They are capable of intelligibly talking about experiences even though they don't even have the faculties for those experiences. An LLM has a faculty for talking, it doesn't have a faculty for seeing. The structure of language itself is sufficient for its intelligible use. — Apustimelogist

Yes. But there's a limitation. If language has its roots in, and acquires its meaning from, human practices and forn of life, LLM cannot use (or abuse) language in the many of the ways that we do.

Yes, sure. LLMs don't encounter information in the same way we do, they cannot choose how they encounter information in the way we do, they don't have aversion or reward afaik.

I wanted to stay near the heart of the matter, so had to be very selective, so it is not impossible that I failed to acknowledge what you actually said properly. — Ludwig V

You covered it pretty well. I just want to recap the central point. It was the belief that was coming into view in Berkeley's time, and is fully entrenched nowadays, that what is real, is real in the absence of any observer or mind whatever. This was a natural implication of the 'primary-secondary' division between the measurable attributes of objects as opposed to the way they appear to observers. It was the novel iteration of the appearance-reality divide in the context of early modern science. That's what I'm saying that Berkeley (and, later, Kant) was reacting against.

The Universe is, according to theory, constantly expanding, and as a result (or many results of said result) will, allegedly, succumb to "Heat Death."

This is a widely accepted scientific theory. — Outlander

I wouldn't call this "scientific". To be science requires convincing experimental evidence.

What I'm saying is, perhaps the speaker of the message is simply aware of the inevitable result of such, which, no matter how long it lasts (say X as freedom), it will inevitable turn into a certain state (say Y as lack of freedom). — Outlander

I can't see how this is relevant. I'm going to die, therefore lose my freedom, long before the proposed heat death of the universe, so how is this relevant?

In simple terms, say you're in a desert next to an oasis. The person is telling you that oasis, the water within, and as a result all life situated next to it that makes it unique from the barren desert-scape around it, is temporary. This is a fact. You consider what is temporary as a permanent concept, because, for all you know, and have ever known, it logically seems to be -- while the other person has seen that it is in fact, not. At least, that's a reasonable counter-argument to the aforementioned quote of yours. — Outlander

Sorry, i still can't see the relevance. Are you suggesting that RusselA is arguing that determinism is permanent? How is that relevant? How could determinism be any thing other than permanent?

Not an infinite regress, as we eventually arrive at the (indivisible) fundamental particles and forces.

There are four fundamental interactions known to exist: Gravitational force, Electromagnetic force, Strong nuclear force, Weak nuclear force. — RussellA

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts. Which are you proposing, fundamental forces (idealism), or fundamental particles (materialism)?

There is also a strong argument that ontological relations don't exist in the world but only the mind. As numbers and mathematics only exists in the mind (are invented not discovered), these relations are expressed in the mind mathematically. — RussellA

So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?

Current scientific thinking seems to be that fundamental particles and forces exist in the world. Accepting that ontological relations between these fundamental particles and forces only exist in the mind, there is no necessity for space to be understood as a real active substance. — RussellA

But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles. How do you propose that we can provide an ontology for real active forces in the world, without allowing for a medium of activity? This could by "space", as a real active substance.

As I see it:

The fundamental particles and forces exist in the world as ontological Realism

The relations between these fundamental particles and forces exist in the mind as ontological idealism — RussellA

I think you need to reconsider this position. "Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. How is this anything other than a concept concerning how the motion of one object can affect the motion of another object? If you want to believe that forces are real things existing in the world, you need some substance for them to exist as. Otherwise "forces" will continue to refer to conceptualized relations between objects.

You reason it through. If you have a large glass then you will feel tired. If you feel tired then you may miss the train. If you miss the train then you may be stuck in the city. If you get stuck in the city then you will have to pay for a hotel. But you have no money on you. You therefore conclude that you will stick to a glass of water. — RussellA

Well, I strongly believe that reasoning through anything is an awful lot of work. And if the world is deterministic, it's obviously unnecessary work. Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. We can avoid all that unnecessary work, and have much more fun this way, if we believe in a deterministic world.

He thinks that to eliminate the concept of matter is to remove an important cause of atheism, scepticism and even socianism – and who could not think that those are important issues? — Ludwig V

I can understand why Berkeley would have thought getting rid of matter would "remove and important cause of atheism" (although the belief in a mind-independent world is not strictly logically inconsistent with belief in the Christian God) and I can see that the idea of a mind-independent physical world coupled with the dualistic problem of "interaction" could be thought in Berkeley's time to lead to the possibility of skepticism, but I'm not seeing just how socianism would be debunked by the elimination of matter. They according to this source believed that the soul dies with the body, but that the souls of the faithful will be resurrected.

