But sometimes we [identify things], as one might say, unconsciously or unaware of the process. In these cases, it is a bit of a moot point whether we should really say "we" identify the specimen. It certainly isn't under our control, in the way that it is when we consciously identify something. — Ludwig V

I agree that how it is done absolutely depends on what you are identifying. And we don’t talk about it because (with most things) we are all trained, told, (but usually just) pick up, our practices (like identifying), but we (like philosophers) are able to stop and reflect on the ways we can tell one thing from another, or we all in any case can ask (and answer) “How are you identifying that Meadowlark? By its feet or wing markings?” Or even, how is identifying different than seeing or perceiving?

You seem to be thinking of witnessing as a preliminary step to the processes involved in perception — Ludwig V

No, I was specifically responding to @Punshhh’s bringing up the sense of mystical witnessing; I believe you’re thinking of the other use, like being a witness to a murder. There is the religious sense also of “bearing witness”, which, even if you couldn’t testify like at trial about the murder, Job and Arjuna could, as it is in this sense, be the testimony of having “felt” or “witnessed” “the power of” God.

Having said all that, there is a paradox inherent in the idea that perceiving something as the result of a process. How do we conceive of the first step in the process? — Ludwig V

Well these words all sound like they are the same thing, but I am thinking of perceiving in its sense of regarding something in a way (like a person as pitiable), or becoming aware of a new aspect of it, which will depend on the thing of course but also where we start with it, our education, our presumptions, etc., or, as Wittgenstein calls it, our “attitude” to it, our (dis)position in relation to it. “All of a sudden, I perceived her entirely differently…” I’m not sure if @Astorre would consider this similar at all to other conceptions of how things “are” (for us), apart from the equating of “is”.

(Philosophically, perception was treated like vision, but some personal version of everything we all had, though, as I said, I don’t really see it as relevant to our discussion here. Though it is the title of literally eight other discussions)

The Italians and Spanish in their use of "being" are able to distinguish between, as you say, a fundamental characteristic of a person's identity (Latin esse) and a person's temporary, transient mood (Latin stare). — RussellA

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. This would not be essential, but also not temporary, as “He’s angry”, but “Be careful, he’s a grump.” And an important part of this is we are not just seeing them differently, but treating them as that, or switching our regard as we become aware of something else. “No, be kind to him, he’s in grief.”

I was truly thrilled to see how vividly and thoughtfully you all responded to my work, "The Language of Philosophy."

As I read through the comments, I had a thought: they not only added new dimensions to our conversation but, and this is the most amazing part, they affirmed my main idea far more powerfully than I could have imagined!

I wrote about how the grammatical structure of language, especially the verb "to be," pushes us to search for a static, unchanging essence. And here's what I saw in our discussion: when I suggested we move beyond this and think of being as "becoming," we all, time and again, reverted to that familiar logic.

When RussellA and Count Timothy von Icarus cited the Italian verbs "essere" and "stare" or Heraclitus, you weren't, in essence, moving away from the concept of "being," but merely finding its different forms—permanent and temporary. The core ambition remained to define "what is" or "what was."

When Joshs and frank debated whether change is possible without rest, I saw a fascinating, yet ultimately still an attempt to reduce the dynamic of "becoming" to two fundamental, "substantial" categories—rest and change. This is the search for the basic elements that constitute being.

And even when Joshs spoke about Heidegger, who, as he correctly noted, grounded "is" in the event of "unfolding," this was, in essence, an effort to find that very first principle, that "root" of our being.

Our entire discussion, paradoxically, became a living illustration of my work.

We weren't just discussing my idea—we were proving it in practice, involuntarily demonstrating how deeply ingrained our habit is to search for "substance" when we talk about being. This realization struck me so profoundly that I simply had to share it.

My observation is by no means a criticism. Rather, it's about how, without realizing it, we continue to operate within this very paradigm of searching for the primary substance. The very format of our discussion is built on this: "M. said: A is B." "K. replied: Is A really B? For example, philosopher M believes that B consists of D + E, but E cannot be a part of A..." and so on. Substantialism, objectivism—this is a reliable train that has allowed us to travel into space and communicate with each other from thousands of miles away. But have we become happier, more friendly, more joyful? And if we consider what is happening in modern ontology (Object-Oriented Ontology or correlationism) and science (the constant refinement of AI, which is increasingly used as a weapon rather than a friend and assistant, and which is developing at an incredible speed), a doubt arises: is this train heading in the right direction, or is it a direction where there will be no room for the subject?

And even when Joshs spoke about Heidegger, who, as he correctly noted, grounded "is" in the event of "unfolding," this was, in essence, an effort to find that very first principle, that "root" of our being. — Astorre

For Heidegger, the phenomenology of Being starts with recognizing the psyche's response to the concept of nothingness, which he describes as a dread.

