• Astorre
    119
    I propose for review one of the chapters of my great work on ontology. Please share your thoughts on this matter

    The Language of Philosophy
    Philosophy is complex because its object of study is intangible. It doesn't uncover a thing; it uncovers the content of a word. Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept. And since philosophy speaks about the world relying solely on language, this creates difficulties for both the researcher and the reader. Moreover, philosophers readily introduce their own terms—monads, simulacra, a posteriori. Thus, what is described is often, in a sense, created.

    Therefore, if we want to understand the assertion "Being is," we must return not only to the thought, but also to the language of those who first uttered it—the Ancient Greeks.

    Here, grammar is crucial: in Ancient Greek, statements are constructed according to the schema "A is B." For example: "Parmenides is a philosopher" (ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐστὶν φιλόσοφος). The copula "is" (or "estin") is obligatory. It passed into Latin (Marcus est philosophus), English (Socrates is a philosopher), French (Socrate est philosophe), and German (Sokrates ist ein Philosoph). For native speakers of these languages, "is" is not just a word, but a mode of thought. It's woven into consciousness like a thread into fabric. To say "Socrates philosopher" without "is" is impossible—the sentence falls apart.

    "Is" lends stability to being: Socrates is not merely a philosopher; he is a philosopher, as if fixed in reality. This structure made the question "What is being?" natural for philosophy, and answers sought a substance—be it God, an idea, or matter.

    The Russian language disrupts this logic. In the present tense, the copula "есть" (is) is not obligatory: "Сократ философ" (Socrates philosopher), "Он доктор" (He doctor), "Я студент" (I student). Being does not demand confirmation; it simply is present. This feature can create a disconnect between Russian thought and Western ontology, vividly illustrated in a classroom where a fifth-grader learns English. The teacher writes: "He is a doctor." The boy translates: "Он есть доктор" (He is a doctor). The teacher corrects: "In Russian, 'есть' isn't needed, just 'Он доктор' (He doctor)." The child freezes, his eyes widen. How can the verb "to be" exist, yet not be there? His world, where everything is simply "He doctor," clashes with English, where the doctor seems frozen in "is." This isn't just a translation error—it's a rupture in thinking.

    The verb "to be" in Russian behaves differently than in Western European languages. In the future tense, we say: "Он будет лечить" (He will treat) or "Он будет доктором" (He will be a doctor)—the emphasis is on change, becoming. In the past: "Он лечил" (He treated, where "to be" is replaced by a suffix) or "Он был доктором" (He was a doctor, indicating something no longer current). Similar features are noticeable in Ukrainian and Belarusian. However, in West Slavic languages like Polish (Jan jest lekarzem) or Bulgarian (Той е лекар), the obligatory copula "jest" or "e" returns, approaching the Western European model. Why this occurs is a question for separate research, but it hints at cultural and linguistic differences that generally influence one's worldview. The verb "to be" in Russian is not a frozen snapshot of a state, but a process, movement, becoming.

    This observation becomes even more striking as we "move eastward." Turkic languages go further still. For example, in Kazakh, there is no copula "is" in the present tense: "Мен ғалым" (Men ǵalym) — "I scientist," "Тау бар" (Taý bar) — "Mountain exists." "Бар" (bar) is not "is" in the sense of being; "бар" is "that which exists"—a fact proven by presence. "Тау бар" means "The mountain is present."

    In Kazakh, the verb "болу" (bolu) — "to be" — is also used, but here it emphasizes process. "Үй болды" (Úi boldy) — not just "The house is," but "The house became": someone built the walls, put on the roof, lit the hearth. "Ол ғалым болды" (Ol ǵalym boldy) — "He became a scientist"—this is a story: sleepless nights, books, exams, the moment the diploma is in hand. "Ол ата болды" (Ol ata boldy) — "He became a father"—the moment the child first cries. The future reinforces movement: "Болады" (Bolady) — "Will be, will happen, will become," like an open road. In Kazakh, to be is not a point, but a path, a becoming. A mountain does not simply "exist"; it formed over centuries. A person does not "exist"; they become—a scientist, a father, themselves.