Was he saying that relations don't really exist? Or just that they don't really exist in the physical world? — Ludwig V

That relations don't really exist in the physical world.

From SEP - Relations

Bradley concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.
But Bradley’s argument is intended to establish that we cannot understand how it is possible for things to be related.
Bradley’s eliminativism{/quote]

Relations certainly exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is to the left of the orange, but in what sense does the apple "know" it is to the left of the orange.

Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose the world is deterministic. Then one's beliefs have been determined, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Suppose the world is not deterministic and one has free will. Then one's beliefs have been freely chosen, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world.

Yes, sure. LLMs don't encounter information in the same way we do, they cannot choose how they encounter information in the way we do, they don't have aversion or reward afaik. — Apustimelogist

Yes - aversion and reward are a key part of this. Which generates an interesting question - what would one have to provide a machine with to get a) an analogue of aversion and reward (which perhaps one could already see in existing machines) and b) actual aversion and reward.

Surely one of the multiple threads on AI would provide a better context (speaking of context).

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts...So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?....................................But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles......................................"Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalism vs Materialism
Historically, Materialists thought that everything was matter, but today, physics has shown that forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind.

Measuring something in the world does not remove that something from the world

The fact that we can use mathematics to describe the Eiffel Tower as 330 metres tall does not mean that the Eiffel Tower has no spatial extension in the world.

The Eiffel Tower has an existence in the world regardless of any measurements we may make on it.

Force is not the same thing as relation

That there is a relation between my feeling thirsty and my thinking about getting a drink does not mean that there is a literal force between my thoughts.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma

You covered it pretty well. — Wayfarer

Thanks.

It was the novel iteration of the appearance-reality divide in the context of early modern science. That's what I'm saying that Berkeley (and, later, Kant) was reacting against. — Wayfarer

It was certainly important. I suppose the schoolmen must have some concept of appearance and of reality - though it is also possible that they just didn't think about them in the way that we do. One would have to read the texts carefully to know.

It was the belief that was coming into view in Berkeley's time, and is fully entrenched nowadays, that what is real, is real in the absence of any observer or mind whatever. — Wayfarer

I treat "in the absence of any observer or mind" as an extreme example of mind-independent existence. That's the key point for me. If only Berkeley had proposed "To be is to be perceivable" instead of "To be is to be perceived (or to be able to perceive)". That still leaves the possibility of inference to unobserved realities in question, though he has to admit that it is possible (as in the case of other minds and God.)

It's worth noting, though, that he cannot, on his own terms, go back to Aristotelianism, which also has realities that cannot be observed, but only inferred. That's what makes him an empiricist.

I treat "in the absence of any observer or mind" as an extreme example of mind-independent existence — Ludwig V

But that is exactly what was implied by the Galilean division. The distinction between what was measurably the case, and how objects appear, was central. I quote this passage about once a week:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them.

Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel, Pp 35-36

That is the context that the OP is referring to.

In my view, both Berkeley and his detractors are right. His detractors are right in that physical definitions purposely omit the subjective. Therefore Lockean primary qualities should be understood as being definitionally irreducible to Lockean secondary qualities. Where his detractors might err is in mistaking definitional irreducibility, which purely concerns semantic irreducibility, for metaphysical irreducibility concerning a fundamental ontological distinction between Lockean primary and secondary qualities.

On the other hand Berkeley is right for pointing out that Lockean primary qualities can only be used for denoting Lockean secondary qualities. In other words, if we think of mathematics as amounting to a language for relating indexicals rather than substances, such that physics is understood as amounting to finding useful indexical relations for the purpose of defining protocols for intersubjective communication and control, then we can reconcile the Lockean hard distinction with Berkeley's collapse of the distinction - on the condition that the lockean distinction is interpreted as being semantic rather than metaphysical.

Very good :ok:

Yes, I'm aware that it is a side-issue, and I've no intention of pursuing it. I don't have the bandwidth to do that, so, although it could be part of another thread, I wouldn't be contributing to it.

