or human reason (ultimately subjective, for whose reason are we speaking of? — Modern Conviviality

The most universal and coherent moral foundations are composed of shared sentiment (i.e: our shared desire to go on living and to live freely) and "human reason" (if you're asking whose reason we're speaking of, the answer is our reasoning; our shared human reasoning).

The social contact is a good metaphor for the form that my moral arguments tend to take. If we have similar goals in life then we may come to an agreement between us to abstain from certain actions and to accept the burden of performing some other actions in order to serve our end goals more effectively.

"More effective"... Some moral systems are more effective than others (although different moral systems sometimes do different things) at achieving their goals. How do you know there are objective rights and wrongs instead of a spectrum of better and worse?

The goals of my moral framework extend only as far as our shared human condition/experience/desire, but luckily there are some basic shared desires that are nearly universal in humans (the aforementioned two for instance). Many non-non-theists try and take issue with my moral framework by claiming that "it's not objective" even while they assent to my moral propositions because they share basic human desires. It seems ironic to me that this issue of non-universality is so important to so many thinkers even though it forces them to nest their moral foundation in some absurd claim to supreme truth which renders their moral system less persuasive and less useful overall.

In short, present me a set of circumstances with moral implications and I'll try to convince you of what I think is the best available moral decision to make. I won't convince you on the basis that a certain decision is good because it is universal, or contains a certain ultimate virtue, but because it demonstrably promotes/preserves stated values and ends that at the time you agree are morally praiseworthy or obligatory.

Of late I have found that morality as a mutually agreeable cooperative strategy designed to promote shared values and goals (and avoiding undesirable ends), is quite useful for convincing people of a particular moral course of action even while they reject it as "morality". For instance, one person might hold (or want to hold) that doing violence against another is universally immoral, but when presented with the right circumstances (such as the need to defend yourself when suddenly thrust into a violent prison system as an inmate) almost everyone would happily consent to do violence once it becomes clear to them that a strategy of mutual cooperation is not available and that doing harm to others is necessary for self-preservation. (if you're interested @Modern Conviviality, just say so and I'll happily paint such a circumstantial picture, as I would be happy to do for any other supposedly "universal" moral commandments). I sometimes call this a "breakdown of morality" in order to emphasize that when conflict is inevitable (when no cooperative strategies are available) the utility of typical intuitive moral positions can go flying out the widow...

if you're asking whose reason we're speaking of, the answer is our reasoning; our shared human reasoning — VagabondSpectre

I can understand your invocation of a universal/collective type of human reasoning to apprehend and intuit morality as human persons, but it still seems unsatisfactory for our purposes. Our 'collective reason' is still human, and so by inference: imperfect and limited. Are you speaking of a Platonic 'collective human logic' which has a special ontological status similar to God's ontological status? Unless moral laws are somehow built into the logical structure of thought (in a Platonic kind of way), which is coherent but difficult to articulate.

Many non-non-theists try and take issue with my moral framework by claiming that "it's not objective" even while they assent to my moral propositions because they share basic human desires — VagabondSpectre

But this is perfectly explainable when we distinguish between epistemological and ontological morality. As a theist I agree with many of the ethical habits, desires, and beliefs of my atheist colleagues. There is no problem here. The problem concerns how the atheist can appropriately ground his moral life in an objective (not universal) way.

virtue ethics, a process of learning good action grounded in the interplay between your reason and experiences with the social practices you find around you — mcdoodle

I'm a big fan of virtue ethics. Studied it lightly, but still retain the fundamentals I think. You're right I blatantly missed the option. However, does virtue ethics go beyond describing what the good life is / what is truly good for man qua man - to answer the question of grounding? If I remember, Aristotle just takes it as axiomatic/self-evident that man truly ought to desire what is good. That it is constitutive of his nature, in a normative way. It is self-evident like 2+2=4 is. Am I correct here?