    If Turkic languages understand "being" as becoming, then Chinese thought has generally abandoned the category of "being" altogether. The Chinese language shapes a worldview distinct from the Western one, avoiding the category of "being." It has no analogue to the Indo-European verb "to be," which fixes existence. Instead, it uses:

    有 (yǒu) — "to have," "to be present/exist"

    无 (wú) — "to be absent," "to not have"

    For example: "桌子有" (zhuōzi yǒu) — "Table exists," not "Table is"; "这里没有人" (zhèlǐ méiyǒu rén) — "Here no people exist" (literally). The Chinese language does not express abstract "being," but rather fixes concrete presence or absence in a specific context. This feature directs thought towards dynamics, rather than a static essence.

    The absence of the copula "is" makes the question "What is being?" alien. Instead of seeking substance, the Chinese language emphasizes relationships and processes. For instance, the word 道 (dào) — "path" — indicates not a fixed state, but movement, the order of the world. 阴阳 (yīn-yáng) describes not opposites, but the change of phases in a cycle. 无 (wú) denotes not "non-being," but potential, a space for emergence. In the Tao Te Ching, Laozi writes: "Thirty spokes share the hub of a wheel, but it is the emptiness in the center that makes it useful." 无 is not emptiness in the Western sense, but the possibility for 有 — temporary manifestation.

    The Chinese language reflects the fluidity of the world in other aspects. 有 (yǒu) indicates transient presence, while 变 (biàn) — change, movement. Being is not fixed as a "thing," but perceived through:

    有 (yǒu) — that which is present now,

    变 (biàn) — that which transforms,

    道 (dào) — inclusion in the flow of the world.

    For example, a river in Chinese is not the "essence of a river," but its presence (有), its flow (变), and its place in the Dao (道). If Western languages prompt us to ask what a table is, Chinese emphasizes its use (用, yòng)—its role in a specific situation. This linguistic structure influences perception: good is harmony with the flow (和, hé), evil is its disruption (乱, luàn). Even in Chinese medicine, health is the movement of qi energy (气), not a static state.

    Such linguistic features shape philosophical conceptions where there is no cult of eternal essences. In Daoism, Confucianism, or Chinese Buddhism, the world is not a collection of "beings," but a field of interactions where everything arises, changes, and disappears.

    The Western philosopher Parmenides asserted: "Being is, non-being is not," thereby establishing an immobile, eternal reality. However, the Western tradition is not limited to stasis: Hegel saw being as becoming through dialectics, and Heidegger emphasized its processuality through care. Deleuze or Whitehead even developed process ontology. Nevertheless, the linguistic structure with the obligatory copula "is" often directed thought towards the search for substance. Directly translating Parmenides into Kazakh, we get: "Болу бар, болмау жоқ" (Bolý bar, bolmaý joq) — "Becoming is, non-becoming is not," which points to the world as a flow where everything is born and transforms. In Chinese, his words would sound like: "道有,非道无" (dào yǒu, fēi dào wú) — "The Way exists, non-Way does not," where "being" dissolves into movement and relationships.

    Western philosophy, from Parmenides to Heidegger, sought the essence of being—eternity, phenomenon, givenness—relying on the formula "Being — is," rooted in a language where "is" fixes being. Even the understanding of God—from Kant's highest being to Heidegger's mystery of being—followed this logic. But languages where the copula "is" is not obligatory or is absent—Russian, Kazakh, Chinese—offer a different perspective. In Russian, being is present without fixation; in Kazakh, it becomes through a process ("болу"); and in Chinese, it manifests as a temporary presence (有) or the potential of emptiness (无), integrated into the flow of Dao. These languages avoid the "forgetfulness of being," of which Heidegger spoke, presenting the world not as a collection of substances, but as a field of changes.

    Language shapes philosophy. The Western tradition, relying on the copula "is," built an ontology of presence, in which the question of being became a question of its essence. Russian, Kazakh, and Chinese languages, which do not require the obligatory expression of being in the present tense, suggest something different: being is not an immobile "thing," but a moment in becoming, arising through relationships and differences. Moreover, the very linguistic distinction between the words "exist" and "to be" (in the sense of "бытийствовать"), "existence" and "being" points to a deeper conceptual cleavage. These words are not synonymous: language captures a distinction that remains, for now, unobvious. In further sections, we will endeavor to philosophically clarify whether this distinction is truly rooted in ontology or if it is merely a grammatical intuition.

