It looks like you view affect primarily as a disruptive or distorting force — Number2018

Affect is simply the differences ( affecting and affected), the partial objects, the building materials, the working parts of machinic assemblages. It’s not the parts which by themselves disrupt or repress, it’s how they are organized. The parts can assemble themselves in ways that resist their own transformation, they can assemble themselves in ways that deterritorialize in a revolutionary manner, but I don’t know what it would mean to say that they can ‘distort’ themselves. Distortion implies a proper configuration, and there would be no fixed basis for the proper here.

I’m curious if you think it would be appropriate for wokeists to ignore something like this: — praxis

That’s an interesting way to frame the question.

I am totally interested in what you think something like this is.

I can’t imagine how to go from what this ad says/means, to what this ad REALLY says/means, to whether that is something that either demands response or that can be ignored.

The notion “good genes”?

Yesterday I was talking with my cousin about heart disease in my family, and then with another cousin (different genes) about who is tall in our family. In both conversations the phrase “good genes” came up.

I barely get the pun - she has “good genes” because she’s pretty I suppose. Is there something more I need to know about the model? She’s white? White people can’t say “genes” anymore? So if the ad only had people of color in it, they would be allowed to make this pun to sell jeans?

Yes it should be ignored for two reasons:
1. It takes too much effort and racism inside someone to be offended at this ad (at least she’s not naked) so they should fight to resist that racist urge and ignore the ad.
2. Giving it any attention at all only promotes American Eagle, so if you can’t help yourself but find something deep in the ad that is offensive to non-white or non-pretty people, it would have been better not to repost the ad and talk about it and get it in the news.

But outrage attracts in own attention and gets clicks and likes - so have at it - seems like a minuscule issue that could easily have been ignored and makes the “woke” look bad. Again.

Wish you would say what you think. Why is it something more than a silly pun on “genes” - what is it really saying that is offensive, so much so that it is not appropriate for it to be ignored?

A critique or even assessment of wokeness can feel ad hoc (and therefore unsympathetic) if it is not situated within a broader theory of error or understanding/assessing. — Leontiskos

That should have been more plainly said by the critic of the critique/assessment. Are you trying to be woke about criticizing wokeness?

perhaps it will help for me to acknowledge that the general error of the woke is not only found elsewhere, but is actually the basis for almost all bad/evil acts of judgment whatsoever. — Leontiskos

True. So maybe what is peculiar about “wokeness” has not been peculiar at all? “Woke” is merely a new window dressing, a new word, for erroneous justification of emotional conviction?

many of our decisions become automatized, almost unconscious. This condition affects not only those identified as “woke” but all of us. Woke individuals primarely remain anchored in a relatively localized domain, where they can continuously demonstrate their vigorous sense of moral rightness and commitment to justice. In doing so, they vividly illustrate how rationality can become subsumed by the impact of ‘the short-circuit’. — Number2018

I think all of this all makes sense, and should continue to be fleshed out, but I also think we may be unnecessarily leaping ahead.

Woke is peculiar. Woke is not just a general neglect of reason, but a particularly focused liberal/progressive brand. Have we defined it enough to go so general as to all error theory?

Eichmann's reason became a slave to his passions, at least if we see Nazism as part of his passions. — Leontiskos

So we can find the same kind of error building leads to following and promoting Nazi ideology, as might lead to following and promoting woke ideology.

Eichmann’s work duties amounted to a network of language games authorized by a form of life which made his work life intelligible to him both practically and ethically. — Joshs

This seems to position things not in emotion, but in a stipulated rational framework called the Nazi.

Affect cannot influence rationality from below — Joshs

Is this a reframing of the source of error? Or are we moving away from error making? In which case we are drifting from our thesis it seems. @Joshs how do you think woke or Eichmann avoid error and emotional trigger.

However, for Deleuze and Massumi, as well as according to Foucault's concept of power-knowledge, affect is the necessary condition of reason and deliberation. My position is that true progress in thought requires an acknowledgment of how we, and our thinking are impacted by the same affective forces and assemblages that shaped figures like Eichmann or contemporary "woke" individuals. This is not a moral equivalence but an ontological and epistemological commitment. Affective investments shape all subjectivity, including our own. — Number2018

Bringing it back home again to the thesis.

So we no longer need care about what is different between “woke” and “Nazi” in order to discuss this subject?

I think error theory is essential here - wokism is error obfuscation. And wokism puts emotion first. But why would the wokist and the Nazi come to such opposite conclusions?

If emotions only, is it random whether a willfully neglect person will become a Nazi or woke?

I mean, both use similar tactics in promoting their ideology, so maybe they are only separated by circumstance? Emotional error makers born in Germany around 1915 who hear Hitler speak are more likely to become Nazis than progressives, and emotional error makers born in America around 1990 who hear the TV and go to school are more likely to become woke? Is that where this analysis is headed?

First, I'll just point out that I think it's a mistake to conflate "emancipatory" with "critical theory" and "definitely not post-modern." Even in less explicitly activist texts, the "free rollicking of thought," the opening of "new lines of thought," or the deconstruction of systems so that new ways of thought and action can come into being are often presented as desirable in themselves. The very word, "freedom"—"libertas" and all its cognates—is value loaded in its Western context, and that certainly doesn't seem to be different even in more theoretical texts. A freedom that is associated with potency, and the generation of greater potentiality vis-á-vis thought becomes itself emancipatory. But Woke has also drank deep from this conception of emancipation as the freedom (as lack of constraint) of thought and action (which is of course part of liberalism as well, although in a different register). This is one of the key points on which it diverges from the older Christian, Islamic, and Marxist activism of the 20th century.

To my eye, this looks like an example of @Leontiskos'
"putting second things first," however. The freedom of thought, an increase in potentialities available, of lines of action and thought, are themselves only good as a means of reaching choiceworthy ends, better means to those ends, etc. Greater potentiality is, of itself, not actually emancipatory nor is it desirable. Taken wholly by itself as an end, it's a slide towards multiplicity and nothingness. It's only choiceworthy itself if it is "unblocking" changes that are actually improvements. This is the old liberal inversion of placing a procedural freedom above the good, which is accomplished when it considers potency a good in itself.

