↪Philosophim You understand that this is one philosophical position. It is called physicalism. — I like sushi

No, I don't. The problem with ascribing me to one 'genre' is that I have no idea if I ascribe to everything in that genre. What I'm posting is not complicated and can be addressed by normal terminology and logic.

If you claim you are not talking about physicalism just spit out what you are talking about to avoid confusion if possible. — I like sushi

I already said I'm not. What area are you confused by? I'll try to clarify.

↪Philosophim . Non-physicality is a way of describing not a object. — Danileo

So a process or verb? But a process and verb is an object or set of objects in action.

I could do a reverse argument and say that what is physical is a construction of our mind and therefore is grounded on our mind. So the foundation of what exists occured in our mind and therefore all theories have the same validation in matters of how they are constructed (not talking on probability or proofs) — Danileo

Feel free to just make the argument, no worry. :) As it stands you run into the same problems. You still have to define what a mind is independent of the physical, so you would still need a clear definition of what is non-physical, then proof that it exists. Using 'mind' as a placeholder concept without understanding its underlying underpinning is fine, but that's far different from claiming, "I know a mind is non-physical, here's clear proof."

I'll let you build out your full argument out first however. No need to rush it.

non-physical for me, is defined by a property that is not found in the tangible universe, for example symmetry. What is symmetric in our minds? The time, with time comes notions like our own death and with it beliefs of what happens after we die.

Note that with this I am not saying that our mind is capable to produce perfect symmetric thinking ( as for that I am not sure ) but at least is close to it.

In this sense claiming that time is deduced from tangible universe is against the sense that the universe is entropic witch is an antonym of symmetry.

No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.

I note you didn’t answer my question, what sort of proof do you require? You do understand, I presume how hard it is to prove something.
I have put forward a rational argument for consciousness to be present in life forms. A presence which doesn’t appear to be necessary if the world is just physical. If the argument has merit, it is inappropriate to dismiss it on the grounds that what it entails can’t be proved, prior to an appraisal of the argument.
As I said, it is dismissing a philosophical enquiry on the grounds that it can’t be proved to be valid, in the terms of one particular philosophical position, which is generally regarded to be opposed to it, ie physicalism.
I can predict now that whatever I say, it will be rejected out of hand for not meeting these requirements.

Yes, it is emergent from physical processes alone. No, the physical processes for consciousness must occur to have consciousness. This is why we can put someone under anesthesia and knock them unconscious. We stop the physical process of the brain responsible for consciousness.

Correction, you are claiming that consciousness is emergent from computation alone, aren’t you?
Saying it is emergent from physical processes is hand waving, because that also includes what a I am saying and which you were denying previously.

I noted that objectively by some AIs actions, they have very low level consciousness.

Show me that they are conscious? They may be philosophical zombies, ie perfect mimics.

Its incredibly difficult, and part of the hard problem of consciousness. Do you see green the way I do? We have color blind people who don't. What do they see the different colors as?

Line of argument is used in discussions of qualia, about differences between people’s qualia due to genetic variation. It doesn’t include the fact that 99% of the experience of one person is identical to that of another, with a nuance of difference. If we were not near as dammit identical clones, our social activity would be far more difficult. This is not comparable to the obvious differences between the conscious experience of a mouse and a high spec’ computer.

Consciousness is a presence of a being and self in the world with all that entails. It is the anima Mundi of living organisms. A dynamic electrical force, field, unifying the whole being, as an entity.

Its a fun thought experiment, but its essentially the 'evil demon' argument from Descartes or 'brain in a vat'.

It isn’t, it is a serious argument. Can you give me one thing in a zombie world which could not be accomplished by an identical unconscious being, which is accomplished in our world of conscious being’s?

We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell.

You’ve just accepted my rational argument. That’s pretty much what I was claiming and you were rejecting.

Of being even something we don't consider life like an atom. After all, we are composed of atoms, so there is something in matter that causes a subjective experience. We just don't know fully what that is yet.

So why are you dismissing it out of hand one minute and then considering it the next.

We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.

This is incorrect, it can be known, we are it. We don’t fully know the processes involved, be it is known, we just need to be able to see the wood for the trees.

A physical process is a supervenient relationship to the physical entities involved in the process. You'll need to explain specifically why it’s not a physical process.