It's in this same phenomenological spirit that Heidegger turns to the nature of Being. He's not doing cosmology. He's not trying to find the root of Being as if we could send out a drone and document that.

All we're doing with Heidegger is coloring inside the lines of phenomenology. Straying outside those lines will result in nonsense.

When Joshs and frank debated whether change is possible without rest, I saw a fascinating, yet ultimately still an attempt to reduce the dynamic of "becoming" to two fundamental, "substantial" categories—rest and change. This is the search for the basic elements that constitute being — Astorre

Heidegger spent much time critiquing the change-rest dichotomy going back to the Greeks. It would seem to be the case that in order for there to be change, difference, transit, there must first be something (object, narrative, scheme, the ‘now' ) to undergo such processes. Something must first be what it is by appearing ‘at rest' in the present tense, before it can undergo transformation.

“In accordance with metaphysics, all beings, changeable and moved, mobile and mobilized, are represented from the perspective of a "being that is at rest," and this even where, as in Hegel and Nietzsche, "being" (the actuality of the actual) is thought as pure becoming and absolute movement.” (Heidegger 1998c)

Heidegger’s notion of “rest” breaks with the traditional metaphysical opposition between rest and change or being and becoming.In metaphysics (from Parmenides to Plato to Aristotle), “rest” implies immutability, permanence, in contrast to movement or change. Heidegger deconstructs this whole framework. He believes this dichotomy is itself a product of metaphysical thinking, which has covered over the more primordial experience of Being (Beyng).

Being and nothingness, presence and absence are thought through a sequential temporality of beings that come into presence, linger for a while and then vanish away. As Heidegger(2013) describes the ordinary concept of time,

“In asking after what happens, we have in mind a being, even when we name it a “becoming” and attend only to its arising, approaching and decaying.” “This passing away is conceived more precisely as the successive flowing away of the "now" out of the "not yet now" into the "no longer now."… Time persists, consists in passing. It is, in that it constantly is not. This is the representational idea of time that characterizes the concept of time which is standard throughout the metaphysics of the West...”(Heidegger 1968)

Could you explain to me how your perspective differs from Heidegger’s here?

And even when Joshs spoke about Heidegger, who, as he correctly noted, grounded "is" in the event of "unfolding," this was, in essence, an effort to find that very first principle, that "root" of our being. — Astorre

When Heidegger says that unconcealment is primary, he doesn’t mean that it is a principle, a substance, a category, a subject or object. That unconcealment is first doesn’t mean it is first in time, but that notions like subject and object, rest and change are derivative modes of unconcealment.

if we consider what is happening in modern ontology (Object-Oriented Ontology or correlationism) and science (the constant refinement of AI, which is increasingly used as a weapon rather than a friend and assistant, and which is developing at an incredible speed), a doubt arises: is this train heading in the right direction, or is it a direction where there will be no room for the subject? — Astorre

So you want to leave room for the subject? I’d love to see how you do this without falling into the sort of metaphysical assumptions that Heidegger critiqued as associated with the modern thinking of subjectivity.

Probably, I could not express my thought in such a way as to emphasize its content. I did not object to the clarification that Heidegger was not a substantialist. I said that the very attempt to search for who Heidegger was is connected with the search for Heidegger's substance, which we do willingly or unwillingly.

I spoke about as a general property of philosophical discourse, where even attempts to talk about becoming remain within the framework of the substantialist habit.

As for the place of the subject and where the world is heading, I ask you to wait a little, all this will happen, but later. Everyone who responded to my work gave me many new human views, and secondly, hope that what I write about ontology will be interesting to the reader. This discussion is precisely what contributes to my text becoming more academic. And this encourages me to work further.

I don’t know of any philosopher who advocates becoming as ‘sheer’ change devoid of relationality. For Deleuze it is in the nature of differences that they always produce themselves within and as assemblages, collectives. The relative stability of these multiplicities does not oppose itself to change but evinces continual change within itself that remakes the whole in such a way that the whole remains consistent without ever being self-identical.

Exactly, which requires sameness and identity. Hence, the principles being equal (or even co-constituting, at least in the order of conception), or even three: actuality, potency, and privation.

Exactly, which requires sameness and identity. Hence, the principles being equal (or even co-constituting, at least in the order of conception), or even three: actuality, potency, and privation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Let’s talk about identity. What is the role of time for you in the determination of identity? In my way of thinking, identity requires temporal repetition. The first time, the emergence into unconcealment of something, is a difference. To emerge is to address a past within the moment of appearance. Think of a line or hinge. It subsists in a contrast, a before and after, an outside and inside, a then and a now. This is one moment of time. Wouldn’t there have to be a second moment in which that which emerges as a divide or hinge reproduces itself as itself? A=A implies temporal repetition, the turning back toward itself of what emerges, identity as pure self-affection and persistence, pure equality. Repeating identity is qualitative, categorical meaning. Calculation and measurement imply the persisting identity of the quality they iterate instance of. To deconstruct this concept of identity is to point out that each repetition of an emerging, appearing ‘something’ introduces alterity and new context ( this is what Derrida means by ‘there is nothing outside of the text’). Temporal repetition always alters what it reproduces in the apparent guise of ‘persisting identity’.