    We will strive to move beyond focusing on "presence" and instead consider reality as a network of processes. Being, in our view, becomes through the establishment of boundaries, through the interaction of presence and change. The question "Being — is. How?" is replaced by another: "Being — becomes. How does it become?"
  • RussellA
    2.4k
    "Is" lends stability to being...............................The verb "to be" in Russian behaves differently than in Western European languages.................the emphasis is on change, becoming.Astorre

    How about the Italian essere (derived from the Latin esse) and the Italian stare (derived from the Latin stare).

    Both essere and stare function as copulas.

    Essere indicates permanence. For example, "è in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen", meaning where it usually is.

    Stare indicates transience. For example, "sta in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen". meaning where it usually isn't

    Perhaps the Russian verb "to be" functions more like the Latin "stare"?
  • Ludwig V
    2.1k
    Language shapes philosophy.Astorre
    I was very impressed by this post. It demonstrates things about language that most of us have to gesture at.

    At the same time, your post manages to explain (no doubt only roughly) the ideas that permeate different languages. So a given language (in this case, English) seems to be able to explain the ideas implicit in the grammar of other languages. A given language may well have sufficient flexibility to articulate a range of philosophical ideas.

    You may or may not have come across a theory on the boundary between philosophy and linguistics, known as the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, which seems to be close to what you are getting at. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "Whorfianism" and Wikipedia - Linguistic determinism.

    Moreover, the very linguistic distinction between the words "exist" and "to be" (in the sense of "бытийствовать"), "existence" and "being" points to a deeper conceptual cleavage. These words are not synonymous: language captures a distinction that remains, for now, unobvious. In further sections, we will endeavor to philosophically clarify whether this distinction is truly rooted in ontology or if it is merely a grammatical intuition.Astorre
    That's a very good question. I don't know how to answer it. So I shall watch what people say with great interest.

    You may or may not have come across "Process Philosophy", often associate with Whitehead. Two more references in case you are interested. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Process Philosophy and Wikipedia - Process Philosophy
  • Joshs
    6.3k


    The verb "to be" in Russian behaves differently than in Western European languages. In the future tense, we say: "Он будет лечить" (He will treat) or "Он будет доктором" (He will be a doctor)—the emphasis is on change, becoming. In the past: "Он лечил" (He treated, where "to be" is replaced by a suffix) or "Он был доктором" (He was a doctor, indicating something no longer current). Similar features are noticeable in Ukrainian and Belarusian. However, in West Slavic languages like Polish (Jan jest lekarzem) or Bulgarian (Той е лекар), the obligatory copula "jest" or "e" returns, approaching the Western European model. Why this occurs is a question for separate research, but it hints at cultural and linguistic differences that generally influence one's worldview. The verb "to be" in Russian is not a frozen snapshot of a state, but a process, movement, becoming.Astorre

    Heidegger’s main argument is that the definition of the truth of a being as adequation, or correctness, between appearance and reality, between how it seems and what it is, was bequeathed to the West by the Greeks and runs continuously through Medieval Christianity and Modern scientific thought. The fact that certain languages which belong to this tradition handed down from the Greeks lack the copula has. or prevented them from accepting the idea of truth as correctness, which assumes the persisting presence of the beings grounding this notion of truth.

    Western philosophy, from Parmenides to Heidegger, sought the essence of being—eternity, phenomenon, givenness—relying on the formula "Being — is," rooted in a language where "is" fixes being. Even the understanding of God—from Kant's highest being to Heidegger's mystery of being—followed this logicAstorre

    How does Heidegger’s mystery of being follow the logic of presence? Heidegger did not seek to ground being in the ‘is’, he sought to ground the ‘is’ in the happening of unconcealment.

    We will strive to move beyond focusing on "presence" and instead consider reality as a network of processes. Being, in our view, becomes through the establishment of boundaries, through the interaction of presence and change. The question "Being — is. How?" is replaced by another: "Being — becomes. How does it become?"Astorre

    Let’s say beings are always ensconced within networks of non-linear, reciprocally causal relations, incessantly self-organizing , self-creative, in always ongoing endogenous activity, evolving ever beyond themselves toward higher heights (like a chaotic, complex dynamical system.).

    Evan Thompson defines such a nondecomposable system as
    “one in which the connectivity and interrelatedness of the components give rise to global processes that subsume the components so that they are no longer clearly separable. In such a system, the distinction between preexisting parts and supervening whole becomes problematic. Not only does the whole emerge from the components, but also the components emerge from the whole.” “ Dynamic co-emergence means that part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each other.”