I’m not saying it isn’t a physical process, it’s just a different physical process, an ethereal one in a supevalent relationship with it’s physical partner.

Phsyicalism is basically the same as Materilaism. You can look it up easily enough.

I was not labelling you I was labelling the position you are expressing. Physicalism comes in many forms. It is not a religious doctrine.

You were expressing that everything we know of, and can know of, is physical which is obviously (for most) associated with a physicalist position. Yet you deny expressing a phsyicalist position and also say you do not know what it means.

What game are you playing here?

If the mind's eye is physical, then its contents should be physical too. But when I imagine a blue flower, my brain doesn’t turn blue. There's no blue in my skull. So where is the blue? Oh, and why do you think this happens in the brain as opposed to the heart? Why is only the brain conscious and why only parts of the brain?

Again, do you think that the world where a molecule changes speed has one more physical thing than the world where the molecule does not change speed? If a molecule's speed is physical then it seems that you must hold this. — Leontiskos

Hmm. Either motion isn't physical, or maybe, just maybe, it is your definition of physical that is at fault.

If its not physical, what is it? This is always the problem. You have no real definition of non-physical that we can clearly point to that doesn't involve the physical. Can you explain non-physical apart from 'a physical process'? — Philosophim

Information is not physical. If it was, it could not retain its identity as it propagates through completely different physical mediums. Information requires a medium, but it is a mistake to conflate information with its medium.

I believe consciousness is informational in nature, not physical. And so like for all informational things, it is a mistake to call consciousness physical, conflating it with its medium, the brain.

If you doubt that consciousness is informational (though I don't see how you can, as you agree consciousness is ultimately computational), reflect how each and every piece of conscious content, every "quale", is telling you something, some piece of information, either about the world (the five senses), your body, your conscious mind (thoughts), or your unconscious mind (emotions).

Can you imagine an non-physical object? Can you refer to something that has velocity but no material qualities? I think you will find in both cases that the answer is no.

This is true of items liek 'and' in language. The 'and' does not exist materially, yet it serves a function for describing material items.

I believe consciousness is informational in nature, not physical. And so like for all informational things, it is a mistake to call consciousness physical, conflating it with its medium, the brain.

I agree with your point here, but I think it is necessary in a discussion about consciousness to delineate consciousness and mind, or mental activity. As I find they are often confused.
Consciousness is the aliveness, sentience of a being.
Mind is information processing and storage.

They are both intimately involved in experience, but are quite different.

Philosophim non-physical for me, is defined by a property that is not found in the tangible universe, for example symmetry. — Danileo

I appreciate this, as its not easy to define something you've been casually using for a while. What is the 'tangible' universe? Because 'tangible' as normally defined means real or not imaginary. So what I heard you say is that 'non-physical' are things that are not real or imaginary. But maybe you were thinking of a different idea and we can try to find another term that better fits what you're feeling.

What is symmetric in our minds? The time, with time comes notions like our own death and with it beliefs of what happens after we die.

Note that with this I am not saying that our mind is capable to produce perfect symmetric thinking ( as for that I am not sure ) but at least is close to it. — Danileo

Ok, I think you believe the mind is real and not imaginary, so I'm going to say you do think that something non-physical is tangible. What you seem to be describing as 'the mind' is really the subjective experience of the brain. Rationally, neuroscientists have over decades continually demonstrated that affecting the brain affects people's subjective experience, and consistently. Think about the entirety of psyche drugs and pharmacology. Think about brain surgery. They keep the patient conscious while they stimulate areas of the brain to get consistent results. Go to a brain chart and you can see that different parts of the brain handle different senses and physical responses.

For the subjective experience of the brain to not be a physical reality of physical processes, we would need some type of evidence of subjective experience apart from the physical. For example, lets say I stepped into a particular empty space and suddenly had a vision of a meadow. And anyone of X height who stepped in had that vision. And it didn't matter what we passed through that space, it gave the same results every time. THAT would be an example of something non-physical that is real.

No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.
I note you didn’t answer my question, what sort of proof do you require? You do understand, I presume how hard it is to prove something. — Punshhh

Oh, I'm not playing a trick here. I'm just asking you to define the word clearly that is not a 'skin' over what is defined as physical, then point to something in reality which objectively matches that definition. If its something close I'll even try to help adjust it if needed. I'm here to discuss, not troll.

