That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts.

Idealism and realism are two sides of the same coin.
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When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration.

A simplistic dichotomy, and simplistic analyses never apply to Kant. The actual distinction Kant makes is between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, which he sees as complementary and not conflicting.

For Kant, empirical realism means that objects of experience - the phenomena we encounter in space and time - are real within the empirical domain. When we perceive a tree or a rock, these objects have objective reality as appearances.

Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, holds that space, time, and the categories of understanding are not features of things as they exist independently of our cognitive faculties, but rather are the forms through which experience is structured or articulated.

Kant sees these as working together rather than in tension: we can be realists about the empirical world precisely because we understand or have insight into the transcendental conditions of experience. The empirical reality of objects is grounded in the fact that they conform to the universal and necessary structures of cognition (space, time, causality, and so forth).

This allows Kant to avoid both the skeptical problems he saw in Hume’s empiricism and what he considered the dogmatic excesses of rationalist metaphysics (e.g. Berkeley). We can have genuine knowledge of objects, but only as they appear to us under the conditions that make experience possible, not as they might exist independently of those conditions.

On the second point, you’re correct.

Nicely put. I wonder what Kant would have made of Bernardo Kastrup’s formulation of idealism.

Kastrup, as you know, wrote a book on Schopenhauer (Decoding Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics) which I found very good, and Schopenhauer saw himself (rightly or not) as Kant’s successor. Now you mention it, I don’t recall Kastrup saying much about Kant, but I think Kant, Schopenhauer, and Kastrup could comfortably fit under one umbrella, so to speak.

//although they might elbow each other from time to time :rofl: //

Now you mention it, I don’t recall Kastrup saying much about Kant, but I think Kant, Schopenhauer, and Kastrup could comfortably fit under one umbrella, so to speak. — Wayfarer

Interesting. I think Kastrup’s notion that materialism is how consciousness appears when viewed across the dissociative divide, if that's the precise wording, (or does he call it the external appearance of inner experiences?) seems compatible with phenomena.

I agree. I like that image of Kastrup that ‘tears are what sorrow looks like from the outside’ (but then, it’s such a sensitive new-age analogy….)

It’s such a powerful tool when the right phrase or description is found to illustrate something complex like this.

Agree. I might mention the interview where I first read it. It’s a good intro to Bernardo Kastrup, and he’s definitely worth knowing about.

I’m still not entirely clear on the exact difference between Kant’s transcendental idealism and classical idealism. Kant isn’t really saying that everything is consciousness, is he? He’s saying that there is something out there (we can't apprehend), and we shape our experience of it through our cognitive apparatus and this we experience as phenomena/reality. Which sounds similar to some of the perspectives you have offered. Thoughts?

Bertrand Russell has a chapter called World of Universals in his early Problems of Philosophy, which I often refer to. — Wayfarer

Bertrand Russell: Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it.

I agree that it it seems plain that Edinburgh and London exist in different places independently of our knowledge of them.

The concept "relation" certainly exists in our mind, in that I know that Edinburgh is to the north of London.

But is it the case that relations exist independently of the mind?

I see this as a similar problem Bertrand Russell approached in his article On Denoting, where he wanted to show that the puzzles of identity, Law of Excluded Middle and non-existence were problems of language.

For example, "Socrates is a philosopher" logically means that "there is something that is a person, seeks wisdom, tries to understand fundamental questions regarding existence, knowledge, and values and is named philosopher"

Relations is also a problem of language, in that we could remove the word from our language and still be able to communicate.

Rather than say "Edinburgh is north of London" we could say "Edinburgh is at 55.9533 deg N, -3.1883 deg W and London is at 51.509865 deg N, -0.118092 deg W".

In language we could remove relational words such as north of, to the left of, above and replace them by existent spatial locations.

I agree that this may make language cumbersome, but this shows that relations is a problem of language rather than a problem of any mind-independent world.

Well said, except a minor quibble, if I may:

The empirical reality of objects is grounded in the fact that they conform to the universal and necessary structures of cognition (space, time, causality, and so forth). — Wayfarer

Knowledge of objects, which just is experience itself….is grounded in the possibility of conforming to…

Empirical reality is mere appearance, “….that which corresponds to a sensation in general…”

….the exact difference between Kant’s transcendental idealism and classical idealism. — Tom Storm

The exact difference refers to a systemic, albeit speculative, purely logically methodology for human thought. Classical predecessors: humans think; Kant: this is what it is to think.

