I don't know if it's intentional or not, but now you've come to compare Russian and European romanticism in literature, which is even more radical, as you put it, than Dostoevsky's. I provided references to Russian writers and philosophers at your request to support the ideas of processualism. However, I don't want to compare anyone's quality or level. My goal is to offer a new perspective in ontology. This was achieved by highlighting the linguistic differences. If, in the current situation, intelligent people start measuring themselves in terms of literature or philosophy, like the average person, then who will we have to rely on? Politicians measure economies, the military measures the size of missiles, writers measure their works, and philosophers measure their philosophies. I don't think I chose this approach. What if we stop proving and try to have mutual respect? The world is not a snapshot. Being is not a substance. What is impossible today will become commonplace tomorrow.

Someone told me Russian speech pervasively pictures properties as external things, impinging on the subject, where in German, the speaker owns the properties, so instead of the cold is upon me, it's I have cold. Do you think that influences the respective philosophies? Germanic languages conjure a huge inner landscape.

That's a really sharp observation, and it's certainly how it might appear to a non-native speaker at first glance. The reality is a bit more nuanced.
In Russian, constructions often express a state through the subject's experience or the givenness of that state, rather than through possession. When we say "Мне холодно" (literally "To me is cold"), "Мне грустно" (To me is sad), or "Мне весело" (To me is cheerful), we're using adverbs of state. This doesn't mean "cold is attacking me" or "I'm becoming an object of external force." Instead, it describes an internal sensation, answering the question, "How is it for me?" (Or, "How do I feel my current state?"). The subject here is the experiencer, not an active possessor or a passive recipient of impact.
This difference is key:

As you mentioned, in German: I have a state. (Emphasis on possession and control.)
In Russian: A state is given to me / I experience a state. (Emphasis on givenness, experience, and immediate perception.)
Does This Influence Respective Philosophies?
I can't state definitively that it does, but it's certainly thought-provoking. We were recently discussing phenomenology, and this connects quite well. To some extent, this Russian emphasis on givenness (like "мне холодно," "мне кажется" - "it seems to me," or one-word impersonal sentences like "смеркается" - "it's getting dark") resonates strongly with phenomenology without the formal method itself.
What I mean is, quite seriously, when a Russian speaker says "мне холодно," they're subconsciously sharing how they're living through that experience. In fact, I remember studying phenomenology myself, and as a native Russian speaker, it took me a long time to grasp what was fundamentally new about it compared to my everyday experience. Perhaps this contributes to forming a mindset where the focus is on perceiving what's happening rather than on actively owning one's body as property.
I must stress that I can only judge this from my own experience. If you happen to have a native Russian speaker nearby (there are many around these days, thankfully! ), just let them read this and compare their feelings with mine.

Oh I see! Thanks for explaining that.

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way? — Astorre

I think we might discover a way to understand something (namely, being/becoming), that does not linguistically look rational.

Meaning, the way we normally talk follows a reasoning.

But there is no normal way to talk about “being” qua being. When we talk normally, and make our topic “being”, we impose things in the topic that obfuscate and cover up what we are trying to say.

When talking about being/becoming, it is often the case that with each word we use, we turn our attention away from being/becoming.

Like you said the question “What is being?” doesn’t even make sense in Russian. I think what we are discovering is that, while “being qua being” is mysterious, and therefore, worthy of inquiry and discussion, even if we discover some wisdom about it, it will be difficult to say or demonstrate with reasonable statements.

So short answer to your question is, yes, I do think a new perspective, or really a new eyeball, (a new logic), needs to be developed to philosophically (not metaphorically or mystically) talk about being/becoming. And your observation about what is present in some languages but not in others relating to something so basic as “is” are really good because they point to a newer method (way of looking - through linguistic analysis), and a bit of new wisdom as a result (being as a piece of Becoming, so to speak).

From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. — Astorre

As a first approximation, one could argue that thinking in the West tends more to a search for substance and in the East thinking tends more to a search for process.

However, in the West, there is another aspect. For example, looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", the word "philosopher" refers to two distinct things.

