Are informational objects causally related in the same sense that physical objects are? If so, how. I not how so? — I like sushi
Then I would say that's not causation at all. Offensive gestures do not result in causation, but in deliberation in which a moral agent can think through the situation and decide to ignore the offenses.As for mental causation, what if I were to write something that caused you to become agitated? Would that not constitute an example of mental causation that has physical consequences such as increasing your pulse? — Wayfarer
There's no causation in any principle of idealism.Or idealism - that mind is somehow fundamental, which is hardly accepted by academic philosophy at all. But in any case it's a more complicated problem than it seems. — Wayfarer
Are informational objects causally related in the same sense that physical objects are? If so, how. I not how so? — I like sushi
I created this thread to talk about the different perspectives regarding Physical and Mental Acts and how I believe there is a problem when using Causation at a micro and macro level as well as between nomological and metaphysical positions. — I like sushi
What are your thoughts regarding Mental Actions as Causal Actions? — I like sushi
When it comes to then trying to establish a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal route a much bigger problem emerges as we have no grounding for what constitutes a Mental Act — I like sushi
Even within the world of physics causation is a quite difficult item to deal with at the extreme ends of the micro and macro scales. — I like sushi
Don't forget about property dualism. :grin: Matter has a non-physical property.Non-reductive physicalism
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The alternative seems to be dualism - that mind is one kind of substance and matter another.
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Or idealism - that mind is somehow fundamental, which is hardly accepted by academic philosophy at all. — Wayfarer
Is there any need for the word "mental"?Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause. — Philosophim
Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere?
— Philosophim
Certainly not floating in space, but existing in a similar sense that numbers exist. There is no 1, 2, 3, floating in space, these numbers must be instantiated physically to "exist", in your sense. — hypericin
Yet we routinely think of them independently from any particular instantiation, math wouldn't exist if we didn't do this. — hypericin
The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it.
— Philosophim
Here, we only identify the notes as information. The instrument is a tool to convert the information contained on the sheet into audible music, and the ears interpret this. — hypericin
A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. If you grant that it is the same song, this song cannot be physical, as their physical instantiation could not be more different. — hypericin
Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause.
— Philosophim
Is there any need for the word "mental"? — Patterner
A computer does not have a mind's eye, cannot imagine, and cannot experience anything. — RogueAI
When I imagine a sunset, I'm experiencing the colors. I'm seeing red. You're saying the redness isn't really there, it's just brain activity, — RogueAI
but that is easily contradicted by imagining something, hallucinating, or dreaming. — RogueAI
All right, let's talk about that. What is it about the brain that makes experience happen? What's it doing that my heart or gut biome isn't doing? Information processing? — RogueAI
Don't forget about property dualism. :grin: Matter has a non-physical property. — Patterner
Its when you start to think they (mental processes) exist apart from physical processes as some independent entities that you run into trouble. — Philosophim
A melody can be represented in musical notation or binary code. It can be engraved in metal or copied on to paper. Then it can be played back on different instruments or through digital reproduction. In every case the physical medium is different but the melody is the same. So how then can the melody be described as physical? — Wayfarer
I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position.
