Appearance of bear when there is no bear: subjective. In your terms: exists, but not real.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
The confusion is real in the sense that it affects you somehow. But I distinguish between this real and the real in my first comment. All our experiences are real in this sense.

Imagining a unicorn: ditto
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
Imagining a unicorn is another activity. — MoK

Please let me know if you are happy with what I said. — MoK

Happy with what you say, MoK.

It seems like, then, that aspect of the scripture was not Divinely Inspired. — Bob Ross

I don't see what the big deal is here. There are plenty of wicked kings in Israel and Judea's history, and these accounts still make it into the Bible. All I'm saying regarding Samuel's command is that there is ambiguity.

The Bible contains some ugly history.

Again, you are confusing God willing evil and doing evil. Persons in creation would have the free will to do evil in virtue of merely having it. — Bob Ross

How about God? Is God free?

I don’t understand how that challenges the view of God I exposed before. — Bob Ross

You propose a God who has foreknowledge. If I know about God's foreknowledge, I can do the opposite since I am a free agent.

Bob, I gave you this definition of murder in our discussion two weeks ago.

Let me post my full quote for context.

Bob, we are at loggerheads because not only can't we agree on the definition of murder, but we also can't agree on the definition of death. A murder must have a dead victim. If the victim is alive, then it's not murder. My position, my argument is that God did not commit murder in the Old Testament because not only is God perfectly good but also the people He supposedly murdered is not truly dead.
— GregW

In a previous post, we have argued over the definition of murder:

Bob, by your reasoning, if "murder is the direct intentional killing of an innocent person and a killing is to end the natural life of a being", then aren't we destined to be murdered by God eventually and intentionally as we lead our innocent ordinary lives?
— GregW

Bob, this is only true if the murder, killing, death is not sanctioned by God. So, murder is a death not sanctioned by God. — GregW

Your definition of murder is 'the direct intentional killing of an innocent person".
My definition of murder is "a death not sanctioned by God".

Bob, your definition of murder, the direct intentional killing of an innocent person applies only to you, to me, and to other people. It does not apply to God

Logically, it would apply to any circumstance where an innocent person is directly intentionally killed. God is not exempt: you would have to redefine murder to support your case. I am still waiting for a definition of murder from you. — Bob Ross

Let's use your definition of murder as it applies here. For God to have murdered you, you must be innocent, and you must be dead. You cannot just be innocent and dead to other people, you must be innocent and dead to God because God holds the exclusive judgement on innocence and death.

To cease to exist to God is just for God to no longer will one’s existence, since we actively get our being from Him, and so this would be the ultimate death of ourselves as soul. Again, this is not what death means in the context of murder: we are talking about the death of a body. — Bob Ross

When you talk about the death of a body, you are only talking about a partial definition of death. God does not commit murder. Even if God killed you, body and soul, and you are truly dead, you have been judged and given due process by God. You were not murdered by God.

Happy with what you say, MoK. — Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Hope to get you in another thread! :wink:

 It is not a demon inhabiting a non-demonic inhabitant, but rather something which is inherently demonic

I apologize: I was not understanding you before. I thought you were referring to demonic possession. Indeed, I agree that it is much more questionable if demonic hybrids would have rights.

On the one hand, I want to say that created beings which violate the proper order of creation should be uprooted and this is not unjust to do (such as eliminating torture devices); on the other hand, persons have rights and a person is a substance of a rational nature. Consequently, (fallen and unfallen) angels would be persons with rights under this view; and since the ends do not justify the means, it follows that these demonic children would probably have rights (since they probably were substances of a rational nature).

It would be permissible, though, to isolate them if needed to stop them from their natural, evil pursuits (if that is intrinsic to being a demon-human hybrid). Stopping evil as it is being attempted is always permissible.

Could God wipe them out justly? I don’t know, but it would definitely violate the rationale I gave above for rights.

Yes, and I think it is something that our Protestant culture misses

I agree. The Bible is incredibly difficult to interpret (I’ve found).

I think the problem here is a sort of reductio. God and the Angel of Death are not generally deemed murderers, and therefore if one maintains a notion in which they are murders then an abnormal semantics is in play.