First, there is the concrete: Socrates was a Greek from Athens, known through the posthumous accounts of classical writers, particularly his students Plato and Xenophon, accused of impiety and corrupting the youth in 399BC and after a trial that lasted a day was sentenced to death (Wikipedia, Socrates).

Second, there is the abstract: a philosopher is a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment, a scholar and a thinker, a student of philosophy, a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with equanimity easier, an expounder of a theory in a particular area of experience and one who one who philosophizes (Merriam Webster, philosopher).

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations gave the example of the duck-rabbit picture. One day when looking at the picture one perceives a duck and the next day, looking at the same picture, one perceives a rabbit.

Similarly, in thinking about "Socrates is a philosopher", one has two distinct thoughts. There is the concrete, "Socrates was Greek", unchanging, a substance, historical and existence. There is the abstract, "a philosopher seeks wisdom", changing, a process, ahistorical and being.

Similarly with the philosophical schizophrenia between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. I would guess that one-third on this Forum are Direct Realists, one-third are Indirect Realists and one-third are confused between the two.

The Direct Realist believes that tables and chairs exist in the world independent of any human observer whilst the Indirect Realist believes that tables and chairs only have being in the mind. Direct Realism is about literal immediacy whilst Indirect Realism is about phenomenological representation. Direct Realists include Thomas Reid and John R Searle, whilst Indirect Realists include Immanuel Kant and Bertrand Russell.

As a second approximation, in the West, when looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", not only does "philosopher" refer to not only the concrete existence, "from Athens", but also the abstract process, "seeks wisdom". In addition, for the Direct Realist, concrete existence means a substance in the world and for the Indirect Realist, concrete existence means a being in the mind.

In the West, thought is also about both existence and being.

It seems to me that you are mixing phenomenal perception (direct/indirect realism) with processuality (becoming). Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world - and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language, and not on the epistemological perception of reality. In the example you give, "Socrates seeking truth" remains a "snapshot". The abstract definition of a philosopher ("seeking wisdom") itself is static, since it describes a role, not a dynamic. In my approach, processuality is a continuous becoming, as in Dostoevsky ("to save oneself every moment"), Abai ("science of Zhol") or Buddha (anicca), where being flows and is not fixed even in abstraction. That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism.

BUT. All that has been said does not in any way diminish the presence of a processual approach and processual understanding in the West. Moreover, I am not saying that the West is necessarily substantial, and the East is necessarily processual. The main hypothesis was that language simply contributes to this. But this does not mean that a philosopher born in London is doomed to substantialism, and one born in Beijing to processualism. As we see, and I emphasized this in the previous answer - the East and the West mutually influence each other and, being in this involvement with each other, they mutually become and continue to do this and right now (in my opinion) we are doing exactly this. This is great

But there is no normal way to talk about “being” qua being. When we talk normally, and make our topic “being”, we impose things in the topic that obfuscate and cover up what we are trying to say. — Fire Ologist

Here is what Heidegger wrote on this subject: “The meaning of the word ‘being’ is the most general and at the same time the most empty. But at the same time it is consistently used in every speech, and we supposedly know what it means – until we are asked about it.”

I agree with you.

My understanding of the definitions
As an Indirect Realist, I know that I, as a human, exist and I believe that a world independent of humans exists.

Ontology can be thought of as a noun, and is about the nature of reality.

Epistemology can be thought of as a verb, and is about how we know the nature of reality.

Substantialism is the theory that substances are the ultimate constituents of the reality of the world.

Processuality is the theory that humans, even at one moment in time, are not static things, like a rock, but are dynamic things that experience a continuous becoming.
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My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language and not on the epistemological perception of reality. — Astorre

How can you arrive at an ontological belief without first going through an epistemological process?

Is your ontological perception about the ontology of the substantialism of a world independent of humans or about the ontology of the processuality of humans?
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Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world — Astorre

I agree that Indirect Realism concerns epistemology in how we can know the ontology of the world.

But as the Direct Realist believes they directly experience the ontology of the world, epistemology is redundant to the Direct Realist.
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and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). — Astorre

Am I right is thinking that Processuality only concerns humans and their continuous becomings, whereas Substantialism concerns the nature of reality in the world?