But that is exactly what was implied by the Galilean division. The distinction between what was measurably the case, and how objects appear, was central. I quote this passage about once a week: — Wayfarer

It's a good passage. Something to put on a wall in a frame.
But I think you misunderstand my point.
The "external reality" is always external, even when, for example, it is measured. Referring to "absence of an observer" allows people to conclude that when an observer is present, what is observed is not reality. But reality is still reality even when it is observed, or, for example, measured.
The new idea seems to define a new world of real objects, distinct from the world we perceive which contains appearances that don't really exist. But that is an illusion. The new idea defines a new way of looking at, thinking about, the same objects that we perceive and think about every day.

physics is understood as amounting to finding useful indexical relations for the purpose of defining protocols for intersubjective communication — sime

I'm not sure I follow you exactly. But the intention to interpret Locke's distinction as semantic seems like a good way to go. I think of it as a methodological decision. I don't know how far that coincides with your view.
When you talk of "indexical relations" are you thinking of the equation, for example, between photons and colours? If so, I wouldn't equate finding them with the whole purpose of physics, nor think that it amounts to enabling inter-subjective communication. Or do I misunderstand you?

That relations don't really exist in the physical world. — RussellA

I see. It's clearly not real issue. I would like to pursue it a bit, but I'm afraid I don't have the time and energy to think it through. But thank you for drawing my attention to it.

Relations certainly exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is to the left of the orange, but in what sense does the apple "know" it is to the left of the orange.

That's a silly question. It is presumably an attempt to explain what Bradley meant, but it is very unhelpful, amounting to mystification. It can't be what Bradley was saying.

I'm not sure I follow you exactly. But the intention to interpret Locke's distinction as semantic seems like a good way to go. I think of it as a methodological decision. I don't know how far that coincides with your view.
When you talk of "indexical relations" are you thinking of the equation, for example, between photons and colours? If so, I wouldn't equate finding them with the whole purpose of physics, nor think that it amounts to enabling inter-subjective communication. Or do I misunderstand you? — Ludwig V

Yes, the semantic distinction is a methodological distinction.

I think of mathematical language as being analogous to a high level programming language, such as the C programming language. In order for C to be portable to any computer hardware system, it must only specify the grammar of the language and must refrain from specifying how it's expressions are to be compiled into machine code instructions, which is vender specific and requires a bespoke solution. Likewise, children must learn how to compile their mother tongue into thoughts and percepts; but their understanding of their language isn't part of the definition of their mother tongue, since their brains, ostensive learning and perspectives are unique to themselves.

A physical language is about encoding common knowlege in a universal and portable format; so like C, it's semantics evolved to become definitionally independent of the perceptual judgements of any individual user. This indispensible "hard feature" of a physical language is often mistaken by philosophers as constituting a "hard problem", due to them conflating intersubjective high-level semantics whose subjective interpretation is deliberately left open, with the low-level subjective interpretation of the language that is bespoke for each person.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world. — RussellA

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed. And so, by extension, even if everyone believes in something this ought not be considered to be evidence of the thing believed.

However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. So I don't see any point to what you have said here.

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind. — RussellA

This is a serious problem with the beliefs of many physicalists. They claim that things like "forces", and "energy" are physical, and they also deny the reality of Platonic realism. However, upon analysis, it can be demonstrated that these things are purely mathematical conceptions. The physicalist will commonly ignore this, and insist that these terms refer to something independent from the conception, which the conception corresponds with, but that is really nothing more than claiming that there is an independent idea, which the human conception corresponds with. And that is exactly what Platonic realism is.

For example, the physicalist might say that there are independent "laws of nature" which correspond with the humanly conceived "laws of physics". Or, one might believe that there is a number "two" which corresponds with the conception of two. There are many examples of Platonist beliefs which physicalist have, and generally they will continue in to incoherently argue against Platonism. I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma — RussellA

It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means. Force is a quantity. It is a figure produced from measurement and application of mathematics. Therefore it is very clear that any force between the earth and the moon is the product of human knowledge of the relations between these two. To say that there is a force which is independent of measurement, as that which is measured, is incoherent. This is because "force" is complex, a product of multiple properties, as "ma" signifies. Very clearly it is a human creation.

That's a silly question. It is presumably an attempt to explain what Bradley meant, but it is very unhelpful, amounting to mystification. It can't be what Bradley was saying. — Ludwig V

As regards the existence of ontological relations in the world, a human may know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh.

But where in Glasgow is the information that it is to the west of Edinburgh?

Where in Edinburgh is the information that it is to the east of Glasgow?

Where in the space between Glasgow and Edinburgh is the information that Glasgow is at the west end of this space and Edinburgh is at the east end of this space?

As the SEP article on Relations writes:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed..........................However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You believe you argue in a non-deterministic way, but as you say yourself "a belief is not evidence of the thing believed."
===============================================================================

I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophical Realism is the view that some things have a mind-independent existence (Wikipedia - Philosophical Realism)

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism)

Platonism is the opposite of Nominalism, as it affirms the existence of abstract objects (Wikipedia - Platonism)
===============================================================================

It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means...Very clearly it is a human creation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does anyone really know what a force is?