There are different approaches here. Some would say that God simply does not murder, some would say that no one is innocent before God

Yes, but no one that objects with those to me (so far) has ever coherently defined what ‘murder’ is. Like I said, that view may be internally coherent in some theory; but it isn’t coherent with the idea of rights I expounded above. Do you have a different definition of murder that you prefer such that God and the Angel of Death are not committing murder?

My definition, to recap, is that murder is the direct intentional killing of a person.

Fr. Stephen De Young must be in my YouTube algorithm now, because I stumbled upon <this short video on messiness>.

Interesting. It seems like Fr. Stephen is taking a more spiritual approach to the theology and the Bible (going back to the beginning of our conversation). His critique is fair insofar that systematizing is can go too far and systematize for the sole sake of doing so (e.g., Kant); but I wonder how valid this critique really is: he seems to just have given up on striving towards perfect knowledge. It seems like systematic knowledge is just the attempt at, or aspiration towards, complete knowledge. Should we really give that up? What do we have left after doing so?

I apologize: I was not understanding you before. I thought you were referring to demonic possession. Indeed, I agree that it is much more questionable if demonic hybrids would have rights. — Bob Ross

That's alright - it's an understandable assumption. At this point we are knee-deep in obscura. :smile:
For example, according to the secondary literature the demons that Jesus casts out were originally spawned by groups like the Amalekites, and roamed the Earth looking for hosts after being killed by the Israelites.

Could God wipe them out justly? I don’t know, but it would definitely violate the rationale I gave above for rights. — Bob Ross

That's a fair argument you give. What's interesting is that when Jesus encounters these demons that—according to the secondary literature—originally came from groups like the Amalekites, they say things like this:

And behold, they cried out, “What have you to do with us, O Son of God? Have you come here to torment us before the time?” — Matthew 8:29 (RSV)

The backstory here is that in his mercy and providence, God has allowed such beings to continue to exist on Earth until "the time," namely the end times. So oddly enough, there is a respect even for demons built into the narratives. Jesus even accedes to their request in v. 32.

Yes, but no one that objects with those to me (so far) has ever coherently defined what ‘murder’ is. Like I said, that view may be internally coherent in some theory; but it isn’t coherent with the idea of rights I expounded above. Do you have a different definition of murder that you prefer such that God and the Angel of Death are not committing murder?

My definition, to recap, is that murder is the direct intentional killing of a person. — Bob Ross

Yes, and it's fair enough that you would press your point. Let's try to understand the logic a bit. First, your argument, which of course presupposes that murder is impermissible:

1. Murder is the direct intentional killing of an [innocent] person
2. The Angel of Death intentionally kills the innocent Amalekite infant
3. Therefore, the Angel of Death is a murderer

And then the reductio I mentioned (although I will not here present it as a reductio):

4. It is the Angel of Death's job to take life
5. It is not impermissible to do one's job
6. Therefore, the Angel of Death is not a murderer

This is the case where there is a logical standoff between two contradictory conclusions, and yet there is no attempt to formally invalidate the opposing argument. Formal reductios also function in precisely this way. If we have only these two arguments, then one must simply weigh them and decide which is stronger.

Digging deeper, (4) and (5) have to do with the idea that death is inevitable, and that for a person to die is not inherently unjust. This opens up the can of worms of the metaphysics and ethics of death, and the adjacent can of worms is the question of God's sovereignty within which question is the matter of whether God is responsible for death (or whether God "directly intends" the fact of natural death).

So this all gets complicated quickly, and therefore it is hard to try to capture the various complexities with a syllogism or two. For example, if everything that occurs is allowed by God to occur, and if this allowance counts as an intentional bringing-about, then it follows that everyone who dies is murdered. The reductio in this case lies in the idea that murder and death are two different things. Note too that we are wrestling with precisely the same issue that the Hebrews wrestled with in trying to understand God's sovereignty and providence (in, for example, hardening or not-hardening Pharaoh's heart).

Interesting. It seems like Fr. Stephen is taking a more spiritual approach to the theology and the Bible (going back to the beginning of our conversation). — Bob Ross

I wouldn't say that he takes a more spiritual or metaphorical approach to theology and the Bible, but I can see how this video in particular might produce that idea.