Am I also right in thinking that by the ontology of processuality, you are only referring to the ontology of humans, and by ontology of substantialism, you are only referring to the ontology of the world?
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That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism. — Astorre

As "from Athens" is something that exists in the world, then substantialism seems appropriate.

However as "seeks wisdom" is something that only exists in the human mind, and humans experience processuality, then this would infer that human concepts are also subject to processuality.

Concepts are never static, continually change, are dynamic and flow through the mind like birds on the wing. Concepts are not substances that make up the reality of the world.

How can you arrive at an ontological belief without first going through an epistemological process? — RussellA

Here’s how Heidegger would answer that question. Let’s see if Astorre agrees:

Heidegger would reject the framing of the question, because it presupposes a priority of epistemology over ontology. Instead, he would argue that epistemology depends on a more basic ontological structure of existence, one that we are already immersed in as Dasein. So, ontological understanding is not a conclusion we reach, but a condition we uncover. Epistemology is derivative. Traditional epistemology (as in Descartes, Kant, etc.) starts with the subject-object divide and questions how the subject can know the world. But we don’t arrive” at ontological belief via epistemology. We start in it. We are always already involved in a world where Being is disclosed. The proper philosophical task is to uncover this ontological structure, not to justify it through epistemology.

No, I was specifically responding to Punshhh’s bringing up the sense of mystical witnessing; I believe you’re thinking of the other use, like being a witness to a murder. There is the religious sense also of “bearing witness”, which, even if you couldn’t testify like at trial about the murder, Job and Arjuna could, as it is in this sense, be the testimony of having “felt” or “witnessed” “the power of” God. — Antony Nickles

I am indeed thinking about standard or normal use. It's use in the context of divine revelations may be different, and I wouldn't argue about that - I'm not qualified or competent to do that. But I also wanted to point out that there is at least one revelation story in the Bible that does not seem to me to fit the description that @Punshhh gives. I hope they feel inspired to comment.

I am thinking of perceiving in its sense of regarding something in a way (like a person as pitiable), or becoming aware of a new aspect of it, — Antony Nickles

I recognize that "seeing as aspect" is inherent in perception. What's bothering me is that as aspect is always an aspect of something. Wittgenstein's presentation of this seems to me to obscure that point. The duck-rabbit can be seen in two ways. But there is a third way, which is neutral between those intepretations and allows us to say that those two interpretations are interpretations of the same picture. I mean the description of the picture as a collection of marks on paper.
St. Paul's vision is described as a flash of light. In one way, that's an identification. In another, it's saying he did not know what he saw. So even if we experience something and then decide how to interpret it, there are descriptions that are also place-holders for a later identification. But paradoxically they can be interpreted by philosophers as an identification. That's not right as it stands, but I hope it gets some meaning across to you.

I recognize that "seeing as aspect" is inherent in perception. What's bothering me is that as aspect is always an aspect of something. Wittgenstein's presentation of this seems to me to obscure that point. The duck-rabbit can be seen in two ways. But there is a third way, which is neutral between those intepretations and allows us to say that those two interpretations are interpretations of the same picture. I mean the description of the picture as a collection of marks on paper — Ludwig V

We understand ‘same picture’ by seeing it as ‘same picture’. Or as you put it, by seeing something as ‘marks on paper’. The notion of marks on paper is no less in need of interpretation than seeing something as a duck or a rabbit. There is pre-interpretive, pre-conceptual perception.

Heidegger would reject the framing of the question, because it presupposes a priority of epistemology over ontology. — Joshs

Ontology is about the nature of reality, and epistemology is about how we know the nature of reality.

There is an analogy to Mary's Room, the knowledge argument. If Mary is embedded in a black and white world, can she ever discover colour.

If I see the colour red, is it possible for me to directly see the cause of my seeing the colour red.

If I don't know something, is it possible for me to decide to search for it.

If there is another reality outside my own reality, can I ever discover it.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

Perhaps this is "Dasein".

This means that I am limited to thinking about the ontology of my own reality, and the process of thinking about my own reality is epistemological.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology.

Kant pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are the ontology of the human brain, and these allow the brain to cognise, which is the epistemological aspect.