For Derrida, a would-be identity comes back to itself differently as the same . Derrida's notion of iterability is informed by a radical view of temporality he shares with Heidegger. The repetition of the same meaning intention one moment to the next is the fundamental origin of the contextual break, and our exposure to otherness. Iterability, as differance, would be an

"imperceptible difference. This exit from the identical into the same remains very slight, weighs nothing itself...(Derrida 1978)". “It is not necessary to imagine the death of the sender or of the receiver, to put the shopping list in one's pocket, or even to raise the pen above the paper in order to interrupt oneself for a moment. The break intervenes from the moment that there is a mark, at once. It is iterability itself, ..passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, traversing and transforming repetition.” (Derrida 1988). “Pure repetition, were it to change neither thing nor sign, carries with it an unlimited power of perversion and subversion.” (Derrida 1978)

Derrida's thinking here bears a remarkable resemblance to Heidegger's(1971a) insistence that identity is never simply present to itself, but differs from itself as the same.

“The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical...The same…is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say "the same" if we think difference.”

Let’s talk about identity. What is the role of time for you in the determination of identity? In my way of thinking, identity requires temporal repetition. The first time, the emergence into unconcealment of something, is a difference. To emerge is to address a past within the moment of appearance. Think of a line or hinge. It subsists in a contrast, a before and after, an outside and inside, a then and a now. This is one moment of time. Wouldn’t there have to be a second moment in which that which emerges as a divide or hinge reproduces itself as itself? A=A implies temporal repetition,. — Joshs

So the world is like a movie. Notice that there is no motion in a movie. It's just one picture after another. X only seems to move from place to place. But poor X is obliterated in the junctions between the pictures. It's not moving because there is no static background against which to mov(ie). :gasp:

I spoke about as a general property of philosophical discourse, where even attempts to talk about becoming remain within the framework of the substantialist habit. — Astorre

I think you're saying phenomenology is a kind of fraud. I think it is in some cases, but ontology is an empty building in my mind. Nobody lives there, and it's fairly important to me that it stay that way.

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations wrote about the duck-rabbit picture.

I see Parmenides and see a philosopher. The next time I see Parmenides I see someone born in Elea. The next time someone who came from Magna Graecia. The next time someone from Italy. Parmenides has many essences. Each time I see Parmenides a discover a new essence.

I see a picture of a duck-rabbit and see a duck. The next day I see a rabbit, But an object such as a picture cannot have contradictory essences, which infers that the essence of the object is in the mind of the observer rather than in the object.

This suggests that the essence the observer finds in an objects exists in the mind of the observer rather than in the object itself.

Western philosophy, from Parmenides to Heidegger, sought the essence of being—eternity, phenomenon, givenness—relying on the formula "Being — is," rooted in a language where "is" fixes being — Astorre

Your analysis of the copula "is" has planted the seed of enquiry in my mind. You have nurtured my curiosity, and I am struggling to bring a quietude to a cacophony of thoughts. I am aiming to discover an island of knowledge within such a vast ocean of information that you have presented.

An important aspect of language is its metaphorical nature, including similes and figures of speech.

Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action.

Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor

The word "gravity" is certainly a figure of speech. When we say "the rock fell to the Earth because of gravity", we are able to understand gravity using the metaphor of a heavy ball on a sheet of rubber.

Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas", through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject

The word "is" may be used literally, as in "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris", ironically, as in "Harry Potter is my favourite character in literature", sarcastically, as in "He is very clever" or metaphorically, as in "Socrates is a towering figure".

It is rare that "is" lends stability to being or fixes an essence in reality.

The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but it could have built at the World Fair in Prague. Harry Potter may not be my favourite character now, but then I have not yet read "The Philosopher's Stone". I may not think that he is clever, but I may have misunderstood him. There is also no fixed meaning to the metaphor "towering".

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning.

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject — RussellA

I think I understand what you are talking about and it intrigues me.

But here comes a very subtle point: although we imply identity, existence or generic class, nevertheless we kind of fix it in reality, indicating that it IS.

To be honest, I cannot imagine how the copula is thought of by a native speaker who has been using this language (for example, English, German or Greek) since birth, but for me, since English is not my native language, and my native language is Russian, this is perceived as an indication, confirmation, disclosure of content and fixation in reality itself.

For example: The cat is black. In Russian I will say "koshka chernaya", simply adding an adjective to the noun, just two words without IS. In Kazakh it will sound "мысық қара" similar to the Russian language.

