Philosophim does not believe there is a Hard Problem.
— I like sushi

Incorrect. We cannot know what its like to have the subjective experience of another individual, and while this is the case, the hard problem will be unsolvable. — Philosophim

But what is the Hard Problem?

Don't be like Wayfarer who acts childish when he realizes he's beat. — Philosophim

:rofl: You don't understand the criticism that are made of your posts, and then think that your not understanding them is a counter-argument. You don't understand what it is you don't understand even if it's explained to you, as a number of other people have said to you in this thread. That's why I gave up trying. Nothing to do with being 'beat'.

We should be aware that there are many who won't recognize the 'hard problem of consciousness' or who will say it's a pseudo-problem or philosophical sophistry with no real meaning. I'm not one of them.

The 'hard problem of consciousness' is connected to the blind spot of science. This is the failure to acknowledge the primacy of subjective experience—the fact that all observation and knowledge occur from a conscious point of view, which science treats as external or irrelevant, despite the obvious fact that science is conducted by subjects. This tendency grew out of the fact that early modern science divided the world up into primary attributes (measurable in mathematical terms) and secondary attributes (taste, color, smell etc), and also into mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa.)

I've also noticed a pattern - that when I bring this topic up, especially in relation to panpsychism, you will not respond to those posts, even if they're addressed to you. I think this is because you don't understand the point, but I suspect it is also because you don't want to know. Perhaps you can help me out here.

acknowledge the primacy of subjective experience — Wayfarer

I acknowledge that I can only see what I can experience. This is not interesting though.

This is not interesting though. — Apustimelogist

Have you encountered phenomenology as a field of study?

Sure, but do I have to be a mentalist to be a phenomenologist?

This is the crux of the so-called "hard problem": how consciousness could possibly emerge from wholly non-conscious components. But note the implicit assumption — that a configuration of matter and forces gives rise to inner experience. What if this assumption is itself misguided? — Wayfarer

It certainty is.

In other words, instead of questioning the conceptual framework that makes consciousness seem alien to materialism, Strawson redefines matter to include it — which looks suspiciously like moving the goalposts. That's the sleight-of-hand that panpychism tries to get away with. — Wayfarer

Another way of looking at it is that I don't think we have any justification for saying reality contains only the things we have discovered, or can discovered, with our senses and the devices we've built. Consciousness is proof of this, and there's no reason to rule out a building block, as it were, for the consciousness we're familiar with. Everything else we're familiar with is built up from some kind of building block, after all.

Hence the various contortions in contemporary philosophy of mind — from eliminativism and behaviourism to panpsychism — all share a desire to naturalise consciousness, but without challenging the presuppositions of naturalism itself. — Wayfarer

How can it be that thinking consciousness is a fundamental property of reality is not challenging the presuppositions of naturalism?

rather than grafting mental properties onto matter
...........

Consciousness isn’t simply another puzzle to be inserted into a pre-existing picture of the world
...........

not of matter with consciousness as a puzzling add-on — Wayfarer

I don't see it as "grafted", "inserted", or "added on", any more than properties like mass or electric charge are. Everything is just a part of what is. As such, consciousness is not "puzzling." The problem is that we are so used to thinking of things in only one way that it's difficult to consider there might be other ways.

But what is the Hard Problem? — Patterner

From all the debates over it, apparently understanding it! I jest. The 'Easy problem" could more easily be called "The objective problem" of consciousness. How do we objectively show how consciousness works? We can solve that. We do this because we observe objective behavior along with brain states. Someone can imbibe alcohol, and we can see how this affects the brain and correlates to their behavior.

The "Hard problem" is "The subjective problem" of consciousness. I can give a person alcohol, I can observe their brain and behavior, but I can't observe their internal state of experience. I can hear from them, "I feel buzzed." But I can't objectively identify what the experience of being 'buzzed' is like. Without an objective ability to measure or understand another person's subjective experience, we're a bit stuck in figuring out how the objective states of the brain create a subjective experience.

The hard problem is often a go to for people who desire that there exists some type of mental or soul-like substance. The thinking goes, "Because we can't record it like other physical measurements, it must be something special." And indeed, I do think consciousness is special. I think some people get a little too into their imagination however, and want it to be something different so badly that they ignore the evidence that its probably not. To be clear, this is not necessarily for religious reasons. Much like people want to believe the pyramids were built by aliens, there is a fascination and draw for some people to find wonder or something exciting in exploring the unknown. I don't think this is wrong, a healthy imagination if necessary for progress and to ensure we're not stuck on the wrong path. Its only wrong if we insist it must be true simply because we want it to be.

I don't see it as "grafted", "inserted", or "added on", any more than properties like mass or electric charge are. Everything is just a part of what is. As such, consciousness is not "puzzling." — Patterner

I think exactly like you on this. The puzzle is figuring out how it works. The 'objective problem' is potentially solvable. We should be able to continue to map deeper and deeper into the brain and figure out how it works over time and careful study. The "subjective problem' is potentially not solvable. Currently the only way to seemingly solve the problem is to 'be' the actual subjective experience. As that's impossible, we're going to have to get more creative and likely find a way to translate subjective experience into some other language, likely based on brain state.

Our objective knowledge of the brain has made leaps and strides, but there's still a massive amount to learn. It may be that we do eventually learn that certain patterns of brain waves or neuronal shifting consistently result in a person's subjective outcome. It might simply be isolated to that person, and we might have to 'calibrate' the outcome to each individual brain. So the subjective problem might not be objectively solved for everyone, but we might be able to have an objective solution for each individual brain.