The general, rather than the exact, difference reduces to an investigation of the faculty, thus the role of, and limitations imposed on, pure reason, as that which provides the principles for proper thinking, re: in accordance with logical laws, hence the name “transcendental” as a modified doctrinal idealism.

The actual distinction Kant makes is between empirical realism and transcendental idealism..............................................For Kant, empirical realism means that objects of experience - the phenomena we encounter in space and time - are real within the empirical domain. When we perceive a tree or a rock, these objects have objective reality as appearances. — Wayfarer

Kant's distinction is slightly more than between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, if empirical realism means that the objects we encounter are real within the empirical domain of appearances.

Kant also wanted to make the distinction between transcendental idealism and realism, where realism means that objects exist independently of any perception of them.

In B276 of his Critique of Pure Reason, in his Refutation of Idealism, he attempts the proof of his theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

This is more than empirical realism.

So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is — Ludwig V

The ship is secured because of physics, the force in the rope between the ship and the bollard.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed.

I’m still not entirely clear on the exact difference between Kant’s transcendental idealism and classical idealism. Kant isn’t really saying that everything is consciousness, is he? He’s saying that there is something out there (we can't apprehend), and we shape our experience of it through our cognitive apparatus and this we experience as phenomena/reality. Which sounds similar to some of the perspectives you have offered. Thoughts? — Tom Storm

I'm attempting to portray Kant's form of idealism. The term 'classical ideaiism' is a little misleading, because idealism itself is a modern idea - that's one of the points of the OP. The term only comes into use in the early modern period.

The meaning of the expression 'everything is in consciousness' is elusive. It is often taken to mean that its adherents say the world is all in the mind of the perceiver - everything is in my consciousness. But that leads to problems of solipsism. I think it's the incorrect perspective - we're trying to stand apart from 'the world' and 'the observer' as if seeing them from some point outside both. But we can't do that.

I really got the sense of what it means for 'mind to create world' through meditation - seeing that process unfolding moment to moment. This process of world-creation is actually going on, all the time - it is what consciousness is doing every second. Becoming directly aware of that world-making process is key. As I've mentioned, I learned about Kant from a scholarly book comparing Buddhist and Kantian philosophy (ref). At the same time this process is happening, there is a vastness beyond that process. I learned about that from Krishnamurti.

Well said, except a minor quibble, — Mww

Thanks, it was carelessly expressed on my part.

I agree that it it seems plain that Edinburgh and London exist in different places independently of our knowledge of them.

The concept "relation" certainly exists in our mind, in that I know that Edinburgh is to the north of London.

But is it the case that relations exist independently of the mind? — RussellA

I see you’re taking a deflationary approach by treating relations as a matter of linguistic convention. But this, I think, misses Russell’s central claim in The World of Universals.

The relation “north of” isn’t just a word we happen to use; it’s something our words pick out. If London had never been discovered, or if nobody ever thought about Edinburgh, the fact that one is north of the other would still obtain. Coordinates make this more explicit, but they don’t abolish the relation — they presuppose it. A system of latitude and longitude is itself a network of relations.

The point is that universals are not “in the mind” — not mere thoughts or conventions. But nor are they independent existents like Edinburgh or London. They are real in the noetic sense: they are what is apprehended in thought. As Russell says, they are not thoughts, though when they are known they are objects of thought. That’s why Russell calls universals real — they aren’t “in the mind,” but only minds can apprehend them. Relations may be expressed in language, but they aren’t created by language — they’re the logical structure that language captures. Again the 'world-building' activity of the mind is always going on, but we don't notice that. We're looking through it, practicing philosophy and meditation is learning to look at it.

In B276 of his Critique of Pure Reason, in his Refutation of Idealism, he attempts the proof of his theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." — RussellA

Indeed - which was directed at Berkeley's idealism. As I mentioned in the OP, after the first edition of CPR, critics said Kant was just recycling Berkeley's idealism, which annoyed him considerably. So he included his 'refutation of idealism' in the B edition, as you say, arguing that the determination of one's own existence in time relies on the perception of something persistent outside of oneself. This challenges what he calls "problematic idealism," of Berkeley's type, which casts doubt on the existence of external objects.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed. — RussellA

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. Good choice. Now, can we agree that the relationship between Glasgow and Edinburgh is between Glasgow and Edinburgh and vice versa?
It depends on what you mean by "secured". But I would say that the rope secures the relationship and not the other way round. But the question that matters to us is whether we have secured that infinite regress.