"Force" is a word and clearly a human creation. However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, and this force is clearly not a human creation.

From the Britannica article on Force:

(Newton's) second law says that when an external force acts on a body, it produces an acceleration (change in velocity) of the body in the direction of the force. The magnitude of the acceleration is directly proportional to the magnitude of the external force and inversely proportional to the quantity of matter in the body.

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

This won't do. Bradley had what he considered a general argument about this - as I'm sure you know. If aRb, then there must be two other relations that relate a to R and R to b. I shall write this down as a(r1)R(r2)b. What is the relationship between a and r1 and R and r2 and b? You see how it goes - a nice infinite regress that proves the impossibility (not merely non-existence) of any relation whatever. Great fun!

Suppose I want my ship next to a quay. I can sail it up until the ship is at location x, where the quay is at location y and x and y are next to each other. If you are thinking like Bradley, you will be thinking that something more needs to be said. So I shall add something to physically represent the relationship - a rope. I shall fix the rope to a bollard on the quay, and fix the other end to the ship. I shall fix the rope by wrapping it round the bollard in a clove hitch, and similarly on the ship. So I can represent all of a, r1, R, r2, and b. So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is. I say it is between the ship and the quay. How could it be anywhere else? It certainly isn't in my head.

Bradley wouldn't be happy with this, because he's a theoretician, playing with symbols, of which he has an infinite supply. That's the province of a logician, which I am not, so I'll leave you to read up on that. But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. You are getting sucked in to his misleading metaphor because you are asking whether relations really exist, with (presumably) tables and chairs as your models. But symbols do not always represent entities that correspond to them. You can see from this example that there is no need for an infinite supply of entities linking the ship and the quay. To put the point another way, in 2+3=5, "2", "3", and "5" represent numbers, but "+" and "=" do not. It isn't a problem.

The relationship "west of" holds between Glasgow and Edinburgh, so I shall say that it is between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Similarly for the relationship "east of" between Edinburgh and Glasgow.

Bertrand Russell has a chapter called World of Universals in his early Problems of Philosophy, which I often refer to.

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ... But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation ["north of"] exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something [real].

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

Russell makes a simple but important point about universals: things like the relation “north of” or the quality “whiteness” are real, but they’re not located in space or time, and they’re not just mental events.
Here’s the gist of his argument in four steps:

[1] Independence from mind – The truth of “Edinburgh is north of London” doesn’t depend on anyone thinking it; it would hold in a mindless universe.
[2] Non-spatiotemporal status – ‘North of’ isn’t in either city, and it’s not in space or time like physical objects are.
[3] Act vs. object of thought – Thinking of whiteness is a mental act in time; whiteness itself is not the act but the object of that act.
[4] Universality preserved – If whiteness were just a thought, it would be particularized (your thought now, my thought then), and couldn’t be the same across different thinkers and times.

That's good stuff. Thank you. :smile:

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism) — RussellA

You can say this, as many do. But the point I made is that nominalism provides no ontology to substantiate the existence of particulars. Particulars are nothing other than perceptions in the mind, as Berkeley argues. Then to validate ontologically, the idea that particulars have independent existence, as a philosophical realism requires, the only principles which will do, are those of idealism. That's why Berkeley needs God. That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. You can readily claim to believe in incompatible ontologies when you do not understand the principles.

However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, — RussellA

This is not true. When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. And, that physicists conceptualize this type of causation as "force" is just a convention. Furthermore, I can cause my own body to accelerate without requiring any external force, as causation, simply by getting up and moving. That's an internal force acting which causes it to move.

Russell makes a simple but important point about universals: things like the relation “north of” or the quality “whiteness” are real, but they’re not located in space or time, and they’re not just mental events.
Here’s the gist of his argument in four steps: — Wayfarer

To me this makes no sense. The relation "north of" exists in space and time between objects. If you move the objects the relation may change. When you think about it everything is either north or south of everything else. To my way of thinking "north of" only exists in its instantiations. If The Problems of Philosophy was written after his rejection of idealism then it seems Russell didn't completely escape it's hold on him.

Universals are not generally associated with idealism. Berkeley rejected them, although Peirce’s objective idealism recognizes them.

When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This statement is incorrect according to Newton’s first law of motion (the law of inertia).

When a force causes a body to accelerate, the acceleration only continues as long as that net force is acting on the object. Once the force ceases, the object will continue moving at whatever constant velocity it had reached, but it will no longer accelerate.

There are some nuanced exceptions in relativity or when dealing with fields, but in classical mechanics, the statement as written is fundamentally incorrect.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​