How can it be that thinking consciousness is a fundamental property of reality is not challenging the presuppositions of naturalism? — Patterner

We have to use words very carefully here. What panpsychism says is that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. Matter can be studied objectively, via physics and chemistry. But the nature of reality is a different question and a much broader question. The scientific analysis of what can be known objectively doesn't consider many elements that science itself relies on - the reality of natural laws, the reality of numbers and abstract objects, the reality of the wave-function. All of these are philosophical questions rather than scientific, hence also a challenge the pose for naturalism insofar as naturalism is confined to what can be know objectively.

I don't see it (consciousness) as "grafted", "inserted", or "added on", any more than properties like mass or electric charge are. — Patterner

That's what panpsychism does, though. Mass, charge and other physical properties are observable and measurable, whereas the idea that matter possesses properties of consciousness is purely conjectural. Again, it is an attempt to rescue the credibility of materialism by saying it must be a property in all matter - instead of questioning materialism itself. That is explicitly what Galen Strawson says about it, mine is not a straw man argument.

The problem is that we are so used to thinking of things in only one way that it's difficult to consider there might be other ways. — Patterner

Careful with this 'we'. I've looked at philosophy of mind from many perspectives. The 'one way' that you have in mind, is still very much influenced by early modern science, the division between mind and matter, subject and object. There are many ways to tackle the hard problem other than panpsychism. Chalmers says in various places that a kind of naturalistic dualism is required, that has to acknowledge the fundamental differentness of mind and consciousness while still keeping within the general bounds of naturalism (although I confess I haven't read much about his proposal there.)

Notes on David Chalmer's 'Naturalistic Dualism'

At its core, naturalistic dualism says:

There are two kinds of fundamental facts in the world:

• Physical facts (e.g. brain states, neurons firing)
• Phenomenal facts (e.g. the what it’s like of seeing red)

And crucially:

Phenomenal facts are not reducible to physical facts.

But phenomenal facts are part of the natural world, so they should be studied by science—just not physical science as currently understood. (This part sounds a lot like phenomenology!)

Hence, it's dualism, because it posits two fundamental kinds of properties or facts, but it's also naturalistic, because it's not invoking supernatural entities or a mind outside of nature.

(However, much rests on what 'outside of' means here.)

What does that make me? — Philosophim

In regrads to the problem at hand you are expressing an idea contingent to physicalism. That is a VERY broad category though.

Regarding this particular problem I would place myself on the side of physicalism as things stand regarding scientific evidence. The thing is this is a Philosophy forum and while it is certainly worth pushing that those partaking in discussions on Philosophy of Mind -- beyond a mere navel gazing -- have a pretty expansive understanding of the cognitive neurosciences. That said, the reverse is also true. One can have a pretty decent grasp of the neuroscientific evidence and yet be completely oblivious to what the Philosophical side of this is trying to tackle.

This problem is probably most pertinent in regards to questions of consciousness as it is here where the neuroscientific experimentation can provide evidence for differing approaches, but this is not by a long shot anywhere near a logical proof.

A good number of scientists and philopshers alike point out that they are doing one or the other and that it is a category to combine the two. Physical Evidence is not an Abstract Proof and an Abstract Proof is not Physical Evidence. When it comes to questions involving consicousness it is pretty easy to confuse one for the other.

Here is a basic rundown of how things work in terms of the terminology involved >

If an argument denies substance dualism this does not necessarily mean it adheres to physicalism. It does necessitate some form on Monism for the position though!

Physical Monism may be what you are getting at, but this is generally regarded as a kind of Physicalism.

Panpsychism? I do not think you have expressed this at all as far as I can see.

Eliminativism? As you strongly deny what you are expressing is physicalism we have to rule this out. This basically describes Mental Terms as misleading (I am sympathetic towards this approach despite its faults).

Neural Monism is a kind of physicalism too, so we have to rule this out.

Non-Reductive Physicalism would mean you have to face the Supervenience Problem.

Epiphenomenalism would be another option possibly? You in for that?

From all you have said a kind of Reductive Physicalism or some kind of Eliminativism are what you have expressed. This is simply a fact. The issue is you seem to have expressed quite ardently that your approach is not physicalist yet both of the above approaches ARE physicalist and you have said you dislike the reductive approach.

I have no problem with someone holding to contradictory positions regarding more complex problems like this, because the reason it is so difficult is because we are met with contradictions as we follow through on the logical reasoning. I am labelling the general schemata of the ideas being expressed.

Being able to label certain positions and highlight where you do and do not agree with them helps people navigate the discussion and argumentation involved. My exploration was an attempt to focus on the Causal nature of Substance Dualism (which we cannot say much about if anything!?) but which could help to further distinguish faults aroudn the Supervenience issue or Property Dualism.

I can only assume you do not really know the appropriate terminology and therefore this entire miscommunication is due to you not knowing the Philosophical terms being used (not uncommon here, and I have been more than guilty of this myself over the years).

Property Dualism in a nutshell? It does get confusing when people use differing terms to describe the same idea.

Another example would be physicalism and materialism. People tend to use this as synonyms while others do not. What is important is to clarify your position and use of terminology.

The thing is this is a Philosophy forum and while it is certainly worth pushing that those partaking in discussions on Philosophy of Mind -- beyond a mere navel gazing -- have a pretty expansive understanding of the cognitive neurosciences. That said, the reverse is also true. One can have a pretty decent grasp of the neuroscientific evidence and yet be completely oblivious to what the Philosophical side of this is trying to tackle. — I like sushi

Very true.