But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. — Ludwig V

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world.

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. — Ludwig V

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world.

The fact I perceive a spatial relation between Glasgow and Edinburgh does not mean the spatial relationship exists in the world.

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world. — RussellA

But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. In any case, it can't be literally true. Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). Whichever it is, there is no room for the ship or the bollard and consequently not for the relationship between them.
I'm happy to say that a concept is in my mind, though neither mind nor concepts occupy any space at all - it's a metaphor. A relationship is indeed not an object in the world; it is something that holds between objects in the world. That mean it doesn't exist only in your mind. If it existed only in your mind, it would not be between the ship and the bollard. The thing is, a concept is always of something else, and the something else may well not be in your mind.

The meaning of the expression 'everything is in consciousness' is elusive. It is often taken to mean that its adherents say the world is all in the mind of the perceiver - everything is in my consciousness. But that leads to problems of solipsism. — Wayfarer

Yes, unless you have Kastrup's Mind-at-Large or Berkeley's God grouding all things. Although Mind-at-Large might be seen as almost solipsistic by some, in as much as you and I, and all members here are dissociated alters of M.a.L. We are all one.

This process of world-creation is actually going on, all the time - it is what consciousness is doing every second. Becoming directly aware of that world-making process is key. As I've mentioned, I learned about Kant from a scholarly book comparing Buddhist and Kantian philosophy (ref). — Wayfarer

I find this view plausible. And phenomenology seems to take similar positions.

So if someone says 'there is nothing except consciousness" what is your view of this?

The general, rather than the exact, difference reduces to an investigation of the faculty, thus the role of, and limitations imposed on, pure reason, as that which provides the principles for proper thinking, re: in accordance with logical laws, hence the name “transcendental” as a modified doctrinal idealism. — Mww

Difficult to understand exactly but I can see some light. The mind structures experience.

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world. — RussellA

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations.

Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). — Ludwig V

The mind is a mysterious expression of the brain, but we know the brain has spatial extension. We know of no example of a brain that has no size.

If the physical brain was removed, we know of no example where a mind would remain.

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations.
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But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. — Ludwig V

In the world are two people of the same height, one standing 10 metres away from an observer and the other standing 100 metres away.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world?

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world.

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations. — Ludwig V

When someone says that they perceive the colour red, science may discover that they are looking at an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered?

This statement is incorrect according to Newton’s first law of motion (the law of inertia). — Wayfarer

My mistake, thanks Wayfarer. I think i was half asleep when I wrote that, glad you're checking.

But we still have the issue of self-caused acceleration, in living beings which are self-moved. This is a case of the acceleration of a body which is not caused by an external force. I will address this issue below in my reply to RussellA. I would appreciate if you could read that, and give me your opinion concerning my thoughts on this matter. If my speculations are unintelligible to you, I may be inclined to think that Janus is right in dismissing it as gobbledygook.

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts. — RussellA

Maybe, but to avoid the vicious circle, the realism which grounds idealism cannot be experience based, which is what you say. It must be prior to experience, that's why it's a Platonic realism.

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration. — RussellA

Yes, Wayfarer corrected me on that. However, Newton's laws cannot account for the reality of free will, where the cause of motion is internal to the body which accelerates. Therefore we ought to conclude that Newton's laws of motion are not properly "universal", as they do not cover all cases of acceleration.

You can opt for determinism, deny that free will, intention, or final cause, is a valid cause, but this is what I argue leaves a hole in your ability to understand reality. This is why physicalism is commonly associated with determinism. If we accept that Newton's laws of physics cover all aspects of reality, then there is no place for final cause, and we have determinism. If we want to allow for the reality of final cause, then we need to open up Newton's laws, determine where they are inconclusive, and find out where final cause can have a position.