If I remember, Aristotle just takes it as axiomatic/self-evident that man truly ought to desire what is good. That it is constitutive of his nature, in a normative way. It is self-evident like 2+2=4 is. Am I correct here? — Modern Conviviality

I think your 'ought to' isn't right, but otherwise, yes. It is for Aristotle the nature of humanity to pursue eudaimonia, flourishing, and the route to this is 'the good'. The details of the virtuous dispositions that will enable us to enact the good are mostly acquired from what people say is blameworthy or praiseworthy, i.e. from the shared Athenian culture which we all know is the best possible culture the world has ever seen - kind of thing.

There's a lot of modern work on virtue ethics which began from Elizabeth Anscombe's paper of 1958, 'Modern moral philosophy', which you can find online. The major work I've read and thought about is 'After Virtue' by Alasdair MacIntyre, which tries to construct a virtue ethics for the present era. Pardon me if you know all this.

Very interesting. But how are 'moral facts held to be discovered in reason'? Again, its not that reason can apprehend moral truths, we both agree on that. Its that moral laws are somehow part of the rational/epistemic enterprise itself - viz. a moral law is just a true proposition, say. Am I getting this right?

I don't know how moral facts are discovered by reason. But they are. And yes, "moral laws are...part of the rational/epistemic enterprise itself". Insofar as something is intelligible, it is grounded in the rational enterprise. Thus all of morality stems from reason. This is my understanding.

I can understand your invocation of a universal/collective type of human reasoning to apprehend and intuit morality as human persons, but it still seems unsatisfactory for our purposes. Our 'collective reason' is still human, and so by inference: imperfect and limited. Are you speaking of a Platonic 'collective human logic' which has a special ontological status similar to God's ontological status? Unless moral laws are somehow built into the logical structure of thought (in a Platonic kind of way), which is coherent but difficult to articulate. — Modern Conviviality

The "laws" I'm interested in are built into reality in the same way that an ideal chess strategy is built into a particular configuration of chess pieces on a chess board.

It is neccessary to have a starting value though; a goal. In chess the goal is winning capturing the enemy king. Reasoning allows us to come to positions about what is objective better or worse in terms of achieving that goal. In chess there are a host of known moves which are almost universally terrible to make (in almost every chess situation), and there are moves which are thought to be very strong. In real world moral terms gouging each-others eyes out is almost universally inconducive to our shared goals; a bad move. But it always depends on the circumstances...

The foundation is shared goals; what we humans want. The moral agreement that can exist between us encompasses the scope of our shared or non-mutually exclusive (life, love, happiness, etc...), and our physical capacity to actually follow a mutually beneficial strategy of cooperation (if physical circumstances make cooperation impossible or necessitates conflict (especially deadly conflict) then there can be no shared moral agreement between us relevant to the situation).

But this is perfectly explainable when we distinguish between epistemological and ontological morality. As a theist I agree with many of the ethical habits, desires, and beliefs of my atheist colleagues. There is no problem here. The problem concerns how the atheist can appropriately ground his moral life in an objective (not universal) way. — Modern Conviviality

Is the human condition an objective authority?

I reckon it's not, but we ARE humans, and as such a morality which serves and pertains to the human condition is the best morality for us. I cannot open a window into some objective dimension and pull out some ultimate and necessary moral purpose. I know this isn't what many thinkers are looking for, but I can promise you that it's very robust when done right.

Take "the desire to go on living" for instance. When survival dilemmas arise coming to an agreement about how to work together in order avoid death is something that all humans generally will get on board with (and of the humans who do not desire to go on living, they generally don't pose any problems).

There's a lot of modern work on virtue ethics which began from Elizabeth Anscombe's paper of 1958, 'Modern moral philosophy', which you can find online. The major work I've read and thought about is 'After Virtue' by Alasdair MacIntyre, which tries to construct a virtue ethics for the present era. Pardon me if you know all this — mcdoodle

I am aware of this great revival of a great moral theory! - indeed the most sound and flexible secular moral theory on offer. I say I am 'aware', but only as someone who follows, in a peripheral way, the trends in modern ethics, but have not read either Anscombe or MacIntyre, yet! I'm still reading & understanding the ancient/medieval positions before I grapple with their modern iterations.