A good number of scientists and philopshers alike point out that they are doing one or the other and that it is a category to combine the two. Physical Evidence is not an Abstract Proof and an Abstract Proof is not Physical Evidence. — I like sushi

Agreed.

The issue is you seem to have expressed quite ardently that your approach is not physicalist yet both of the above approaches ARE physicalist and you have said you dislike the reductive approach. — I like sushi

And this is often a problem I have with broad generalized terms. The general definition of a physicalist is "One who thinks everything is physical." But I don't. I simply note that the consciousness is physical because that's where the science is leading us. But its not a broad claim that 'Everything is physical and will be physical." So defacto I'm not a physicalist.

So we have to invent a new term. None of the terms really fit my conclusion, because terms rarely ever do. What I've learned in my time in philosophy is that 'ideologies' can be useful as general starting points for a discussion to get people in the ballpark. What I've found in practice is the ideologies and terminology get upheld more than the logic being discussed. Its the wrong emphasis. Every single ideology and terminology came to being due to someone's reasoning and logic. The reasoning and logic are what are important, not using the terms themselves.

This being understood, we must be very careful that we don't take ideologies and special terms as holding some special power. They do not. Their stringent and rigid adherence is only appreciated by an academic and rarely useful to creating new philosophy. My point was, "It doesn't matter what I am. It matters if what I think is the most rational approach." A 'label' is not the goal of a good philosophical discussion, only the reasoning of the discussion.

Being able to label certain positions and highlight where you do and do not agree with them helps people navigate the discussion and argumentation involved. — I like sushi

Also agreed. But they should be an assistance to understanding the argument being made, not something we try to fit the argument into. Its why when asked if I was a physicalist, I'm not. Hopefully that lets a person realize, "Oh, this person believes non-physical things are possible. Let me explore that." Instead, and I'm not saying you do this, it can become a game of, "Oh, but you said that the mind was physical, therefore you have to be a physicalist!" One is an attempt to clarify one's position and spark curiosity and understanding while the other is an attempt at closed minded idealism and used to shut down further exploration and curiosity. In most of my encounters over the years on the general forums, its the latter use that happens. Its because more people are interested in securing the 'rightness' of their position than genuinely exploring others ideas.

My exploration was an attempt to focus on the Causal nature of Substance Dualism (which we cannot say much about if anything!?) but which could help to further distinguish faults aroudn the Supervenience issue or Property Dualism. — I like sushi

Yes, and I do apologize earlier for losing track of that. That is definitely my fault. It may have been a little rough pivoting back to that, and that's where we both might have misunderstood each other. I do agree that we probably can't come up with any idea of causality with substance dualism, as the secondary substance could do anything. While the possibility is interesting, practically its a dead end for further exploration beyond its plausibility.

I can only assume you do not really know the appropriate terminology and therefore this entire miscommunication is due to you not knowing the Philosophical terms being used (not uncommon here, and I have been more than guilty of this myself over the years). — I like sushi

Yes, but not in the way you think. Often times I am aware of the terminology in a formal sense. Sometimes I am not of course, and I'll try to adapt and learn where I can. But what I am almost never aware of in a conversation is how other people define the terminology. I have learned that many people rarely use the formal definition of complex philosophical ideologies or terms. Its often subjectively bent through their own lens, and I am just as guilty of this. Its why I continually asked, "What do you define 'non-physical' as." Because there's a formal definition for non-physical, but that doesn't mean everyone views it in that formal way.

Anyway, thank you I am Sushi. I really did enjoy our discussion and can see you are a thoughtful person. A good thread. I can only hope I added to it and did not detract from your overall goal. See you in another discussion.

Physical Monism may be what you are getting at, but this is generally regarded as a kind of Physicalism.

>Generally described under the title 'physicalism'. In slogan form 'mind is what brain does'.

Panpsychism?

>Matter has some latent consciousness, Patterner is an advocate.

Eliminativism? As you strongly deny what you are expressing is physicalism we have to rule this out. This basically describes Mental Terms as misleading (I am sympathetic towards this approach despite its faults).


Neural Monism is a kind of physicalism too, so we have to rule this out.

>Neutral monism is not usually desribed as physicalism - it is the idea that at bottom, being or reality is neither mental nor physical but can appear as either.

Non-Reductive Physicalism would mean you have to face the Supervenience Problem.

>Correct. It's probably the majority view.

Epiphenomenalism would be another option possibly?

Usually associated with physicalism> mind is an epiphenonenon that appears in sophisticated beings.

Your list doesn't mention idealism. Bernardo Kastrup is an advocate.

David Chalmer's paper Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness was one of the origins of 'consciousness studies'. — I like sushi

And this is often a problem I have with broad generalized terms. The general definition of a physicalist is "One who thinks everything is physical." But I don't. — Philosophim

Misrepresetnation of what is being said.

Also agreed. But they should be an assistance to understanding the argument being made, not something we try to fit the argument into. Its why when asked if I was a physicalist, I'm not. — Philosophim

and again.

Sometimes I am not of course, and I'll try to adapt and learn where I can. But what I am almost never aware of in a conversation is how other people define the terminology. I have learned that many people rarely use the formal definition of complex philosophical ideologies or terms. — Philosophim

They are not 'ideologies'. Such is to adhere to a form of Idealism.

People on philosophy forums do occasionally actually use philosophical terminology. You can say until you are blue in the face that what you are expressing is not a type of Physicalism, but it is. Just like someone going around killing random people can claim they are not a murderer, it does not stop everyone else from blatantly disagreeing. The murderer could argue that "being a murderer is not eveyrthing I am!" but they cannot rationally argue that they are not guilty of murdering people.