— Philosophim
Every post of yours that I’ve read assumes physicalism. — Wayfarer
Maybe because you assume that everything is physical — Wayfarer
and don’t understand how anything can described in other terms — Wayfarer
I've abandoned the word 'complex' a long time ago because I could not make any of my argument stick just by attaching this word. Similarly, I have avoided using percentages of human DNA to strengthen my argument.An adult fruit fly’s brain is much more complex, however—and most importantly, the small insects share 60 percent of human DNA, as well 75 percent of the genes that cause genetic diseases, per a statement. As such, understanding the fly’s brain in such detail could hold implications for connections in human brains—and the neural pathways that lead to certain behaviors. Fruit flies, like humans, can get drunk, sing and be kept awake with coffee, suggesting similarities in our brains." — Philosophim
No, the melody is not the same. It is similar, which is a very distinct difference. If I play the song in two different places at the same time, they are not the same. The physical composition of the instrument, the physical composition and actions of the player, and the very air and accoustics the song travels two are different. We summarize them as 'the same song' for convenience and summary in communication. But when we break it down and need to look at it in detail, our summary is not representative of some 'form' that exists outside of physical reality. — Philosophim
I am very open to the existence of something non-physical. I am open to a God existing. A magical unicorn. I am not being sarcastic or intending to insult. I LOVE thinking of wonderful things. — Philosophim
Incorrect. The melody IS the same. RIght now, my 10-month-old grand-child is playing with an electronic toy which is playing the song My World is Blue. — Wayfarer
The problem is, that is not at all what philosophy of mind believes by the immaterial or non-physical. — Wayfarer
The fact you can only conceive of alternatives to the physical in terms of magical unicorns indicates a misunderstanding of the subject. — Wayfarer
No, by fact it is not the same Wayfarer. Same being identical. Are a pair of twins the same? Similar, but not identical. Again, lumping things into a category is not the same as saying that all the things in that category are identical in reality. I can define sheep, but there is no one sheep that is identical to any other sheep. — Philosophim
there is no one sheep that is identical to any other sheep. — Philosophim
I'm merely asking for a clear definition of something non-physical — Philosophim
If your philosophy cannot allow for the existence of a song, and copywright to it, then all I can say is that it has a serious deficiency. — Wayfarer
Melodies, as discussed. Numbers, laws, conventions, chess. There are thousands of these general kinds of things that are grasped by the mind (but not by 'neural activity'). — Wayfarer
↪Philosophim I think I am getting lost in the meaning of what is physical, for example if I start flying it would be physical? — Danileo
Care to elaborate?I mentioned in an earlier post there are a few things that might be non-physical, they've just never come up.
I mentioned in an earlier post there are a few things that might be non-physical, they've just never come up.
Care to elaborate? — Punshhh
I just got obfuscation. If you start to pin him down he will miraculously agree with you. — Punshhh
Therefore non-physical principles should be different principles from those who are physical, for example I could came up with a law that is claiming that the energy is limited or being generated randomly etc. — Danileo
One argument for the presence of non-physical principle is why people can end up believing in those principles and transcending them to earth. — Danileo
I don't know how you mean by this. In what way can anyone specify what they think is the answer to the HPoC? Surely proto-consciousness is not far less specified that it shouldn't be mentioned with the other guesses.Don't forget about property dualism. :grin: Matter has a non-physical property.
— Patterner
Which nobody can specify. — Wayfarer
I italicized the two instances of "I don't know" because Greene emphasizes them in his reading of the book. So if a fairly competent physicist doesn't know what a couple of important physical properties are - properties that we know certainly exist because of the effects they have on things, effects that we have measured with incredible precision - then I'm not going to worry that we can't do more for a non-physical property.If you’re wondering what proto-consciousness really is or how it’s infused into a particle, your curiosity is laudable, but your questions are beyond what Chalmers or anyone else can answer. Despite that, it is helpful to see these questions in context. If you asked me similar questions about mass or electric charge, you would likely go away just as unsatisfied. I don’t know what mass is. I don’t know what electric charge is. What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force. So while I can’t tell you what these features of particles are, I can tell you what these features do. In the same vein, perhaps researchers will be unable to delineate what proto-consciousness is and yet be successful in developing a theory of what it does—how it produces and responds to consciousness. For gravitational and electromagnetic influences, any concern that substituting action and response for an intrinsic definition amounts to an intellectual sleight of hand is, for most researchers, alleviated by the spectacularly accurate predictions we can extract from our mathematical theories of these two forces. Perhaps we will one day have a mathematical theory of proto-consciousness that can make similarly successful predictions. For now, we don’t.
I gotcha. And I agree, although I don't suspect you would agree with the reason I agree. I think consciousness and thinking/mental are entirely different things. I think consciousness is simply subjective experience, and thinking/mental is something humans are conscious of. So we can talk about mental being a physical process without touching on consciousness.Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause.
— Philosophim
Is there any need for the word "mental"?
— Patterner
Absolutely. We can't go around calling everything 'physical' all the time in normal conversation. It is a great way to compartmentalize a certain set of physical existence and processes that are different from other physical sets and processes. We need some type of categorization, and we're not going to change the use of the word anytime soon. The issue is that mental processes are still physical processes. As long as you realize that, talking about mental processes is fine. Its when you start to think they exist apart from physical processes as some independent entities that you run into trouble. — Philosophim
I think consciousness is simply subjective experience, and thinking/mental is something humans are conscious of. So we can talk about mental being a physical process without touching on consciousness. — Patterner
I mean that energy transforms constantly and does not disappear. Energy disappearing would be the non physical. — Danileo
Then if I dream I am flying? How can I dream of something that is not physical if the dreams are a physical product — Danileo
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