They are relativist to a point.

Yes, it varies, but they do seem to tend towards various forms of anti-realism as well, including historical anti-realism. I think you are selling short the level of commitment here. One of the things right-wing media made the most hay over was straightforward pronouncements of the relativism and anti-realism coming out of activist circles.

Statues, names on buildings, memorials, etc. become such a focus because history can very much be re-written by the current victors, and while this is sometimes framed as merely "uncovering the truth about the past," it is also sometimes framed more explicitly simply in terms of power dynamics ("he who controls the present controls the past"). It is often "power all the way down," when the adversary controls it, and something to be uncovered when the forces of virtue control it. But the apparent contradiction here, or supposition of a "real" bedrock realism, is in fact also consistent with the "power all the way down" narrative. Those welding "power that goes all the way down," are not obligated to frame it as such, and indeed it would be unwise for them to do so.

My general impression is that, broadly speaking, the median Woke position is simply contradictory. It is morally and epistemically anti-realist and strongly relativistic, while at the same time being absolutist. This is, in many cases, an unresolved, and perhaps often unacknowledged contradiction. But my point would be that, accepting some of their starting points, contradiction is actually not a fatal problem. One can dismiss the demand for contradiction-free reasoning as nothing more than a power move (and indeed this has been done). You can see this more in the right-wing analogs of Woke (which are often conscious responses to it), which are even more explicitly relativistic and anti-realist, following a logic that terminates in something like "might makes right," where "might" has been given a much wider theoretical understanding than mere physical strength or kinetic force.

Don’t confuse flows and concatenations with value-free causal bits. These flows are anything but value-neutral. And they are anything but motive and purpose-neutral.

Sure, although I would say the aesthetics of such an interpretation have already begun to deflate our fellow "concatenations." But my point was more about adopting a study of them that attempts to bracket out or withhold all moral judgement. This seems to me to be, by definition, a deflation vis-a-vis value.

The fact that we are concatenations and flows of values and desire means that no one can stand outside of some stance or other to judge from on high, including the philosopher who writes about such flows. They are not a neutral observer but are writing always from within context , within history, within perspective. There is no perspective which doesn’t already have a stake in what matters and how it matters, but this doesn’t prevent one from talking about it from within one’s relation of care and relevance to the world.

Right, but then this is also taken as a reason for bracketing out or eschewing moral judgement. It's that line of reasoning I find faulty. Consider that Socrates does not need to "step outside his humanity" to judge, universally, that "all men are mortal." He can do this just fine while remaining a man.

The idea is not that the wise man steps outside the world to stand alongside a Good that also lies outside the world. The Good is everywhere, in all things. Rather, there is merely the concession that it is possible for some to be wiser than others.

Affect cannot influence rationality from below
— Joshs

Is this a reframing of the source of error? Or are we moving away from error making? In which case we are drifting from our thesis it seems. — Fire Ologist

I am engaged in a dispute with Number2018 over what writers like Deleuze, Wittgenstein (where Antony’s perspective comes from) and Foucault mean by affect and how it relates to reason. These thinkers assert that error is not the result of any ‘distorting’ effect of affect on reason. A system of logical assertions gets its sense from a way of looking at the world, a perspective which is not itself either logical or illogical, correct or incorrect. Only the particulars organized within a perspective can be correct or incorrect error.

Your position, like that of Leontiskos, harks back to an older way of thinking about this relation, wherein emotion and reason run on partially independent circuits, and emotion can distort or inhibit rational processes of thinking.

Your position, like that of Leontiskos, harks back to an older way of thinking about this relation, wherein emotion and reason run on partially independent circuits, and emotion can distort or inhibit rational processes of thinking. — Joshs

I think my position is less clear than that.

I would say that reasoning is an act of the will and the intellect. A synonym for “to reason” would be “to deliberate”. So will and intellect must simultaneously be at work to reason. Emotion can consume the will or, like a stoic, be subsumed by the will. So emotion is not on a parallel track, or prior to, reason. It’s all in the mix.

What I describe is not very clear, even to me, but I think it is more clear than what I see you describing of Deluze (who I’ve read a little) and Witt (read a bit more). I see carts and horses being moved around, but not much clarity regarding independent circuits being identified.

What I describe is not very clear, even to me, but I think it is more clear than what I see you describing of Deluze (who I’ve read a little) and Witt (read a bit more). I see carts and horses being moved around, but not much clarity regarding independent circuits being identified. — Fire Ologist

Maybe the views of two prominent researchers on affect will be a little clearer. Robert Solomon’s book Not Passion’s Slave argues against the traditional view (especially David Hume’s) that emotions are irrational impulses that control us, and that reason is merely a tool used to fulfill emotional desires. Instead, he claims that emotions are forms of judgment: They aren’t just feelings or reactions; they involve interpretation, appraisal, and meaning. Emotions are structured by reasoning: For example, fear usually involves a belief that something is dangerous. These beliefs can be questioned and corrected. Reason and emotion work together. Rather than being enemies, Solomon says emotions are intelligent and reflective; you can reason about your emotions and emotions can involve reasoning. Emotions are not irrational forces. They’re ways of seeing and making sense of the world, shaped by and open to rational reflection.

For Matthew Ratcliffe, emotions are not just about things in the world (like fear of a dog) but are about our whole way of experiencing the world. He calls these “existential feelings; they shape our sense of possibility, reality, and self. Rather than being just cognitive judgments, emotions structure our background sense of meaning, making some things feel possible, hopeful, threatening, or hopeless before we even articulate them. Emotions are not just ways of thinking or judging, they are pre-reflective ways of being in the world, shaping how things matter to us. This view is closer to that of Deleuze and Wittgenstein than it is to Solomon.

I would love it if someone ended my "woke." I woke up at 245 wet in a pickling sweat so I jumped in the shower, and have been up every hour since! :groan:

emotions are forms of judgment: They aren’t just feelings or reactions; they involve interpretation, appraisal, and meaning. — Joshs

Emotions are not just ways of thinking or judging, they are pre-reflective ways of being in the world, shaping how things matter to us. — Joshs

This is all very clarifying, but I think I disagree with some of the distinctions being made.