I hold to physicalism in some situation and not others. I can be liberal about one political problem and conservative about another. Neither rigidly defines me as either.

Because you are unwilling to accept that what you are saying adheres to some sort of argumentation from some form of physicalism, and instead repeatedly revert to 'I am not a physicalist!' like it is some harsh insult, you completely miss everything.

Maybe chat GPT can do a better job? Here is its take on your reply:

"Certainly. Here's a clear explanation you can give to this person regarding the philosophical problem they seem to be having—namely, the confusion caused by adopting a position that seems to commit to physicalism while denying that label, and the consequences this has for coherence in the philosophy of mind debate:

Hi [name],

Thanks again for the discussion. It seems to me that the issue you're running into is a classic one in philosophy of mind, especially when navigating between physicalist and non-physicalist frameworks. Here's the core problem, as I see it, and I hope this helps clarify some of the points raised earlier.

The Philosophical Tension:
You've said you're not a physicalist, because you don't think "everything is physical" in the broad, metaphysical sense. However, you also say that consciousness is physical, because that's where the science is pointing. That sounds like you're committed to at least token physicalism about consciousness (i.e., each instance of a mental event is identical to some physical event in the brain).

But if that's your view, then you're not rejecting physicalism — you're accepting a form of it, even if you're uncomfortable with the term.

So the tension is this:

You're trying to occupy a non-physicalist position while affirming physicalist conclusions about the mind.

That does raise confusion because labels in philosophy matter, not to stifle thinking, but to track arguments, commitments, and counterarguments. Without clear reference points (like physicalism, property dualism, emergentism, etc.), discussions risk talking past one another, as seems to have happened here.

The Supervenience Problem:
Now, if you're affirming that consciousness is physical — but still not reducible to physical states — that’s non-reductive physicalism, which relies on supervenience (i.e., mental states depend on physical states such that no change in the mental without change in the physical is possible).

But if you reject supervenience (or leave it vague), you fall into interactionist dualism, and then you're stuck with:

The causal closure problem: How does a non-physical substance cause anything in a physical system?

The pairing problem: Why does a particular non-physical mind interact with this brain?

And yes, the supervenience problem again: If mental states don't supervene on physical ones, then how do we explain regular, lawlike mind-brain correlations?

So even if you don’t want to use the term “physicalist,” your statements imply physicalist commitments. And that matters because the moment you say “consciousness is physical,” you enter territory with well-mapped problems, arguments, and consequences.

Let me know if you'd like this reworded more diplomatically or conversationally — but the goal here is to help your interlocutor see that clarifying terms isn't a pedantic game, it's part of responsibly navigating conceptual terrain."

For those actually interested the Causal issue here is a snippet from Davidson expressing something akin to what I am getting at:

The first principle asserts that at least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (We could call this the Principle of Causal Interaction.) Thus for example if someone sank the Bismarck, then various mental events such as perceivings, notings, calculations, judgements, decisions, intentional actions, and changes of belief played a causal role in the sinking of the Bismarck. In particular, I would urge that the fact that someone sank the Bismarck entails that he moved his body in a way that was caused by mental events of certain sorts, and that this bodily movement in turn caused the Bismarck to sink. Perception illustrates how causality may run from the physical to the mental: if a man perceives that a ship is approaching, then a ship approaching must have caused him to come to believe that a ship is approaching. (Nothing depends on accepting these as examples of causal interaction.)

Though perception and action provide the most obvious cases where mental and physical events interact causally, I think reasons could be given for the view that all mental events ultimately, perhaps through causal relations with other mental events, have causal intercourse with physical events. But if there are mental events that have no physical events as causes or e ects, the argument will not touch them.

The second principle is that where there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. (We may term this the Principle of the Nomological Character of
Causality.) This principle, like the first, will be treated here as an assumption, though I shall say something by way of interpretation.

The third principle is that there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained (the Anomalism of the Mental).

From Mental Events by Donald Davidson

Apologies for jinky copy and paste (Might be a word or two missing cut so let me know where and I will Edit as needed).

As I mentioned way, way back I was trying to look at the disparity between nomological and metaphysical positions.

And this is often a problem I have with broad generalized terms. The general definition of a physicalist is "One who thinks everything is physical." But I don't.
— Philosophim

Misrepresetnation of what is being said. — I like sushi

How so?

"Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#ReduNonReduPhys
-Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I clearly pointed to you that I do not believe all of existence is physical. If you read my paper on the Logic of Universal Origin and Meaning, you'll clearly see its a non-physicalist explanation for the universe. Further, if right, proves the very real possibility of non-physical things that could form in the universe that we are not aware of.

If I look at a block of wood and say, "That's physical." am I a physicalist? No. If I look at a brain and consciousness and say, "Consciousness seems to exhibit the signs of being physical, therefore its likely physical," am I a physicalist? No. You're making a mistake of taking my conclusion in one area and broadly attributing the moniker of physicalist to me from that alone.

So unless you are using the term physicalism in a way that is not formal, I am simply not a physicalist.

You're trying to occupy a non-physicalist position while affirming physicalist conclusions about the mind. — I like sushi

No. I'm not a physicalist, as they believe everything is physical. I simply conclude that the brain and consciousness is physical due to years of scientific results that indicate consciousness seems to be physical, while little to no evidence of it being non-physical. Concluding that consciousness is physical does not make you a physicalist. Believing that all of reality is physical and that there can be nothing non-physical does.