I don't know how moral facts are discovered by reason. But they are. And yes, "moral laws are...part of the rational/epistemic enterprise itself". Insofar as something is intelligible, it is grounded in the rational enterprise. Thus all of morality stems from reason. This is my understanding. — Brian A

Well wait a minute, I think we have come back round to the beginning again. In a weak sense, 'rational enterprise' sounds like something humans do 'create' and are responsible for. But 'rational enterprise' could be interpreted in a stronger ontological sense, namely, as the underlying structure of thought/reality itself.

The latter is something we humans simply participate in but are in no way responsible for - logic and its laws being the main example. So, to go back, if morality is part and parcel of Logic with a capital L then we are mere participants of morality in the same way we merely participate in using logic.

It seems like we pushed the problem back one step! How do we ground logic itself? I think this isn't a problem for most people, as we are comfortable with the thought that logic is necessary and axiomatic. But Morality with a capital M does not feel necessary in the same way.

but have not read either Anscombe or MacIntyre, yet! — Modern Conviviality

Worth noting that McIntyre converted to Catholicism, and that that Anscombe was Catholic. That might be incidental, but the thrust of McIntyre's argument tends logically towards theism. (He had previously been Marxist.)

There are some terminological ambiguities ("objective", "law-like", "constructivist" etc), which make it difficult to discuss the issue, without firstly getting rid of these. But, if you're ok with it, we can also start by discussing the exclusion of theism from your question. So, let me ask: why don't you include theists in your question? Is theism somehow free of this problem (by "theism" here, I understand some form of divine command, correct me if I'm wrong)? I'm asking since someone could level a "euthyphrean" critique, arguing that divine command is just another sort of ethical subjectivism. Just with a godly flavor. Nothing is objectively good or bad, in themselves things are not moral or immoral, what makes them such is that God commands them or forbids them. In being extrinsic to things themselves, theistic morality is not objective. So, why the distinction? — Πετροκότσυφας

My response to Euthyphro is stolen from Aquinas. That it is a false dilemma, in that God acts consistently with his essential character, which is the foundation of goodness. God is neither the architect of goodness nor is he the expert on goodness, He is the foundation of goodness.

If morality came into existence with man, how can it be objectively binding (i.e. law-like). — Modern Conviviality

We do not require that physical laws "came into existence" prior to the phenomena they govern in order to qualify as being "objective"; so why should we require it in the case of moral laws that govern the behavior of moral beings?

I think your 'ought to' isn't right, but otherwise, yes. It is for Aristotle the nature of humanity to pursue eudaimonia, flourishing, and the route to this is 'the good'. — mcdoodle

If it is "the nature of humanity to pursue eudamonia" (and this is taken in a positive sense as 'flourishing'), and the "route to this is the good" then why would these facts not justify the conclusion that we ought to pursue the good (meaning, of course. nothing other than 'take that route')?

why should we require it in the case of moral laws that govern the behavior of moral beings? — Janus

Physical laws purportedly act without intention; if there is no intention, there can be no question of morality. So how could moral laws be compared to physical laws? (As I mentioned, the doctrine of karma does provide a somewhat naturalistic solution, in that it connects intentional actions with consequences in a law-like manner. However I don't think there are many analogies to that in Western ethical philosophy.)

I don't understand your objection since I wasn't talking about physical laws in the context of morality, but rather moral laws. The contention, as I understood it, was that moral laws could not be "objective" because they came into existence with moral beings. But by that argument physical laws could not be objective if they came into existence with physical entities. Or are you saying that only physical things can be objective? If you want to say so, that would be a separate argument, and it would also make it look like you had bought into the logic of the very ones (physicalists and materialists) you generally seem to be seeking to refute.