I would say judgments take account of emotions, but I don’t see how emotions could possibly be a “way of thinking or judging”.

Emotion is a psychological condition. It is like the body or the brain, something in which conscious thought sits. Emotion is disposition, and situates one’s conscious thought in the world. Emotion is like a higher form of sensation.

It can’t be a “way of thinking”. Emotion can be conceptualized and considered as evidence when thinking (but emoting itself is not a type of thinking). One can make judgments to follow the flow of emotion versus stopping to further deliberate and introduce concepts and other reasons. One can choose to go with one’s gut feel and not think too hard about something. This can be the best way to proceed (it’s a judgment call whether to think or not.)

The moment where a judgment is made, one is willing, intensional, about some mental object of thought. One judge’s the deliberation is over, enough evidence has been correlated into a coherent judgment, and one judges. This is reasoning or thinking - intellect and will in operation. But the moment of judgment is the end of this moment of reason. We sense - we reason - we judge. We gather experience through sensation, emotion and conceptualization; we reason about these and deliberate (forming many interim judgments); and then we make the ultimate judgment - we stop thinking and otherwise act.

One feels scared as one senses an angry bear, but one further observes the bear is focused on something else and one reasons the bear is not aware of you so one can judge what to do next. Feeling scared is important evidence to do the right thing. We can short-circuit to the moment of judgment and act immediately out of fear - but in doing so, this is not a “way of thinking” but is not thinking at all. We could also swallow our fear, and be courageous and stay still and quiet to think about what to do next.

There are not two different tracks or circuits here that we judge which to follow. We don’t act on emotion OR act on reason. Emotion is always there, like the body is. We are on one track and either incorporate sensation, emotion, AND intellectual activity all before judgment, or we skip one of these steps.

One can see the American Eagle ad and immediately feel outrage, and act angry, and try to construct an argument about how outrage is reasonable or go protest, or deliberate about what is happening to you by this ad before acting at all, before judging your emotions are reasonable evidence of the world and state of affairs.

To add on a bit of a late point, I have often found that people who are pro-woke tend to retreat to theoreticals and philosophy while neglecting the material concerns that were brought up. It's an understandable impulse, but a frustrating one. I am sympathetic to moral concerns, obviously, but I find woke actions often have a startling lack of pragmatism backing them up. It gives off the vibe that they would rather lose than compromise what seem to be increasingly rigid beliefs. While I find this admirable to an extent, it makes attempts at rational discussion about pragmatic solutions all but impossible sometimes, even when you ultimately share similar goals.

Pardon the intrusion, but I think the fact that they are ontologically incapable of not responding to it, even though it would arguably be beneficial to ignore it in the current moment, illustrates that their actions have become more ideologically motivated than meant for real change.

First, I'll just point out that I think it's a mistake to conflate "emancipatory" with "critical theory" and "definitely not post-modern." Even in less explicitly activist texts, the "free rollicking of thought," the opening of "new lines of thought," or the deconstruction of systems so that new ways of thought and action can come into being are often presented as desirable in themselves.

The freedom of thought, an increase in potentialities available, of lines of action and thought, are themselves only good as a means of reaching choiceworthy ends, better means to those ends, etc. Greater potentiality is, of itself, not actually emancipatory nor is it desirable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right , one needs to find a criterion on the basis of which way of being is preferable to another, more desirable.

The fact that we are concatenations and flows of values and desire means that no one can stand outside of some stance or other to judge from on high, including the philosopher who writes about such flows. They are not a neutral observer but are writing always from within context , within history, within perspective. There is no perspective which doesn’t already have a stake in what matters and how it matters, but this doesn’t prevent one from talking about it from within one’s relation of care and relevance to the world.

Right, but then this is also taken as a reason for bracketing out or eschewing moral judgement. It's that line of reasoning I find faulty. Consider that Socrates does not need to "step outside his humanity" to judge, universally, that "all men are mortal." He can do this just fine while remaining a man. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Let’s examine two ‘postmodern’ models. According to one, ethical and empirical progress are united, based on the same criterion, optimal anticipatory sense-making. According to another, there can be no such overarching vector of historical progress since the criterion changes along with the social structure. However, there is local progress. One initially finds oneself ensconced within a particular set of cultural norms ( ethical, empirical). These norms inform one about what ethically desirable and what is to be rejected. Eventually, cultural change shifts perspectives on the criteria of ethical norms, and one now disapproves of the previous conventions while embracing the new ones. This process of establishing, living within and overcoming criteria of ethical desirability repeats itself endlessly without any over progress. You may want to call each of these totalitarian, but such totalitarianism will never be used as weapon against your belief in moral and empirical foundations. In the first case cultural progress is subsuming. Each formation of knowledge and ethics is equally valid, and there is no justification for coercing a change in beliefs from an external vantage. In the second case as well , persuasion substitutes for coercion. In both case ma there would be no wokist breathing down your back and policing your language. Your concerns about these models’ totalitarianism would have to restrict itself to the complaint that they eschew punishment, condemnation and coercion against those believe are unjust.

They are relativist to a point.

Yes, it varies, but they do seem to tend towards various forms of anti-realism as well, including historical anti-realism. I think you are selling short the level of commitment here. One of the things right-wing media made the most hay over was straightforward pronouncements of the relativism and anti-realism coming out of activist circles.

My general impression is that, broadly speaking, the median Woke position is simply contradictory. It is morally and epistemically anti-realist and strongly relativistic, while at the same time being absolutist. This is, in many cases, an unresolved, and perhaps often unacknowledged contradiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is their position contradictory, or are you failing to appreciate that there can be forms of realism? As you pointed out, anti-realism is not opposed to totalitarianism or absolutism. That was Rouse’s point about social constructionists being semantic realists. You can try and pathologize them if you want by claiming that at bottom they just desire power for power’s sake, but I think that would be utterly missing their motivation, which is not power but moral truth.

@Leontiskos@Joshs@Count Timothy von Icarus

My position is that true progress in thought requires an acknowledgment of how we, and our thinking are impacted by the same affective forces and assemblages that shaped figures like Eichmann or contemporary "woke" individuals. This is not a moral equivalence but an ontological and epistemological commitment. Affective investments shape all subjectivity, including our own.
— Number2018

Bringing it back home again to the thesis.