That does raise confusion because labels in philosophy matter, not to stifle thinking, but to track arguments, commitments, and counterarguments. — I like sushi

Yes. And you can clearly see from the above that my assertions that I am not a physicalist are true.

I've already said my piece in previous discussions, if there is something unclear or you disagree with specifically, feel free to reference it again.

How so? — Philosophim

Because you are obsessed with not being labelled a Physicalist when I am not labeling you as a physicalist. Every post you seem to do this.

I am labelling the arguments put forward in this particular area of philosophy of mind as physicalist because they are.

You're trying to occupy a non-physicalist position while affirming physicalist conclusions about the mind.
— I like sushi (chat gpt)

No. I'm not a physicalist, as they believe everything is physical. I simply conclude that the brain and consciousness is physical due to years of scientific results that indicate consciousness seems to be physical, while little to no evidence of it being non-physical. Concluding that consciousness is physical does not make you a physicalist. Believing that all of reality is physical and that there can be nothing non-physical does. — Philosophim

Take it up with Chat gpt. Not my words.

All I can suggest is exploring this site further Stanford and beyond the opening paragraph.

Here is something else: Property Dualism

Property Dualism in a nutshell? It does get confusing when people use differing terms to describe the same idea.

Another example would be physicalism and materialism. People tend to use this as synonyms while others do not. What is important is to clarify your position and use of terminology. — I like sushi

Ain't it the truth. Materialism. Physicalism. Naturalism. Nagel even says 'I will use the terms “materialism” or “materialist naturalism” to refer to one side of this conflict...' I can't imagine there will ever be a consensus on the exact meaning of these words, and anything less than exact can only lead to discussions of definitions. Which takes away from the more important discussion. I think the best solution is probably to not use any of them, and just spell out what you mean every time.

Because you are obsessed with not being labelled a Physicalist when I am not labeling you as a physicalist. Every post you seem to do this. — I like sushi

Just ensuring the accuracy of terms as you mentioned.

I am labelling the arguments put forward in this particular area of philosophy of mind as physicalist because they are. — I like sushi

Just because a physicalist can hold these arguments, this doesn't make someone who holds an argument that consciousness is physical as physicalist.

I can't imagine there will ever be a consensus on the exact meaning of these words, and anything less than exact can only lead to discussions of definitions. Which takes away from the more important discussion. I think the best solution is probably to not use any of them, and just spell out what you mean every time. — Patterner

Agreed. Patterner. At least for me I feel I've reached the end of any important discussion points. You all have a nice day.

For those actually interested the Causal issue here is a snippet from Davidson expressing something akin to what I am getting at: — I like sushi

I like the snippet. Wish his books didn't cost so much.

Careful with this 'we'. I've looked at philosophy of mind from many perspectives. — Wayfarer

Sorry. I didn't mean you. I meant people in general, as a result of "Galileo's Error".

Coming back to this but trying to shorten the length a bit...

In general I see no reason to claim that causality is physical. — Leontiskos

I can't see that it could obtain if not. This is a really weird statement, for me. It's almost like saying "I can't see a reason, in general, to assume that heat causes hotness". I mean, causation happens in the physical world. We don't have other examples (ignoring some "hard problem" considerations that would beg the question on either side). — AmadeusD

I think this is the central point. If there are no good arguments that causality is physical, then we have no reason to claim that causality is physical. Of course if we ignore the ubiquitous phenomenon of mental causation, then we are closer to a physicalism that would favor physical causality. But at the moment I think we're asking whether causality that does not involve mentality is physical.

The way that causality abstracts from objects—physical or otherwise—and is situated in between objects (in their relationality) is another example of the way that two differentiated genera provide us with the power to reason. — Leontiskos

It doesn't obtain "between" the objects, in physical space. It only obtains "between" the objects in thought (like the "relationship" between two corporate entities. In reality, it is the "relationship of them - how the two relate). — AmadeusD

Yes, but even then the relationship between two objects is something that is between the two objects. It is neither one object nor the other nor some third object. Thus to say that causality occurs between physical objects does not seem to prove that causality is physical, unless by "is physical" we only mean, "occurring between two physical objects."

There doesn't seem to be any reason whatsoever to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer yet. — AmadeusD

Well "basis" is a strange word here. If there is no reason to claim that causality is physical, and there is no reason to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer, then why not simply abstain from affirming either of those things?

In light of the above, i think I need an elucidation here. It seems this has been answered adequately above: Yes, they are one-and-the-same but in concert, not considered individually. The energy of one ball is part and parcel of itself, and not something "other". The same true for ball 2. They then interact, physically, and pass physical matter between themselves causing "work" to have obtained. — AmadeusD

Note though that if you think energy transfer is the transfer of physical matter, then it seems that you do think energy is a physical object, even though you said, "Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is." This is a large part of the difficulty. The concept of "capacity to do work" (energy) is not physical matter, and yet you think the transfer of energy is the transfer of physical matter.

and therefore a mathematical distance-measurement is not physical — Leontiskos

This is wrong as I see. The division is not physical. The division is artificial and, as you say, abstract. The measurement is entirely physical and rests on the actual physical limitations of point A in relation to point B and the physical space between them, along with our measurement methods which are also physical. — AmadeusD

I have a hard time with your claim that measurement is physical. I would say that a measurement of distance and the two endpoints belong to a different genus. The spatial orientation of a physical object, especially relative to something else, is not a property of itself. It is a Cambridge property. This is why points can be dimensionless even while line-lengths are not. In Euclidean geometry a line is always qualitative more than a set of points.