    Perhaps this type of model of creative emergence through relational process is close to the notion of becoming you have in mind.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    4.1k


    Sort of like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis for philosophy? It's an interesting though. However, it seems to me like Sapir-Whorf has fallen into ill repute in its stronger forms and the empirical support mustered for its weaker forms is, from what I can tell, is quite modest. Certainly, a lot of people have wanted it to be true, and I can see why, as it would suggest that merely speaking differently would open up all sorts of new horizons, but I am a bit skeptical. At least, prima facie, I would think that language is flexible enough to allow for either development in thought. English has being as a noun and verb, and Latin has ens/esse.

    For instance, Indo-European languages have produced plenty of process/relational metaphysics. I think that critiques of the "metaphysics of presence" have often themselves painted too much with a monochrome brush (a sort of static presence itself maybe?). Certainly, there is Parmenides, Plato's forms, or Brahman as an ultimate and unchanging reality, but there has also been Heraclitus, Nagarjuna, and countless expositions on the Holy Trinity as fundamentally relational (self-giving love), living activity (or Brahman as activity). Aristotle sometimes gets lumped in as a key purveyor of "static being" or "substance metaphysics," but, were I forced to lump him into either category, I'd probably place him on the "process metaphysics" side. Hegel would be another example.

    Not that there isn't a real issue here, although I would diagnose the problem more as two sorts of tendencies stemming from the Problem of the One and the Many. I think it's fair to say that, on average, and particularly since the Enlightenment (or maybe the Reformation), Western thought has tended too much towards the One (toward Parmenides). It has, at times however, lurched into excesses in the other direction. But I see the story as more about an attempt to chart a path between Scylla and Charybdis, rather than Western (and Indian?) thought having remained firmly in the clutches of one or the other. Plato's forms themselves were an attempt to chart a sort of via media here, and Aristotle is largely following his teacher's lead, but showing how the principles of his psychology can be expanded to an explanation of physics, i.e., "being qua changing."

    For instance, the fullness of life and understanding attributed to God in much of the "Neoplatonic" tradition (across Pagan, Islamic, Jewish, and Christian thought), God as pure act, strikes me as something that cautions against any conception that is too "static." I'm reminded here of Derrida's "Plato's Pharmacy," which is focused on the ol' "problem of presence." However, I recall thinking that Derrida might be a bit off base in contrasting speech/writing here. In the Phaedrus at around 275a-276d, Plato is pretty clear that his claims about the insufficiency of writing have more to do with the lack of an intellect that knows what is said, and in the context of his overall metaphysics this reveals itself to be more about the insufficiency of finite things, which are more or less just bundles of external causes, and so not intelligible in themselves (being always referred to something else). The point is, as with Saint Augustine's "inner word," participation in Logos. Yet I'd hesitate to call this static. In a way it has to be most alive, lacking nothing. For Augustine and later thinkers in his tradition, it couldn't be a being, or even, univocally, "being," but was "beyond being" (or being/becoming). Dionysius says something on this to the effect of "It is false to say that God exists, but also false to say that God does not exist. But of the two, it is more false to say that God does not exist."
  • Joshs
    6.3k
    The point is, as with Saint Augustine's "inner word," participation in Logos. Yet I'd hesitate to call this static. In a way it has to be most alive, lacking nothing. For Augustine and later thinkers in his tradition, it couldn't be a being, or even, univocally, "being," but was "beyond being" (or being/becoming). Dionysius says something on this to the effect of "It is false to say that God exists, but also false to say that God does not exist. But of the two, it is more false to say that God does not exist."Count Timothy von Icarus

    Is this inner word beyond being and becoming certain in itself , and as such the certain and absolute ground of all that is and all that becomes or merely ‘seems to be’? Can there be certainty without stasis?
  • frank
    17.9k
    Can there be certainty without stasis?Joshs

    Can there be change without stasis? Aren't they two sides of the same coin?
  • Joshs
    6.3k
    Can there be change without stasis? Aren't they two sides of the same coin?frank

    Derrida, Heidegger and Deleuze say there can be change without stasis. More precisely, there can be difference without a prior identity. So how does that work? One can imagine an assemblage of differences which continually make changes in each other. No aspect of the assemblage remains unchanged by the changes that occur in any part of it. There can be consistencies and patterns, but these are not static in the sense of being able to locate some static center around which the pattern is organized and which give it its sense.
  • frank
    17.9k

    Einstein said all motion is relative to a chosen frame of reference. You declare a point to be unchanging at the same time you perceive change.