So we no longer need care about what is different between “woke” and “Nazi” in order to discuss this subject?

I think error theory is essential here - wokism is error obfuscation. And wokism puts emotion first. — Fire Ologist

Even in writing here, we likely operate under the same general conditions that enable and reinforce what we now call wokeness. As Foucault reminds us:"The strategic adversary is fascism... not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively—but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us." (Preface to Anti-Oedipus, p. 13)
Following Foucault’s warning, one can find that our discourses often exhibit a kind of affective resonance, marked by overlapping expressions of identity and moral values. This phenomenon cannot be reduced to individual psychology or collective emotion.
A systems theorist Niklas Luhmann argues that under certain systemic conditions, memory ceases to function as a personal retrieval of the past. Instead, it becomes a functional, situationally enacted element within broader communicative systems. Today, digital media structures largely determine the selection of what counts as meaningful references to the past. In parallel, memory politics emerges as a struggle over the circulation of selectively chosen content and facts. Based on such systemically produced memory, affectively charged networks generate discursive effects of credibility and authenticity. In this context, genuineness is no longer grounded primarily in personal sincerity or factual correspondence. In online discourse and media- mediated domains of public life the distinction between 'truth' and 'lie' often does not comply with the binary of factual accuracy versus intentional deception. Therefore, wokeness represents a relatively localized phenomenon of affective-driven regime of truth within broader contemporary tendencies. For Foucault, a regime of truth refers not simply to "what is true," but to the systems of discourses and power relations that maintain what is accepted as truth.Truth is produced historically and tied to power. So, Foucault’s insight about 'the fascism in us all' can serve as a provocation to examine the contemporary epistemic and affective shifts that impact our subjectivity.

The divide between woke and not is so large I still am not sure if people are actually upset about this ad or whether this is American Eagle contriving outrage for publicity, with perhaps a few confused people buying in. — Hanover

To date American Eagle is being tight lipped about it. When looking for their response just now I found this interesting tidbit from former Levi’s brand president Jennifer Sey, who said, “They’ve [the woke] lost their power. They just haven’t realized it yet.”

Jean branders have realized it, apparently. :lol:

I also think it is a characteristic of woke - if the other party doesn’t appear to agree with you, they must need to reevaluate their whole approach so let’s talk about that instead of whatever thing we both disagree with. — Fire Ologist

This is, expressly, the problem I am having (and one I wanted to highlight within 'woke'). That is ironic, unfortunately as I think it is what's happening. I can't understand Antony's intention anymore, given the responses which have been directly on point and either claiming we have done his dance, or that it is not really what we want to do. It seems the circles continue, but I have two further pages to read before hitting Post Comment.

BTW - I do appreciate the effort, and I am working on a response. — Antony Nickles

Entirely reasonable, thank you.

There was a big controversy about a transwoman being allowed to compete a couple years ago. Last year the world surfing league tightened up the requirements though, to appease the anti-woke. All that over 1 surfer, and a longboarder at that. — praxis

I take issue with trying to frame the opposing side as unreasonable in this particular way (its not always a sin). A single male surfer taking a female accolade is enough, on the "anti-woke" side (though, that's misleading of a label). A single harmed child will have us looking at child abuse law. A single dead engineer will have us overhauling H&S. A single female being abused or harmed by a male in the bathroom should have the same response, to be consistent, or discuss why they aren't similar. That last bit nveer gets done... And i can see several powerful responses (they just happen to not land for me). So, I think these sorts of arguments need to engage why that position is so reprehensible. "Oh its only x no. of people". Yes. But what those people are doing matters (and this isn't akin to an argument I am liable to make about prevalence causing alarm. We can ignore that, and assume its 1:1000000 for hte above to still run well, imo).

Thus the importance to imagine a context in which people are trying to decide what to do where the value of those criteria (above) for deciding what to do, in that situation, is up for grabs. — Antony Nickles

I would suggest for myself, and I think Leon is on this page, that this is just ignorant (not in a personal sense). We do understand these things, and we do not need to reinvent the wheel. The tension is between competing arguments (not even interests. I've tried to make this clear but if not: If you aren't willing to state your goals then I can't get on with your arguments. If you wont give me your arguments, I can't assess them against anything. Your 'interest' wouldn't help because getting there is what's at stake, not "having interest" in x y or z policy for a, b or c reasons) and we can't assess arguments without knowing the goal the argument is meant to support.

You have to make a proposition: Lived experience is a valuable aspect of a person's exploitable wisdom.

We can get on with that. But you'll notice most arguments I have made (and, from what I see, Leon) address this squarely, and this is why we cannot understand why you're asking us to slow down the horses. If there is some significant different between "interest" and "goal" for you here, please make it explicit. I see the difference broadly, but for our purposes it just seems to be a difference in clarity:

Interest (in): Not being subject to arbitrary search and seizure
Goal: I am not liable to arbitrary search and seizure.

The former is a desire which isn't particularly apt for policy. The latter is a goal which absolutely is (as the constitution will evidence). If you mean interest in a more legalese sort of why, I do not know what (extending hte metaphor) estate you could be claiming an interest in, to get this discussion off the ground, without creating a scenario of expressly competing interests in the way that "life" and "death" are express competitive notions. They cannot co-exist. The way I see this playing out is that if we had this discussion first we'd all be looking at similar things:

For all to be treated with respect;
For legitimate power to be wielded in the face of arbitrary disparity/force

and all the rest that underpins most concepts of "policy". Once we have all this on the table, we can discuss what methods might get us there. The interests, themselves, don't tell us muc because we must break them down to this priors. If you're not looking for equality of opportunity, you can support many bigoted policies. If you're not looking for equality of outcome, you must drop some policies of force, as examples.

How is talking about a board going to help us get to where we want to go? — Leontiskos

The veil of ignorance, i suspect, is at play. And its not the worst premise for a discussion of this kind. I just think Antony is importing (maybe unconsciously) plenty of goals which he/they (others, not a gender joke) implicitly carry, without these base discussions. I'm doing my utmost to ignore those voices and discuss with zero on hte table, to begin with. What do you want seems the right question.