IN fairness, this was rough-and-ready and I'm technically misspeaking, even on my own understanding. Different forms of transfer require different descriptions, but something like this seems to work for your example. A version below:

"At the interface where the two objects meet, the faster-moving, higher-energy particles from the hot object collide with the slower-moving, lower-energy particles of the colder object."

At collision, "energy" which is read essentially as head or speed in this context, passes between the two objects, more-or-less replacing the hotter, faster particles in the moving object with colder, slower particles from the stationary object (again, not quite right - but the net effect is this).

An easier example is something like boiling (convection more broadly): less energetic particles are heated, move faster and spread about over a larger area, which causes them to move (as they cannot be as close to other particles when vibrating so fast, lest destruction occur) upwards and transfer that heat as essentially movement, to the more dense, less hot particles which they encounter. There's a purely physical explanation going on there.

Energy is just an assignment of value to the ability for a system to "do work" or affect other systems and objects. It's not claimed to be a "thing". Its a physical attribute, described very different across different media. — AmadeusD

I agree that the case of boiling water fits your account better than the case of collision. The difficulty here is that if you think every cause is physical, then you will need to defend not only the boiling of water, but also the collision of objects, gravity, etc.

it is hard to see how gravity is itself supposed to be physical. — Leontiskos

I don't find it hard. But then, I include certain assumptions about "fabric" being involved in space-time. That there is a finite set of work that can be done within the Universe leads me to understand that all bodies will be affected by all other bodies. This will represent itself in a ubiquitous force exerted by everything, on everything else. I'm unsure its reducible in any way from that. — AmadeusD

But I think "fabric" is another metaphor being reified. Does the physicist see the "spacetime fabric" as physical? In what sense is it said to be physical? We can surely stretch the word "physical" far beyond what we ever generally mean by it, but I am not much interested in that approach.

I'll go with your example though [but add premise 3]: — AmadeusD

1. Billiard ball1 causes billiard ball2 to move
2. Billiard ball1 and billiard ball2 are both physical
3. There is nothing else involved in the interaction
4. Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two billiard balls is itself physical — Leontiskos

I still don't see that (4) follows. There is no sufficient reason to believe that the (causal) interaction is itself physical.

Consider: <Muhammad Ali causes George Foreman to move; Muhammad Ali and George Foreman are both human; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two boxers is itself human>.

Or: <The cue-ball causes the the nine-ball to move; The cue-ball and the nine-ball are both phenolic resin; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two balls is itself phenolic resin>.

This form of reasoning does not seem to be valid. A kind of metabasis eis allo genos is occurring in the conclusion, where the predicate term is of an improper genus. Causation is not human, or phenolic resin, or physical, etc. We can say that what causes the nine-ball to move is the collision with a phenolic resin object, but words like "collision," "interaction," "relation," are also not amenable to the genera in question. Collisions are not phenolic resin, or phenolic resin objects. Collisions can occur between objects made of phenolic resin; or objects made of phenolic resin can collide, but it is still improper to say that the collision is itself phenolic resin.

I would say that the majority of talk about causation is in non-physicalist terms. — Leontiskos

I agree. I think most of it is doomed to be self-contradictory, empirically untenable or down-right ridiculous (God did it, for instance). — AmadeusD

That's not what I am saying. If two physicists are studying billiards and you ask them, "Are you assuming that the collision is itself phenolic resin?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Or, "Are you assuming that the collision is itself physical?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Physics by its very nature has always prescinded from the idea that collisions are themselves phenolic resin or that collisions are themselves physical. I gave the reason why earlier, "explanation and reasoning requires differentiated genera." If everything is reduced to the physical (or to any one homogenous thing), then explanation will be impossible, including causality-explanations.

But I think what you say is right when taken with respect to our cultural "religion" of materialism or physicalism. If we just assume that everything is physical, including causality, then we lead ourselves into absurdities. In this case it is the absurdity which makes interactions the same kind of thing as that which interacts. ("The Physical" is the new Ur-explanation)

Exactly: "that a car could make." It is potential. "Energy, in physics, the capacity for doing work" (Britannica). — Leontiskos

Physically deducible. — AmadeusD

"Physically deducible" is a strange and ambiguous phrase. Better to say, "deducible from physical interactions." And there simply is no valid deduction to the conclusion that the interaction is itself physical.

That's what panpsychism does, though. Mass, charge and other physical properties are observable and measurable, whereas the idea that matter possesses properties of consciousness is purely conjectural. Again, it is an attempt to rescue the credibility of materialism by saying it must be a property in all matter - instead of questioning materialism itself. That is explicitly what Galen Strawson says about it, mine is not a straw man argument. — Wayfarer

You interpret it that way. I interpret it that physical is not all there is to reality.

I understand the physical we experience every moment isn't exactly what it seems. However, whatever the explanation for what is not exactly physical seeming to be physical, it does seem to be physical. How many seeming forms could whatever is really there take? Why did it take this one? It seems bizarre to me that the nature of reality would assume a false nature that is so unlike its true nature that there's no way to detect that true nature within the system of the false nature, and it's impossible to prove that true nature's existence. I must consider that, somehow or other, the physical, imperfect though our understanding of it may be, is, in some sense, true.

But it's not all there is. It's not the full story.

You're looking at the question as if it is an objective matter - a question of 'what is really there'' and whether 'consciousness' is a constituent of the objective domain. But I'm saying that this is the wrong way to look at it. The only instance of consciousness we really know is our own. The mind appears as us, as Being, not to us, as object. This is of course why Descartes' cogito ergo sum remains true (although his model of separate mental and material substances is not.)