His critique is fair insofar that systematizing is can go too far and systematize for the sole sake of doing so (e.g., Kant); but I wonder how valid this critique really is: he seems to just have given up on striving towards perfect knowledge. It seems like systematic knowledge is just the attempt at, or aspiration towards, complete knowledge. Should we really give that up? What do we have left after doing so? — Bob Ross

This is a really interesting and complicated topic, but I will try to say a few things.

In general we recognize that one must collect the data before they form their theory or propose their thesis. We also recognize that if a theory is invalidated by data, we have to accept that rather than stubbornly cling to the theory while ignoring the data. I think De Young is saying that a lot of people have over-simple theories that run into problems when deeper and broader datasets are encountered. For example, I am told that there is a fun documentary on the Super Smash Bros video game, which follows different groups of people who thought they were the best and had mastered the game, only to find that others were much better (and that South Koreans are often elite in such matters).

It's something like that: you thought you understood it until you understand that you don't. That is Socrates' virtue: an understanding of his own limitations and ignorance. De Young is saying that when it comes to God this phenomenon gets taken to a whole new level (cf. Isaiah 55:8-9).

At the same time there is the danger of falling into the other extreme, which is what I think you are speaking to. There is the danger of skepticism or despair of knowledge altogether. There is the danger of theological voluntarism where God becomes wholly inscrutable. Yet what happens when one settles into a deep tradition such as Christianity, is that they settle into the habit of finding they were mistaken and thus being prepared to see how they are currently mistaken. This creates an openness to a reality beyond them (and this same phenomenon occurs when someone takes on a teacher, acknowledging that they have much to learn). I want to say that this humble stance towards reality and God is incredibly important, even if one rejects Christianity. We can of course reject things, but (please God) we should never find ourselves in a place where a self-confidence has closed us off to reality or to that which transcends our own capacities.

Buber thought Samuel was confusing his human impulses with God's will. Rashi, OTOH, does take it as a literal command to slaughter all of Amalek.

There is definitely at least some ambiguity in Samuel. When the Israelites ignore his anti-monarchy polemic, God tells Samuel to give them a king and he sends everyone home instead, a sort of punt perhaps, and then there is his inability to communicate his virtues to his sons, and his seeming habit of withholding information and guidance from Saul until the last minute.

Nonetheless, this reading seems to be a stretch. I have seen the argument that Samuel is here trying to manipulate the recalcitrant Saul into taking on a dangerous task. Either Saul will be killed, returning leadership to Samuel, or he will be successful, and more in awe of Samuel and beholden to him. In the end though, God refuses to be manipulated, and places the kingship in the hands of a third party. At least that's how the "Samuel misinterprets or makes it up," often narrative goes.

Robert Alter deigns it worthy of a footnote at least, but I cannot see how this isn't doing violence to the text. Nothing in God's late condemnation of Saul suggests the misrepresentation thesis. Although, it seems more plausible to me if Samuel is read has wholly misreading the entirety of the Saul selection in some way (to this point he does initially think David's strapping older brother is who God intends, a sort of second instance of his prioritizing the visible above the invisible, suggesting a sort of lack of full vision).

Nothing in God's late condemnation of Saul suggests the misrepresentation thesis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't read much on this point, but it seems to me that the condemnation remains intelligible as long as we don't take the Samuel thesis to an extreme. Saul's actions seem indefensible in general.

So I think this line could be fruitful even if we don't go the route of the "deceiving" thesis:

I remember the writing in bSamuel as brilliant and capturing what can happen even when legitimate prophecy is granted to the crooked timber of humanity.

...

In Torah, you'll hear, e.g., "And God said to Abraham...." In the book of Samuel, this doesn't happen, and instead, it's Samuel telling Saul to put Amalek under the ban. The key here is Samuel. He could be correctly and perfectly conveying God's will, or he could be mistaken, or he could be deceiving. The clarity of Torah, where we see God's words openly dictated, is no longer present in Samuel. — BitconnectCarlos

Meier's Themes and Transformations in Old Testament Prophecy would generally support this thesis, as he argues that the potency, competency, and clarity of prophets gradually diminishes as the Bible draws on.

How about God? Is God free?