The copula Is is added in Russian, but only when talking about tenses: past: "koshka byla chernaya" (the cat was black); in the future: "koshka budet chernaya" (the cat will be black). In the Kazakh language, everything is exactly the same, only the word order changes. "Mysyk Kara Boldy" (the cat was black); in the future: "Mysyk Kara Bolady" (the cat will be black).

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. Hence these metaphors about our life being like a film on film (like a series of frames), but each frame separately is as if IT IS, it is fixed.

I think you're saying phenomenology is a kind of fraud. I think it is in some cases, but ontology is an empty building in my mind. Nobody lives there, and it's fairly important to me that it stay that way. — frank

No, it is not so clear-cut. I believe that phenomenology has given the very possibility of philosophically rethinking the Western approach to understanding the world.

Eastern traditions proceed from the direct experience of being: be it "awakening" in Zen, "liberation" in Vedanta or "the path" in Taoism. This experience can be paradoxical, but it is considered reliable without rational justification.

The Western mind (especially since the New Age) was brought up in the paradigm of rationality, analysis, proof, so phenomenology is like a methodical path back to the intuitive. Through descriptions of intentionality, the "life of consciousness", the horizon of meaning, it makes possible an approach to this Eastern "self-evident".

Phenomenology is like an intellectual bridge, with the help of which the Western mind was able to come to a contemplative, immediate, "Eastern" way of perceiving being. At the same time, it remains Western in its style of thinking: it seeks a path through awareness, not through the rejection of consciousness.

For example:
Husserl: epoche - "removing" attitudes in order to see things as they are. Zen: shikantanza (just sitting) - full presence without analysis.

Heidegger: Gelassenheit - letting go, allowing to be. Dao: wu wei - non-action as a way to correspond to the path.

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning. — RussellA

I also want to say that it's quite possible the very framing of the question, the very premise, might be a kind of speculation or a misunderstanding on my part. This is precisely why I published it here—so that philosophers or simply native speakers could offer guidance, direction, or challenge my ideas.

At the same time, I want to share with you that by starting from this premise, I was able to arrive at something new in the subsequent chapters of my work.

If we stop fixating on essence and separate the concepts of sushchee (existent) and bytie (being), we can arrive at some interesting conclusions. The very notions of bytie and sushchee in Russian are something different. To exist (sushchestvovat’) simply means to be in a state where your attributes do not change by your own will (a stone lying on the ground, a tree growing according to its program, or an AI operating by an algorithm). To be (byt’) is something more than mere existence. It's roughly what happens when something can change its attributes at its own discretion (a prime example is a human, but not necessarily only them).

I write in more detail about the attributes of sushchee in my work. In due time, I will share all of this, so as not to lead the current conversation too far astray. But these intuitions came from the very feeling that byt’ and sushchestvovat’ are two different things.

Being, in my opinion, is not just a snapshot or a sequence of snapshots that can be captured. Yes, it can be done and it can be described to an external observer in this way. And it will be scientific and substantiated and very Western. But being is something more. It is what makes it possible to capture, film or feel. To live in becoming.

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. — Astorre

Language expresses thoughts. In an uncertain world, language mirrors this uncertainty

We say "this apple is healthy" until we discover that although apples themselves are generally safe to eat, their seeds contain a compound called amygdalin, which can release cyanide when chewed or crushed.

We are aware that the world is not stable, in stasis or changeless and our language represents this

If someone says "the world is static", then the copula "is" is being used ironically. If someone says "the world is dynamic", then the copula "is" is being used literally.

We use the copula "is" to refer to something that is a process rather than an essence.

As the BBC wrote: Why the world feels so unstable right now

For many of us, life seems to progress smoothly and predictably for much of the time. Indeed, it seems one of our biggest concerns appears to be getting stuck in a rut. But then, seemingly out of nowhere, our world is turned upside down. A global pandemic strikes us down, killing millions of people and forcing entire countries into lockdown. Then inflation takes off and economic downturn threatens our livelihoods. And (not unrelated) one country invades another and the resulting war affects us all. Whoa! Where on Earth did all that come from?

We exist (sushchee) within this changing world, unable to have much affect on it.

But being (byt) in this world, we are part of the world and as part of the world both part of the problem and part of the solution, as Don Paterson writes in his poem "Being"

Silent comrade of the distances,
Know that space dilates with your own breath;
ring out, as a bell into the Earth
from the dark rafters of its own high place –

then watch what feeds on you grow strong again.
Learn the transformations through and through:
what in your life has most tormented you?
If the water’s sour, turn it into wine.

Our senses cannot fathom this night, so
be the meaning of their strange encounter;
at their crossing, be the radiant centre.

And should the world itself forget your name
say this to the still earth: I flow.
Say this to the quick stream: I am.

The copula "is" should be seen in the context of metaphor, and metaphor is more "being" than "existing".