You're looking at the question as if it is an objective matter - a question of 'what is really there'' and whether 'consciousness' is a constituent of the objective domain. But I'm saying that this is the wrong way to look at it. — Wayfarer

And I disagree. I'm willing to believe we are all conscious. Just because I can't know your instance of consciousness doesn't mean I won't accept that you are conscious. I do. I can't prove that any consciousness other than my own exists, but I don't care about proof in this instance. If I didn't accept your consciousness as fact, I wouldn't be participating in the conversation. So my starting point is that subjective experience is an objective fact. And the explanation is (maybe) that consciousness is a fundamental part of reality.

I'm willing to believe we are all conscious. — Patterner

As am I! We can objectively verify if a subject is conscious (well, except in extermely rare cases such as 'locked-in syndrome') and we can tell when people and animals are conscious and when not.

So my starting point is that subjective experience is an objective fact. And the explanation is (maybe) that consciousness is a fundamental part of reality. — Patterner

This really gets to the nub of the problem. What I'm saying is that the knowledge we have of our own consciousness is of a different order to the knowledge we have that others are conscious. To be conscious is to know of our own existence, in a direct and unmediated way. I know that I am in a different way to the indirect and mediated knowledge I have of other minds.

Chalmers’ “what-it-is-like”-ness is precisely about this direct, first-person givenness. That element — the qualitative feeling of being — is not captured by any third-person account, no matter how detailed. This is where the irreducibly subjective aspect of consciousness shows itself.

This is why I think the panpsychist move is ultimately a misstep. By trying to objectify consciousness — to treat it as a measurable attribute of matter — it attempts to assimilate consciousness into the obective mode, from which it is essentially different. The first-person reality of consciousness doesn’t appear as an object in the world; it manifests as the point of view from which the world is experienced.

Panpsychism is also subject to the 'combination problem' - the question about how primitive, conscious units of matter are able to combine in such a way as to give rise to the unitary sense of self that characterises actual conscious experience. This is where phenomenology offers a different perspective to both panpsychism and philosophical dualism.

Phenomenology is not concerned by the ‘combination problem’ because it bases its enquiry on the present, global, embodied, human experience of the researcher, and not on any hypothetical "elementary form of consciousness". It bypasses the speculative move of attributing consciousness to microphysical entities by focusing instead on the lived, first-person givenness of the world. From this standpoint, consciousness is not a property in the world, but the condition for there being a world at all. — Michel Bitbol

Full paper here Beyond Panpsychis: the Radicality of Phenomenology

The first-person reality of consciousness doesn’t appear as an object in the world; it manifests as the point of view from which the world is experienced. — Wayfarer

This is precisely why I favour Husserl's approach to a science of consciousness. He was not at all concerned with the 'existence' of physical objects and bracketed out any difference between a unicorn and a horse. Both are 'objects' of consciousness.

His phenomenology -- whilst problematic -- does offer an interesting way of approaching the problem of articulating consciousness without direct concern with empirical objective measurements.

Thus to say that causality occurs between physical objects does not seem to prove that causality is physical, unless by "is physical" we only mean, "occurring between two physical objects." — Leontiskos

I think this is entirely wrong. We're looking at something observable, not abstract. We need to look at what actually happens in the world. Causation happens between physical objects, in a physical world with no evidence of any non-physical attribute involved. Philosophers don't seem to even think this is a coherent claim of a possible reality. I again want to bring in Jaegwon Kim and his pretty tireless arguments around trying to ascertain a non-physical mode of causation and landing on Supervenience of something undescribed as the only way out of hte physicalist corner. I tend to think no one has gotten further. I can't understand how you're getting yourself off hte ground, yet, though I find all of the discussions interesting. What we have to 'fall back on' as it were, is not something that points to causality being non-physical. And we don't seem to have much better than a fall-back. I do not know of any example of non-physical causation (mental causation is likely physical, reducible).

If there is no reason to claim that causality is physical, and there is no reason to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer, then why not simply abstain from affirming either of those things? — Leontiskos

I disagree with the former, so maybe we are on different pages here. I've not affirmed either, though. There is reason for the first claim, and no reason for the second, both of which support the first. That's as far as I'll go.

Note though that if you think energy transfer is the transfer of physical matter, then it seems that you do think energy is a physical object, even though you said, "Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is." This is a large part of the difficulty. — Leontiskos

Its not difficult. I had assumed this would be intuitive.
"energy" is a description of effects gained by the interactions of bits of matter. That "energy" is not an object, or a "thing" at all. But it obtains in the transfer described (i mean, it could be that "charge" is what transfers as, in that way, if its not the particles themselves, we may have more to discuss and might be hte page you're on).

The concept of "capacity to do work" (energy) is not physical matter, and yet you think the transfer of energy is the transfer of physical matter. — Leontiskos

The above should sort this out. The capacity to do work is exactly represented by hte physical attributes of the matter in question.

It is a Cambridge property. — Leontiskos

Very hard disagree, which should but paid to that part of the discussion. Something's position in space and time are properties of it. An apple has to be an apple at a certain time, in a certain place. It cannot simply be 'an apple'. That doesn't exist, anywhere. If you take away the spatio-temporal description of a physical object, you lose the ability to claim it as extant (on our current knowledge). This doesn't seem at all unusual or controversial to me.