So yes, the ontology of the brain precedes the possibility of epistemology by the brain.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

Perhaps this is "Dasein".

This means that I am limited to thinking about the ontology of my own reality, and the process of thinking about my own reality is epistemological. — RussellA

Heidegger understands the term ontology in a peculiar way.
He draws from Kant’s idealism the notion of condition of possibility. Kant’s categories are the synthetic condition of possibility of epistemology. For Heidegger the ontological is something like a condition of possibility, but it is not transcendental in Kant’s sense. Think of it as a stance or perspective, the Being of a being in terms of its way of being, not what a being ‘is’ but how it is. These stances do not precede the existence of the world, they are what it means to exist. To exist is to open up a stance. An epistemology is what is made possible ( intelligible) by a stance.

I am indeed thinking about standard or normal use. It's use in the context of divine revelations may be different,

What I was thinking of is that there is the ability (in us) for us to witness something inconceivable to us, which we are entirely unable to comprehend. It may be in our unconscious, or the body, that records an imprint of what was witnessed, while our mind, alters it to something more manageable.
In this passage from Ezekiel, this is going on I think.

Ezekiel 10; Their faces looked like this: Each of the four had the face of a human being, and on the right side each had the face of a lion, and on the left the face of an ox; each also had the face of an eagle. 11 Such were their faces. They each had two wings spreading out upward, each wing touching that of the creature on either side; and each had two other wings covering its body. 12 Each one went straight ahead. Wherever the spirit would go, they would go, without turning as they went. 13 The appearance of the living creatures was like burning coals of fire or like torches. Fire moved back and forth among the creatures; it was bright, and lightning flashed out of it. 14 The creatures sped back and forth like flashes of lightning.

15 As I looked at the living creatures, I saw a wheel on the ground beside each creature with its four faces. 16 This was the appearance and structure of the wheels: They sparkled like topaz, and all four looked alike. Each appeared to be made like a wheel intersecting a wheel. 17 As they moved, they would go in any one of the four directions the creatures faced; the wheels did not change direction as the creatures went. 18 Their rims were high and awesome, and all four rims were full of eyes all around.

There is also the issue of presence (communion) and grace (a kind of hosting by an angelic being).

The reason I mention this is that in mysticism there is the idea that there are experiences in which the mind, or normal mental processing involved in the experience, is superseded by the body, or something approximating the soul. Indeed there are whole areas of practice seeking to do this.

Another example is the lyre bird in Australia, which mimics sounds so perfectly, it’s like hearing the original sound played back on a tape recorder. There must be something superseeding mental activity involved.

For Heidegger the ontological is something like a condition of possibility, but it is not transcendental in Kant’s sense. Think of it as a stance or perspective, the Being of a being in terms of its way of being, not what a being ‘is’ but how it is. These stances do not precede the existence of the world, they are what it means to exist. To exist is to open up a stance. — Joshs

Is it like a Derain painting, which exists as shapes and colours, and where the form of the shapes and colours allows the possibility of content within these shapes and colours.

However, the form of shapes and colours cannot be said to precede the content of shapes and colours, as the form is what it means for there to be a content.

The form of shapes and colours is the ontological condition of possibility for an epistemology of content of shapes and colours. Yet, at the same time, the form of shapes and colours don't precede the existence of the content expressed by shapes and colours, the form is what it means for the content to exist.

Maybe not a perfect analogy, but it introduces the relationship between form and content.

Yep, that sounds about right.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality. — RussellA

Your "own reality" is not reality itself, but your idea of it. Human perception is limited: the eye does not see bacteria, the skin feels the wind, but does not determine its exact speed or temperature. We invent tools to expand the boundaries of the senses - and ontology and epistemology are such a tool (in the broad sense).

If we consider an object only as a fixed "snapshot", we narrow the possibilities of cognition. According to the main idea of my work, language itself - through grammatical structure and, in particular, the copula - inclines us to such fixation. From this follows a logical proposal: to think of an object not as a completed entity, but as a process. This changes the very framework of research and the way we interact with reality.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology. — RussellA

What is primary depends on where you look from

It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality — RussellA

It is logically (rationally) that we can admit that what we know is incomplete, because we cannot know everything (due to limitations). This is how science often works: something is first presented theoretically, and then confirmed experimentally.