Let’s talk about identity. What is the role of time for you in the determination of identity? In my way of thinking, identity requires temporal repetition.

I guess I disagree here, for the aforementioned reason that I don't think it makes sense to talk about time in the first place unless something is already the same across the sequence. If there isn't already sameness, you just have wholly discrete being(s). The very ability to notice difference, for it to be conceptually present, requires that there also be sameness.

That was, I took it, Eddigton's point about Kant and Hume that I shared, and I think it's a good one. It seems to me that a phenomenological approach that assumes that temporal experience is prior to sameness/identity, is in fact, already presupposing a certain sort of sameness and identity that is prior to temporality itself. To use a metaphor, it's assuming that all the frames on the "reel of experience" are already part of the same reel, such that one can "play it forward." Whereas, if we drop this assumption, we would be forced to get rid of the film reel and we would instead have a bunch of wholly isolated frames, detached from one another (no prior similarity).

But, as noted earlier, I also think it is easy here to pass between conceptual priority and priority in the order of experience, and ontological priority. A wholly phenomenological argument against something like the "block universe," (which assumes that the block universe is equal with itself) that relies on assuming that the order of experience just is the order of ontological priority, seems rather shakey.

I don't think it makes sense to talk about time in the first place unless something is already the same across the sequence. If there isn't already sameness, you just have wholly discrete being(s). The very ability to notice difference, for it to be conceptually present, requires that there also be sameness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sameness, similarity, consistency and inferential
compatibility are important. The self-preservation of living things, scientific knowledge and agreement in ethical norms depend on it. The question is whether belief in pure self-identity over time furthers scientific progress and ethical understanding or inhibits it. When one begins from pure self-identity-identity, differences appear as necessarily arbitrary, violent. polarizing, oppositional. In treating the temporally unfolding repetition of a phenomenon in terms of absolutely equal sameness one misses the subtle , intricate shifts in sense of meaning which take place in every every moment of the repetition. Then, when one finally notices a qualitative difference, one’s noticing arrives too late. Having missed the intricacy of qualitative change underlying the assumed qualitative stasis, one is only attentive to the gross, abstractive contours of contradiction and violation.

Your metaphor of the film reel as a depiction of time falls within the conception of time as related to motion, on which the empirical measurement of time is based. An object in motion differs from itself over time by displacing itself in space. But the qualitative sense of the object supposedly does not change through the quantitative changes in spatial location. The accounts of time that I endorse assert that the qualitative sense of an object that we observe in motion does change. This doesn’t mean that it does not continue to be the same object. What it means is that to continue to be the same object is to refresh its contextual sense, significance and relevance.

For anything to have meaning requires two things. It requires that it present a new aspect, a new way of being alike and different from other events. And it requires that this novel feature be relevant. What this implies is that identity is not necessary for the perception of similarity, for anticipating what is to come, for predicting events empirically. On the contrary, pure identity is the death of sense and meaning. To hold something as self-identical is to make its meaning disappear. The constant appearance of our world as self-same from one moment to the next that the perceptual system makes possible is only achieved by continuous changes it makes in itself. For instance, to see an insert as unmoving requires continuous subtle rapid oscillations of the eye. Hold the eye completely still and the object vanishes. A color only appears as it is against contrasting colors. If the entire visual field becomes monochrome, the perception of the color as color disappears.

Try to measure the motion of a ball, and see if you can notice how, even as you dutifully maintain your attention to the task, the sense of the task, what interests you about it, how it feels to you are all in continuous motion. The mistake we make is to consider such shifts in sense as merely ‘subjective’ and extraneous to the meaning of the object as self-identical.

If we stop fixating on essence and separate the concepts of sushchee (existent) and bytie (being), we can arrive at some interesting conclusions. The very notions of bytie and sushchee in Russian are something different. To exist (sushchestvovat’) simply means to be in a state where your attributes do not change by your own will (a stone lying on the ground, a tree growing according to its program, or an AI operating by an algorithm). To be (byt’) is something more than mere existence. It's roughly what happens when something can change its attributes at its own discretion (a prime example is a human, but not necessarily only them). — Astorre

I know of two cultures which have been claimed as thinking radically differently about being, presence and purpose in comparison with Western approaches. Heidegger singled out pre-Socratic thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides as understanding becoming in a fundamental way that was derailed when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle shifted the focus to beings, and truth as correctness, and Western thinking has followed suite ever since. It didnt matter to Heidegger whether a language like Russian was missing the present tense copula or not. What mattered was what kind of philosophical and religious literature was produced within Russian language without the copula. If the simple absence of the copula in a language predisposes their culture toward modes of thought which avoid the trap of fixing becoming into being, where is the evidence of this in the philosophical writings of Russia and other Slavic countries?