    It's not that everything is changing before you declare a frame of reference. There simply is no change without stasis.
  • MoK
    1.8k

    They are.
  • Joshs
    6.3k
    ↪Joshs
    Einstein said all motion is relative to a chosen frame of reference. You declare a point to be unchanging at the same time you perceive change.

    It's not that everything is changing before you declare a frame of reference. There simply is no change without stasis.
    frank

    That is a good summary of what we get from Einstein. Do you want to treat physics as the ground floor of your understanding of the world, or do you, like me, see Einstein’s thinking as the expression of an era of philosophy which has since been surpassed?
  • frank
    17.9k
    hat is a good summary of what we get from Einstein. Do you want to treat physics as the ground floor of your understanding of the world,Joshs

    I don't have a ground floor. I have a very principled lack of ground floor.

    like me, see Einstein’s thinking as the expression of an era of philosophy which has since been surpassedJoshs

    It sounds like you're saying you understand Special Relativity, you just think it's been surpassed by something else. I think we could find common ground if you explained what you see as its flaw?
  • Janus
    17.4k
    More precisely, there can be difference without a prior identity. So how does that work?Joshs

    How could there be difference unless some difference is identified? Identity and difference co-arise―you can't have one without the other.
  • Joshs
    6.3k
    How could there be difference unless some difference is identified? Identity and difference co-arise―you can't have one without the other.Janus

    Difference isn’t identified, as though there were some separate subject simply noticing what differs. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is all about this. He shows how it’s possible to think difference prior to identity.
  • Janus
    17.4k
    How can you say there is difference if it is not identified? How is it possible to think difference without thinking (identifying) the things which differ?
  • Antony Nickles
    1.3k


    Well done; very interested to mull over. It reminds of the later Heidegger text "What is Called Thinking?" in which the Greek translation of that question is eventually taken in English to be: "Useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart, too", so the evidence can be fruitful.
  • Joshs
    6.3k
    ↪Joshs How can you say there is difference if it is not identified? How is it possible to think difference without thinking (identifying) the things which differ?Janus

    Thinking isn’t in the business of thinking ‘things’ (identities) that differ, but of producing differences that relate to other differences.
  • 180 Proof
    16k
    Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept. And since philosophy speaks about the world ..Astorre
    This is confusing. Maybe you mean 'philosophy speaks about the concept of world'?
  • Janus
    17.4k
    The logic of thinking difference involves things which are identified as being different. I don't see how you can escape that.
  • Wayfarer
    25.2k
    A classic paper you might find of interest is The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Problem of Being, Charles S. Kahn.
  • Punshhh
    3.2k
    The logic of thinking difference involves things which are identified as being different. I don't see how you can escape that.
    Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
    To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification.
  • Punshhh
    3.2k
    Thanks for an insightful post.
    Something I contemplate at length is how being is somehow static and mobile. Neither one nor the other.
    A static being is like the Buddha in stillness.
    A mobile being is like a presence observing life as if watching the world go by through the window of a vehicle. An experience of events while travelling, rather than places and moments. The sense of self is experienced as a presence in and defined by the movement. We are fellow travellers, rather than fellow fixed states.
  • Wayfarer
    25.2k
    a static being is like the Buddha in stillness.Punshhh

    although the Buddha said there is nothing not subject to change
  • Punshhh
    3.2k
    although the Buddha said there is nothing not subject to change
    “Subject to”.
    Is there something absent change, or would that be nothing at all. Or there could be no thing, other than change.
    This would suggest that upon enlightenment the Buddha ceases to be a thing.
  • Ludwig V
    2.1k
    No aspect of the assemblage remains unchanged by the changes that occur in any part of it. There can be consistencies and patterns, but these are not static in the sense of being able to locate some static center around which the pattern is organized and which give it its sense.Joshs
    This reads to me as a specification of something that may well be possible. But without specific cases, one cannot assess what it really means.

    Can there be change without stasis? Aren't they two sides of the same coin?frank
    That seems about right to me. But I would have to add that change and stasis are relative. Heraclitus' river has constantly changing water relative to the bed and banks. But the water itself, not to mention other factors, cause the bed and banks to change constantly relative to the landscape it flows through.