- This is a question for non-theists who hold to objectivity in ethics (moral realists) - e.g. it is always true that murdering someone for no reason is morally wrong, etc. — Modern Conviviality

I'm pretty much a subjectivist on morality, so I don't think anything really objectively grounds it. I would say that an individual person's system of morality, insofar as it is coherent, is grounded in subjective first principles. However, once you make use of these first principles and assume their value is true, there are many logical truths we can derive from it.


i.e. 1. Murder is always wrong --> subjective principle

2. Abortion is murder (I personally reject this premise so to me the argument is not at all sound)
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3. So therefore abortion is wrong, too. The conclusion follows from the premises.


First principles themselves are based on what I would call existential choices made by the individual subject. So accepting premise #1 as true would be such a choice.
I'm not sure if there's anything that can objectively ground morality, not even God. If morality is the divine command of God, it just seems to be that God is putting forth her own preferred subjective system of morality.

If it is "the nature of humanity to pursue eudamonia" (and this is taken in a positive sense as 'flourishing'), and the "route to this is the good" then why would these facts not justify the conclusion that we ought to pursue the good (meaning, of course. nothing other than 'take that route')? — Janus

I was just trying to be pedantic about the source in ancient Greek, not express an opinion of my own. It's commonly accepted that the ancient world didn't have this sense of 'ought' in the language, so if one thinks they must have meant it all the same, one has to go by a roundabout route. That's part of what Anscombe says: that the very idea of duty, of 'ought' in our cultural traditions derive from a God who was unknown to the classical world.

"The unexamined life is not worth living"

It seems fair to say that both Plato and Aristotle, in their perhaps different ways, recommended the pursuit of eudamonia and the 'good life'; and that such a recommendation is certainly an "ought" of sorts; although obviously not an "ought" imposed by a transcendent authority; which is the narrower way you seem to be interpreting it.

"The unexamined life is not worth living"

Do you think the examined life is necessarily a moral life or that philosophy is the correct methodology for examining life. It didn't seem to work out too well for Socrates. He was democratically judged to be impious and a corrupting influence by 280 of 500 Athenians.

"The unexamined life is not worth living"

It seems fair to say that both Plato and Aristotle, in their perhaps different ways, recommended the pursuit of eudamonia and the 'good life'; and that such a recommendation is certainly an "ought" of sorts; although obviously not an "ought" imposed by a transcendent authority; which is the narrower way you seem to be interpreting it. — Janus

Well, what do you mean by 'an "ought" of sorts'? That's the question. I still want to emphasize that I'm reporting a view of the ancients which was specifically revived by Anscombe's paper 'Modern moral philosophy' of 1958, which you can find online, and greatly reinforced by MacIntyre. Their view is that 'ought' is about a law-based version of ethics, which Plato and Aristotle didn't hold; that the virtue-based view of ethics is quite different.

Do you think the examined life is necessarily a moral life or that philosophy is the correct methodology for examining life. — Cavacava

I'm not clear on what you're asking here. Are you offering these: "a moral life" and 'philosophy-as-methodology' as alternative ways of living an examined life and asking which one is the necessary and/ or more correct way?

Their view is that 'ought' is about a law-based version of ethics, which Plato and Aristotle didn't hold; that the virtue-based view of ethics is quite different. — mcdoodle

OK, I haven't read those two and nor do I intend to. If what you say exemplifies their view, then I would say that it seems like a myopic, or one-dimensional view to me on the face of it.

Does not virtue ethics consist in saying that one ought to live a virtuous life? Surely not all 'oughts' consist in following rules. One model of morality says that it consists in following rules, and another says that it consists in moral intuition; in following a cultivated natural moral conscience; whichever way one understands morality it makes sense to say that one ought to be moral.

OK, I haven't read those two and nor do I intend to. If what you say exemplifies their view, then I would say that it seems like a myopic, or one-dimensional view to me on the face of it.