Robert Ziporyn, a translator of ancient Chinese texts, makes the claim that certain strains of Buddhism avoid fixing becoming. He associates this with their non-phonetic language and absence of copula, but derives his evidence from the content of the writings, not just their grammar.

I will call the claims of Heidegger about the pre-Socratics and Ziporyn about ancient Buddhism the nostalgic position. The nostalgic position asserts that some individual or culture in our distant past ‘got it right’ by arriving at a way of understanding the nature of things that we drifted away from for many centuries and are just now coming back to. So the latest and most advanced philosophical thinking of the West today is just a belated return to what was already discovered long ago.

I dont buy the nostalgic position. I think it is only when we interpret ancient thought in a superficial way that it appears their ideas were consonant with modern phenomenology and related approaches. Why are we so prone to misreading the ancients this way? I believe this comes from emphasizing only one aspect of their thought and ignoring the other, more significant dimension. Western philosophy after Hegel shifted its attention away from unchanging foundations and towards a discourse of evolution, revolution and becoming in which foundations become relative, contingent and impermanent. The primacy of the self-knowing ego and the purposefulness of the grasping will were put into question. Some of these philosophers took note of the fact that Buddhist scholars also talked about egolessness and non-willing.

But I want to argue that the most valuable consequence of the modern turn toward becoming was that it represented a further step in the evolution of Western thinking toward ways of understanding the world in terms of intricate relationships, harmonies, interconnections and correlations. This process necessarily had to start out with the belief in fixed objects and universal laws as a ground for seeing consistencies and stabilities in the world. My contention is that ancient buddhist thought is not post-Westen but pre-Western. Its view of change and becoming does not have room for the intricate interconnections that phenomenology and other contemporary philosophies describe within change.

The fact that I disagree with Heidegger concerning the significance and relevance of the pre-Socratics for his phenomenology doesn’t diminish my support for his ideas, and I am interested to see how your thinking relates to his, even if I don’t buy your nostalgia for older cultural-linguistic products.

Brook Ziporyn. And it's not just nostalgia. Indra's Net is hardly a primitive ontology.

Western philosophy after Hegel shifted its attention away from unchanging foundations and towards a discourse of evolution, revolution and becoming in which foundations become relative, contingent and impermanent — Joshs

Hegel's roots were Neoplatonic, which is the philosophy Christianity is built on. Maybe he was instrumental in bringing it back to the academic scene, but it had been around for centuries.

↪Joshs Brook Ziporyn. And it's not just nostalgia. Indra's Net is hardly a primitive ontology. — Wayfarer

Oops. Thanks. Concerning Indra’s net, it is not enough to transport the concept of the radical interdependence of all things as a one-size-fits-all cliche. One has to examine
what this means in practice in the way a culture conducts itself, treats expressions of otherness i. one’s family and community, avoids war and other violent acts which define the boundaries of ‘interconnectedness’.

Hegel's roots were Neoplatonic, which is the philosophy Christianity is built on. Maybe he was instrumental in bringing it back to the academic scene, but it had been around for centuries. — frank

Neoplatonism may have been around for centuries, but my references to evolution and revolution were meant to capture how Hegel’s focus on historical change set the stage for Darwin, Marx, American Pragmatism, Nietzsche and Heidegger. I may be mistaken, but I dont think Christian neoplatonists were big on revolution. Hegel radically historicized the platonic absolute.

I may be mistaken, but I dont think Christian neoplatonists were big on revolution. — Joshs

Freemasons were. Their belief system was Neoplatonic. As you may know, many of the founders of the USA were Freemasons.

Hegel radically historicized the platonic absolute. — Joshs

When you talked about shifting foundations, I thought you were talking about dialectics. Becoming analyses out to Being and Non-Being, and that brings us to Heidegger's What is Metaphysics, one of my favorites. :grin:

One has to examine
what this means in practice in the way a culture conducts itself, treats expressions of otherness i. one’s family and community, avoids war and other violent acts which define the boundaries of ‘interconnectedness’. — Joshs

Indeed. And on the whole, with some notable exceptions, Buddhism has been a civilizing influence through the East.

I know of two cultures which have been claimed as thinking radically differently about being, presence and purpose in comparison with Western approaches. Heidegger singled out pre-Socratic thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides as understanding becoming in a fundamental way that was derailed when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle shifted the focus on beings and truth as correctness, and Western thinking has followed suite ever since. It didnt matter to Heidegger whether a language like Russian was missing the present tense copula or not. What mattered was what kind of philosophical and religious literature was produced within those languages without the copula. If the simple absence of the copula in a language predisposes their culture toward modes of thought which avoid the trap of fixing becoming into being, where is the evidence of this in their philosophical writings? — Joshs

I am not aware of any Russian philosophers who directly linked the absence of a copula in the language to a different approach to understanding reality. Perhaps someone has mentioned this, but it is unknown to me. However, I can speak about the distinct approach of Russian philosophers to being. (For them, as for Heidegger, the presence or absence of a copula in language was not significant.)