If I see the colour red, is it possible for me to directly see the cause of my seeing the colour red.

If I don't know something, is it possible for me to decide to search for it.

If there is another reality outside my own reality, can I ever discover it.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

What is the sound of one hand clapping?

to think of an object not as a completed entity, but as a process.

I agree, the way I see it is like we are fellow travellers, continually on a journey. What we see are things in motion. If the motion were to stop, there would be nothing there. The things are in the motion itself.

We are in vehicles travelling at speed, if you stare at the railings going past, you see a standing wave, a strobe effect, as though the railings are standing still alongside you.

Yes, I agree. In fact, RussellA, just now pushed me to another thought.
Let's say we have confirmed: The world is not static and does not consist of substance. It is dynamic and eventful. Then, the question arises, how to know it? Let's take phenomenology, returning to the things themselves as they are given. The method is good, but it essentially records the world in new frames.. Phenomenology allows us to clear our judgments from previous experience. Cleared. And again took a picture.

It turned out very interesting. The world is not a picture, ok. But how then to know it? What do you think about this?

It is dynamic and eventful. — Astorre

which is Whitehead's process and reality, right?

Incidentally I might mention that 'substance' in philosophy is more properly 'substantia', 'the bearer of predicates', than 'substance' 'a material with uniform properties'. The philosophical term 'substance' is actually a different word than the everyday English word 'substance'. Of course this is common knowledge to students of philosophy but it doesn't hurt to repeat it from time to time.

seeing as aspect" is inherent in perception. …The duck-rabbit can be seen in two ways. But there is a third way, which is neutral between those intepretations and allows us to say that those two interpretations are interpretations of the same picture. I mean the description of the picture as a collection of marks on paper. — Ludwig V

I’m suggesting that to perceive something (about something) is (the same as) to become aware of an aspect of it, regard it as something, as evidenced by the fact that when we say we perceive something, we are pointing out an aspect of a thing. This would mean there is no need for something called “perception” that happens (like vision does), of which seeing aspects is “inherent”.

I’m not sure we would say that seeing the picture as marks on a page is an aspect of it (as it is so generally an aspect of any drawing), or maybe it is, as is our becoming aware of the truth of it, the trick of it, both together as you say. Also, I would think that sometimes a rose is just a rose. In other words, I’m not sure seeing a chair, even recognizing or identifying a chair, would count as perceiving an aspect of it; as if each time we regard it as a chair. I’m not sure whether @Astorre’s pointing out that some countries recognition of a thing’s “presence” is just as mundane as this, but, in contrast to equating a thing with something specific (with “is”), the difference in perspective at least points out that there is at times the occurrence of something surprising us (perhaps our letting a thing surprise us).

Incidentally I might mention that 'substance' in philosophy is more properly 'substantia', 'the bearer of predicates', than 'substance' 'a material with uniform properties'. The philosophical term 'substance' is actually a different word than the English 'substance'. Of course this is common knowledge to students of philosophy but it doesn't hurt to repeat it from time to time. — Wayfarer

I speak English at the level of: gossiping with a neighbor. Reading a tabloid newspaper or traveling is enough. When I write here, I first write in my native language, then I have to translate it with a translator, and then proofread it in English and check what I wrote with a reverse translation. Thus, I cannot take into account the subtleties between substances. In my native language, there is no such difference in spelling, since the word substance is most likely originally understood in Russian in a philosophical sense. In everyday life, we use the word "veshchestvo". But, thanks for the clarification

The Latin 'substantia' was used as the translation for the Greek 'ouisia'. But 'ouisia' is a form of the Greek verb 'to be', which has very different implications than what 'substance' conveys. See this heading. It is directly connected to the OP in my opinion.

Your "own reality" is not reality itself, but your idea of it...We invent tools to expand the boundaries of the senses — Astorre

No one can ever know if one's own reality is or is not reality itself.

Mary, in the knowledge argument, lives in her black and white world.

At each moment in time, Mary only knows what she knows. She doesn't know what she doesn't know, and what she knows makes up her reality.