    How could there be difference unless some difference is identified? Identity and difference co-arise―you can't have one without the other.Janus
    That also seems about right to me. The thing is, though, that identifying a difference is a rather different exercise from identifying an object.

    Thinking isn’t in the business of thinking ‘things’ (identities) that differ, but of producing differences that relate to other differences.Joshs
    I can see how one might want to say that. But "different" is a relation, so it requires two objects to be compared. Of course, from another perspective, those objects might be dissolved into a bundle of differences, which then require a range of other objects to establish themselves.

    Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
    To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification.
    Punshhh
    If you don't identify the object you perceive, how do you know what you have witnessed?

    We are fellow travellers, rather than fellow fixed states.Punshhh
    But if there is nothing fixed, how do we know that we are travelling? Or rather, how do we tell the difference between our travelling and the rest of the world travelling?
  • frank
    17.9k
    That seems about right to me. But I would have to add that change and stasis are relative. Heraclitus' river has constantly changing water relative to the bed and banks. But the water itself, not to mention other factors, cause the bed and banks to change constantly relative to the landscape it flows through.Ludwig V

    Right. We could pick a point in the steam and build a frame of reference around it so that the surrounding landscape is in motion around the stream. There's no truth of the matter about which one is in motion. It's a matter of choice.

    By the same token, it is not true that the whole universe is in motion, waiting for us to pick a frame of reference. Again, there is no truth regarding change and stasis until we orient ourselves.
  • Ludwig V
    2.1k
    By the same token, it is not true that the whole universe is in motion, waiting for us to pick a frame of reference.frank
    The whole universe could, I guess, be regarded as a single body. For a universe that consists of a single body, there is no way to differentiate rest and motion. (There's nowhere for an observer to observe from.)

    There's no truth of the matter about which one is in motion. It's a matter of choice.frank
    But once the choice is made, there is a truth. That's the point of the choice.
  • Wayfarer
    25.2k
    A fundamental ontological distinction is between beings and things. I’ve had many an argument about it. That was the context in which I was sent the Kahn paper.
  • Wayfarer
    25.2k
    For a universe that consists of a single body, there is no way to differentiate rest and motion. (There's nowhere for an observer to observe from.)Ludwig V

    The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

    Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

    So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.
    — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271
  • frank
    17.9k
    But once the choice is made, there is a truth. That's the point of the choice.Ludwig V

    Yep
  • Antony Nickles
    1.3k
    Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept.Astorre

    We’ve been reading the Blue Book here, and one of Wittgenstein’s main themes, and first, is that thinking of something else (like feelings) as an object, treating them as an object, copying the framework analogously, is a major source of problems in philosophy.

    Being does not demand confirmation; it simply is present.Astorre

    Then I’m taking “is” as a claim, to be verified or justified, different than something… self-evident? or something that doesn’t work like a claim? Maybe accepted until mistaken, and then just corrected.

    Maybe the Russian says that person (is a) doctor, not to make a claim that they are a doctor (to be proven with a license), but to identify them, like pointing to that particular individual (singling them out, Cavell says), that one:doctor, as if doctor is not another noun (that they are equated with), but a modifying adjective.

    "Mountain exists." "Бар" (bar) is not "is" in the sense of being; "бар" is "that which exists"—a fact proven by presence. "Тау бар" means "The mountain is present."Astorre

    In Russian, being is present without fixation; in Kazakh, it becomes through a process ("болу"); and in Chinese, it manifests as a temporary presence (有) or the potential of emptiness (无), integrated into the flow of DaoAstorre

    Thought of just as: the mountain is present (to us) compared to existing (apart from us), casts it in a Cartesian light you are obviously not suggesting. But there is the sense were we are present to the mountain, as in, we are aware of it, now focused on it, perhaps even, in its “mountain-ness” (channeling later Heidegger).

    If Western languages prompt us to ask what a table is, Chinese emphasizes its use (用, yòng)—its role in a specific situation.Astorre

    The Western tradition, relying on the copula "is," built an ontology of presence, in which the question of being became a question of its essence.Astorre

    Wittgenstein will ask what is essential (to us) about a table, in looking at how we measure, say, that this, here, has fulfilled the role of a table.

    Again, very interesting, congratulations. Of course this is to just tease the meat of the findings, but I find the research/evidence does allow for an astounding perspective, particularly how the classic philosophical framework is seemingly baked into the language.
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