I have put forward a rational argument for consciousness to be present in life forms. A presence which doesn’t appear to be necessary if the world is just physical. If the argument has merit — Punshhh

I tried to address your argument and simply noted that you are ascribing consciousness to something non-physical when we already have massive evidence that it is physical. Read my response to Danileo to see where I'm coming from.

Correction, you are claiming that consciousness is emergent from computation alone, aren’t you?
Saying it is emergent from physical processes is hand waving, because that also includes what a I am saying and which you were denying previously. — Punshhh

Perhaps we misunderstood each other then. Computation is a physical process. If the brain is active at a particular level, it has a subjective and objective experience we call consciousness. If it does not, it loses objective experience, and even further, seemingly loses subjective experience. Think a deep coma or dreamless sleep that feels like no time has passed on awakening. All of these are objectively understood in neuroscience and can be monitored by doctors and sometimes altered by drugs or treatments on the brain.

Line of argument is used in discussions of qualia, about differences between people’s qualia due to genetic variation. It doesn’t include the fact that 99% of the experience of one person is identical to that of another, with a nuance of difference. — Punshhh

The only way you can claim this is by observing people's actions. Objectively, you have zero ability to claim this is true from a subjective viewpoint. Please think on this for a minute. Do you know that other people think 99% like you because we can know the subjective experience they are having, or is it really an assumption based on people's physical actions and responses? Take being gay for example (or straight if you're gay) You can see a person's actions, but can you actually know what its like to be in their brain when they look at another person? No. No one can.

We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell.
You’ve just accepted my rational argument. That’s pretty much what I was claiming and you were rejecting. — Punshhh

I agree with the point that we cannot know if something else besides has a subjective experience. I add that by consequence, we cannot know what its like to have another subjective experience than our own, nor claim with any rational certainty what does and does not have subjective experience. All we can do is observe behavior and assign objective consciousness.

But if you agree with me, this does not prove that consciousness is something non-physical. Because when we talk about some 'thing' having a subjective experience, we are talking about a physical thing in process. It is not a separate thing that floats apart from something physical, it is part of physical reality. It is what its like to BE that physical thing.

We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.
This is incorrect, it can be known, we are it. We don’t fully know the processes involved, be it is known, we just need to be able to see the wood for the trees. — Punshhh

Yes, "Me". You know what YOU have when you subjectively experience. Is there a way in science to hook me up to a screen and see what I see and feel what I feel? When I say, "Ow, I'm in pain," can you objectively know what its like for me to experience that pain, or do you only know from my words and actions? This is the classic hard problem.

I’m not saying it isn’t a physical process, it’s just a different physical process, an ethereal one in a supevalent relationship with it’s physical partner. — Punshhh

Then we have no disagreement. As long as you're not claiming its something 'non-physical' as in 'an entity that is not physical', then we're both thinking in the same terms.

I was not labelling you I was labelling the position you are expressing. Physicalism comes in many forms. It is not a religious doctrine. — I like sushi

Don't. Just address my arguments. Trying to attach an entire to theory to my arguments is a straw man tactic. I have a very simple point here. "Clearly define the term 'non-physical' and demonstrate that it exists." Everybody likes to criticize the 'physical' world with this strange term called 'non-physical', and yet no one seems to be able to define what non-physical is or demonstrate that its real. If you want to call an expectation of clearly defined words and a re-examining of assumptions a game, its called philosophy. :)

You were expressing that everything we know of, and can know of, is physical which is obviously (for most) associated with a physicalist position. — I like sushi

There is your key word, 'most'. I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position. You even admit that not everyone does. It should be the end of this point. If it helps, I do not believe that everything we can know of is physical. But I sure can't know what is non-physical if no one can present a clear definition that isn't a skin over 'physical' that can be shown to exist. I'm not saying a God can't exist, I'm just asking for a clear definition and evidence of its existence.

If the mind's eye is physical, then its contents should be physical too. But when I imagine a blue flower, my brain doesn’t turn blue. There's no blue in my skull. So where is the blue? — RogueAI

Sure, this is a common mistake. When you 'see' blue, its light entering your eyes, bouncing around and being interpreted by your brain as an experience. But the 'blue light' isn't being emitted by your brain. Lets use a computer analogy.