Yes, God is absolutely free and absolutely incapable of doing otherwise in my view. This is fundamentally because freedom for excellence, as opposed to freedom of indifference, does not require the ability to have done otherwise.

You propose a God who has foreknowledge. If I know about God's foreknowledge, I can do the opposite since I am a free agent.

Well, I think this would assume that God has the same kind of foreknowledge as you in this case and that freedom consists in true agent indeterminacy—both of which I reject. When you have foreknowledge, it is temporal; God doesn’t have foreknowledge in the literal sense, because He is outside of change itself. The ‘whole’ is just immediately ‘in front’ of Him; which is different than you knowing something about what is going to happen next. Likewise, I don’t think you have the ability to have done otherwise simpliciter: I think libertarian freedom, leeway freedom, properly consists in the ability to do otherwise than what physically would have happened.

Now, you could say that if you had this ‘whole’ of all change ‘in front’ of you like God then you could go against God. Ok, but then you are God.

Now, if you have foreknowledge in the literal sense and know that God wants you to do something, X, but choose not to; well, that’s standard free will which doesn’t negate anything I said. God would know you will choose not to do X and that would be a part of His knowledge of ‘the whole’.

But how is it inerrant if the author's are untrustworthy and give false information?

Maybe it is Divinely Inspired that way, but, at a minimum, that doesn't seem to cohere with God's nature. Don't you think?

Yes, and it's fair enough that you would press your point. Let's try to understand the logic a bit. First, your argument, which of course presupposes that murder is impermissible:

1. Murder is the direct intentional killing of an [innocent] person
2. The Angel of Death intentionally kills the innocent Amalekite infant
3. Therefore, the Angel of Death is a murderer

And then the reductio I mentioned (although I will not here present it as a reductio):

4. It is the Angel of Death's job to take life
5. It is not impermissible to do one's job
6. Therefore, the Angel of Death is not a murderer

This is the case where there is a logical standoff between two contradictory conclusions

But I don’t think you accept that reductio. I’ll run a parody argument to demonstrate my point:

4. It is the Heinrich Himmler’s job to mass execute jews.
5. It is not impermissible to one’s job.
6. Therefore, Himmler is not a murderer.

I think what you are really contending, which to me begs the question, is whether or not God has the authority to take innocent life; and this just loops back to our original point of contention.

Digging deeper, (4) and (5) have to do with the idea that death is inevitable, and that for a person to die is not inherently unjust. This opens up the can of worms of the metaphysics and ethics of death, and the adjacent can of worms is the question of God's sovereignty within which question is the matter of whether God is responsible for death (or whether God "directly intends" the fact of natural death)
…
For example, if everything that occurs is allowed by God to occur, and if this allowance counts as an intentional bringing-about, then it follows that everyone who dies is murdered

That’s an interesting point. I am going to have to think about that one and get back to you.

My prima facie response would be that the world is fallen due to sin, and that sin is what causally is responsible for our mortality. Without “evil of persons”, there would be no mortality. That seems like the only viable rejoinder.

Bob, I gave you this definition of murder in our discussion two weeks ago

There’s no definition in your quote that you provided of yourself. What is your definition of murder? All you said is that it ‘must have a dead victim’.

My definition of murder is "a death not sanctioned by God".

Ok, this is a definition: thank you! Firstly, I want to hyper-focus on the fact that your definition here would prima facie allow for murder on earth for people who don’t completely die (e.g., have rational souls). Are you also still claiming that “a death” has to be a complete annihilation of a life? If so, then there cannot be murder of any humans on earth according to your view.

Secondly, I would like to just note how arbitrary this definition is. You just evaded the conversation by defining murder as “any case of directly intentionally killing an innocent person that does not involve God”. Why doesn’t it apply to God too?

Yes, God is absolutely free and absolutely incapable of doing otherwise in my view. This is fundamentally because freedom for excellence, as opposed to freedom of indifference, does not require the ability to have done otherwise. — Bob Ross

So, God can sin since He is free! Agree, or disagree?