As a courtesy I will say in summary (though I will not argue it here, as I have spelled it out in length above), wanting to first decide what we are going to do, or imposing criteria for how to decide that, is to skip over examining, in a sense, how the world works — Antony Nickles

Do you not notice that this fizzles out into a total nothing by the end? "how the world works" is not a reference we can make any sense of in this context. What about it, are you referring to? Besides that, I think you're wrong.

or draw in a certain demographic. — Antony Nickles

I think this is hte best argument for bringing in lived experience. The problem is that if that person is a dick, or a moron, or dishonest or any number of things, the board wont take their ideas on board very readily. If they are clearly bad economic ideas, or are typically irrelevant to the goal of the Board (quite common for DEI-type hires as best I can tell) then that person is ignored, and their complaints ring true to their politically-aligned based in that "See, they only hired me as a token for looks - they don't even take me seriously" where, you'll notice, there isn't even room for discussions of hte merits or relevance of the person's experiences.

This is why goals are far, far, far more important than criteria.

gets in the way of a broader practice of assessment. — Antony Nickles

I think this is the same mistake my would-be board member above is making: There is no reason to think that your descriptions here are in any way helpful to the goal you're after (coming to terms, it seems). But again, a perfect example of why not stating your goals clearly has muddied these waters. Your goal is "a process", not an end-point, so there's nothing we can adequately hold to the light for assessment. Your position seems to ruin the potential for a valid assessment.

I think this fairly clearly sorts a couple of things out, but makes the above comments (immediately above) all the more apt: you are shying from an assessment by continually trying to bring our attention to that which we have already gone over. Perhaps this is not to your satisfaction, and so FireOlogist's comment I've quoted above comes in. If we don't agree, we must not understand. That seems wrong.

This one is confusing. You seem to be saying that you posited a method, which I then carried out, while arguing against it. That's not the case. I ran with your example because you gave it. It should be clear I think its unhelpful and a bad example that leapfrogs the fundamental, base-level function of decision making: Goal orientation. If you're tlaking about how we decide on goals, that's really not what this thread or discussion are about. But it would explain the disconnect.

hat would be valuable to get clear about before judging how the board would go forward and what that looks like here. — Antony Nickles

Without a clear, articulated goal, this isn't helpful and there is no meat. it is window-dressing for a show we're not part of.

I would concede to suggestions from the group for agreement on a different example as long as it is a situation (not an “issue” abstracted from any sense of a possible context) about how to decide what to do in a particular case, i.e, with competing, say old vs new, criteria. — Antony Nickles

Then, unfortunately, I do not think you are here in good faith. That is specifically not what's at stake in the discussion, and exactly what we've been saying is problematic in your responses/approach. It comes across like you are not getting the joke, and trying to explain the pun in terms other than whimsy. The issue is what needs discussion. The 'situation' is entirely ungrounded and unable to be approached without a stated issue/goal for which someone's experience might be relevant. This cannot be talked about without specificity (as you seem to acknowledge, but in a different place).

Appointing someone to a board based on "lived experience" is not relevant? — Antony Nickles

What board, for what purpose? Otherwise, no, clearly not.

But I think your idea that we will be able to decide what to do without a goal is simply incoherent — Leontiskos

I agree. I think the discussion is evidence in itself.

They should just enjoy it, like all of us who acquiesce to be advertised to.

They did the same thing (the advert) with Beyonce for Levi. The woke (such as you are referring) should just stop making shit up to get upset about and call people Nazis. It just shows us how bored and uninteresting you are. Its utterly fucking bizarre that anyone is making hte kind of comments they are about htis advert. Its selling sex. Not fucking Eugenics. You've got to be so bored - so incredibly bored - to find stretches that Mr Fantastic would be impressed by - to call people bigots.

I"VE RUN OUT OF TIME BUT I INTEND TO ADD TO THIS POST. IF YOU CAN, HOLD OFF ON RESPONDING UNTIL IMARK IT COMPLETE>

@Leontiskos

I can't understand Antony's intention — AmadeusD

It was to try to offer a different way than just a philosophical framework which tends to overlook things based on the terms we bring to something.

if the other party doesn’t appear to agree with you, they must need to reevaluate their whole approach so let’s talk about that instead of whatever thing we both disagree with — Fire Ologist

I was literally not arguing; how can I “disagree”!? And 3/4 of this discussion is y’all and @Joshs bashing on about theories on how we approach things!

We do understand these things, and we do not need to reinvent the wheel. — AmadeusD

I did/do apologize for insinuating that anyone didn’t understand what they were talking about, or that I was trying to slander anyone’s judgment.

You have to make a proposition: Lived experience is a valuable aspect of a person's exploitable wisdom. — AmadeusD

And I will leave y’all to that, because I hadn’t even figured out: “valuable” how?

The veil of ignorance, I suspect, is at play…. I just think Antony is importing (maybe unconsciously) plenty of goals which he/they (others, not a gender joke) implicitly carry, without these base discussions. — AmadeusD

Now I get it. Y’all think I’m trying to sandbag you, or set a trap, etc. If anyone is bringing “implicit” “unconscious” goals—as like implicit premises—the idea would be to realize that, to get a chance to become aware of that, just like a logical error or a contradiction. My whole idea was to come at it open-minded and then figure out what the terms and stakes are. If I realize I have presumptions, prejudgments, a preconceived idea of “rational”, an axe to grind, etc., I could then separate what I am bringing from looking at what is the case here. Thus the idea of jointly brainstorming the criteria so that we keep each other honest to sort out the grounds, yes, on which we might actually (ultimately) disagree. If we assume disagreement, we’re just picking sides and fighting to see whose sword is sharper; I’m good.

If you're talking about how we decide on goals, that's really not what this thread or discussion are about. But it would explain the disconnect. — AmadeusD

I see; sorry I wasted your time with all this.

I take issue with trying to frame the opposing side as unreasonable in this particular way (its not always a sin). A single male surfer taking a female accolade is enough, on the "anti-woke" side (though, that's misleading of a label). A single harmed child will have us looking at child abuse law. A single dead engineer will have us overhauling H&S. A single female being abused or harmed by a male in the bathroom should have the same response, to be consistent, or discuss why they aren't similar. — AmadeusD

It seems like a stretch to compare longboard surfing, something that doesn’t even qualify for the Olympics, to child abuse, industrial safety, and sexual assault.