I will try to explain what this distinction entails in the context of our discussion. This is a very interesting topic, and I would like to start with Dostoevsky, although he was not an academic philosopher, his literary works are considered philosophical.
Dostoevsky viewed human being as a process tied to freedom and moral choice, rather than a static essence. In Notes from Underground (1864), the protagonist—the underground man—rejects rationalistic determinism, symbolized by the “crystal palace,” a utopian idea where human behavior is predictable and subject to the laws of nature. He asserts that human being is defined by free will, even if it leads to irrational or self-destructive actions: “Man needs… only independent volition, whatever it may cost and wherever it may lead.”. "Eh, gentlemen, what kind of free will is there when it comes to arithmetic, when only twice two four is in use? Twice two will be four without my will. Is this what free will is?"
(https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/can-dostoevsky-still-kick-you-in-the-gut)

In The Brothers Karamazov (1880), Elder Zosima teaches that life is a continuous process of spiritual becoming, where each moment of choice brings a person closer to or further from God: “Every moment one must save oneself.” He describes being as a movement through time, shaped by love and responsibility.
For Dostoevsky, being is not a fixed state but a dynamic process of struggle, doubt, and spiritual becoming. Each moment of choice shapes a person, making their existence open and unfinished. This resonates with the idea of “living in becoming,” where being is not a sequence of fixed “snapshots” but a dynamic process tied to will and responsibility.
The Russian-Ukrainian philosopher Grigory Skovoroda, in his work Narcissus, viewed being as a triadic unity of the macrocosm (the universe), the microcosm (the human), and symbolic reality (Holy Scripture). He emphasized that being is a process of uncovering the invisible divine nature, not a static essence.
Nikolai Berdyaev clearly distinguished between “being” and “existence” in works such as The Philosophy of Freedom (1911) and The Meaning of the Creative Act (1916). He argued that being is tied to spiritual freedom and creativity, while existence refers to the material, objective world subject to necessity.
Similarly, the works of Alexei Losev (1893–1988) reveal ideas of the processuality of being. For example, in his multi-volume History of Ancient Aesthetics, Losev reinterprets the Platonic eidos as a dialectical process rather than a static form. He writes: “Eidos is a becoming form, a living dialectic of matter and meaning” (Volume 1, section “Platonic Eidos”). For Losev, being is not a fixed substance but a process of interaction between form, matter, and the subject, where every thing is constantly transformed through its meaning.
Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. It is often tied to the religious and mystical traditions of Orthodoxy. Unlike Western philosophy, which, starting with Descartes and Kant, focused on rationalism, systematization, and substantialism, Russian thought leans toward processuality, intuitiveness, and ethical reflection. Russian philosophers such as Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Alexei Losev, Grigory Skovoroda, and Fyodor Dostoevsky (as a thinker) often viewed being as a dynamic process tied to freedom, creativity, and spiritual becoming, rather than a static essence.
Undoubtedly, there were other Russian philosophers who thought in the context of substantialism, but those I have listed are studied in universities as having had the greatest influence on Russian philosophy as a whole.

To complete the picture, I will give an example from Kazakh philosophy
Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) viewed being as a dynamic process of spiritual and moral improvement. In "Words of Edification" (for example, the 25th word), he emphasizes that a person must constantly develop through reason, labor and morality: "Reason and labor are the main qualities that an ideal person must master." His philosophy emphasizes the continuous movement towards enlightenment, overcoming ignorance and achieving harmony with society and nature. In poems such as "Spring" or "Summer", nature is depicted as a changeable, living force, reflecting the process of becoming a person and society.

For Heidegger, the process of being is an analytical disclosure of Dasein through care, where the subject exists in "abandonment" and is directed towards death. This is a more abstract and universal approach, without drama or ethical passion. The Eastern approach is more emotional, spiritual, connected with personal ethics, with a development that may be erroneous but humane.

Were these works inspired by the absence of a copula in the language? I don’t know. In any case, I am unaware of any works that explicitly state, “We have no copula, therefore we are processualists.” Is my idea speculative? Perhaps. But then what philosophical intuition is non-speculative?

Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. — Astorre

Though this sounds very similar to Continental Philosophy, with its emphasis on human behaviour, existentialism and psychoanalysis.

I agree not exactly the same, but sharing a family resemblance, and more similar than Analytic Philosophy.

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes

Their approach to philosophy is more reflexive as they try to understand human behaviour by using social science. They do not believe that scientific models that dissect, analyse, and explain ideas provide a comprehensive answer. Instead, they look at things from a humanistic perspective, thus investigating the context and history of a subject matter to draw a conclusion.