Right now you're looking at your screen. The computer is processing everything you see. When you type a key, it shows up on the screen. The computer is doing all of the processing, then sends it to the screen to display. The screen of course doesn't know anything about the processing. It just displays the light sequence. But everything that's on the screen, the computer is processing. I can unhook the screen, and all that will still process. I can open my computer up and watch the hard drive spin. Where's the light from the screen? If its processing the screen light, then why can't I see it? Should we conclude that because I cannot see the screen being processed in the computer, that it is not managing the process of the screen? No.

You're making a mistake in thinking that the experience of one type of processing is equivalent to another type of processing. Lets take it from another viewpoint now. All the computer knows is 1's and 0's that it feeds into a processor. It scans memory for more one's and zeros, it interupted by other 1's and 0's, and so on. This is 'its' experience. While part of it is processing the 1's and 0's its sending to the screen, 'it' doesn't know what its going to look like on that screen. Its just processing. Its internal processing is different than the external result when you put it all together.

Now, lets look at the brain. We already know that different areas of the brain process different senses. We have a section of the brain that processes the light from our eyes and processes it into something that we subjectively see. The subjective part of you is the screen. You don't know what's being processes in the sight part of your mind. Its just '1's and '0's. But eventually it gets to the section of your brain that gives you 'the screen'. "The screen' doesn't understand the processor, and the processor doesn't understand the screen. Does this make more sense?

I repeat to people often, "You cannot do philosophy of mind without neuroscience." If you do not understand modern day neuroscience, you are stumbling blindly in the dark.

Information is not physical. If it was, it could not retain its identity as it propagates through completely different physical mediums. Information requires a medium, but it is a mistake to conflate information with its medium. — hypericin

Of course its physical. Let take music for example. The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it. Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere? The notes on the page are not the same as the sound from the intrament, and this is not the same as the ears that hear it and the brain that interprets it. All of these are separate physical experiences that we label as 'information' due to the fact we create a process within multiple physical mediums to get a consistent outcome. Please, try to give me an example of a 'non-physical' bit of information that exists.

Don't. Just address my arguments. — Philosophim

What arguments. I have provided examples of what people refer to as Mental Acts: Desires, Beliefs, Propositions etc.,.

I created this thread to talk about the different perspectives regarding Physical and Mental Acts and how I believe there is a problem when using Causation at a micro and macro level as well as between nomological and metaphysical positions.

I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position. — Philosophim

Yet you cannot express what position you lean towards. Physicalism is a not a dirty word. What I meantr by it not being a religious doctrine was that actual philosophers Explore other philosophical perspectives not bang a drum about their own particular point of view. They provide Proofs not Evidence and this in and of itself leads to problems. It is around this area that I was hoping to examine Causation as an example of how they differ in Proofs and Evidence.

Proofs are based on abstractions (not overtly concerned with spacio-temporal matters) and Evidence is based on empirically measureable events (more overtly concerned with spacio-temporal matters).

Both have differing forms of Causation built in to them as we operate as spacio-temporal human beings that intuitively appear to be grounded in the physical world.

Back to Causal Acts ...

From a physicalist perspective (to repeat, only crazies are dogmatic physicalists in a philosophical sense) the problem lies in infinite reduction unless it shifts to something like Russellian Monism -- but that is spectulative and a cohesive thoery has yet to be crafted there.

Then there is Substance and Property Dualism. The list goes on ...

Just to be explicitly clear. Many of the exmaple and analogies you have given lean toward a physicalist perpsective. You are obviously open to other possibilities and I am still struggling to discern where it is you are coming from (Russellian Monism?), while also trying to guide this back to the OP and question of Causation.

What about that situation is 'physical'?

Magnus Carlsen plays against 10 people while blindfolded — Wayfarer

If I were watching a computer play another, which part is physical?

Just the part I see, or would it also include the most significant part, the computations I don't see?

Information is not physical. — hypericin

Is data stored in a computer "information," or are you referencing the meaning a conscious being imposes on it?

For example, does the red leaf contain non-physical information that autumn has arrived, or is the red itself physical information?

Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere? — Philosophim

Certainly not floating in space, but existing in a similar sense that numbers exist. There is no 1, 2, 3, floating in space, these numbers must be instantiated physically to "exist", in your sense. Yet we routinely think of them independently from any particular instantiation, math wouldn't exist if we didn't do this.

The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it. — Philosophim

Here, we only identify the notes as information. The instrument is a tool to convert the information contained on the sheet into audible music, and the ears interpret this.

Please, try to give me an example of a 'non-physical' bit of information that exists. — Philosophim

A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. If you grant that it is the same song, this song cannot be physical, as their physical instantiation could not be more different.

Sure, this is a common mistake. When you 'see' blue, its light entering your eyes, bouncing around and being interpreted by your brain as an experience. But the 'blue light' isn't being emitted by your brain. Lets use a computer analogy.

Right now you're looking at your screen. The computer is processing everything you see. When you type a key, it shows up on the screen. The computer is doing all of the processing, then sends it to the screen to display. The screen of course doesn't know anything about the processing. It just displays the light sequence. But everything that's on the screen, the computer is processing. I can unhook the screen, and all that will still process. I can open my computer up and watch the hard drive spin. Where's the light from the screen? If its processing the screen light, then why can't I see it? Should we conclude that because I cannot see the screen being processed in the computer, that it is not managing the process of the screen? No.

You're making a mistake in thinking that the experience of one type of processing is equivalent to another type of processing. Lets take it from another viewpoint now. All the computer knows is 1's and 0's that it feeds into a processor. It scans memory for more one's and zeros, it interupted by other 1's and 0's, and so on. This is 'its' experience. While part of it is processing the 1's and 0's its sending to the screen, 'it' doesn't know what its going to look like on that screen. Its just processing. Its internal processing is different than the external result when you put it all together.

Now, lets look at the brain. We already know that different areas of the brain process different senses. We have a section of the brain that processes the light from our eyes and processes it into something that we subjectively see. The subjective part of you is the screen. You don't know what's being processes in the sight part of your mind. Its just '1's and '0's. But eventually it gets to the section of your brain that gives you 'the screen'. "The screen' doesn't understand the processor, and the processor doesn't understand the screen. Does this make more sense?

I repeat to people often, "You cannot do philosophy of mind without neuroscience." If you do not understand modern day neuroscience, you are stumbling blindly in the dark. — Philosophim

The problem with this line of thought is I'm not a computer. There is no tension with breaking down computer "knowledge" (in quotes here because it's not at all clear that computers know anything) to 1's and 0's. A computer does not have a mind's eye, cannot imagine, and cannot experience anything. Your response would make sense if we were all p-zombies.

But we're not p-zombies, and therein lies the problem for your argument. When I imagine a sunset, I'm experiencing the colors. I'm seeing red. You're saying the redness isn't really there, it's just brain activity, but that is easily contradicted by imagining something, hallucinating, or dreaming. When we do that, we create a divide between the causal states behind the colors and the experience of the colors themselves.

I repeat to people often, "You cannot do philosophy of mind without neuroscience." If you do not understand modern day neuroscience, you are stumbling blindly in the dark. — Philosophim

All right, let's talk about that. What is it about the brain that makes experience happen? What's it doing that my heart or gut biome isn't doing? Information processing?

Is data stored in a computer "information," or are you referencing the meaning a conscious being imposes on it? — Hanover

Data on a computer certainly is. I think information and interpretation have to be kept distinct. Note that it doesn't need to be a conscious being doing the interpretation.

For example, does the red leaf contain non-physical information that autumn has arrived, or is the red itself physical information? — Hanover

That autumn has arrived is an interpretation, it is not latent in the leaf itself. That same red leaf might be red due to a mutation, a response to a parasite, etc.

The red itself is information, though we don't usually think of it that way. Ontologically information is state divorced from substrate. But we think of information as state encoded on a substrate optimized for state retrieval and manipulation. So the leaf contains endless state, including its color and all the subtle variations in its shading, but it cannot be retrieved or manipulated easily. While the information in the leaf's genetic code is very much information in this sense.