In these terms, my point was that the ad hoc assumption of—inherently to prove legitimacy/not legitimate up front—say, the desire for, a framing of irrationality/emotion, is endemic in philosophy and humanity, and gets in the way of a broader practice of assessment. I should have qualified this with the recognition that there are mistakes (to be) made (bad means), and I do think it is important to sort the wheat from the (general) chaff. And here it seems there is some distinction to be made between (general) bad means separate from certain goals or criteria, and those intrinsic in the value(ing) of certain criteria, and, recognizing there are costs to meeting most goals, is the juice worth the squeeze (and what that is, and if avoidable, able to be mitigated, etc) — Antony Nickles

This is just so hard to read. I'm not sure what you are saying.

Edit: Note too that so much of this can be simplified. An ad hoc assumption merely intended to "prove" legitimacy/illegitimacy up front is already a huge problem.

I asked where you argued that a step back is necessary, and you basically didn't answer my question. So I went back to some of your earlier posts to look. Here is one issue I found:

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible. — Antony Nickles

I am going to point out some of the grammatical problems first, because these seem to be present throughout. What does "it is" refer to? What does "these" refer to? It's hard to follow what you are saying.

With that said, it seems like your thesis in this paragraph is <We must move beyond fixed standard for knowledge and rationality>. So let me just oppose that thesis of yours. Here are two "fixed standards":

1. We should not put second things first
2. We should not place appearance over reality

A woke example of the first would be an attempt to make diversity an absolute goal. A woke example of the second would be virtue signaling.

Now we can argue over whether the woke do either of these two things, but on your argument that doesn't seem to matter at all. On your argument, even if they do those things, I still can't critique them because my critique involves a "fixed standard for [...] rationality."

To be clear, suppose I accuse the woke of virtue signaling. Someone might respond, "I recognize the standard which says that we should not engage in virtue signaling, but I am not engaged in virtue signaling." Yet that is not the response I am interested in, because it is not your response. Your response is apparently, "To critique on the basis of virtue signaling is to critique on the basis of a fixed standard, and you aren't allowed to appeal to fixed standards; therefore your critique fails." Do we agree that this is your response? If not, then what does it mean to object to fixed standards?

I think this is helpful in furthering the discussion. :up:

We could certainly talk about the relation between reason and "affect," but I want to remain at a different level for a moment. If one holds to a theory in which it is possible for ideological movements such as wokeness to be erroneous, then it is possible for that person to see wokeness as erroneous. Contrariwise, if one holds to a theory in which it is not possible for ideological movements such as wokeness to be erroneous, then it is not possible for that person to see wokeness as erroneous. This point is very similar to my analogy about weeding a garden. Note too that we could substitute different negative valuations for "erroneous."

I am wondering if @Joshs and @Antony Nickles think ideological error (and the attendant rebuke) is possible. My guess is that both of you do not think that moral error is possible (which includes ideological error), and that you hold this for slightly different reasons. If this is right and there are different grounds at play, then I think the anthropological reason-affect approach could be useful in speaking to @Joshs but not in speaking to @Antony Nickles. @Antony Nickles seems to eschew charges of irrationality for a somewhat different reason.

To add on a bit of a late point, I have often found that people who are pro-woke tend to retreat to theoreticals and philosophy while neglecting the material concerns that were brought up. It's an understandable impulse, but a frustrating one. I am sympathetic to moral concerns, obviously, but I find woke actions often have a startling lack of pragmatism backing them up. It gives off the vibe that they would rather lose than compromise what seem to be increasingly rigid beliefs. While I find this admirable to an extent, it makes attempts at rational discussion about pragmatic solutions all but impossible sometimes, even when you ultimately share similar goals. — MrLiminal

Yes, that's a very interesting point. :up:

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That should have been more plainly said by the critic of the critique/assessment. Are you trying to be woke about criticizing wokeness? — Fire Ologist

The "ad hoc" objection could be phrased this way, "You just dislike wokism. You have no real arguments against it; it's just an emotional dislike."

True. So maybe what is peculiar about “wokeness” has not been peculiar at all? “Woke” is merely a new window dressing, a new word, for erroneous justification of emotional conviction? — Fire Ologist

I think it is a particular determination of that broader sort of error. It is also a paradigm example given that its outcomes are so obviously inordinate.

Let’s start with this: If you agree with Barron that CT doesn’t adhere to an ‘anything goes’ relativism, are you claiming that some wokists do adhere to an ‘anything goes’ relativism? Can you give specific examples here, (besides Amadeus’s assertions)? — Joshs

Sure: the woke belief that (biological) men and (biological) women should compete against one another within the same sport.

I suggest it is extremely unlikely the woke leadership, much less the rank and file, has assimilated any of this stuff — Joshs

I agree, but you are the one who wanted to explore the connection between wokism and philosophical antecedents. Why did you want to do that?

Is it your contention that wokist practices are so wildly deviant from the philosophical antecedents Barron mentions that ‘blurring the difference’ deprives us of a vital understanding of wokists? — Joshs

My contention is that one who "blurs the difference" is able to conclude whatever they want to conclude. For example, you cherry pick a subset of philosophers from a very broad construal of CT, ask how wokism could possibly issue from such thinkers, all the while refusing to consider other thinkers in that very same broad construal of CT. Everything is so loose here that ad hoc reasoning becomes incredibly easy. To give another example, you single out Adorno to somehow justify your highly implausible claim that CT is realist.

Are you suggesting that wokists, in treating others as a means to an end, don’t believe they have intrinsic worth? Should I be looking in the direction of Kant to locate the context of your critique of means-ends thinking? — Joshs

Do you really not know what a means and an end are?