What I've explained already, is that Newton's first law is fundamentally determinist, and does not adequately represent the real difference between past and future. The difference is that the past consists of "actuality", what actually is, or has been, and cannot be changed, while the future consists of indeterminate "possibility". Representing time as a continuity from past to future, as Newton's first law does, assuming that what has been will necessarily continue to be as it has, unless caused to change by something else which continues to be as it has been, produces the determinist premise. But this form of "necessity" which Newton's first law is based in, is what Hume rejected, as a premise of attitude rather than truth.

The theological/mystical premise, which allows for the reality of final cause, also rejects this proposed necessary continuity of temporal existence, supported by a difference of attitude. In this perspective, since the future consists of possibility, and the past consists of actuality, a selective cause is required to account for the activity of the present. In Christian theology this selective cause is the Will of God, and it is understood that the continuity represented as Newton's first law requires an active cause.

The principal difference between the two perspectives is that from Newton's premise a cause is required to alter the continuity of existence known as inertia. Inertia is taken for granted as given. From the theological/mystical perspective a cause is required to produce the continuity of existence known as inertia. The Newtonian premise of continuity, if taken as absolutely universal, disallows the reality of final cause, so that is a significant problem for it. Furthermore, the modern physics of quantum mechanics indicates that the separation between past actuality, and future possibility, is likely very real.

Therefore, I believe that it is time for us to reject the universality of Newton's first law, as fundamentally insufficient, and representative of a misleading attitude toward reality. We also ought to accept the real separation between past actuality and future possibility as strongly supported by evidence, and this is inconsistent with Newton's first law. That change in attitude will provide a much more sound position for a true understanding of the nature of motion and activity, one which allows for the reality of final cause.

The mind structures experience. — Tom Storm

Conventionally, true enough, I suppose.

In the interest of systemic analysis, on the other hand, reason structures experience, at least because mind, as such, is not reducible to systemic composition, but merely represents as half of a complementary pair.

Anyway…..light is always good.

The point is that universals are not “in the mind” — not mere thoughts or conventions. — Wayfarer

As a Nominalist I disagree. But I don't think we will be able to resolve the debate between Universals and Nominalism in this thread.

There is a spatial relation between a particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy.

The relation cannot be in a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the space between the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and our Sun.

Then where is this relation?

Anyway…..light is always good. — Mww

Light is all I've got. :wink:

However, I may perceive Mary is bored because she is wearing bright clothes and you may perceive that Mary is not bored precisely because she is wearing bright clothes.

If perception refers to understanding, the situation becomes very unclear. How can anyone know what is in the mind of God if everyone's perceived understanding of the same situation is probably different. How can anyone ever know Mary's true state of being.

Mary's "to be" can never be known if "is to be perceived" means perceived in the understanding. — RussellA

But "bored" is not the only perception you might have with Mary. Did you perceive her as standing in front of you, or looking out the window, or talking to someone else. And did it occur to you that your understanding that she is bored might be erroneous?

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations. — RussellA

I won't argue with that.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other. — RussellA

... or, alternatively, that one of them is further away than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world. — RussellA

The mind does make mistakes, but it is a lot cleverer than that. It judges the size of distant objects by comparing their height with other objects in the field of vision. It knows the actual height of the other objects, so it can work out the height of the unknown object.
So, yes, it creates a perception, but not necessarily a false one.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world? — RussellA

Wherever they are.

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them. — RussellA

The relation between their heights doesn't change depending how far away a given observer is.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world. — RussellA

No, it suggests that the observer exists in the world.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered? — RussellA

Nowhere. Neither can it be discovered in my brain or my mind. Where do your eyes tell you it is?

(PS Actually, I've been told, the colours do not directly respond to actual wavelengths. Apparently, it is to do with the proportion of a given wavelength in the overall impacting wavelengths. The take-away is - it's complicated.)

Fwiw, if mind is mind-dependent, then 'transcendental idealism' is merely i-maginary (à la Spinoza's 'first type of knowledge'); however, if mind is mind-i]ndependent, then 'transcendental idealism' is only a solution in search of a problem (à la 'Cartesian doubt'). I find 'indirect/critical realism' (e.g. perspectivism, fallibilism, cognitivism/enactivism) to be much more self-consistent and parsimonious – begs fewer questions (i.e. leaves less room for woo-woo :sparkle:) – than any flavor of 'idealism' (... Berkeley, Kant/Schopenhauer, Hegel ... Lawson, Hoffman, Kastrup :eyes:) which underwrites my commitment to p-naturalism.