Can you imagine an non-physical object? Can you refer to something that has velocity but no material qualities? I think you will find in both cases that the answer is no. — I like sushi

Yes, I imagine informational objects, so do many. Using technology these days does that to you. Velocity is typically a property of material objects, but it has an informational analog in data transmission rates.

This is true of items liek 'and' in language. The 'and' does not exist materially, yet it serves a function for describing material items. — I like sushi

"And" doesn't describe a material item. It is a kind of semantic glue that doesn't describe anything in itself, it is used with other words to create meaning, which may or may not refer to material items.

Words by the way are paradigmatic examples of informational objects. Is the 'and' on a paper the same as these 'and's on your screen?

Ontologically information is state divorced from substrate. — hypericin

I have a leaf. In list A itemize those parts of the leaf that are information. In list B itemize those parts that are substrate.

I have a leaf. In list A itemize those parts of the leaf that are information. In list B itemize those parts that are substrate. — Hanover

A:
The leaf is red.
The leaf has such and such shape.
The genetic sequence is ATATGCA...

B:
(The actual light reflected)
(The actual molecules arranged in such a shape)
(The DNA)

A way to think about the distinction is that state can be exhaustively captured in words. If you write out a map of the color at every point, the exact shape, the full genetic sequence, that is the state, divorced from the leaf's substrate. Whereas no amount of marks on paper can equal a physical leaf.

If I were watching a computer play (chess against) another, which part is physical? — Hanover

The medium is physical; the game is formal; the meaning or purpose (like “this move is a blunder”) is relational or noetic.

Hmm, is mathematics a meta-language for relational structure?

The word ‘formal’ originates with Greek metaphysics.

Of course its physical. Let take music for example. The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it. Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere? — Philosophim

A melody can be represented in musical notation or binary code. It can be engraved in metal or copied on to paper. Then it can be played back on different instruments or through digital reproduction. In every case the physical medium is different but the melody is the same. So how then can the melody be described as physical?

I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position. — Philosophim

Every post of yours that I’ve read assumes physicalism. Maybe because you assume that everything is physical, and don’t understand how anything can described in other terms, then you don’t understand what physicalism is, because you think there is nothing outside the physical with which to compare it.

Please, try to give me an example of a 'non-physical' bit of information that exists.
— Philosophim

A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. — hypericin

It seems that @Philosophim is thinking of information as requiring the physical substrate, while @hypericin believes information is some further item that the physical substrate may instantiate. The analogy with numbers illustrates this: The numeral "3" would be an instantiation of the number 3. Or, using music, both the vinyl and the digital are instantiations of the song.

I don't have any stake in which way is the better way to use the term "information."* I'm just pointing out that, either way, a complete account needs to include both halves of the relation, so to speak. If information is like numerals, then we need to know the status of numbers -- "informational content", perhaps? Or, if information is like numbers, what do we understand numerals to be? I'm calling them "instantiations", but maybe "informational vehicles" is better. Or just "symbols"?

*Unless the "information is like numerals (hence physical)" position entails physicalism. Which it needn't. But if taken that way, I don't think physicalism gives a convincing account of abstracta in general.

a complete account needs to include both halves of the relation, so to speak. If information is like numerals, then we need to know the status of numbers -- "informational content", perhaps? Or, if information is like numbers, what do we understand numerals to be? I'm calling them "instantiations", but maybe "informational vehicles" is better. Or just "symbols"? — J

I would say there are three terms, not two. Substrate, encoding, and content. Substrate is purely physical, content is purely informational, and they meet in the encoding. "3" encodes the information, 3. Outside the "3" there is a fourth thing, decoder, which interprets "3" by instantiating 3 as a native encoding (synaptic firing pattern in humans, or the electrical pattern 00000011 in a computer)

Note that it might seem that the interpretation is fully a subjective act by the decoder, and that the information (and encoding) are in no way "in" the object. But this is wrong. While this might seem to be the case for "3", imagine taking a pile of sand and decoding Disney's Beauty and the Beast from it. Totally not possible, the information is just not "in" the sand, the way it is"in" the VHS tape.

Yes, I imagine informational objects, so do many. — hypericin

Can you imagine a non-informational object?

Anyway, I misrepresented what I meant. No problem. Back to the matter that concerns me :)

Are informational objects causally related in the same sense that physical objects are? If so, how. I not how so?