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You may be more conversant with Hegel than I am, but I suspect that thinking a hierarchy of values according to power originates with Hegel’s dialectical ‘stages’ of history. His idea of a totalizing emancipatory telos in the form of absolute Spirit becomes naturalized as dialectical materialism with Marx, and rethought as discursive power relations with CT writers. This is where I situate wokism, more or less. Only with Nietzsche and postmodern writers like Foucault is the logic of an emancipatory hierarchy and telos abandoned.
If to be woke is to be enlightened, then Foucault’s response to Kant’s 1774 essay ‘What is Enlightenment’ is instructive of where he might depart from wokists. He considers enlightenment not as emancipation through reason (as in Kant), but as the use of reason to challenge authority, norms, and institutions. This is true of wokists as well, but woke movements often aim to enforce moral clarity, while Foucault sees that impulse as itself a form of power-knowledge that should be questioned. — Joshs

This seems largely correct, but the more general point is that wokism isn't genealogically simple. It derives from a number of different sources, philosophical and non-philosophical. For example, when I called it a Christian heresy I was saying that one of its sources is Christian morality.

It seems like a stretch to compare longboard surfing, something that doesn’t even qualify for the Olympics, to child abuse, industrial safety, and sexual assault. — praxis

Maybe, but without judging the value of the things being stretched, just to judge the length of the stretch: is the above stretch between a man taking over a women’s sporting event (maybe as a precedent for all women’s sports) and child abuse/sexual assault a bigger stretch than an ad with a pretty white girl talking about have good genes/jeans and being offended by her? I’d say only the woke hear that sort of dog-whistle. But all of the girls in surfing competition (if not everyone who watched, could see what was expressly being done (no whistle sensitivity needed).

I am going to point out some of the grammatical problems first, because these seem to be present throughout. What does "it is" refer to? What does "these" refer to? It's hard to follow what you are saying. — Leontiskos

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible. — Antony Nickles

“It” being “the idea of one’s ‘experience’ as unique”, in that it also creates the idea of irrational as individual, emotional (relative to a person). And “these” would be: both these errors.

<We must move beyond fixed standard for knowledge and rationality — Leontiskos

I said, “to ignore… in only recognizing fixed standards”, and this would be preset (created) requirements, not “any standards”, and also in the sense of desiring them to be (as philosophy does) applied generically, uniformly, without any context (or across all). And, anticipating the next bit, I am specifically not talking about errors in logic or grammar I might make here, as it were, philosophically.

I still can't critique them because my critique involves a "fixed standard for [...] rationality." — Leontiskos

you aren't allowed to appeal to fixed standards — Leontiskos

And here, as I have said (quite a few times now), I am not trying to cut off argument or dismiss anyone (not saying “can’t critique” or “aren’t allowed”), only suggesting we find out if our (any) assumptions are getting in the way of seeing things clearly. I think the presumption here—which I am starting to take personally as an accusation based on my desire and repeated efforts to be intellectually forthright and honest (also admitting errors and my own assumptions)—is that I actually do have a position and am either trying to cut off all others philosophically (theoretically as it were), or I am merely being slippery, or trying to hide, which I mentioned above to @AmadeusD, would be the whole point of looking at actual criteria in a case: to investigate them together to sort them from our assumptions, which we all have, and are, categorically, unrealized. Isn’t this what anyone is against, being judged prematurely, say, based on an inappropriate standard?

I am, of course, abandoning that effort here in order to avoid cutting off discussion or appearing dismissive (of anyone), as has been pointed out. If we can get past the skepticism of my “intentions” or the presumption of my goal, I don’t mind discussing the philosophy.

:lol: Who would you rescue first?

1. A child being abused.
2. Someone involved in an industrial accident.
3. A woman being sexually assaulted.
4. A woman competing with a trans-woman in a longboard competition.

It seems to me that there's a rather large gulf between 3 & 4.

but without judging the value of the things being stretched, just to judge the length of the stretch — Fire Ologist

You forgot:

5. Pretty white girl who talks about her genes.
6. Someone who is having a seizure because they saw the ad.

I was literally not arguing; how can I “disagree”!? And 3/4 of this discussion is y’all and Joshs bashing on about theories on how we approach things!

I see; sorry I wasted your time with all this. — Antony Nickles

I had a pretty good sense this was how your well-intended project was going to end. I consider you to be one of the rare few on this site who grasps the idea that what is at stake and at issue for a matter of concern is not something which can be treated separately from questions of empirical validity , of what is reasonable, rational and logical. Rather, such considerations form the very basis of intelligibility for judgements of fact. Armed with this knowledge, you hoped to steer the discussion of wokeness away from what is true, rational , reasonable and logical to a preliminary exploration of the different ways participants construe what is at stake and at issue, and then see what kind of consensus might arise from this hermeneutic exercise. To your apparent surprise and chagrin, your attempt to begin at a point prior to formed ideology and theory was accused of being biased in the direction of an already formed ideology which you were trying to shove down people’s throats. In a certain sense they have a point.

Let me explain. You rightly take from Wittgenstein the anchoring of sense in systems of intelligibility that he talks about in terms of language games, forms of life and hinges.
What Wittgenstein does not discuss is how difficult one should expect it to be to persuade another to change their way of looking at things. There is a difference between seeing that considerations of what is at stake and at issue (forms of life) form the very basis of intelligibility for judgements of what is reasonable, and getting other to arrive at that insight. You seem to be treating this understanding as some kind of common sense, as though all you had to do was explain what you had in mind in a few paragraphs and it would be immediately comprehended by other members of the thread.

I think this lack of attention to historical genesis is an important weakness in Wittgenstein’s thinking. What we see in the work of writers like Focault, Deleuze , Heidegger and Derrida is a depiction of what Wittgenstein calls form of life as ‘sticky’, intractable and resistant to transformation and persuasion. And they explain why this is so. The very stability of systems of intelligibility which allows us to make
sense of the world imbues them with a certain conservatism and resistance to change. This is why Foucault can talk about cultural knowledge epistemes lasting for centuries, and Heidegger can talk about the first beginning of philosophy ( traditional metaphysics of presence) and the other beginning (inaugurated by Heidegger’s own thinking), with the first beginning extending 2000 years from the Greeks to the modern era.
That’s right, the first beginning lasted 2000 years, and you were hoping to cause a philosophical shift in thinking in a matter of minutes! What you have been considering as merely the commonsensical preliminary to a discussion of wokism is the whole kit and kaboodle. If other members were prepared to grasp the orientation toward what is at stake and at issue that you have been trying to convey, the whole conversation would be unnecessary in the first place.