Does the physicist see the "spacetime fabric" as physical? In what sense is it said to be physical? We can surely stretch the word "physical" far beyond what we ever generally mean by it, but I am not much interested in that approach. — Leontiskos

This is interesting. I think, yes, they do. I think intuitively, most would. I cannot understand the underlying strata of the universe not being physical. We are in a physical universe. If you're going to posit otherwise, You need to explain how to get from that, to this physical universe. No one can do that. So it doesn't make any sense to me to go down that route (at this time) despite it being interesting, to some degree or another. We don't live in a non-physical universe. Its actually hard to even point to a non-physical thing in it (Though, i understand a few good candidates about). I guess, on similar thinking to some of your replies, I'm not prepared to look at some physical force like gravity and entertain that it isn't physical, yet. We have zero avenue to explain try to explain that. The other option is weird and difficult, but i prefer that currently.

I still don't see that (4) follows. There is no sufficient reason to believe that the (causal) interaction is itself physical. — Leontiskos

There is no reason to think it isn't is my position(and good reason to think it is). It obtains within a physical system, between two physical objects in a physical event with no indication anything else is involved. When you adjust any physical parameter, the result differs.
At the very least, this should be accepted as the best explanation we have. Speculation abound, for sure. But there's nothing here that makes me think its even reasonable to start looking for an non-physical answer (except perhaps impatience, which isn't the worst reason, tbf).

This form of reasoning does not seem to be valid. — Leontiskos

Because it isn't. I didn't mention material. I mentioned mode. Theres a gulf between the two "reasonings" you've put up, which are non invalid, but essentially tautological (or self-evident in some other way). The reasoning I gave speaks about mode not content. If the lines in the previous paragraph I've written above about why we have no reason to think about non-physical causation occurring go through, then the content is irrelevant. Any event which can described on that term would adhere to that reasoning. I would want to say calling something "human" is hugely different to calling something "physical". Largely, because in your examples, everything reduces to the physical explanations underlying those words.

Causation is not ... physical — Leontiskos

But that begs the question. I can't quite wrangle something helpful out of this explicative section..

If we just assume that everything is physical, including causality, then we lead ourselves into absurdities. In this case it is the absurdity which makes interactions the same kind of thing as that which interacts. — Leontiskos

Evidenced by this (out of order, sorry) making no sense to me. We don't "assume". We investigate and find nothing but physical interaction surrounding all change we see in the physical world. We are given no material on which we can explore a non-physical basis (descriptively) of causation. We may not have good answers, but we certainly don't have any reason to move off the line currently. Again, it's interesting to entertain and may well at some stage become something we can adequately explore, but we have nothing on which we can do so currently but speculation.

but it is still improper to say that the collision is itself phenolic resin. — Leontiskos

I am unsure it is. But its not saying the same thing as calling hte collision physical. They are asking different things. The collision between two balls of phenolic resin is clearly phenolic resin (they are just in contact with each other - changing nothing about the material we're wanting to name). The mode is different, as I see it and requires a different answer.

I think its possible you are just flat-out wrong about what physicists would say about a collision. I also don't think that has much to do with our discussion. Whether a physicist says x y z doesn't quite change anything in the world. Unless you're a total Continental.

is a strange and ambiguous phrase. — Leontiskos

Not at all. You just picked up something wrong in it. It means to deducible entirely in physical terms, from physical activity, assessed in physical terms against other physical activity. If you want to say the deduction isn't physical (because mental) I put the conversation down, as that's a very different thing for another time imo. Fraught, and something I'm only really getting into currently (that is, why it seems mental causation is a misnomer.

This really gets to the nub of the problem. What I'm saying is that the knowledge we have of our own consciousness is of a different order to the knowledge we have that others are conscious. To be conscious is to know of our own existence, in a direct and unmediated way. I know that I am in a different way to the indirect and mediated knowledge I have of other minds.

Chalmers’ “what-it-is-like”-ness is precisely about this direct, first-person givenness. That element — the qualitative feeling of being — is not captured by any third-person account, no matter how detailed. This is where the irreducibly subjective aspect of consciousness shows itself. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

This is why I think the panpsychist move is ultimately a misstep. By trying to objectify consciousness — to treat it as a measurable attribute of matter — it attempts to assimilate consciousness into the obective mode, from which it is essentially different. The first-person reality of consciousness doesn’t appear as an object in the world; it manifests as the point of view from which the world is experienced. — Wayfarer

I do not think it is a misstep.

Is it or is it not an objective fact that we're all subjectively conscious? Just because neither of our first-person realities of consciousness appear as objects in the world doesn't mean they don't both come into being for the same objective reason/when the same objective conditions are present.

Two telescopes made on the same machinery, seconds apart, can never have the exact same view of anything at the same time, despite being made the same way, out of the same materials, and working the same way.

We are, obviously, far more complex than telescopes. Our brains and bodies follow the same general plan, but there are many differences between our brains. We also have different experiences, which means different memories, beginning before we're even born. So, while we might argue that we could arrange things such that it's possible for two telescopes to have the exact same view of something at different times, even that's not possible for different people. It's not even possible for one person to have the same experience more than once.

Panpsychism is also subject to the 'combination problem' - the question about how primitive, conscious units of matter are able to combine in such a way as to give rise to the unitary sense of self that characterises actual conscious experience. — Wayfarer

What guess about the nature of consciousness doesn't have to deal with the combination problem? Does it somehow make more sense that consciousness is nothing but the physical activity of the brain, and the activity of these neurons over here are all somehow combined into one subjective visual experience, the activity of those neurons over there all somehow combine into one subjective aural experience, and the activity of both groups of neurons, as well as that of still other groups of neurons, somehow combine into one subjective experience that is visual, aural, and whatever else?

I don't know anything about your idealism. How does that avoid the combination problem?

If my position is correct, then the combination problem is obviously not a problem. No matter what guess is actually the correct one, the combination problem clearly isn't a problem.