Well, I think this would assume that God has the same kind of foreknowledge as you in this case and that freedom consists in true agent indeterminacy—both of which I reject. When you have foreknowledge, it is temporal; God doesn’t have foreknowledge in the literal sense, because He is outside of change itself. The ‘whole’ is just immediately ‘in front’ of Him; which is different than you knowing something about what is going to happen next. Likewise, I don’t think you have the ability to have done otherwise simpliciter: I think libertarian freedom, leeway freedom, properly consists in the ability to do otherwise than what physically would have happened.

Now, you could say that if you had this ‘whole’ of all change ‘in front’ of you like God then you could go against God. Ok, but then you are God.

Now, if you have foreknowledge in the literal sense and know that God wants you to do something, X, but choose not to; well, that’s standard free will which doesn’t negate anything I said. God would know you will choose not to do X and that would be a part of His knowledge of ‘the whole’. — Bob Ross

I can do the opposite of God's foreknowledge if I am a free agent and have access to His foreknowledge. I know that is not acceptable in your view, but I am able to do it since I am free. That is the same ability that keeps us responsible for our actions. If you think that is not an acceptable problem in your view, then you have to either agree that I am not free or that Foreknowledge does not exist. Which one do you pick?

Off the top of my head, this seems to hold for Ezra or Maccabees. I have seen this trend remarked upon as well. God goes from being a direct parent figure (a "helicopter parent") who speaks to individuals, to speaking through prophets to a corporate people, to (in the Christian Scriptures) speaking to man as man, to a direct indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the putting on of the "Mind of Christ." This can be put in developmental terms, i.e., as man moves from "childhood towards adulthood," we see the need for the internalization of external teaching, with the teaching becoming more and more hands-off as man matures (and man is allowed to fail more often and more severely). It can also be put in terms of an "exitus et reditus," a fall from the presence of the divine, and a parallel ascent and return.

Anyhow, in support of such a reading of Samuel, Samuel doesn't seem particularly concerned with being a strict documentary (if it was, we shouldn't expect ambiguity). In I Samuel 16 we get the first David origin story, with David being selected to play the lyre to calm Saul who is afflicted by an evil spirit. In I Samuel 17, we get the parallel story of David killing Goliath. But in I Samuel 17, we Saul and Abner seem to have no idea who David is, whereas, in I Samuel 16 he has already become Saul's beloved armor bearer who goes everywhere with him. Some commentators have tried to explain the disconnect as amnesia brought on by the evil spirit (and Abner is just humoring Saul), but this seems like a stretch. Or we could assume that Samuel 17 comes first, but then we have the same sort of problem where Saul should know David.

Often this is explained as two parallel takes on David, where by Biblical convention a character's first words and appearance define them. In this first, God is central, and David is a sort of conduit, whereas in the second, God is absent and David is a worldly military leader. We get the two sides of David.

In terms of the text giving guidance itself, such a disconnect (if one takes the point of the text as being primarily documentary) could hardly have been lost on the writer or any redactor. It's like that for a reason. There are a number of cases like this in the Bible, right from Genesis 1 vs Genesis 2. And I think this at least suggests a close reading.

But how is it inerrant if the author's are untrustworthy and give false information?

It wouldn't be false in that reading, it simply reports what Samuel says. But see the point above about the parallel David introduction stories. One can take the text as divinely inspired and not take its purpose as being primarily a straight documentary. If it was, it is, at the very least, quite confused.

In terms of the text giving guidance itself, such a disconnect (if one takes the point of the text as being primarily documentary) could hardly have been lost on the writer or any redactor. It's like that for a reason. There are a number of cases like this in the Bible, right from Genesis 1 vs Genesis 2. And I think this at least suggests a close reading. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It could be just that there were multiple versions of the various stories and a desire to create a single consistent story was of less priority to the person who sewed the various accounts together than was protecting as much original text as possible.

This posits that there were multiple sources for the Bible and that the redactor's primary objective was that of an archivist of foundational literature.

This is a widely held view.

I disagree, as noted in my response before. Again, you thinking of liberty of indifference not liberty for excellence.