Does not virtue ethics consist in saying that one ought to live a virtuous life? Surely not all 'oughts' consist in following rules. One model of morality says that it consists in following rules, and another says that it consists in moral intuition; in following a cultivated natural moral conscience; whichever way one understands morality it makes sense to say that one ought to be moral. — Janus

I think there is a third option, consequentialism, that one should take account of outcomes, besides virtue ethics and deontic or rule-based notions.

Your 'ought' here is a meta-ethical question, or so I read it, and I quite agree, if we are even going to bother with ethics, it makes sense to say that one ought to be moral.

It's hard to extend the 'ought' to particular acts, whereas rule-based people and consequential people seem to find it easy. Of course this is all part of a debate stretching back to Hume about 'ought'. I don't understand why you say in advance you won't read certain philosophers: they have something interesting to say, in my opinion - they both fiddle with the is/ought problem en route to their ethical views - and they set the scene for modern virtue ethics between them. A couple of years ago I was never going to read any of this ethics stuff, but here I am, all the same.

What does it mean that "God is neither the architect of goodness nor is he the expert on goodness, He is the foundation of goodness"? — Πετροκότσυφας

It means that God is not constructing moral laws or designing the contours of what is normative arbitrarily, He is himself that standard, that locus. It emanates from His nature (necessarily)

Jokes on you, atheists! I have a degree in Christology and enough historical and theological evidence to prove that God exists.

I have a degree in Christology — Jeff

What, do you show that at the Pearly Gates? X-)

Several non-theist philosophers have written about objective morality.

Paul Boghossian is Silver professor of philosophy at New York University, where he was Chair of the Department for ten years (1994�"2004) and responsible for building it into one of the top philosophy programs in the world.[1] His research interests include epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. He is Director of the New York Institute of Philosophy and research professor at the University of Birmingham.

Timothy Williamson is a British philosopher whose main research interests are in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics.

He is currently the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College, Oxford. He was previously Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh (1995�"2000); Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Oxford (1988�"1994); and Lecturer in Philosophy at Trinity College, Dublin (1980�"1988). He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 2004 to 2005.

He is a Fellow of the British Academy (FBA),[1] the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters,[2] Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (FRSE) and a Foreign Honorary Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.


Simon Blackburn is a British academic philosopher known for his work in metaethics, where he defends quasi-realism, and in the philosophy of language; more recently, he has gained a large general audience from his efforts to popularise philosophy. He retired as professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge in 2011, but remains a distinguished research professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, teaching every fall semester. He is also a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and a member of the professoriate of New College of the Humanities. He was previously a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford and has also taught full-time at the University of North Carolina as an Edna J. Koury Professor. He is a former president of the Aristotelian Society, having served the 2009�"2010 term.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (born 1955) is an American philosopher. He specializes in ethics, epistemology, and more recently in neuroethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of cognitive science. He is the Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.[1] He earned his Ph.D. from Yale University under the supervision of Robert Fogelin and Ruth Barcan Marcus, and taught for many years at Dartmouth College, before moving to Duke.[2]

His Moral Skepticisms (2006) defends the view that we do not have fully adequate responses to the moral skeptic. It also defends a coherentist moral epistemology, which he has defended for decades. His Morality Without God? (2009) endorses the moral philosophy of his former colleague Bernard Gert as an alternative to religious views of morality.

In 1999, he debated William Lane Craig in a debate titled "God? A Debate Between A Christian and An Atheist".[3]

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that God is not only not essential to morality, but moral behaviour should be independent of religion. A separate entity one could say. He strongly disagrees with several core ideas: 1. that atheists are immoral people; 2. that any society will become like lord of the flies if it becomes too secular; 3. that without morality being laid out in front of us, like a commandment, we have no reason to be moral; 4. that absolute moral standards require the existence of a God( he sees that people themselves are inherently good and not bad); and 5. that without religion, we simply couldn't know what is bad and what is good.

Dan Fincke also argues in defense of objective morality.

yes

I think our morality is quided by our upbringing and existing laws of morality.