Mary reads a book by Abai Qunanbaiuly, and in learning new things, her reality changes.

The book is a tool that Mary has used to expand the boundary of her senses.

Mary knows that her reality has changed since reading the book, and can reason that in the future she may know things that she doesn't know today.

Mary knows that in the future she will know new things, even though she doesn't know what these new things will be.

In such a way Kant knows that there are things-in-themselves, even if he doesn't know what they are.

Mary can reason that her reality will change, and can ask herself "is there a reality itself of which my reality is just a part?"

This question is unanswerable, as Mary can only know the reality she exists in at each moment in time. She can never know what she doesn't know.

In such a way is Heidegger's Dasein

Mary can never know if there is a "reality itself" of which her reality is just a part, because she can never know what is outside her own reality.

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part.

It follows that it is not even possible to say that "your own reality is not reality itself", because this is something one can never know.

↪Astorre The Latin 'substantia' was used as the translation for the Greek 'ouisia'. But 'ouisia' is a form of the Greek verb 'to be', which has very different implications than what 'substance' conveys. See this heading. It is directly connected to the OP in my opinion. — Wayfarer

Thank you, this is a great starting point for additions to the work.I dug up some stuff here, I'll share it later

Mary knows that in the future she will know new things, even though she doesn't know what these new things will be. — RussellA

Mary doesn't know that her reality has changed. After reading the book, she may learn that there may be another reality, different from her own reality. Or she may not learn, if she is convinced of her ideas and does not allow others (and perhaps she will start praying to her black-and-white deity)

But Mary may also like Abay, who claimed that the world may be colorful, but we, black-and-white inhabitants, all see it in black and white. How can Mary imagine this if her life is black and white? Perhaps she will start asking Abay questions on a black-and-white forum, demanding that Abay explain how she can understand colors with the help of her black-and-white thinking.

And so she tries to knock out of Abay how to do this, but Abay cannot recommend anything to her (since he himself understands that there is no methodology that allows this to be done), saying that she confuses Understanding with Essence.

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part. — RussellA

This is the common point where solipsism, radical skepticism and phenomenalism, and in a milder form, Kantianism, meet. The difference between them is whether they believe that external reality does not exist at all, or merely admit that we cannot know whether it exists.

Baudrillard added to this the idea of a world of "hyperreality" in which simulacra (copies of non-existent originals) replace reality.

. According to the main idea of my work, language itself - through grammatical structure and, in particular, the copula - inclines us to such fixation. — Astorre

Is any kind of fixity possible in language?

Consider "the apple is on the table". It is true that there is fixity here. We are explicitly told that the apple is on the table, and the copula "is" has fixed the apple on to the table.

However, "apple" and "table" as parts of language are concepts, and concepts are far from fixed. For example, your concept of "table" is presumably different to my concept of "table", and my concept of "table" changes daily as I learn new things.

Proof that the concept "table" is not fixed is the impossibility of describing "table" in words. Any description would be either incomplete or inaccurate.

Yes, the copula "is" has fixed the apple on the table, but as nether the concept "apple" nor "table" are fixed, the copula "is" is not capable of fixing anything.

Let's take phenomenology, returning to the things themselves as they are given. The method is good, but it essentially records the world in new frames.. Phenomenology allows us to clear our judgments from previous experience. Cleared. And again took a picture. — Astorre

In phenomenology as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty conceived it, the ‘things themselves’ which are given to consciousness are not ‘recordings’ of real objects. They are not ‘pictures of the world’ but descriptions of constituting acts of intentionality. What a thing is in itself is the way it is constructed via mental processes which are directly in touch with the world.

Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances—as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking. But is it not a piece of foolishness to suppose that world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make my formulation more precise. In my Ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my “representation of the world, ” my “picture of the world, ” whereas outside of me, naturally enough, there is the world itself. But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed within what is for me real or possible?” (Husserl, Phenomenology and Anthropology

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part.

It is not as clear cut as that. Some people know a little more than that and can infer a little more again, some can intuit this. Also some can seek guidance, some can develop wisdom, some can learn to interpret ancient teachings and mythologies and gain insight. Others will be taught.