There’s no definition in your quote that you provided of yourself. What is your definition of murder? All you said is that it ‘must have a dead victim’. — Bob Ross

Your definition of murder is "the direct intentional killing of an innocent person".
My definition of murder is "a death not sanctioned by God". — GregW

Let's use your definition of murder as it applies here. For God to have murdered you, you must be innocent, and you must be dead. You cannot just be innocent and dead to other people, you must be innocent and dead to God because God holds the exclusive judgement on innocence and death. — GregW

Bob, if you use my definition of murder in place of your definition of murder in all your arguments that God had committed murder in the Old Testament, then you would find that God had not committed murder by my definition of murder, on earth or anywhere else.

I disagree, as noted in my response before. Again, you thinking of liberty of indifference not liberty for excellence. — Bob Ross

I am talking about free will. The ability to do whatever I want, even sin. Does God have such an ability?

Nonetheless, this reading seems to be a stretch. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would agree, although I would need to read Buber's case. If I'm not mistaken, the mainstream rabbinic Jewish view is that Samuel does receive legitimate revelation, interprets it correctly, and does correctly convey God's will in his command to Saul to destroy Amalek.

The question is what we as believers make of this. What do we have here — a divinely ordained state of exception where moral rules have been temporarily (or permanently) altered regarding a specific group (Amalek, Midian, Canaan)? And sure, we can say that historically, putting groups under the ban in the ancient Near East has precedent, but theologically, what do we make of our relationship with God in light of these commands? And how do we view such an extreme manifestation of His authority? Not only does He give the law, He can also suspend it at will. That is no minor feature.

I don't have any easy answers. Much easier to try to make the question disappear by absolving God of responsibility.

But how is it inerrant if the author's are untrustworthy and give false information?

Maybe it is Divinely Inspired that way, but, at a minimum, that doesn't seem to cohere with God's nature. Don't you think? — Bob Ross

Which version of the Bible are you claiming inerrancy? In modern biblical studies, many different versions are often compared with each other.

In any case, it may come down to whether one understands the Bible as being written in the language of man to understand the divine or as a divinely perfect language where every detail is meaningful.

I think what you are really contending, which to me begs the question, is whether or not God has the authority to take innocent life; and this just loops back to our original point of contention. — Bob Ross

I think it has more to do with the metaphysics of death, as noted in my last.

That’s an interesting point. I am going to have to think about that one and get back to you.

My prima facie response would be that the world is fallen due to sin, and that sin is what causally is responsible for our mortality. Without “evil of persons”, there would be no mortality. That seems like the only viable rejoinder. — Bob Ross

Sure, and that's a pretty common Christian response. But if someone is focused on individual guilt, then Original Sin will not satisfy them. Someone focused on individual guilt would insist that only one who has personally sinned is able to die.

Which version of the Bible are you claiming inerrancy? In modern biblical studies, many different versions are often compared with each other.

I was speaking generically like a stereotypical Christian would about it. I would say stereotypical Christianity sees all legitimate copies of the Bible to be inerrant.

In any case, it may come down to whether one understands the Bible as being written in the language of man to understand the divine or as a divinely perfect language where every detail is meaningful.

Not really. This isn’t a dispute about God ‘dumming things down’: it’s about how God is said to do things in the OT that are incongruent with His nature (e.g., the Great Flood, laws about slavery, the conquest of Canaan, etc.).

When God ‘inspires’ rules in Exodus about keeping gentiles as property, that’s not a question about Him ‘dumming ethics down’.

Sure, and that's a pretty common Christian response. But if someone is focused on individual guilt, then Original Sin will not satisfy them. Someone focused on individual guilt would insist that only one who has personally sinned is able to die

I don’t see why someone cannot hold an individual guilt theory and hold that Original Sin is the causal consequence of the first fall. If my parents are given 10,000,000 dollars and they waste it and I consequently get no inheritance, I don’t think that infringes or impedes on guilt being individualistic: I wasn’t owed that money. However, perhaps someone could rejoin that God, being perfectly good, would intervene and fix that causal chain for me so that I get what He intended for me (instead of letting me exist in the fallen world); but I think this requires that God is doing something wrong by allowing the evil to continue and this requires a demonstration of how God could intervene in a morally permissible way: I simply don’t see how He could.

Likewise, correct me if I am wrong, but I don’t think Orthodox and Catholic Christians believe that Aboriginal Sin is something one is guilty of: they believe that it is something one is not culpable for but still causally affects them.