anything which a mind can produce), when determining to create the universe.I think sometimes philosophical machinations can be so reductive that they fall prey to becoming so abstracted from any real life scenario that the crux of the matter is lost.
Yes and I’m hoping to learn something.In particular the focus here is on the use of Mental Acts and Physical Acts in terms of Philosophy of Mind. I think there is still worthy groudn to cover within more a more focused scope.
'It would be possible', wrote Einstein, 'to describe everything scientifically, but it would make no sense; it would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.' — Wayfarer
like trying to capture a conversation by analyzing the acoustic properties of the sound waves of which it consists (although orders of magnitude more complex). Even if successful, it would miss the semantic content, the intentions, the meaning being imparted. — Wayfarer
I question that the brain can be described in solely physical terms or as a physical thing — Wayfarer
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