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes — RussellA

Interesting theory. From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. If you cover the entire Eurasian continent and pave the way from India to Great Britain, you get a spectrum from hot and sensual to cold and analytical.

And yes, I just asked AI:

In Hindi, domes are obligatory, while in Bengali, Odia, Tamil, domes are either absent or optional.

What's even more interesting: Buddha lived in Northern India. At that time, the main languages of the region were Prakrit languages - colloquial dialects derived from Sanskrit, as opposed to the literary Sanskrit used in Vedic texts.
The most likely language that Buddha spoke was Pali or the closely related Prakrit of Magadha. Pali became the language of canonical Buddhist texts (Tripitaka), since it was considered close to the spoken language of Buddha. Magadhi was the main dialect of the region where the Buddha preached.

Copula in Pali:
In Pali, as in other Prakrits, the copula is the verb असति (asati, "to be"), derived from Sanskrit asti. In the present tense, the copula is often used in statements of identity or quality: for example, "सो भिक्खु असति" (so bhikkhu asati, "He is a monk"). However, in colloquial speech and some contexts, the copula could be omitted, especially in descriptive sentences: "सो भिक्खु" (so bhikkhu, "He is a monk"), which is similar to Russian ("Socrates is a philosopher") or Kazakh ("adam aqyldy").
In the past tense, the copula is obligatory: "सो भिक्खु आसि" (so bhikkhu āsi, "He was a monk"), as in Hindi (thā) or Russian ("there was a doctor"). Pali also uses constructions without copula to express states or qualities, especially in philosophical texts: "सब्बं अनिच्चं" (sabbam aniccam, "Everything is impermanent"), where the copula is implied but not explicitly stated.

I agree "is" does not seem to distract from the "what", which is more pure. Whatness. Without distraction. Simply present. Letting the being continue breathing and not packing into a stagnant what through sentence structure. — Fire Ologist

Again, very interesting, congratulations. Of course this is to just tease the meat of the findings, but I find the research/evidence does allow for an astounding perspective, particularly how the classic philosophical framework is seemingly baked into the language. — Antony Nickles

Thank you for your interest and support. I was pleased with both the interest and skepticism of other participants, the approach to further analysis, and the development of ideas. Unfortunately, I did not have time to respond to all the comments, I am only now sorting them out.

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way?

From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. If you cover the entire Eurasian continent and pave the way from India to Great Britain, you get a spectrum from hot and sensual to cold and analytical. — Astorre

It seems to me the distinction you are making can just as well be cast as that between philosophy and literature as between West and East. With regard to the Russian writers you mention, it is further narrowed down to literature of a particular era, the 19th and 20th centuries, which happens to coincide with the Romanticism and post-Romanticism which swept across Europe. Russian literature's spiritual intensity emerged during the same period that produced equally passionate and non-analytical Western works. In fact, Romanticism came to Russia a bit later than it emerged in Europe.

To make your analysis more complete, shouldn’t you bring into the discussion Western works of literature from that period so we can see if perhaps they as well are more ‘hot and sensual’ than ‘cold and analytical’? I notice, for instance, that you didn’t mention Georges Bataille. His work is simultaneously French and utterly opposed to cold analyticity; dealing with death, eroticism, sacred violence, and mystical experience in ways that are arguably more extreme than anything in Dostoevsky.

Here are some other examples:

French literature:

Charles Baudelaire. Les Fleurs du mal* explored decadence, eroticism, and spiritual corruption with intense sensuality.

Arthur Rimbaud.His visionary poetry and A Season in Hell were explosively passionate and mystical

Paul Verlaine. Symbolist poetry emphasizing music, sensation, and emotional immediacy

Joris-Karl Huysmans. À rebours was a decadent exploration of aesthetic excess and spiritual crisis

German Literature:

Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zararhustra

Novalis. Romantic poet-philosopher whose *Hymns to the Night* merged erotic and mystical experience

Heinrich Heine. Poetry combining political passion with sensual romanticism

Stefan George. Aestheticist poet creating a cult of beauty and spiritual intensity

Thomas Mann. Works like *Death in Venice* explored psychological passion and moral decay

English Literature:

Oscar Wilde. Aestheticism prioritizing beauty and sensation over moral analysis

Algernon Charles Swinburne. Poetry notorious for its eroticism and pagan sensuality

D.H. Lawrence. Novels like *Women in Love* emphasized bodily experience and vital forces

Gerard Manley Hopkins. Religious poetry of intense spiritual and sensual experience

Scandinavian Literature:

August Strindberg. Psychological dramas of sexual and spiritual torment

Knut Hamsun. Hunger and other works emphasized irrational, instinctive experience

When you talked about shifting foundations, I thought you were talking about dialectics. Becoming analyses out to Being and Non-Being, and that brings us to Heidegger's What is Metaphysics, one of my favorites. :grin: — frank

It’s one of my favorites too. ‘The Nothing nothings’