But the very intractability of participants’ orientations on this matter made your assumption that mutual understanding here was assured fooled from the start.

My strategy in such discussions is to assume that it will not be possible to attain mutual agreement on such fundamental philosophical matters if the starting point for participants (their form of life) is too distant from that of Wittgenstein’s and writers who overlap his thinking. My goal is instead to zero in on their orientations as intricately as possible such as to glimpse the outer boundaries of their way of thinking, that zone of intractability beyond which any attempts at persuasion on my part meet with a glassy eyed stare and/or outright hostility.

You complain that my contributions to the thread restricted themselves to debates over ‘theory’, as though what you were asking of the group didn’t itself require a major shift in their presuppositions butting up against that very zone of intractability. You really don’t see that if Leontiskos and Fire Ologist embrace theories of emotion which split affective phenomena off from rationality as potential disrupters and inhibitors of reason they are going to be in a position to embrace a notion of what matters and what is at issue that completely overcomes this split? I think you should take your own admonition to heart. If you really want to understand others’ ways of thinking and valuing, what matters and how and why it matters to them, the. you need to appreciate the enormous difficulties they may have in coming over to your way of seeing things.

I said, “to ignore… in only recognizing fixed standards”, and this would be preset (created) requirements, not “any standards” — Antony Nickles

So do you know what you mean by "fixed standards" vs. "any standards"? Can you provide an example of a non-fixed standard?

And here, as I have said (quite a few times now), I am not trying to cut off argument or dismiss anyone (not saying “can’t critique” or “aren’t allowed”), only suggesting we find out if our (any) assumptions are getting in the way of seeing things clearly. — Antony Nickles

I want you to say out loud what sort of assumption would get in the way of seeing things clearly. You keep alluding to things that you never actually explicate.

I think the presumption here [...] is that I actually do have a position — Antony Nickles

Yes, the presumption is that you do have a position, and that this is why you are interested in this thread. Be forthright about your position, even if your position is not simply pro-woke or anti-woke. Tell us what you are arguing for or against and why, even if you are arguing for greater clarification because you think there is a lack of clarity.

Isn’t this what anyone is against, being judged prematurely, say, based on an inappropriate standard? — Antony Nickles

If you want to be forthright then you have to spell out the inappropriate standard that you think is in play. You can't just keep making vague allusions ad infinitum.

This is an instructive exchange:

I have tried to explain this, make an argument for it; — Antony Nickles

Can you point me to the post where you provide reasons for why we ought to take a step back? — Leontiskos

My first post was to get at why “rational/irrational” gets in the way, and to suggest a way around that, but I think I did such a poor job of it, not expecting confusion in the right places, that I think it better to just see what I am doing in, participate in the method of, the example and maybe hold off of on the larger philosophical issues; — Antony Nickles

So are you saying that you don't really know of a place where you provide reasons for why we ought to take a step back? — Leontiskos

We keep going in this circle because you apparently want to say things without being committ[ed] to saying anything. Every time someone tries to capture what you are saying you balk, and then do not clarify what you are saying. I want you to say something and stick to it. Say something that you are willing to stand behind. Philosophy cannot begin until that occurs.

You rightly take from Wittgenstein the anchoring of sense in systems of intelligibility that he talks about in terms of language games, forms of life and hinges.
What Wittgenstein does not discuss is how difficult one should expect it to be to persuade another to change their way of looking at things. — Joshs

Yes, and I think that lacuna is built in:

As Wittgenstein observes, "There is no why. I simply do not. This is how I act" (OC 148). — Moliere

How should we respond to Wittgenstein here? Apparently by pointing out to him that there is a why, and that other people act differently than he does. As soon as two people who act in foundationally different ways come into contact with one another the "why" will become a question of interest. — Leontiskos

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Armed with this knowledge, you hoped to steer the discussion of wokeness away from what is true, rational , reasonable and logical to a preliminary exploration of the different ways participants construe what is at stake and at issue, and then see what kind of consensus might arise from this hermeneutic exercise. — Joshs

I would say the problem is that @Antony Nickles would reject your verb "steer." He somehow doesn't understand himself to be doing anything. In his mind he is not steering, he is not arguing, he is not taking an ideological side and he is not even acting for the sake of any end or goal whatsoever. Thus it becomes impossible to get him to see the fork in the road between these two approaches that you outline. My underlying point has been, "Hey, there's a fork in the road here. We have to deliberate and discuss which route to take. We can't pretend there isn't a fork while simultaneously picking a side."

I get the oddest responses from Wittgenstenians when I tell them that their activity is not being done for no reason at all - when I tell them that everyone acts for ends, themselves included. They tend to see themselves as eternally above the fray.

My guess is that both of you do not think that moral error is possible (which includes ideological error), — Leontiskos

I feel like I should take issue with the presumption, but the question itself is too broad for me to answer. Nevertheless (stepping in front of the loaded question), what is an example of an error that is moral, say ideological? As, say, opposed to a political one, like dictatorship? which seems hard to call an “error”. Dewey (as I discuss here) will call intolerance a “treason” to democracy, which would cast one out of the polis, not be “wrong” or a mistake.

In AO Deleuze distinguishes between investment in pre-conscious interests and unconscious desires. Pre-conscious interests guide and organize what matters and how it matters. — Joshs

I see your approach and @Antony Nickles' as quite distinct for the relevance of this thread (despite some overlap in general). But there is a point at which they can come together. It is this: we can talk all we like about "pre-conscious interests," "unconscious desires," "a preliminary stage to that in which we know our goals," but all of this is actually non-discursive and therefore separate from what occurs on a philosophy forum. A philosophy forum could be driven by any number of such things, but it is not possible or permissible to directly appeal to such phenomena as justification for this or that claim. The non-discursive aspect must first be made transparent and discursive before it can be utilized within a discursive context such as a philosophy forum.

More simply, a philosophy forum is about deliberation, and we deliberate about that which we are conscious of, not what we are unconscious of. The only way that unconscious entities can be brought to bear within a deliberative philosophy forum is by first bringing them into consciousness.